Art Center School v. United States

142 F. Supp. 916, 136 Ct. Cl. 218, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 117
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 5, 1956
DocketNo. 228-53
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 142 F. Supp. 916 (Art Center School v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Art Center School v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 916, 136 Ct. Cl. 218, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 117 (cc 1956).

Opinion

Laramoke, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff, an educational institution, in this action seeks to recover the difference between its customary rate and the rate it was paid under an agreement entered into initially on September 23, 1946, for the vocational rehabilitation of disabled veterans pursuant to Public Law 16, 57 Stat. 43, which rate was, in accordance with the agreement of the parties, also charged by plaintiff for instruction and training furnished to nondisabled veterans under Public Law 346, 58 Stat. 284, 287. Plaintiff further seeks to recover the ex[220]*220penses incurred, as a result of an audit it caused to be performed in preparation of this suit.

Defendant contends that plaintiff is bound by the contracts executed by the parties for vocational rehabilitation of disabled veterans in accordance with the authority provided therefor in Public Law 16 and that plaintiff, by its course of conduct during the period herein concerned, effectively waived its “customary rate” for education and training of nondisabled veterans enrolled pursuant to Public Law 346. The facts necessary to this opinion briefly stated are these. Plaintiff is a nonprofit educational institution incorporated under the laws of the State of California and is engaged in teaching, among other things, art and photography. During the period pertinent to this action it was engaged in a program of vocational rehabilitation for disabled veterans pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 16, supra, and the education and training of other than disabled veterans under the provisions of Public Law 346, supra.

No contract was ever entered into between plaintiff and defendant concerning other than disabled veterans.

Beginning in September 1943, a contract was entered into between plaintiff and the defendant, acting through the Veterans’ Administration, covering Public Law 16 students. The contract rate paid for such students for both the art course and the photography course was $41.66 per 4-week period. Payments were made by tire defendant on vouchers submitted to it by the plaintiff in that amount for each veteran. Although there was no contract covering Public Law 346 students, payment was made for their training at the same rate as for Public Law 16 students on vouchers submitted by the plaintiff at those rates.

About June 24, 1946, plaintiff advanced its tuition rates and in July or August 1946 it advised the Veterans’ Administration Regional Office in Los Angeles that commencing September 23, 1946, it was increasing its catalog rates. The new rates were submitted to Mr. David Slayton, the contract officer assigned to the negotiation of a contract with plaintiff for the training of Public Law 16 students, and referred by him to Mr. Charles Binder, chief of the training facilities section, and Mr. Raymond J. Royer, supervisor of the con[221]*221tract unit. These officials considered that inasmuch as the new proposed rates represented a radical increase over the rates previously charged by plaintiff and were considerably higher than the rates charged by similar institutions offering similar courses in the same locality, a lower and more reasonable rate should, if possible, be negotiated. Accordingly, a conference was arranged in August of 1946 which was attended by representatives of both plaintiff and defendant. After further negotiations, together with a cost analysis furnished by plaintiff and inspection of plaintiff’s books by the Veterans’ Administration office, a contract was entered into between plaintiff and defendant for the period September 23, 1946 to May 16, 1947. The contract covered Public Law 16 students and it was the understanding of the parties that the same rates would apply to Public Law 346 students. Accordingly, plaintiff submitted vouchers and was paid tuition at the contract rate. The contract was renewed on two separate occasions and plaintiff was paid as above described.

At no time from September 23,1946 to February 24,1949, did plaintiff express dissatisfaction with the rates agreed upon and no pressure or coercion was exerted upon plaintiff to accept a rate lower than its “customary rate.” However, the rate which plaintiff was paid was at a lower rate than its “customary rate” for nonveteran students, and it was arrived at after a conference in which plaintiff’s officials urged acceptance by the Veterans’ Administration of the increased rates. At that time plaintiff’s representatives were asked to justify the increase. The school was asked to go over its costs and to allow an inspection of its records by the Veterans’ Administration officer.

Plaintiff had constructive notice of public laws and regulations given by publication in the Federal Register and had actual notice of laws and regulations pertaining to the training of nondisabled veterans pursuant to Public Law 346.

The plaintiff in 1950 applied for and was granted a review by the Veterans’ Education Appeals Board covering a period after the period now in suit.

Pursuant to rule 38 (c) of this court, by stipulation between the parties hereto, the trial was limited to the' issues of law and fact relating to the right of plaintiff to recover, reserving [222]*222the determination, if necessary, of the amount of recovery and the amount of offsets for further proceedings.

Public Law 16, supra, enacted March 24, 1943, provided in pertinent part as follows:

* * * shall have the power and duty to prescribe and provide suitable training * * * and, in addition, b.e may, by agreement or contract with public or private institutions or establishments, provide for such additional training facilities as may be suitable and necessary to accomplish the purposes of this part.

Thus it can be seen that the Administrator had a right, under Public Law 16, to execute contracts for such training. However, Veterans’ Administration regulations, 38 GFli §35.018 (1939 Ed., 1945 Supp.), required that “* * * the Administrator shall pay * * * the customary cost of tuition, * * * fees, * * (Italics supplied.) This regulation was based on the Administrator’s Decision, Veterans’ Administration, No. 638, dated March 19, 1945, which stated in pertinent part as follows:

* * * the only rates that may he paid for veterans entered as trainees under the provisions of said Act [P. L. 16] are the regular established rates paid by all other enroTlees (in effect at the time the trainee enters the university, or as may thereafter nondiscriminatorily be established for all students) * * * [Italics supplied.]
‡ $ $ $ $
* * * The Service Letter of October 24, 1944 authorizing increased rates * * * attempted to preclude the increasing of rates after June 22,1944, the effective date of Public No. 346. This was in error and was corrected by the Service Letter of December 7, 1944, providing that regular increased rates established by the institution, if nondiscriminatory, may be paid by the Veterans Administration. * * * [Italics supplied.]
* * * * *
The foregoing decision is hereby promulgated for observance by all officers and employees of the Veterans Administration.

This regulation continued in effect and was reaffirmed in Veterans’ Administration Manual M7-5, paragraph 45, dated April 15, 1947, which provided, with respect to Public Law 16, that

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Bluebook (online)
142 F. Supp. 916, 136 Ct. Cl. 218, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/art-center-school-v-united-states-cc-1956.