COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
ARTHUR P. KNOX MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0988-01-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER MARCH 5, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge
Carter Phillips (Weisbrod & Phillips, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Arthur P. Knox (appellant) appeals from his conviction for
possession of cocaine pursuant to Code § 18.2-250. On appeal,
he contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress because he was subject to an illegal seizure in the
form of a weapons frisk, which tainted his consent to the search
of the bag in which cocaine was found. We hold that the initial
encounter was consensual. However, appellant did not consent to
a pat-down search for weapons, and we hold the officer who
conducted the pat-down lacked reasonable suspicion to believe
both that appellant was engaged in criminal activity and that he
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. was armed and dangerous. Thus, appellant's purported consent to
the search of his duffel bag was tainted by the illegal seizure
immediately preceding it, and the trial court erroneously denied
the motion to suppress. Because the cocaine supporting
appellant's conviction was obtained during the illegal search,
we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.
On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d
47, 48 (1991). "[W]e are bound by the trial court's findings of
historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to
support them," McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487
S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc), but we review de novo the
trial court's application of defined legal standards such as
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to the particular facts
of the case, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699,
116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).
In order to justify a brief seizure or Terry stop, an
officer must have a "reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity on the part of the defendant." Commonwealth
v. Holloway, 9 Va. App. 11, 15, 384 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1989). An
officer who develops such suspicion may stop a person "in order
to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him
briefly while attempting to obtain additional information" to
- 2 - confirm or dispel his suspicions. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 816, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 1647, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985).
However, "a police request made in a public place for a
person to produce some identification, by itself, generally does
not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." McCain v.
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 491, 545 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2001).
Even when a police officer retains an individual's
identification long enough to conduct a check for outstanding
warrants, this retention does not convert the encounter into a
seizure unless additional circumstances exist indicating "a
reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave
the scene of [the] encounter with the police." Id. at 488-91,
545 S.E.2d at 544-45.
Here, Officer Sparks' request to appellant for
identification and Sparks' retention of appellant's ID long
enough to check for outstanding warrants, did not, without more,
constitute a seizure. Although Sparks was in uniform, he was
the only officer at the scene, he did not draw his weapon, and
he made no statements indicating that appellant was not free to
leave. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, supports a finding that Officer Sparks' initial
encounter with appellant was consensual.
However, as the Commonwealth concedes, the encounter became
a seizure when Officer Sparks conducted a pat-down search of
appellant for weapons. "While being frisked, no reasonable
- 3 - person would feel free to walk away." Toliver v. Commonwealth,
23 Va. App. 34, 36, 473 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1996). Because
appellant did not consent to be frisked, the Fourth Amendment
required that Officer Sparks have reasonable suspicion to
believe both that appellant was engaged in criminal activity
and, in addition, that appellant was armed and dangerous. See,
e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921,
1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (noting that officer may frisk
suspect for weapons during Terry stop only if officer also "has
reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous");
United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that frisk during consensual encounter in which suspect
refused to answer officer's questions or to comply with police
request to remove hand from pocket was illegal because officer
who thinks suspect might be armed "must [also] have reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity
may be afoot" in order to justify weapons frisk). Circumstances
"relevant in [this] analysis include characteristics of the area
surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct
of the suspect individual, the character of the offense under
suspicion, and the unique perspective of a police officer
trained and experienced in the detection of crime." Christian
v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 704, 714, 536 S.E.2d 477, 482
(2000) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
- 4 - Here, the evidence was insufficient to provide Officer
Sparks with reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was
engaged in criminal activity and, additionally, that he was
armed and dangerous. The evidence established that appellant
was in a high crime area in which Officer Sparks had made
numerous drug arrests and that Sparks observed appellant leaning
into a car. Sparks testified that, in his experience,
appellant's leaning into a vehicle meant he was engaged either
in prostitution or a drug transaction. Sparks did not, however,
observe money, drugs or any other item change hands.
Although appellant "denied having any conversation [with an
occupant of a vehicle] and denied being in any [vehicle] window"
when questioned by Sparks, the record does not indicate whether
appellant made these denials before or after Sparks conducted
the pat-down search of appellant for weapons. Thus, the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, established only that Sparks saw appellant lean
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
ARTHUR P. KNOX MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0988-01-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER MARCH 5, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge
Carter Phillips (Weisbrod & Phillips, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Arthur P. Knox (appellant) appeals from his conviction for
possession of cocaine pursuant to Code § 18.2-250. On appeal,
he contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress because he was subject to an illegal seizure in the
form of a weapons frisk, which tainted his consent to the search
of the bag in which cocaine was found. We hold that the initial
encounter was consensual. However, appellant did not consent to
a pat-down search for weapons, and we hold the officer who
conducted the pat-down lacked reasonable suspicion to believe
both that appellant was engaged in criminal activity and that he
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. was armed and dangerous. Thus, appellant's purported consent to
the search of his duffel bag was tainted by the illegal seizure
immediately preceding it, and the trial court erroneously denied
the motion to suppress. Because the cocaine supporting
appellant's conviction was obtained during the illegal search,
we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.
On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d
47, 48 (1991). "[W]e are bound by the trial court's findings of
historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to
support them," McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487
S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc), but we review de novo the
trial court's application of defined legal standards such as
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to the particular facts
of the case, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699,
116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).
