SUMMERS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by default.
Plaintiff, Ascension Builders, Inc., instituted this suit on November 17, 1967 against Wallace Jumonville, Jr., Gertrude Jumonville, Chester A. Melancon and Mary Helen Jumonville Melancon, alleging they were indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $6,958.81 with interest and costs. The petition also alleges defendants
. . . purchased materials from plaintiff and plaintiff performed certain labor for defendants as set forth on the itemized statement of account annexed hereto; that said labor and materials were furnished for use in and actually used in the construction of a place of business known as Jumonville’s Bakery owned by the defendants located on lots Numbers 1, 2 and 3 of Bella Rina Subdivision in the Town of Gonzales.
The petition then sets forth:
. . . petitioner executed a lien affidavit on October 4, 1967, for the purpose of preserving the lien and privilege granted by law to plaintiff, that said lien was duly recorded in the mortgage records of Ascension Parish within sixty (60) days after the date of (sic) the last material was delivered or labor performed on (sic) the construction of the building was completed.
After alleging that it was entitled to have its lien recognized, plaintiff prayed for judgment in the amount alleged to be due with interest and cost and for recognition and enforcement of its lien, for the seizure and sale of the property, and reservation of the right to claim a deficiency judgment.
[525]*525The itemized statement annexed to the petition is dated June 12, 1967 and lists the “Purchases and work authorized by owners in excess of Contract price,” amounting to $5,716.32 and a balance “due on original contract” of $1,242.49, a total of $6,958.81, the amount sued for.
A preliminary default was entered against defendants on March 29, 1968 and again on May 8, 1968. Thereafter, on May 13, 1968, a judgment was rendered on confirmation of default reciting: “On Motion of Robert L. Roshto, attorney for plaintiff, and upon producing due proof in support of plaintiff’s demands, the law and the evidence being in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Judgment is then rendered in favor of plaintiff against defendants for $6,958.81, the amount prayed for, and, further, plaintiff’s lien is ordered recognized and enforced on the property described in the petition, and the property is ordered seized and sold, reserving to plaintiff the right to claim a deficiency should the sale not satisfy its claim.
There is no written transcript of evidence, and there are no documents or other evidence filed in the record other than the petition, and the annexed account referred to. The clerk’s certificate makes clear that the record is complete in this state.
After rendition of judgment, defendants filed their answer, a general denial, alleging that they entered into a contract for construction of a bakery building in accordance with specifications set forth in the contract, it being alleged that the contract was attached to the answer. However, no contract is attached.
The answer then alleged that the construction was faulty and the materials defective to the extent that the building was not suitable for the purposes intended. Demolition and reconstruction of the bakery building is alleged to be necessary, during which time defendants’ business would suffer losses for which defendants pray for judgment in reconvention. Since this answer was filed on May 15, 1968, two days after judgment was rendered on May 13, 1968, the answer cannot be considered. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1002.
A motion for a new trial was also filed, tried and denied, whereupon a suspensive appeal was taken to the First Circuit. Finding no basis in the record to support the default judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings there. La.App., 251 So.2d 639. We granted review, 259 La. 895, 253 So.2d 221.
There is no requirement that a party confirming a default must have the testimony reduced to writing or that a note be made of the evidence introduced, and when a judgment has been rendered and no note of evidence has been made, it is [527]*527incumbent on the party desiring to appeal to secure a narrative in accordance with Articles 2130 and 2131 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Succession of Moore, 42 La.Ann. 332, 7 So. 561 (1890); Francois v. Cloud, 149 So.2d 678 (La.App.1963). This was not done.
In order to obtain reversal of a default judgment appealed from, or to obtain a remand, defendant must overcome the presumption that the judgment was rendered upon sufficient evidence and that it is correct. When the judgment recites, as it does here, that plaintiff has produced due proof in support of its demand and that the law and evidence favor plaintiff and are against the defendant, the presumption exists that the judgment was rendered upon sufficient evidence and that it is correct. Baker Finance Co. v. Hines, 255 La. 971, 233 So.2d 902 (1970); Massey v. Consumer’s Ice Co. of Shreveport, 223 La. 731, 66 So.2d 789 (1953); Nugent v. Stark, 34 La.Ann. 628 (1882).
This presumption which exists, when there is no note of evidence of parole testimony, that the judgment is well-founded and that it was based on competent evidence, is a fair and reasonable one conducive to the efficient administration of justice and should be given much weight. It has long been recognized in our law. Escurieux v. Chapduc, 4 Rob. 323 (La.1843); Hubbell v. Clannon, 13 La. 494 (1839).
But it is, after all, only a presumption. It does not attach when the record upon which the judgment is rendered indicates otherwise. The presumption cannot be applied, for instance, in a case where the plaintiff’s demand is one which of necessity, under the law, depends upon written proof. In such a case there should be more to support the presumption than the mere statement, more or less pro forma, that the court, on confirmation of default, receives “due proof in support” of the demand, or “ ‘the law and evidence being in favor thereof.’” Francois v. Cloud, supra; Landreneau v. Perron, 174 So. 140 (La.App.1937).
