ARTHUR JENKINS, JR. NO. 21-CA-644
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
AIU INSURANCE COMPANY PEOPLE COURT OF APPEAL READY TEMP SERVICE STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION DISTRICT 7 STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 20-5546 HONORABLE SHANNON BRUNO BISHOP, JUDGE PRESIDING
June 22, 2022
JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Jude G. Gravois
REVERSED AND REMANDED JGG SMC FHW COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ARTHUR JENKINS, JR. Ann M. Johnson-Griffin
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, PEOPLE READY, INC. AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY Jason Edward Wilson Joshua E. Sins GRAVOIS, J.
Claimant/appellant, Arthur Jenkins, Jr., appeals a judgment of the workers’
compensation court that granted the exception of prescription filed by
defendants/appellees, AIU Insurance Company and People Ready Temp Services,
dismissing his Disputed Claim for Compensation. Upon de novo review,
considering the applicable law, we find merit to appellant’s first assignment of
error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment that granted appellees’ exception of
prescription and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Claimant fax-filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation with the Office of
Workers’ Compensation (the “OWC”) on September 8, 2020,1 claiming that he
was injured in a work-related incident on September 7, 2019 while working for
People Ready Temp Service on a garbage truck. The original of the Disputed
Claim for Compensation, including the required fees, which was sent by claimant
via certified mail, was received by the OWC on September 16, 2020 at 3:35 p.m.,
as duly noted in the record.
On February 1, 2021, defendants filed a peremptory exception of
prescription, arguing that the suit was prescribed under La. R.S. 23:1209 since
receipt of the claim and payment by the OWC on September 16, 2020 was outside
of the seven-day follow-up period for filing the original claim form and payment
with the OWC, of which the last day was September 15, 2020, and thus the suit
was prescribed.
Claimant opposed the exception of prescription, arguing that under La.
C.C.P. art. 5059, which provides the rules for time computation, and La. R.S. 1:55,
which provides that Saturdays and Sundays are legal holidays, the filing was
1 September 7, 2020, the one-year anniversary of the incident, was a legal holiday, Labor Day.
21-CA-644 1 timely, because Saturday, September 12 and Sunday, September 13 were excluded
from the computation, and the seventh day would therefore have been September
17, 2020. Accordingly, the receipt by the OWC of the original claim form and
payment on September 16, 2020 was timely. Claimant also argued that his timely
filing of a third-party tort suit in the 24th Judicial District Court on September 7,
2020, arising out of the same incident, interrupted prescription on his workers’
compensation claim. Claimant attached a copy of the petition in his tort suit to his
opposition to the exception of prescription.
The matter came up for a hearing on March 26, 2021, at which counsel for
both parties were present and argued. The attachments to defendants’ exception of
prescription were admitted into evidence. Claimant did not move to admit the
attachment to his opposition or any other evidence. The workers’ compensation
court recessed the hearing that day in order for defense counsel to provide the court
with a brief on one of the issues raised at the hearing, namely whether a timely-
filed tort suit would interrupt prescription on the workers’ compensation claim.
The hearing was continued to May 21, 2021. Defendants filed a brief on May 19,
2021.
At the May 21, 2021 hearing, claimant’s counsel was not present. At that
hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench, holding that claimant’s suit was
prescribed according to La. R.S. 13:850, which provides that “within seven days”
after the Court receives a fax filing, all of the original documents and payment
shall be delivered to the Clerk of Court. The court noted that the fax filing date
was September 8, 2020, which meant, according to the trial court’s interpretation
of La. R.S. 13:850, the original documents and fees payment must have been
received by the court by September 15, 2020, the seventh day, which included
counting Saturday, September 12 and Sunday, September 13 in the seven-day
computation. Because the documents and fees were not received by the OWC
21-CA-644 2 until September 16, 2020, the trial court found the suit prescribed. A written
judgment was entered on June 2, 2021, finding the matter prescribed and
dismissing it with prejudice. Notice of signing of the judgment was mailed on
June 21, 2021. Claimant timely filed a notice of appeal which was granted on July
26, 2021.
On appeal, claimant argues that the trial court erred in applying La. R.S.
