UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
OTIS ARRINGTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 24-4203 ) ERIN POSEY, ) ) Defendant. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and civilly detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center (“Rushville”) pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, pursues an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3). The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). A court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court will grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the Second Amended Complaint states a federal claim. This case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Erin Posey, the Assistant Program Director, retaliated against him by instructing security staff to conduct shakedowns of his cell and confiscate his electronics on October 11, 2023, January 23, 2025, and March 31, 3025, because he filed complaints against her with the Illinois State Police and in federal court. Prisoners have a protected First Amendment right to file lawsuits. Dobbey v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner may not be disciplined for filing a lawsuit, as “[a]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the Constitution.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). To proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must successfully
allege that (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the Defendant’s action. Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020). Based on his allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Posey. Plaintiff also claims he was denied his electronics without due process or justification for several weeks each time they were confiscated. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “To state a property loss claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. If the state provides an adequate remedy, Plaintiff has no civil rights claim.” Cason v. Hare, No. 19-CV-00885-JPG, 2019 WL 6054823, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2019) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984)). “[T]he Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. Thus,
Plaintiff must pursue any claims for the loss of his property in the Illinois Court of Claims.” Harbaugh v. Scott, No. 19-4240, 2020 WL 1917831, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2020) (quoting Cason, 2019 WL 6054823, at *2) (internal citations omitted). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Pursuant to the Court's merit review of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds Plaintiff states a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Erin Posey. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [3] is GRANTED.
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
5) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s position. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
OTIS ARRINGTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 24-4203 ) ERIN POSEY, ) ) Defendant. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and civilly detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center (“Rushville”) pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, pursues an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3). The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). A court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court will grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the Second Amended Complaint states a federal claim. This case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Erin Posey, the Assistant Program Director, retaliated against him by instructing security staff to conduct shakedowns of his cell and confiscate his electronics on October 11, 2023, January 23, 2025, and March 31, 3025, because he filed complaints against her with the Illinois State Police and in federal court. Prisoners have a protected First Amendment right to file lawsuits. Dobbey v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner may not be disciplined for filing a lawsuit, as “[a]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the Constitution.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). To proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must successfully
allege that (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the Defendant’s action. Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020). Based on his allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Posey. Plaintiff also claims he was denied his electronics without due process or justification for several weeks each time they were confiscated. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “To state a property loss claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. If the state provides an adequate remedy, Plaintiff has no civil rights claim.” Cason v. Hare, No. 19-CV-00885-JPG, 2019 WL 6054823, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2019) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984)). “[T]he Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. Thus,
Plaintiff must pursue any claims for the loss of his property in the Illinois Court of Claims.” Harbaugh v. Scott, No. 19-4240, 2020 WL 1917831, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2020) (quoting Cason, 2019 WL 6054823, at *2) (internal citations omitted). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Pursuant to the Court's merit review of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds Plaintiff states a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Erin Posey. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [3] is GRANTED.
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
5) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s position. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. 6) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
8) Counsel for Defendant is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Counsel for Defendant shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
10) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.
11) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to defense counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
12) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.
Entered this 14th day of May, 2025.
s/Sara Darrow SARA DARROW CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE