Aronson v. Internal

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 1992
• Docket: 91-2256
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

July 10, 1992  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________
        No. 91-2256

                                  ROBERT A. ARONSON,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                          INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                      __________
        No. 91-2257
                                  ROBERT A. ARONSON,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                          INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellants.
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before
                                 Breyer, Chief Judge,
                                         ___________
                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________
                               Boyle,* District Judge.
                                       ______________
                                 ____________________

            Channing  S. MacDonald with  whom Richard  W. Lubart  was on brief
            ______________________            __________________
        for Robert A. Aronson.
            Frank  P. Cihlar,  with  whom James  A.  Bruton,  Acting Assistant
            ________________              _________________
        Attorney  General, with  whom Gary  R. Allen,  and Jonathan  S. Cohen,
                                      ______________       __________________
        Attorneys,  Tax Division, Department  of Justice,  and Wayne  A. Budd,
                                                               ______________
        United States Attorney, were on brief for the Internal Revenue Service
        et al.
                                 ____________________

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____________________

        _____________________

        *Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

BREYER, Chief  Judge.   The  government appeals  a
                               ____________

             district  court  judgment  requiring  the  Internal  Revenue

             Service ("IRS")  to provide Robert Aronson, a private tracer

             of lost  taxpayers, with the last known  street addresses of

             persons  to whom  the government  owes tax  refunds for  the

             years  1981-87.  The district court held that the Freedom of

             Information  Act ("FOIA"),  5  U.S.C.    552, requires  that

             disclosure.   In our  view, however, a  different statute, a

             special tax statute that limits the disclosure of tax return

             information,   permits  the   IRS  not   to  disclose   this

             information to private persons such as Aronson.  26 U.S.C.  

             6103(a),  (m)(1).  And, an exemption in the FOIA makes clear

             that  this tax  statute, not  the FOIA's  general disclosure

             provision, governs this  case.   5 U.S.C.    552(b)(3).   We

             reverse  the district court's determination to the contrary.

             For similar reasons, we  affirm the district court's related

             decision denying  Aronson access to some  different taxpayer

             information, namely taxpayer identification numbers.

                                          I

                                      Background
                                      __________

                       Robert  Aronson is  a  lawyer who  specializes  in

             finding persons to whom the government owes money and, for a

             fee,  helping  them obtain  the  money  that is  their  due.

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                                          3

Insofar  as  he  finds  people  whom the  agency  would  not

             otherwise  have found,  Aronson performs  a  public service.

             Insofar as he finds and charges people whom the agency would

             have  located on  its own, his  service is  less beneficial.

             See Aronson v. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 822 F.2d  182,
             ___ _______    _____________________________

             183, 188 (1st Cir.  1987) (Department's "poor performance in

             locating"  those owed  money is  a "public  interest" factor

             favoring disclosure), later proceeding, 866 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
                                   ________________

             1989).

                       In May 1989, Aronson, invoking the FOIA, asked the

             IRS for "the entire file of undistributed income tax refunds

             for the tax years 1981 through and including 1987."  Aronson

             wanted  the name  of each  taxpayer due  a refund,  the last

             known   street   or   mailing   address,    the   taxpayer's

             identification  number, and  the amount  of the  refund due.

             The IRS had previously  released names and partial addresses

             (cities, states, and zipcodes)  to the press as part  of its

             own efforts to find  those taxpayers.  It gave  Aronson this

             same  information.   Aronson  then brought  this lawsuit  to

             compel the IRS to give him the rest of the information.

                       The  district   court,  finding  no   genuine  and

             material  factual  disputes, entered  an  order, on  summary

             judgment, compelling the IRS to  give Aronson the last known

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street addresses  along with the names,  cities and zipcodes
             ________________

             already  supplied.  It denied the rest of Aronson's request.

             The IRS now appeals the  district court's order requiring it

             to  provide  street addresses.    Aronson  appeals only  the

             district court's decision not to require the IRS to give him
                                       ___

             each  taxpayer's identification number.   We  shall consider

             the  IRS's appeal first, turning  to Aronson's appeal in the

             final section of this opinion.

