ARP Wave, LLC v. Salpeter

District Court, D. Minnesota·Decided April 28, 2021·No. 0:18-cv-02046·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

ARP WAVE, LLC, a Minnesota Case No. 18-cv-2046 (PJS/ECW) Limited Liability Company,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

GARRETT M. SALPETER, NEUROLOGICAL FITNESS EQUIPMENT AND EDUCATION, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company, NEUROLOGICAL FITNESS AND RECOVERY FACILITIES, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company, ARPWAVE AUSTIN, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company, and JOHN DOES I-X,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Motion Regarding Continued Sealing (Dkt. 290) pursuant to Local Rule 5.6(d) concerning documents filed under seal in relation to the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment and Defendants’ motion for sanctions. The parties agree that Docket Entries 195-6, 195-12, 195-13, 254-5, 254-6, 254-9, 254-12, 254-14, 254-19, and 270 should be unsealed. (Dkt. 290 at 1.) Therefore, these documents will be unsealed. The parties also agree that Docket Entries 254, 254-1, 254-2, 254-3, 254-111, 254- 15, and 254-18 should remain under seal. (Id.) However, the parties fail to provide the Court with any reason why continued sealing is appropriate. “The fact that a document has been designated as confidential under a protective order alone is not a valid basis to

keep the document under seal indefinitely for the purposes of Local Rule 5.6(d), which governs motions for further consideration of sealing in this District.” Nagel v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, No. 18-CV-1053 (WMW/ECW), 2020 WL 6145111, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2020) (citing Micks v. Gurstel Law Firm, P.C., No. 17-CV-4659 (ECT/ECW), 2019 WL 220146, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2019)). The Court cannot make

arguments on the parties’ behalf and therefore temporarily denies the joint motion for continued sealing as to these entries. The Court will give the parties two weeks from the date of this Order to provide a basis as to why these documents should remain under seal. In addition, the parties disagree with respect to the continued sealing of numerous documents. The Court addresses those disagreements below.

I. LEGAL STANDARD American courts “recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted); see also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The common law right of public

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff appears to argue later in the joint motion that Docket Entry 254-11 should be unsealed. (Dkt. 290 at 7.) To the extent that Plaintiff contends that Docket Entry 254-11 should be unsealed, Plaintiff shall so specify in the parties’ supplemental submission to the Court. access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nation’s history.”); Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but is also the public’s case.”). As the Eighth Circuit has held:

There is a common-law right of access to judicial records. . . . This right of access bolsters public confidence in the judicial system by allowing citizens to evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of judicial proceedings, and “to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.” It also provides a measure of accountability to the public at large, which pays for the courts.

IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “‘This right of access is not absolute, but requires a weighing of competing interests.’” Feinwachs v. Minn. Hosp. Ass’n, No. 11-cv-8 (JRT/SER), 2018 WL 882808, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2018) (quoting Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1990)). According to the Eighth Circuit: Where the common-law right of access is implicated, the court must consider the degree to which sealing a judicial record would interfere with the interests served by the common-law right of access and balance that interference against the salutary interests served by maintaining confidentiality of the information sought to be sealed. . . . The decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.

IDT, 709 F.3d at 1223 (cleaned up); see also Feinwachs, 2018 WL 882808, at *3. While Local Rule 5.6 does not explicitly set forth the applicable standard when determining if a document should remain sealed, the 2017 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 5.6 provides guidance similar to the Eighth Circuit in IDT, supra, by requiring this Court to balance parties’ interests in maintaining the confidentiality of documents with the public’s right of access: [P]arties have been filing too much information under seal in civil cases . . . . As a general matter, the public does not have a right of access to information exchanged in discovery; thus, protective orders are often quite broad, covering entire documents or sets of documents produced during discovery, even when most or all of the contents are not particularly sensitive. But the public does have a qualified right of access to information that is filed with the court. Even if such information is covered by a protective order, that information should not be kept under seal unless a judge determines that a party or nonparty’s need for confidentiality outweighs the public’s right of access.

D. Minn. LR 5.6(d) advisory committee’s note. In evaluating whether to unseal judicial documents, courts in the District of Minnesota have utilized the six-factor balancing test outlined in United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Krueger v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., No. CV 11-2781, 2014 WL 12597948, at *10 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2014). These six factors are: (1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.

Id. at *10-11 (citation omitted). The Court looks to see if compelling reasons have been provided to overcome the presumption that court documents should be public record when applying the six-factor test. Id. at *11. It is also important to emphasize that “‘the weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and resulting value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.’” IDT, 709 F.3d at 1224 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)) (citations omitted). When a document plays only a negligible role in a court’s exercise of its Article III duties, such as a complaint, the public’s interest in access to the document is weaker and “the weight of the presumption is low and amounts to little more than a prediction of public access absent a countervailing reason.” Id. (quoting Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050). While the

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
United States v. Amodeo
71 F.3d 1044 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga
435 F.3d 110 (Second Circuit, 2006)
IDT Corp v. AR Public Law Center
709 F.3d 1220 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
762 F.3d 744 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Hubbard
650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Circuit, 1980)
Duron v. Guidant Corp.
245 F.R.D. 632 (D. Minnesota, 2007)
Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc.
960 F.2d 1013 (Eleventh Circuit, 1992)