13:850 and computing the time within which the original documents and payment
were required to be received by the OWC. Alternatively, claimant argues that his
timely-filed tort suit interrupted prescription on his workers’ compensation claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a peremptory exception of prescription, the mover bears the burden of
proof. Blanchard v. Gerry’s Place, Inc., 18-106 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258
So.3d 1024, 1029.
The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a peremptory exception of
prescription generally turns on whether evidence is introduced. Law Enf’t Dist. of
Jefferson Par. v. Mapp Constr., LLC, 19-543 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/20), 296 So.3d
1260, 1263, citing DeFelice v. Federated National Insurance Company, 18-374
(La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/19), 279 So.3d 422, 426 (citing Wells Fargo Financial
Louisiana, Inc. v. Galloway, 17-413 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 231 So.3d 793,
800). When no evidence is introduced, appellate courts review judgments
sustaining an exception of prescription de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the
petition as true. Id. (citing Wells Fargo, 231 So.3d at 800). Normally, when
evidence is introduced at a hearing on an exception of prescription, the trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest error standard. Id. (citing Wells
Fargo, 231 So.3d at 800; Tenorio v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 14-814 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/15/15), 170 So.3d 269, 273, writ denied, 15-1145 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 149).
However, when evidence is introduced but the case involves only the
21-CA-644 3 determination of a legal issue, not a dispute regarding material facts, an appellate
court must review the issue de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s legal
determination. Id. (citing Wells Fargo, 231 So.3d at 800; Cawley v. National Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 10-2095 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/6/11), 65 So.3d 235, 237).
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in counting the legal holidays
Saturday, September 12 and Sunday, September 13, when computing the seven-
day filing period found in La. R.S. 13:850, which provides for filing by facsimile
and states, in pertinent part:
A. Any document in a civil action may be filed with the clerk of court by facsimile transmission. All clerks of court shall make available for their use equipment to accommodate facsimile filing in civil actions.
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ARTHUR JENKINS, JR. NO. 21-CA-644
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
AIU INSURANCE COMPANY PEOPLE COURT OF APPEAL READY TEMP SERVICE STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION DISTRICT 7 STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 20-5546 HONORABLE SHANNON BRUNO BISHOP, JUDGE PRESIDING
June 22, 2022
JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Jude G. Gravois
REVERSED AND REMANDED JGG SMC FHW COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ARTHUR JENKINS, JR. Ann M. Johnson-Griffin
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, PEOPLE READY, INC. AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY Jason Edward Wilson Joshua E. Sins GRAVOIS, J.
Claimant/appellant, Arthur Jenkins, Jr., appeals a judgment of the workers’
compensation court that granted the exception of prescription filed by
defendants/appellees, AIU Insurance Company and People Ready Temp Services,
dismissing his Disputed Claim for Compensation. Upon de novo review,
considering the applicable law, we find merit to appellant’s first assignment of
error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment that granted appellees’ exception of
prescription and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Claimant fax-filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation with the Office of
Workers’ Compensation (the “OWC”) on September 8, 2020,1 claiming that he
was injured in a work-related incident on September 7, 2019 while working for
People Ready Temp Service on a garbage truck. The original of the Disputed
Claim for Compensation, including the required fees, which was sent by claimant
via certified mail, was received by the OWC on September 16, 2020 at 3:35 p.m.,
as duly noted in the record.
On February 1, 2021, defendants filed a peremptory exception of
prescription, arguing that the suit was prescribed under La. R.S. 23:1209 since
receipt of the claim and payment by the OWC on September 16, 2020 was outside
of the seven-day follow-up period for filing the original claim form and payment
with the OWC, of which the last day was September 15, 2020, and thus the suit
was prescribed.
Claimant opposed the exception of prescription, arguing that under La.
C.C.P. art. 5059, which provides the rules for time computation, and La. R.S. 1:55,
which provides that Saturdays and Sundays are legal holidays, the filing was
1 September 7, 2020, the one-year anniversary of the incident, was a legal holiday, Labor Day.
21-CA-644 1 timely, because Saturday, September 12 and Sunday, September 13 were excluded
from the computation, and the seventh day would therefore have been September
17, 2020. Accordingly, the receipt by the OWC of the original claim form and
payment on September 16, 2020 was timely. Claimant also argued that his timely
filing of a third-party tort suit in the 24th Judicial District Court on September 7,
2020, arising out of the same incident, interrupted prescription on his workers’
compensation claim. Claimant attached a copy of the petition in his tort suit to his
opposition to the exception of prescription.
