Arredondo Hernandez v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 17, 2024
• Docket: 23-501
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID ARREDONDO HERNANDEZ, No. 23-501

Petitioner, Agency No. A202-171-414

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 14, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: GILMAN,*** N.R. SMITH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

David Arredondo Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA’s) order denying his

motion to reopen “withholding-only” proceedings. Having jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we review the denial of a motion to reopen under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. abuse-of-discretion standard. Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th

Cir. 2017). For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for review.

Arredondo Hernandez moved to reopen his case on the basis of changed

country conditions in Mexico. To succeed on such a motion, a noncitizen must

(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearings; and (4) demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Id. at 1204 (cleaned up). “The [BIA] could thus deny the motion to reopen for

failing to meet any of these burdens.” Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996

(9th Cir. 2008).

1. In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a

letter submitted by Arredondo Hernandez’s brother “does not contain sufficient

information to establish . . . a change in [country] conditions since 2018.” The

letter asserted that Arredondo Hernandez was at “imminent risk” of harm from

individuals who had previously beaten his brothers and threatened him “[y]ears

ago,” but it did not indicate that any member of Arredondo Hernandez’s family

had been attacked or threatened since that incident. Rather, the letter stated that

the aggressors “are currently fugitives from justice and . . . are our neighbors.”

Arredondo Hernandez’s own accompanying affidavit noted only that the

attackers “have been seen in town.” Without any evidence indicating that these

individuals have recently threatened or harmed Arredondo Hernandez’s family,

2 23-501 such cursory statements are not enough to establish a material change in country

conditions. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010)

(holding that a petitioner’s evidence in support of a motion to reopen based on

changed country conditions must be “qualitatively different” than the evidence

that he presented at his initial hearing).

2. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in concluding that Arredondo

Hernandez’s evidence purportedly showing a general increase in violence and

crime was insufficient to establish a material change in country conditions. See

Sarkar v. Garland, 39 F.4th 611, 622 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding that evidence

of changed country conditions is not material where the noncitizen “failed to

show that those conditions more severely impact him and his family than the

population at large”). And the BIA similarly did not err in denying Arredondo

Hernandez’s claim for protection under the CAT because this court has held

that “generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico” is insufficient to

establish prima facie eligibility for such relief. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,

600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

3. Finally, to the extent that Arredondo Hernandez contends that he

would be more severely impacted by increased violence and crime than the

Mexican population at large because he is a deportee from the United States, he

cannot establish prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal on this basis.

See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the

proposed social group, ‘returning Mexicans from the United States,’ . . . [is] too

3 23-501 broad to qualify as [a] cognizable social group[] because [it] share[s] neither a

voluntary relationship nor an innate characteristic”).

PETITION DENIED.

4 23-501