Arthur T. Conley v. Abraham A. Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

294 F.2d 190, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 3746
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 10, 1961
Docket16983_1
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 294 F.2d 190 (Arthur T. Conley v. Abraham A. Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arthur T. Conley v. Abraham A. Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 294 F.2d 190, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 3746 (9th Cir. 1961).

Opinion

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal stems from the rejection by the Bureau of Old Age and *192 Survivors’ Insurance in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of Arthur T. Conley’s application for federal old age insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (49 Stat. § 622 as amended, 70 Stat. § 824, 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.). After the claims officer of the Bureau refused to reconsider the matter a hearing was had before an agency referee who sustained the Bureau. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied review and thus constituted the referee’s determination the final decision of the Secretary. Goldman v. Folsom, 3 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 776. 1 Conley’s suit in the District Court for judicial review of that decision as provided by 205(g) of the Act terminated in a summary judgment against him. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Sec. 205(g) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.

Conley made his application as a person who had been gainfully self-employed, but the Bureau took the position, and the referee decided, that Conley did not qualify and was ineligible for benefits on the sole ground that the income for 1956 and 1957 on which he had paid social security tax pursuant to 26 U.S. C.A. § 1401(1) was not “self-employment income” within the meaning of Sec. 211 (b) of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 411(b)).

“Self-employment income” is defined by Sec. 211(b) as “net earnings from self-employment” and the latter term is defined in turn in Sec. 211(a). Until 1956 Sec. 211(a) so far as pertinent, read “(a) The term ‘net earnings from self-employment’ means the gross income, as computed under chapter 1 of Title 26, derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed under such chapter * * * (1) There .shall be excluded rentals from real estate and from personal property leased with the real estate (including such rentals paid in crop shares) * * However, in 1956 Congress, by amendment effective December 31, 1955, qualified the rental exclusion by adding this proviso:

“Except that the preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any income derived by the owner or tenant of land if (A) such income is derived under an arrangement, between the owner or tenant and another individual, which provides that such other individual shall produce agricultural or horticultural commodities * * * on such land, and that there shall be material participation by the owner or tenant in the production or the management of the production of such agricultural or horticultural commodities, and (B) there is material participation by the owner or tenant with respect to any such agricultural or horticultural commodity * *

Prior to the amendment of this chapter of the Act, the coverage of the old age and survivors insurance program extended to the owner who was in complete charge of the farming on his own property or to the share crop tenant when the farm was operated under a share farming agreement. The amendment went a step farther and extended the coverage to the farm owner as well as the tenant in the latter situation in instances where there is “material participation” by the owner in the agricultural activity. Henderson v. Flemming, 5 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 882; Harper v. Flemming, 4 Cir., 1961, 288 F.2d 61. The Act contains no definition of “material participation” but the legislative history reveals that the lawmakers intended the term to include the exercise of authority by the owner with respect to matters that are of substantial importance in the particular farming operation as well as the performing of actual physical labor required *193 in that enterprise. The making of “management decisions” by the owner may constitute “material participation” in the management of the production. 2

“Although Congress did not undertake to phrase it in any such legal categories, this was a recognition that under some arrangements, the two, the owner of the land and the so-called tenant, are engaged in a joint venture. The result would be that the owner of the land, as well as the tenant, would, in this way, be engaged in the business of farming.” Henderson v. Flemming, supra, 283 F.2d at page 888.

Conley contends that he comes within the 1956 amendment; in his application to the Bureau and in the several administrative proceedings following its rejection and afterwards in the District Court and finally here, he has asserted and maintained that although his entire income for 1956 and 1957 consisted of part of the crops grown on his farm by neighboring farmers he nevertheless made all important management decisions regarding the use of the property and the manner in which the operation should be carried on, thus meeting the statutory requirement of “material participation” in the management of the production of the agricultural commodities.

Conley’s farm property is situated near Bristol, South Dakota, in the Great Plains region of the United States, consists of open fields barren of any improvements, and is devoted to the raising of grain by dry farming. 3 Conley farmed the land for many years but in 1956 and 1957, while he was living in California, the farming was conducted by neighboring farmers pursuant to several crop share agreements. The agreements each provided that the farm operation would “sow and plant the said lands in such [grain] crops as said party of the second part [Conley] shall direct * * They also provided that the tenant would purchase all seed, furnish all necessary machinery and equipment, perform all farm work; they further provided that the operator shall pay all expenses except for a part of any fertilizer that was used, 4 and that Con *194 ley was to receive one-third of the crops and the farm operator the balance.

In rejecting the. claim the referee characterized Conley as “an absentee landlord interested primarily in the protection and enhancement of his investment”; he considered Conley’s share of the crops as investment or rental income derived from the use of his property by others and found as his ultimate factual conclusion that:

“There is no satisfactory showing that by the rental arrangement the claimant reserved and exercised the right to substantial supervision and direction in the actual production or the management of the production of the agricultural activities.”

Section 205(g) of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g)) provides in part that “[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.

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Bluebook (online)
294 F.2d 190, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 3746, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-t-conley-v-abraham-a-ribicoff-secretary-of-health-education-and-ca9-1961.