The matter came up for a hearing on March 26, 2021, at which counsel for
both parties were present and argued. The attachments to defendants’ exception of
prescription were admitted into evidence. Claimant did not move to admit the
attachment to his opposition or any other evidence. The workers’ compensation
court recessed the hearing that day in order for defense counsel to provide the court
with a brief on one of the issues raised at the hearing, namely whether a timely-
filed tort suit would interrupt prescription on the workers’ compensation claim.
The hearing was continued to May 21, 2021. Defendants filed a brief on May 19,
2021.
At the May 21, 2021 hearing, claimant’s counsel was not present. At that
hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench, holding that claimant’s suit was
prescribed according to La. R.S. 13:850, which provides that “within seven days”
after the Court receives a fax filing, all of the original documents and payment
shall be delivered to the Clerk of Court. The court noted that the fax filing date
was September 8, 2020, which meant, according to the trial court’s interpretation
of La. R.S. 13:850, the original documents and fees payment must have been
received by the court by September 15, 2020, the seventh day, which included
counting Saturday, September 12 and Sunday, September 13 in the seven-day
computation. Because the documents and fees were not received by the OWC
21-CA-644 2 until September 16, 2020, the trial court found the suit prescribed. A written
judgment was entered on June 2, 2021, finding the matter prescribed and
dismissing it with prejudice. Notice of signing of the judgment was mailed on
June 21, 2021. Claimant timely filed a notice of appeal which was granted on July
26, 2021.
On appeal, claimant argues that the trial court erred in applying La. R.S.
13:850 and computing the time within which the original documents and payment
were required to be received by the OWC. Alternatively, claimant argues that his
timely-filed tort suit interrupted prescription on his workers’ compensation claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a peremptory exception of prescription, the mover bears the burden of
proof. Blanchard v. Gerry’s Place, Inc., 18-106 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258
So.3d 1024, 1029.
The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a peremptory exception of
prescription generally turns on whether evidence is introduced. Law Enf’t Dist. of
Jefferson Par. v. Mapp Constr., LLC, 19-543 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/20), 296 So.3d
1260, 1263, citing DeFelice v. Federated National Insurance Company, 18-374
(La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/19), 279 So.3d 422, 426 (citing Wells Fargo Financial
Louisiana, Inc. v. Galloway, 17-413 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 231 So.3d 793,
800). When no evidence is introduced, appellate courts review judgments
sustaining an exception of prescription de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the
petition as true. Id. (citing Wells Fargo, 231 So.3d at 800). Normally, when
evidence is introduced at a hearing on an exception of prescription, the trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest error standard. Id. (citing Wells
Fargo, 231 So.3d at 800; Tenorio v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 14-814 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/15/15), 170 So.3d 269, 273, writ denied, 15-1145 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 149).
However, when evidence is introduced but the case involves only the
21-CA-644 3 determination of a legal issue, not a dispute regarding material facts, an appellate
court must review the issue de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s legal
determination. Id. (citing Wells Fargo, 231 So.3d at 800; Cawley v. National Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 10-2095 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/6/11), 65 So.3d 235, 237).
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in counting the legal holidays
Saturday, September 12 and Sunday, September 13, when computing the seven-
day filing period found in La. R.S. 13:850, which provides for filing by facsimile
and states, in pertinent part:
A. Any document in a civil action may be filed with the clerk of court by facsimile transmission. All clerks of court shall make available for their use equipment to accommodate facsimile filing in civil actions. Filing shall be deemed complete at the time the facsimile transmission is received by the clerk of court. No later than on the first business day after receiving a facsimile filing, the clerk of court shall transmit to the filing party via facsimile a confirmation of receipt and include a statement of the fees for the facsimile filing and filing of the original document. The facsimile filing fee and transmission fee are incurred upon receipt of the facsimile filing by the clerk of court and payable as provided in Subsection B of this Section. The facsimile filing shall have the same force and effect as filing the original document, if the filing party complies with Subsection B of this Section.