The question, then, is whether the absence from the record of the written building contract and the lien affidavit which form the basis of this suit makes it appear that the judgment was not rendered upon sufficient evidence and is not for that reason correct. If this is so, the presumption of legality which attaches to this judgment is removed, and the record must be found to be insufficient to support the judgment.
A written contract was undoubtedly entered into by the parties and is the basis for the construction of the bakery building. The itemized statement annexed to the petition and made a part thereof refers to the balance “due on original contract.” This language alleges a contract. Plaintiff’s counsel, moreover, concedes in brief [529]*529that “although a contract does exist it is not recorded.”
To do away with the presumption it should be established that of necessity, under the law, this claim depended upon the written proof which the contract would provide. Proof, in its simplest form, is the means employed to convince the judge; it is all that which convinces the mind of a truth.
And a right is nothing without proof of the juridical act or material fact which it has as its origin.
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SUMMERS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by default.
Plaintiff, Ascension Builders, Inc., instituted this suit on November 17, 1967 against Wallace Jumonville, Jr., Gertrude Jumonville, Chester A. Melancon and Mary Helen Jumonville Melancon, alleging they were indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $6,958.81 with interest and costs. The petition also alleges defendants
. . . purchased materials from plaintiff and plaintiff performed certain labor for defendants as set forth on the itemized statement of account annexed hereto; that said labor and materials were furnished for use in and actually used in the construction of a place of business known as Jumonville’s Bakery owned by the defendants located on lots Numbers 1, 2 and 3 of Bella Rina Subdivision in the Town of Gonzales.
The petition then sets forth:
. . . petitioner executed a lien affidavit on October 4, 1967, for the purpose of preserving the lien and privilege granted by law to plaintiff, that said lien was duly recorded in the mortgage records of Ascension Parish within sixty (60) days after the date of (sic) the last material was delivered or labor performed on (sic) the construction of the building was completed.
After alleging that it was entitled to have its lien recognized, plaintiff prayed for judgment in the amount alleged to be due with interest and cost and for recognition and enforcement of its lien, for the seizure and sale of the property, and reservation of the right to claim a deficiency judgment.
[525]*525The itemized statement annexed to the petition is dated June 12, 1967 and lists the “Purchases and work authorized by owners in excess of Contract price,” amounting to $5,716.32 and a balance “due on original contract” of $1,242.49, a total of $6,958.81, the amount sued for.
A preliminary default was entered against defendants on March 29, 1968 and again on May 8, 1968. Thereafter, on May 13, 1968, a judgment was rendered on confirmation of default reciting: “On Motion of Robert L. Roshto, attorney for plaintiff, and upon producing due proof in support of plaintiff’s demands, the law and the evidence being in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Judgment is then rendered in favor of plaintiff against defendants for $6,958.81, the amount prayed for, and, further, plaintiff’s lien is ordered recognized and enforced on the property described in the petition, and the property is ordered seized and sold, reserving to plaintiff the right to claim a deficiency should the sale not satisfy its claim.
There is no written transcript of evidence, and there are no documents or other evidence filed in the record other than the petition, and the annexed account referred to. The clerk’s certificate makes clear that the record is complete in this state.
After rendition of judgment, defendants filed their answer, a general denial, alleging that they entered into a contract for construction of a bakery building in accordance with specifications set forth in the contract, it being alleged that the contract was attached to the answer. However, no contract is attached.
The answer then alleged that the construction was faulty and the materials defective to the extent that the building was not suitable for the purposes intended. Demolition and reconstruction of the bakery building is alleged to be necessary, during which time defendants’ business would suffer losses for which defendants pray for judgment in reconvention. Since this answer was filed on May 15, 1968, two days after judgment was rendered on May 13, 1968, the answer cannot be considered. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1002.
A motion for a new trial was also filed, tried and denied, whereupon a suspensive appeal was taken to the First Circuit. Finding no basis in the record to support the default judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings there. La.App., 251 So.2d 639. We granted review, 259 La. 895, 253 So.2d 221.
There is no requirement that a party confirming a default must have the testimony reduced to writing or that a note be made of the evidence introduced, and when a judgment has been rendered and no note of evidence has been made, it is [527]*527incumbent on the party desiring to appeal to secure a narrative in accordance with Articles 2130 and 2131 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Succession of Moore, 42 La.Ann. 332, 7 So. 561 (1890); Francois v. Cloud, 149 So.2d 678 (La.App.1963). This was not done.
