Arshdeep S. v. Minga Wofford, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARSHDEEP S.,

12 Petitioner, No. 1:26-cv-00402-TLN-CKD

13 14 v. ORDER MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Arshdeep S.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ 19 of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 20 Petitioner’s Petition. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 2 The instant action arises from Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention. (See ECF No. 1.) 3 Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled India to escape persecution. (ECF No. 6-1 at 2.) On 4 November 5, 2024, upon Petitioner’s entry into the United States, U.S. Immigration and Customs 5 Enforcement (“ICE”) released Petitioner on his own recognizance with instructions to contact for 6 monitoring. (Id.) Following his release from detention, Petitioner filed an application for 7 asylum. (Id.) Petitioner is gainfully employed and has complied with all conditions of his 8 release. (Id.) On October 25, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained at an ICE check-in appointment 9 without any meaningful process or determination. (Id.) 10 On January 20, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, challenging 11 the lawfulness of his civil detention and seeking release. (ECF No. 1.) On January 23, 2026, the 12 Court granted Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and ordered 13 Respondents to show cause why the Petition should not be granted. (ECF No. 7.) On January 30, 14 2026, Respondents filed a response to the order to show cause and motion to dismiss the Petition. 15 (ECF No. 9 at 1.) Petitioner did not file a reply. The Court therefore considers the Petition on its 16 merits. 17 II. STANDARD OF LAW 18 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 19 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 20 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 21 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 22 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 23 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 24 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 25 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 26 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 27 1 The following factual background is taken largely verbatim from Petitioner’s brief in 28 support of his motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 6-1.) 1 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 2 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully 5 subjected to mandatory detention in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 6 and due process.2 (See ECF No. 1.) In response, Respondents contend Petitioner is an “applicant 7 for admission” who is subject to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“§ 8 1225(b)(2)”). (ECF No. 9 at 1–2.) The Court discusses each of Petitioner’s claims in turn. 9 A. Violation of the INA 10 Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for 11 arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for 12 removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the 13 Government has broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual. Id. Further, 14 § 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also 15 confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented 16 by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when 17 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Conversely, § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention 18 during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond 19 hearing. 20 This Court agrees with Petitioner that the text and legislative history of the INA 21 demonstrates that § 1226(a) governs his detention, not § 1225, and he is entitled to the process 22 § 1226(a) requires, including a bond hearing. (ECF No. 6-1 at 13–14.) This Court and many 23 others have repeatedly found that § 1225(b) applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” –– a 24 category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner who were detained within the United 25 States. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 26 2 Petitioner also asserts a claim for violation of the INA’s bond regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 27 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19. (ECF No. 1 at 14–15.) The Court finds it need not address Petitioner’s additional claim to rule on the Petition, as this claim seeks the same relief Petitioner 28 seeks in his INA and procedural due process claims. 1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this Court’s reasons for taking this position). To reiterate, 2 absent a higher court order holding otherwise, this Court finds Petitioner is not an applicant 3 “seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and therefore disagrees with 4 Respondents (see ECF No. 9 at 1). Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is therefore 5 entitled to the process that statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, 6 Respondents have not provided any hearing to Petitioner either pre- or post-detention. The Court 7 accordingly finds Respondents violated Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA. 8 B. Violation of Procedural Due Process 9 The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or 10 property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 11 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 12 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 13 These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94. 14 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 15 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 16 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 17 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 18 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 19 the question remains what process is due.”). 20 i. Liberty Interest 21 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has established a protectable liberty 22 interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. 23 Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by 24 statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he 25 government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon 26 which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to 27 the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 28 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original)). “Accordingly, a 1 noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 2 remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 3 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional 4 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific 5 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 6 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. 7 Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 8 Here, the Court agrees with Petitioner that he gained a liberty interest after he was 9 released on his own recognizance on November 5, 2024. (ECF No. 6-1 at 2.) Under Morrisey, 10 this release implied a promise that he would not be re-detained, during the pendency of his 11 immigration proceedings, if he abided by the terms of his release. As this Court has found 12 previously, along with many other courts in this district when confronted with similar 13 circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in his continued freedom as he awaits the outcome of 14 his asylum proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) 15 (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five 16 years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 17 ii. Procedures Required 18 As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three 19 factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 20 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 21 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 22 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 23 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set 24 forth below, the Court finds Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights were violated. 25 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. 26 “Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 27 restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 28 at 690. Petitioner asserts he was pursuing his asylum claim, and then he was re-detained despite 1 complying with all conditions of his release. (ECF No. 6-1 at 2, 9.) Accordingly, this factor 2 weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See 3 Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 4 Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly). 5 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received 6 any hearing, either pre- or post-detention. Petitioner maintains that he has not been given any 7 bond hearing. (ECF No. 6-1 at 15); see also Manzanarez, 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (quoting A.E. 8 v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) 9 (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received 10 any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”)). Thus, the Court finds Petitioner was likely 11 erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Without any procedural safeguards to determine 12 whether his detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional procedural safeguards is 13 high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 14 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 15 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- 16 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Where removal is not imminent 17 under a final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining 18 individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose 19 appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or 20 alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 21 (“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a 22 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” (cleaned up)). 23 The cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Petitioner notes that 24 Respondents’ own regulations require notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, which they did not 25 provide. (ECF No. 6-1 at 10, 15.) Notice and custody determination hearings are routine 26 processes for Respondents. Indeed, these are the very processes owed to Petitioner under 8 27 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which Petitioner contends applies to him. (ECF No. 6-1 at 14.) Any delay in 28 detention (if justified) for the time to provide notice and a hearing would be minimal. Moreover, 1 it would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioner 2 home to await a determination on his asylum application than to continue to detain him. See also 3 Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he 4 Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are 5 staggering.”). 6 The Court finds that, under these circumstances, Respondents are required to provide 7 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The United States Supreme Court “usually has held that the 8 Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or 9 property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). The Court 10 describes post-deprivation remedies as the “special case” where those are “the only remedies the 11 State could be expected to provide.” Id. at 129. Here — where Petitioner has substantially 12 complied with the conditions of his release and there is no final order of removal — the Court 13 finds pre-deprivation notice and a hearing are possible and valuable to preventing erroneous 14 deprivation of liberty. Further, Respondents have not provided any substantive opposition to the 15 contrary. (See ECF No. 9.) 16 On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner was entitled to 17 pre-deprivation notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents 18 did not provide either. Moreover, Respondents did not provide a post-deprivation opportunity to 19 be heard. The Court accordingly finds Respondents violated Petitioner’s procedural due process 20 rights. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 23 (ECF No. 1) and DENIES Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). Respondents are 24 ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance 25 with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before 26 a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show material changed circumstances demonstrate a 27 significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future; or (b) 28 Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence before a neutral decisionmaker that 1 | Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall 2 | be allowed to have counsel present. 3 The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this case. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 | Date: February 5, 2026 7 8 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28