B. Within seven days, exclusive of legal holidays, after the clerk of court receives the facsimile filing, all of the following shall be delivered to the clerk of court:
(1) The original document identical to the facsimile filing in number of pages and in content of each page including any attachments, exhibits, and orders. A document not identical to the facsimile filing or which includes pages not included in the facsimile filing shall not be considered the original document.
(2) The fees for the facsimile filing and filing of the original document stated on the confirmation of receipt, if any.
(3) A transmission fee of five dollars.
C. If the filing party fails to comply with any of the requirements of Subsection B of this Section, the facsimile filing shall have no force or effect. The various district courts may provide by court rule for other matters related to filings by facsimile transmission.
***
21-CA-644 4 (Emphasis added.)
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 5059 provides, in pertinent part:
A. In computing a period of time allowed or prescribed by law or by order of court, the date of the act, event, or default after which the period begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period is to be included, unless it is a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a legal holiday.
B. A half-holiday is considered as a legal holiday. A legal holiday is to be included in the computation of a period of time allowed or prescribed, except when:
(1) It is expressly excluded;
(2) It would otherwise be the last day of the period; or (3) The period is less than seven days. ***
(Emphasis added.)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:55 expressly declares that Sundays are legal
holidays, and Saturdays are half-holidays unless they have been declared full
holidays by individual parishes. Further, as shown above, La. C.C.P. art. 5059
declares that half-holidays are considered as legal holidays, and legal holidays are
to be included in the computation of time periods allowed or prescribed by law,
unless they are expressly excluded.
Resolution of the first assignment of error did not require the introduction of
evidence, as the matter is a legal issue of statutory interpretation, and the fax-filing
date of September 8, 2020 and the September 16, 2020 date the original documents
and payment were received by the OWC are matters known to the OWC court in
its own suit records.2 Therefore, we review the matter de novo. For the following
reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application
of La. R.S. 13:850 and La. C.C.P. art. 5059.
2 A court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings. KJ Monte Invs., LLC v. Acadian Properties Austin, LLC, 20-0204 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 354.
21-CA-644 5 Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:850 allows for fax-filing of petitions, and
expressly states that the facsimile filing shall have the same force and effect as
filing the original document, if the filing party complies with Subsection B of this
Section. Subsection B requires that the filing party must deliver to the court the
original document as well as the various filing fees, within seven days, exclusive of
legal holidays, after the clerk of court receives the facsimile filing. Further, as
noted above, La. R.S. 1:55 expressly declares that Sundays are legal holidays, and
Saturdays are half-holidays unless they have been declared full holidays by
individual parishes. As also shown above, La. C.C.P. art. 5059 declares that half-
holidays are considered as legal holidays, and legal holidays are to be included in
the computation of time periods allowed or prescribed by law, unless, as here, they
are expressly excluded.
Upon de novo review, considering the applicable law, we find that the trial
judge misinterpreted and therefore misapplied La. R.S. 13:850 by including, rather
than excluding, the legal holidays of September 12 and 13 (a Saturday and a
Sunday) in its computation. When these two days are properly excluded from the
computation, as per La. R.S. 13:850, La. C.C.P. art. 5059, and La. R.S. 1:55, we
see that the receipt of the documents by the OWC on September 16, 2020 was
timely, as the seventh day of the computation was September 17, 2020. Thus,
claimant’s Disputed Claim for Compensation is not prescribed.
In support of its argument, appellees also cite to State ex rel. State Pharm.
Ass’n v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 So. 565 (1900), which we find to be
distinguishable on the facts and the law. That case, from over 100 years ago,
concerned the computation of a five-day time period within which the governor
must return a bill to the legislature. Therein, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here
is a rule of general, though perhaps not of universal, acceptance, that, where a
limitation of time is fixed within which a particular act or thing is required to be
21-CA-644 6 done, if done at all, after which performance or the doing of the thing would be
without effect, if the time limited exceed a week, an intervening Sunday is to be
included in the computation; if less than a week, Sunday is to be excluded.” Id. at
568. This general, but not universal rule of acceptance, and cases citing it, have
long been superseded by the enactment of La. R.S. 1:55.
