Arotin v. Arotin

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: 2025-G-0032
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Arotin v. Arotin, 2026-Ohio-1226.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY

WILLIAM AROTIN, et al., CASE NO. 2025-G-0032

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Civil Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas

RANDY J. AROTIN, et al., Trial Court No. 2024 F 000421 Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: April 6, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed

Marc L. Stolarsky, Marc L. Stolarsky Law, L.L.C., P.O. Box 24221, Cleveland, OH 44124 (For Plaintiffs-Appellants).

Donald B. Bagley, III and David A. Urbancic, Ibold & O’Brien, 401 South Street, Village Station, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Defendants-Appellees).

MATT LYNCH, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, William Arotin and Linda Arotin, appeal from the final

judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion for

summary judgment and granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees, Randy J.

Arotin and Faith O. Cull-Arotin, on appellants’ complaint in foreclosure. We affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

{¶2} In June 2020, appellants executed and recorded a quitclaim deed

conveying a parcel of real property in Chardon, Ohio, to appellees “for valuable

consideration of $10.00 paid.” In June 2024, appellants initiated this foreclosure action against appellees “to reclaim ownership of the real property due to breach of contract plus

other relief as set forth here.”

{¶3} In their amended complaint in foreclosure, appellants alleged that on or

about June 17, 2020, they agreed to sell the property to appellees in an oral contract for

a total price of $20,000.00 plus costs of $735.00, which appellees agreed to pay in

$300.00 monthly installments. Appellants submitted the quitclaim deed and receipts of

payments made by appellees in the total amount of $4,350.00. According to appellants,

appellees had not made any payments since October 3, 2022, leaving a balance due of

$16,385.00. They additionally alleged that appellees had failed to pay property taxes to

the Geauga County Treasurer. Appellants requested the following relief from the trial

court:

1. Transfer of the real property from Defendants to Plaintiffs.

2. That any person owning or claiming any right, title or interest in the property as set forth in this Complaint be required to answer, setting forth their interest, if any, or be forever barred from asserting any right, title or interest in the property.

3. That the court order that the property as described in this Complaint be awarded to Plaintiffs according to law.

4. Cost and fees of this action including the Court filing fee and all attorney fees that are reasonable for this action.

5. Complainants ask the Court to order Defendants to pay the Geauga County Treasurer with the amount in property taxes that Defendants have failed to pay while they were in possession of the property in question.

6. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

{¶4} Appellees answered the amended complaint, denying the oral contract and

outstanding balance.

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 {¶5} Appellants moved for summary judgment, maintaining “they have

demonstrated that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiffs and

Defendants agreed to an oral contract for the sale of the real property and Plaintiffs have

presented evidence showing that there was an oral contract by attaching the payment

receipts to this Motion; (2) Plaintiffs have a right to the real property that they contracted

to sell to Defendants; and (3) construing the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor because

Defendants breached their contract to Plaintiffs they are no longer entitled to the

property.” In addition to the payment receipts, appellants submitted affidavits in which

they each affirmed the allegations in their amended complaint.

{¶6} Appellees opposed the motion on the following grounds: (1) appellants

lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action, as they have not pleaded facts alleging the

existence of a legally enforceable lien or mortgage on the property; (2) appellants falsely

claim that certain disputed facts are undisputed (e.g., that appellants agreed to sell the

property in an oral contract, that appellees agreed to pay $20,735.00 in $300.00 monthly

installments, and that the payments totaling $4,350.00 were related to the property

transfer); (3) appellants have not presented facts that show an exception to the statute of

frauds, requiring contracts for the purchase of real property to be in writing; (4) the

quitclaim deed appended to the amended complaint bars all conflicting parol evidence of

consideration in excess of $10.00; and (5) the exemption form submitted by appellants to

the County Auditor is evidence that the transfer was a gift (although this document was

not attached as an exhibit to appellees’ response).

{¶7} Appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment on the basis that

appellants lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action against them. Appellees attached

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 as an exhibit to their motion the preliminary judicial report, which had been prepared for

appellants, indicating that title to the property is vested in appellees by the recorded

quitclaim deed and that appellants did not hold a mortgage or lien on the property at the

time the lawsuit was filed. Appellees also submitted affidavits in which they each averred

that they owned the property when the complaint was filed, there were no liens or

mortgages recorded against the property when the complaint was filed, and there were

no liens or mortgages presently recorded against the property.

{¶8} Appellants did not respond in opposition to appellees’ motion for summary

judgment.

{¶9} The trial court issued a written decision on August 15, 2025, denying

appellants’ motion for summary judgment, granting appellees’ motion for summary

judgment, and dismissing the case. The court determined that appellants lacked standing

to bring a foreclosure action because the quitclaim deed attached to the amended

complaint proves appellants transferred all interest in the property to appellees four years

prior to filing suit. The court additionally held that, to the extent appellants were attempting

to recover the remaining payments allegedly owed under the oral contract, their claim

was barred by the parol evidence rule.