In order to obtain reversal of a default judgment appealed from, or to obtain a remand, defendant must overcome the presumption that the judgment was rendered upon sufficient evidence and that it is correct. When the judgment recites, as it does here, that plaintiff has produced due proof in support of its demand and that the law and evidence favor plaintiff and are against the defendant, the presumption exists that the judgment was rendered upon sufficient evidence and that it is correct. Baker Finance Co. v. Hines, 255 La. 971, 233 So.2d 902 (1970); Massey v. Consumer’s Ice Co. of Shreveport, 223 La. 731, 66 So.2d 789 (1953); Nugent v. Stark, 34 La.Ann. 628 (1882).
This presumption which exists, when there is no note of evidence of parole testimony, that the judgment is well-founded and that it was based on competent evidence, is a fair and reasonable one conducive to the efficient administration of justice and should be given much weight. It has long been recognized in our law. Escurieux v. Chapduc, 4 Rob. 323 (La.1843); Hubbell v. Clannon, 13 La. 494 (1839).
But it is, after all, only a presumption. It does not attach when the record upon which the judgment is rendered indicates otherwise. The presumption cannot be applied, for instance, in a case where the plaintiff’s demand is one which of necessity, under the law, depends upon written proof. In such a case there should be more to support the presumption than the mere statement, more or less pro forma, that the court, on confirmation of default, receives “due proof in support” of the demand, or “ ‘the law and evidence being in favor thereof.’” Francois v. Cloud, supra; Landreneau v. Perron, 174 So. 140 (La.App.1937).
The question, then, is whether the absence from the record of the written building contract and the lien affidavit which form the basis of this suit makes it appear that the judgment was not rendered upon sufficient evidence and is not for that reason correct. If this is so, the presumption of legality which attaches to this judgment is removed, and the record must be found to be insufficient to support the judgment.
A written contract was undoubtedly entered into by the parties and is the basis for the construction of the bakery building. The itemized statement annexed to the petition and made a part thereof refers to the balance “due on original contract.” This language alleges a contract. Plaintiff’s counsel, moreover, concedes in brief [529]*529that “although a contract does exist it is not recorded.”
To do away with the presumption it should be established that of necessity, under the law, this claim depended upon the written proof which the contract would provide. Proof, in its simplest form, is the means employed to convince the judge; it is all that which convinces the mind of a truth.
And a right is nothing without proof of the juridical act or material fact which it has as its origin. A contract is the proof the parties have established in advance to govern their relationship in the event of suit. The contract is the law between the parties. La.Civil Code art. 1945. Where such a contract is shown to exist, witnesses and presumption are, in principle, discarded. Since a valid presumption would dispense with proof, if it can be shown that the presumption no longer had any basis for existence, proof will be required. La.Civil Code arts. 2284-88; Planiol, Civil Law Treaties, Vol. 2, Nos. 2-54.
Thus a plaintiff who knows of a writing which is the principal basis for his claims must produce it when it is the best evidence of the facts at issue. Cf. La. Civil Code art. 2775; Breaux v. Laird, 230 La. 221, 88 So.2d 33 (1956); Hamill v. Moore, 194 La. 486, 193 So. 715 (1940); Marks v. Winter, 19 La.Ann. 445 (1867). And parole evidence of the content of written instruments is not admissible, La. Civil Code art. 2276, except under circumstances prescribed by law. La.Civil Code art. 2279.
Article 2277 of the Civil Code is pertinent here, for it provides that:
All agreements relative to movable property, and all contracts for the payment of money, where the value does not exceed five hundred dollars, which are not redticed to writing, may be proved by any other competent evidence; such contracts or agreements, above five hundred dollars in value, must be proved at least by one credible witness, and other corroborating circumstances. (Emphasis added.)
This Article, we think, applies inversely to the situation before us. In prescribing the mode of proof for contracts not reduced to writing, by clear implication it prescribed that when the contract is reduced to writing, the writing is the required proof.
In addition to our conviction that this case requires the production of the written contract to support plaintiff’s claim, we are certain that the affidavit which is the subject of the lien and privilege must be produced and filed in the record of the proceedings to support that part of the judgment which recognized the lien and orders it enforced. La.R.S. [531]*5319:4812; cf. La. Civil Code art. 2775. A document is not only necessary to establish that the affidavit was made, but proof of its recordation must also be made by written evidence, either a certified copy of the recorded instrument or a certificate of recordation signed by the Clerk and Recorder.
It may be that plaintiff exhibited the original to the judge on the occasion when the judgment by default was confirmed. But this is not sufficient. Where an original recorded instrument is introduced in evidence, leave of court must be obtained to substitute a certified copy and the certified copy must be filed in the record of the proceedings to support the judgment by default. Escurieux v. Chapdue, 4 Rob. 323 (La.1843); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Copeland, 169 So. 251 (La.App.1936). No such document appears in this record.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the trial court be annulled and set aside, and this case is remanded to the court a quo for a new trial.
SANDERS, J., concurs in the result.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.