Appellees also seek support for its argument that the claim is prescribed by
citing the rule found in 40 La. Admin. Code Pt. I, §5701, which states in paragraph
(C)(1):
Within seven days, exclusive of legal holidays, after the district office or the records management division has received a facsimile transmission, the party filing the document shall forward the following to the district office or records manager: a. the original signed document; b. the applicable filing fee, if any; and c. a transmission fee of $5 in addition to $5 for the first 5 pages and $2.50 for each page thereafter.
We first note that the OWC court does not appear to have relied upon this
administrative rule in reaching its ruling, though appellees cited it in their
exception and argue it in their appellee brief. Also, the rule’s language contains an
important difference from the language of La. R.S. 13:850. The statute requires
that the original document and fees be delivered to the clerk of court within seven
days, exclusive of legal holidays. The rule, however, requires that the filing party
forward to the clerk of court the originals within seven days, exclusive of legal
holidays. This is a crucial difference that does not aid appellees’ argument.
Prior to its 2016 revision, La. R.S. 13:850 also required that the original
pleading be forwarded to the clerk, rather than delivered to the clerk. In Hunter v.
Morton’s Seafood Rest. & Catering, 08-1667 (La. 3/17/09), 6 So.3d 152, 156
(superseded by 2016 revision of La. R.S. 13:850), the Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted the pre-revision “shall forward” language of the statute, holding “that to
forward a document as required in La. R.S. 13:850(B), a litigant must only send
21-CA-644 7 the document; the sending of the document towards the place of destination is all
that is required, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of La. R.S.
13:850(B).” (Emphasis added.) In other words, the date the document was sent is
what counted.
This Court examined the proper interpretation of the post-revision version of
La. R.S. 13:850(B) containing the new terms “shall be delivered” in Clark v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 18-52 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/18), 259 So.3d 516. Therein, this
Court found that the statute as amended to require delivery required receipt of the
documents, and the plaintiff’s petition was “delivered” when it was signed for by
the court worker at the P.O. Box facility and in the Clerk’s possession on the last
day of the prescriptive period. See also Petit-Blanc v. Charles, 21-0094 (La.
4/20/21), 313 So.3d 1245, 1247.
Thus, citing to the administrative rule, as appellees do in brief, does not
strengthen their argument that the matter was prescribed, as the original was
received by the OWC on September 16, 2020, having been previously forwarded
to the OWC by certified mail, as evidenced by the appellate record. It is clear that
the act of forwarding took place prior to September 16, at the very least by
September 15, 2020, the day before it was received at OWC, which would make
this filing timely, even if legal holidays were incorrectly included as appellees do
in their computation.
In any event, appellees’ argument that the Administrative Code might apply
over the Louisiana Revised Statutes must fail, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that the Louisiana Administrative Code does not take precedence over the
Louisiana Revised Statutes. Jurisich v. Jenkins, 99-0076 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d
597, 602.
21-CA-644 8 In conclusion, we find that appellant’s first assignment of error, that the trial
court erred in its computation of time, has merit. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment granting the exception of prescription.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Alternatively, appellant argues that his workers’ compensation suit is not
prescribed because he timely filed a civil suit against a third party for the same
injuries, in district court. The OWC court did not reach this issue in its judgment,
instead finding the matter prescribed upon its application of La. R.S. 13:850, which
was erroneous as previously discussed in the first assignment of error. Having
found merit to appellant’s first assignment of error, analysis and discussion of this
assignment of error is pretermitted.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment on appeal, which granted appellees’
exception of prescription, is reversed. The matter is remanded to the OWC court
for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
21-CA-644 9 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON FREDERICKA H. WICKER INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK HANS J. LILJEBERG JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY JUNE 22, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
21-CA-644 E-NOTIFIED OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 7 (CLERK) HON. SHANNON BRUNO BISHOP (DISTRICT JUDGE) ANN M. JOHNSON-GRIFFIN (APPELLANT) JASON EDWARD WILSON (APPELLEE) JOSHUA E. SINS (APPELLEE)
MAILED NO ATTORNEYS WERE MAILED