{¶10} From this decision, appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. They present

two assignments of error for our review:

[1.] The Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment because no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendants-Appellants’ breach of the oral land contract, and Plaintiffs- Appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[2.] The Trial Court committed prejudicial error in granting Defendants- Appellees’ . . . Motion for Summary Judgment as they failed to meet their burden under Civil Rule 56.

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 We address the assignments of error together for ease of discussion.

{¶11} “As a preliminary matter, this court would note that, as a general proposition,

the denial of a summary judgment motion is not considered a final appealable order.”

Tornincasa v. Liberty Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1995 WL 815364, *4 (11th Dist. Dec.

8, 1995), citing State ex rel. Overmeyer v. Walinski, 8 Ohio St.2d 23, 23 (1966).

“However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has also held that the judgment denying such a

motion can be appealed after an adverse final order has been rendered in the case.” Id.,

citing Balson v. Dodds, 62 Ohio St.2d 287, 289 (1980). “Thus, in appealing from the

granting of an appellee’s summary judgment motion, an appellant can also contest the

denial of its competing motion.” Id.

{¶12} A trial court’s summary judgment decision is reviewed de novo on appeal.

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Appellate review is

necessarily confined to the materials that were properly before the trial court in the first

instance. See State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trs., 73 Ohio St.3d 728, 730,

quoting State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus (“‘A

reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial

court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.’”).

Accordingly, any reference in the parties’ briefs to evidence that was not presented to the

trial court has not been considered on appeal.

{¶13} Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56(C) when the moving

party establishes the following: “(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to

be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for

summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.” Temple v. Wean

United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). The moving party must point to evidentiary

materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C), which include “the pleading, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the

pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,

292-293 (1996). “If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for

summary judgment must be denied.” Id. at 293. However, if the moving party meets its

initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C), then the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden under

Civ.R. 56(E) to demonstrate, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in the rule, that there

is a genuine issue of material fact suitable for trial. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do

so, the trial court may enter summary judgment against that party. Id.

{¶14} Appellants challenge the trial court’s decision to grant appellees’ motion for

summary judgment, arguing that appellees did not meet their burden of production under

Civ.R. 56(C). Appellees moved for summary judgment on the basis that appellants lacked

standing to foreclose.

{¶15} There is no standing to pursue a foreclosure action if the plaintiff does not

have an enforceable interest, typically a mortgage or other lien, that existed at the time

the complaint was filed. Bank of New York Mellon v. Workman, 2020-Ohio-3330, ¶ 46

(11th Dist.), citing Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 27.

See also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Horn, 2015-Ohio-1484, ¶ 17 (“[A]lthough the plaintiff

in a foreclosure action must have standing at the time suit is commenced, proof of

standing may be submitted subsequent to the filing of the complaint.”).

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 {¶16} The quitclaim deed attached to appellants’ amended complaint proved that

they transferred all interest in the property to appellees approximately four years prior to

filing suit. The summary judgment record shows no recorded mortgage or lien in

appellants’ favor at the time of filing; appellees’ affidavits attest to the absence of any

such encumbrance; and appellants’ own preliminary judicial report reflects title in

appellees free of any such encumbrance. We therefore agree with the trial court’s

conclusion that appellants lacked standing to foreclose as a matter of law.

{¶17} Appellants also challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the parol evidence

rule bars them from recovering the remaining payments allegedly owed under the oral

contract. In so holding, the trial court recited R.C. 1302.05 and noted it could find no case

that has specifically applied the statute to a quitclaim deed. This is because R.C. 1302.05

establishes the parol evidence rule for commercial transactions for the sales of goods

under Ohio’s codification of the Uniform Commercial Code.

{¶18} Ohio real estate transactions are governed by the common law parol

evidence rule, which has long held that “‘absent fraud, mistake or other invalidating cause,

the parties’ final written integration of their agreement may not be varied, contradicted or

supplemented by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written

agreements.’” Galmish v. Cicchini, 90 Ohio St.3d 22, 27 (2000), quoting 11 Williston on

Contracts (4th Ed. 1999). “Despite its name, the parol evidence rule is not a rule of

evidence, nor is it a rule of interpretation or construction.” Id., citing Charles A. Burton,

Inc. v. Durkee, 158 Ohio St. 313, 324 (1952). “‘The parol evidence rule is a rule of

substantive law which, when applicable, defines the limits of a contract.’” Id., quoting

Durkee at paragraph one of the syllabus. The principal purpose of the parol evidence

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 rule is to protect the integrity of a written contract by ensuring “the stability, predictability,

and enforceability of finalized written instruments.” Id.

