Arthur Llorens v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 13, 2014
StatusUnpublished

This text of Arthur Llorens v. Department of the Air Force (Arthur Llorens v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arthur Llorens v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2014).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ARTHUR LLORENS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-13-4907-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: August 13, 2014 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Arthur Llorens, Henderson, Nevada, pro se.

Basil R. Legg, Jr. and Jody-Ann E. Gilzene, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the agency’s action indefinitely suspending the appellant from his position. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The appellant, a Budget Analyst, GS-9, occupied a critical-sensitive position which required him to hold a Top Secret security clearance. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 7, 12. By memorandum dated July 26, 2013, the Commander notified him that a security determination had been made to suspend the appellant’s access to classified information/unescorted entry into restricted areas because of financial concerns. Id. at 15. Specifically, the memorandum indicated that, according to credit reports, the appellant had a significant amount of personal debt in collection status for which he was making no monthly payments. Id. On the same day, the Commander issued another memorandum in which he proposed to indefinitely suspend the appellant from his position for failure to maintain a condition of employment. Id. at 4. On August 29, 2013, the deciding official upheld the proposal, warranting the appellant’s indefinite suspension effective September 7, 2013. IAF, Tab 4 at 10. The decision stated that the suspension would remain in effect until there was a final determination by the Air Force Central Adjudicating Facility (CAF) regarding the appellant’s security clearance and access to sensitive materials “and for such time as further administrative action is taken following a final decision by the CAF.” Id. 3

¶3 On appeal, the appellant argued that, in his position, he does not, in fact, handle classified information and has no access to it. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. He requested a hearing, id. at 2, after which the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing the agency’s action, IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 5. He found that the agency committed harmful error because it did not afford the appellant the procedures required before taking an adverse action related to personnel security. Specifically, the administrative judge found that Department of Defense (DoD) regulations generally prohibit an agency from taking, as a result of a personnel security determination, “unfavorable administrative action,” which includes a suspension for more than 14 days, before an employee has received a final decision from the CAF and the opportunity to appeal that decision to the Personnel Security Appeals Board (PSAB). DoD 5200.2-R at C8.2.2.3, 4; ID at 2. The administrative judge concluded that the agency in this case indefinitely suspended the appellant before he received a final decision from the CAF, much less one from the PSAB. ID at 3. The administrative judge ordered the agency to reverse the suspension and retroactively restore the appellant, ID at 5, and to provide him interim relief, if either party filed a petition for review of the initial decision, ID at 6. ¶4 The agency has filed a timely petition for review challenging the initial decision, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1, and stating that it certified that it had provided or would provide the appellant with interim relief as ordered by the administrative judge within the time frame set. The appellant has responded to the petition and has also filed a motion that it be dismissed for failure to provide interim relief. PFR File, Tab 3. There, he argues that the agency has not contacted him regarding restoring him to duty and that he has received no pay since the date his suspension was effected. Id. In reply, the agency has submitted evidence that it has canceled the appellant’s indefinite suspension. PFR File, Tab 5 at 5. The agency also has included a copy of a memorandum it issued to the appellant, several days after filing the petition for review, advising 4

him that, due to considerations on his pending security investigation, he was being temporarily reassigned in 10 days, and that he would be placed on administrative leave in the interim. Id. at 9. ¶5 When an initial decision grants the appellant interim relief, any petition for review must be accompanied by a certification that the agency has complied with the interim relief order. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). To comply with the interim relief order, the agency must either provide the interim relief ordered by the administrative judge or make a determination that returning the employee to the position designated by the administrative judge would cause undue disruption to the work environment. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B). If an agency fails to establish its compliance with the interim relief order, the Board has discretion to dismiss the petition for review, but need not do so. Guillebeau v. Department of the Navy, 362 F.3d 1329, 1332-34 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Stack v. U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 6 (2006). ¶6 Under the circumstances of this case, we exercise our discretion not to dismiss the agency’s petition for review because the agency has submitted evidence to show that it has complied with the interim relief order, that its delay in doing so was minimal, and that any shortcomings in its certification of compliance were not sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal. See Kolenc v. Department of Health & Human Services, 120 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 11 (2013).

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Arthur Llorens v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-llorens-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2014.