Arthur's Executors v. Butterfield

125 U.S. 70, 8 S. Ct. 714, 31 L. Ed. 643, 1888 U.S. LEXIS 1915
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 19, 1888
Docket167
StatusPublished
Cited by59 cases

This text of 125 U.S. 70 (Arthur's Executors v. Butterfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arthur's Executors v. Butterfield, 125 U.S. 70, 8 S. Ct. 714, 31 L. Ed. 643, 1888 U.S. LEXIS 1915 (1888).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Field

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought by the plaintiffs below to recover of the late collector of the port of New York certain sums of money alleged to have been illegally exacted as duties on goods imported by them. It. was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, where the plaintiffs recovered a verdict, and to review the judgment entered thereon the executors of the collector, since deceased, have sued out this writ of error.

' The complaint describes the goods imported in general terms as manufactures of hair. There were fourteen importations between' the 24th of January and the 25th of June, 1874. Upon the goods, which were styled “goat hair goods,” the *72 collector assessed duties under provisions of the act of March 2, 1867, c. 197, § 2, 14 Stat. 561, “to provide increased Eevenue from imported Wool, and for other Purposes,” relating to women’s and children’s dress goods, and real or imitation Italian cloths, composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other like animals, at six cents a square yard and thirty-five per centum ad valorem upon such as were valued at not more than twenty cents a square yard, and at eight cents a square yard and forty per centum ad valorem upon such as were valued at more than twenty cents a square yard.

The plaintiffs contended that this assessment of duties was erroneous; that the duties should have been assessed under the 21st section of the act of July 14, 1870, “to reduce internal Taxes, and for other Purposes,” 16 Stat. 264, c. 255, § 21, as the goods were within its terms “manufactures of hair not otherwise provided for,” and that a reduction thereon should be made of ten per centum, under the act of June 6, 1872. 17 Stat. 231. That section provides that “after the thirty-first day of December, eighteen hundred and seventy, in lieu, of the duties now imposed by law on the articles hereinafter enumerated or provided for, imported from foreign countries, there shall be levied, collected, and paid the following duties and rates of duties, that is to say: . . . On hair-cloth of the description known as hair seating, eighteen inches wide or over, forty cents per square yard; less than eighteen inches wide, thirty cents per square yard. 0,n hair cloth known as crinoline cloth, a/nd on all other ma/nufaetures of' hai/r not otherwiseprovided for, thirty per centum ad valorem.”

By the joint resolution of January 30, 1871, -this clause was amended by the insertion of the word “ herein,” between the words “ otherwise ” and “ provided.” 16 Stat. 592.

The reduction of ten per cent under the act of June 6, 1872, was made upon such of the invoicés as were produced, but most of the invoices had been mislaid. It was not, therefore, shown that such reduction had been made upon all of them.

On the trial it appeared that the “goat hair goods” are *73 fabrics manufactured of cotton, and the hair of the angora, or other goat, the warp being cotton and the woof being goat’s hair; that their chief use is for women’s dresses; that they are known in the trade under such specific names as brilliantines, lustrines, alpacas, and mohairs; that the goat’s hair of which they are composed in part constitutes eighty per cent of the whole value, and the cotton twenty per cent.

It also appeared that crinoline cloth 'is made of cotton and hair, the long hair being from the tail or mane of the horse and woven into a cotton warp, the width being governed by the length of the hair, and that it is used for ladies’ underwear ; that hair seating is a similar fabric to crinoline cloth, the only difference being that it is more closely woven, and is used mainly for upholstering purposes.

Evidence was offered by the defendant tending to show that the goat hair goods are generally known in the trade and commerce of the country under the name of women’s dress goods; but on this ■ point the evidence was conflicting, some of the witnesses stating that they were known by their specific names as brilliantines and alpacas, and some that they were at the time of importation known as women’s dress goods.

It was stipulated, for the purpose ■ of the trial, that if the jury should render a verdict for the plaintiff it should be subject to adjustment as to formal requisites and amounts at the custom-house, under the direction of the court. And to raise the questions involved it was also stipulated, as to one of the importations that the plaintiffs had paid the duties assessed and in due time filed their written protest, appealed to the. Secretary of the Treasury, and brought this action.

■When the evidence was closed, the court was requested to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that such goat hair goods were:

1st. Women’s dress goods, composed wholly or in part of the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other like animal;

2d. That they were not manufactures' of ’ hair, but were manufactures of mixed materials, and by the similitude clause were liable to duty as manufactures of cotton, the latter being assessed at a. higher rate of duty than that prescribed for manufactures of hair; and,

*74 3d. That under the act of 1870, the terms “ all other manufactures of hair not otherwise provided for,” meant other manufactures of hair, like those enumerated in the same section, namely, crinoline cloth or hair seating, and that there was no evidence that the goat hair goods were like them.

The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted. It then instructed the jury in substance as follows : That, under the act of 1867, which remained in force until 1870, there was assessed a certain duty on women’s and children’s. dresses composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, hair of the alpaca, goat, and other like animals; that in 1870 the law was changed in some respects, so .as to make the duty assessable on hair cloth, known as crinoline cloth, and all other manufactures of hair, at a less rate; that the goods upon' which the duties were assessed in this case were manufactures principally of hair; that the principal value of them was of hair; that according to the evidence eighty per cent was of hair and twenty per cent of cotton; that the general language of the act of 1870 would control and guide in the assessment of duties upon them, unless they had, before the passage of the act, come to be specifically known as dress goods among merchants and importers; that the question, therefore, was whether they had acquired such-a name in the trade and commerce of the country as to be specifically known by it, instead of the general name of manufactures of hair; that if they had not acquired such specific name, and were not known by it, they Avould come under the general name of manufactures of hair, and the plaintiffs would be entitled to recoA^er; and that on the other hand- if they had acquired such specific name, and were lcnoAvn by it in trade and commerce, the defendant Avould be entitled to a verdict.

The defendant took various exceptions to this charge, and in this court presents anew the questions l’aised upon the instructions refused.

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125 U.S. 70, 8 S. Ct. 714, 31 L. Ed. 643, 1888 U.S. LEXIS 1915, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthurs-executors-v-butterfield-scotus-1888.