In order to justify a brief seizure or Terry stop, an
officer must have a "reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity on the part of the defendant." Commonwealth
v. Holloway, 9 Va. App. 11, 15, 384 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1989). An
officer who develops such suspicion may stop a person "in order
to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him
briefly while attempting to obtain additional information" to
- 2 - confirm or dispel his suspicions. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 816, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 1647, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985).
However, "a police request made in a public place for a
person to produce some identification, by itself, generally does
not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." McCain v.
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 491, 545 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2001).
Even when a police officer retains an individual's
identification long enough to conduct a check for outstanding
warrants, this retention does not convert the encounter into a
seizure unless additional circumstances exist indicating "a
reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave
the scene of [the] encounter with the police." Id. at 488-91,
545 S.E.2d at 544-45.
Here, Officer Sparks' request to appellant for
identification and Sparks' retention of appellant's ID long
enough to check for outstanding warrants, did not, without more,
constitute a seizure. Although Sparks was in uniform, he was
the only officer at the scene, he did not draw his weapon, and
he made no statements indicating that appellant was not free to
leave. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, supports a finding that Officer Sparks' initial
encounter with appellant was consensual.
However, as the Commonwealth concedes, the encounter became
a seizure when Officer Sparks conducted a pat-down search of
appellant for weapons. "While being frisked, no reasonable
- 3 - person would feel free to walk away." Toliver v. Commonwealth,
23 Va. App. 34, 36, 473 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1996). Because
appellant did not consent to be frisked, the Fourth Amendment
required that Officer Sparks have reasonable suspicion to
believe both that appellant was engaged in criminal activity
and, in addition, that appellant was armed and dangerous. See,
e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921,
1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (noting that officer may frisk
suspect for weapons during Terry stop only if officer also "has
reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous");
United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that frisk during consensual encounter in which suspect
refused to answer officer's questions or to comply with police
request to remove hand from pocket was illegal because officer
who thinks suspect might be armed "must [also] have reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity
may be afoot" in order to justify weapons frisk). Circumstances
"relevant in [this] analysis include characteristics of the area
surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct
of the suspect individual, the character of the offense under
suspicion, and the unique perspective of a police officer
trained and experienced in the detection of crime." Christian
v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 704, 714, 536 S.E.2d 477, 482
(2000) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
- 4 - Here, the evidence was insufficient to provide Officer
Sparks with reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was
engaged in criminal activity and, additionally, that he was
armed and dangerous. The evidence established that appellant
was in a high crime area in which Officer Sparks had made
numerous drug arrests and that Sparks observed appellant leaning
into a car. Sparks testified that, in his experience,
appellant's leaning into a vehicle meant he was engaged either
in prostitution or a drug transaction. Sparks did not, however,
observe money, drugs or any other item change hands.
Although appellant "denied having any conversation [with an
occupant of a vehicle] and denied being in any [vehicle] window"
when questioned by Sparks, the record does not indicate whether
appellant made these denials before or after Sparks conducted
the pat-down search of appellant for weapons. Thus, the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, established only that Sparks saw appellant lean
into a vehicle in "a high drug, very high crime area" and that
appellant kept putting his hands into his pockets when Sparks
engaged him in a consensual encounter, despite Sparks' request
to appellant not to do so. Although appellant could have been
engaged in a prostitution or drug transaction with the occupant
of the car when Sparks first saw appellant, Sparks saw no money,
drugs or anything else change hands, and appellant could just as
easily have been engaged in some lawful activity, such as giving
- 5 - directions to the occupants of the vehicle. The information
available to Officer Sparks when he conducted the pat-down
search, even including appellant's repeated placement of his
hands in his pockets despite Officer Sparks' request that
appellant keep his hands in sight, was insufficient to give
Sparks reasonable suspicion to believe both that appellant was
engaged in illegal activity and that he was armed and dangerous.
See Burton, 228 F.3d at 528.
Thus, appellant was subject to an illegal seizure and
search when Officer Sparks patted him down for weapons. If
appellant's subsequent consent to the search of his duffel bag
was
obtained as a product of the illegal search [and seizure], it was invalid as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 651, 347 S.E.2d 175, 182 (1986), unless the Commonwealth can show that the consent was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the illegal [search]." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416-17, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
Wood v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 21, 30, 497 S.E.2d 484, 488
(1998) (en banc). Although the trial court found appellant's
consent to the search of his duffel bag was "voluntary," the
principle is well established that the fact that the consent was
voluntary does not mean that it was "sufficiently an act of free
will to purge the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83
S. Ct. at 416. Here, when appellant purportedly consented to a
- 6 - search of the duffel bag, Officer Sparks had just completed a
pat-down search of appellant's person without consent or
reasonable suspicion. Thus, appellant had every reason to
believe Officer Sparks would examine his duffel bag even if
appellant challenged Sparks' authority to do so. Accordingly,
the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellant's relinquishment
of his duffel bag to Officer Sparks was not tainted by the
illegal seizure immediately preceding Sparks' request to search
the bag.
For these reasons, we hold the trial court's denial of
appellant's motion to suppress was erroneous, and we reverse the
conviction. Because the only evidence proving appellant's drug
possession was obtained in the illegal search, we also dismiss
the charge.
Reversed and dismissed.
- 7 -