{¶19} Ohio courts also apply the merger-by-deed doctrine, which provides that

“whenever a deed is delivered and accepted without qualification pursuant to a sales

contract for real property, the contract becomes merged into the deed and no cause of

action upon said prior agreement exists. The purchaser is limited to the express

covenants only.” Suermondt v. Lowe, 2006-Ohio-224, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). Thus, in the real

estate context, the parol evidence rule prevents parties from introducing evidence of oral

agreements that would contradict clear and unambiguous terms of a written deed or lease

agreement. Once merger occurs, prior oral agreements are generally extinguished, and

parties cannot pursue claims based on those earlier arrangements.

{¶20} “The construction of written instruments is a matter of law.” McCoy v. AFTI

Properties, Inc., 2008-Ohio-2304, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line

Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. “When construing a deed,

a court must examine the language contained within the deed, the question being not

what the parties meant to say, but the meaning of what they did say, as courts cannot put

words into an instrument which the parties themselves failed to do.” Id., citing Larwill v.

Farrelly, 8 Ohio App. 356, 360 (5th Dist. 1918). Specifically, “[a] consideration clause is

conclusive as to the amount, kind, and receipt of consideration and is not open to

explanation by parol proof.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing Shehy v. Cunningham, 81 Ohio St. 289

(1909), syllabus.

{¶21} For example, in McCoy, the deed contained the language, “for valuable

consideration paid,” but the transferor claimed the conveyance was a gift. Id. at ¶ 5-6.

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that “‘parol evidence is inadmissible to alter, vary

or contradict the consideration expressed in a deed, when the purpose or effect of such

alteration, variation or contradiction would change the effect or legal operation of the

deed.’” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting Muckerheide v. Zink, 3 Ohio Misc. 33, 36 (Hamilton P.C.

1963). The court explained that “when a deed contains a recital of a valuable

consideration received from the grantee, it is to be construed as a deed of purchase, and

parol evidence may not be used to show that it was instead a deed of gift.” Id., citing

Groves v. Groves, 65 Ohio St. 442 (1902), syllabus.

{¶22} Here, the quitclaim deed clearly and unambiguously states that appellants,

“for valuable consideration of $10.00 paid, Quit Claims to [appellees] . . . the following

real property . . . .” Absent fraud, mistake or another invalidating cause, appellants may

not contradict the recited consideration with parol evidence of a prior or contemporaneous

oral agreement for additional payments. Appellants do not dispute the validity of the deed,

nor do they allege fraud, mistake or any other invalidating cause. Rather, they contend

that the oral agreement is enforceable under the part performance exception to the statute

of frauds.

{¶23} Ohio’s statute of frauds, codified in R.C. Chapter 1335, requires all contracts

for the sale of lands to be “in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith.”

R.C. 1335.05. “No lease, estate, or interest, either of freehold or term of years, or any

uncertain interest of, in, or out of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be assigned

or granted except by deed, or note in writing, signed by the party assigning or granting it,

or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized, by writing, or by act and operation of law.” R.C.

1335.04. An agreement that fails to satisfy the statute of frauds may still be enforceable

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 if the parties partially performed the contract. See Stoops v. Miller, 97 Ohio App.3d 265,

269 (1994), quoting Delfino v. Paul Davies Chevrolet, Inc., 2 Ohio St.2d 282 (1965),

paragraph four of the syllabus (part performance “‘must consist of unequivocal acts by

the party relying upon the agreement, which are exclusively referable to the agreement

and which have changed his position to his detriment and make it impossible or

impractical to place the parties in statu quo’”).

{¶24} Appellants contend that appellees made partial payments, accepted

possession, and corresponded extensively in writing regarding the obligation, all of which

unequivocally confirms the existence and terms of the oral contract and removes it from

the statute of frauds. However, appellants conveyed their interest in the property to

appellees in a signed writing, the quitclaim deed. Thus, the statute of frauds is satisfied

here and, under the merger-by-deed doctrine, any prior oral agreement has been

extinguished. Even assuming that the receipts are evidence of partial payments under

an oral agreement, the evidence is barred under the parol evidence rule. “Attempts to

prove assertions contradictory to the terms in the written instrument through parol

evidence is exactly what the statute of frauds was designed to prohibit.” McCoy, 2008-

Ohio-2304, at ¶ 11 (10th Dist.).

{¶25} The summary judgment record reflects (1) a quitclaim deed transferring title

for valuable consideration paid; (2) no recorded security; and (3) claimed oral terms of a

prior agreement that would vary the deed’s expressed consideration and legal effect.

Appellants’ chosen remedies—foreclosure and reconveyance—depend on the existence

of a security interest or a basis to rescind the deed, neither of which is shown here.

Appellants lacked standing to foreclose, and their breach of oral contract theory fails as

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 a matter of law on this record. Therefore, reasonable minds could only conclude that

appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶26} Appellants’ assignments of error lack merit. The judgment of the Geauga

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2025-G-0032 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellants’ assignments of error

are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the

Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to be taxed against appellants.

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI, concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-G-0032