                                          II

                                The Relevant Statutes
                                _____________________

                       Two statutes  set forth the law  that governs this

             case.   The first is  the Freedom  of Information Act.   The

             second is a specific provision of the Internal Revenue  Code

             that  governs  the  confidentiality  of   taxpayer  identity

             information.

                       1.   The  Freedom of  Information Act.    The FOIA
                            ________________________________

             requires  government  agencies  to  "make  .  .  .  promptly

             available" to  any person, upon request,  whatever "records"

             the agency possesses unless  those "records" fall within any

             of nine listed exemptions.  5  U.S.C.   552(a)(3), (b).  The

             third  listed  exemption  in  the  statute  ("Exemption 3"),

             relevant here, provides:

                       (b)   This   section  [i.e.,   the  FOIA
                                              ____
                       disclosure  requirement  and procedures]

                                         -5-
                                          5

does not apply to matters that are . . .
                       ______________
                       (3)    specifically     exempted    from
                       disclosure by statute .  . . ,  provided
                                                       ________
                       that  such statute (A) requires that the
                       matters be  withheld from the  public in
                       such a manner as to leave no  discretion
                                                 ______________
                       on   the   issue,  or   (B)  establishes
                                          __
                       particular  criteria for  withholding or
                       ____________________                  __
                       refers to particular types of matters to
                                 ___________________________
                       be withheld.

             5 U.S.C.   552(b)(3) (emphasis added).   That is to say, the

             FOIA does not  require an agency to  disclose information if

             another  statute  requires   the  agency  to  withhold   the

             information, as  long as  that other  statute (1)  gives the

             agency  no  discretion  to  disclose,  or  (2)   establishes

             criteria  for withholding, or (3) specifies particular types

             of information to be withheld.

                       2.  The Tax Statute.  Congress, as part of the Tax
                           _______________

             Reform Act of 1976, enacted a detailed statute governing the

             "[c]onfidentiality  and  disclosure  of  returns  and return

             information."  26 U.S.C.   6103.  This tax statute lays down

             a  basic rule  of confidentiality.   It  forbids the  IRS to

             "disclose" any tax "return" or tax "return information."  26

             U.S.C.     6103(a).    It defines  "return  information"  as

             including     "a   taxpayer's  identity."     26   U.S.C.   

             6103(b)(2)(A).   And, it defines "taxpayer identity" as 

                       the  name  of a  person with  respect to
                       whom  a  return  is  filed,  his mailing
                                                    ___________

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                                          6

address,   his   taxpayer    identifying
                       _______    _____________________________
                       number, . . . or a combination thereof.
                       ______

             26 U.S.C.    6103(b)(6) (emphasis added); see also Church of
                                                       ________ _________

             Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9,  10-11 (1987).  It then sets
             ___________    ___

             forth several  narrowly drawn exceptions,  defining specific

             circumstances  in which the IRS may, or must, reveal some of

             this  information.  26 U.S.C.    6103(c)-(o).   One of these

             exceptions, relevant here, states:

                       The  Secretary   may  disclose  taxpayer
                                        _______________________
                       identity  information  to the  press and
                       ________________________________________
                       other  media  for purposes  of notifying
                       ____________
                       persons entitled to tax refunds when the
                       Secretary,  after reasonable  effort and
                       lapse of time, has been unable to locate
                       such persons. 

             26 U.S.C.   6103(m)(1) (emphasis added).

                                         III

                             The Relevant Legal Questions
                             ____________________________

                       The  Supreme Court  has  held that  a court,  when

             examining a claim that FOIA Exemption 3 permits an agency to

             withhold particular requested data, must ask two  questions.

             First, does the  special statute (here, the  tax statute, 26

             U.S.C.    6103(a), (m)(1)) "constitute a statutory exemption

             to  disclosure within the meaning  of Exemption 3"?  Second,

             is  the  requested  data   "included  within"  this  special

             statute's "protection"?   CIA  v. Sims,  471  U.S. 159,  167
                                       ___     ____

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                                          7

(1985); see also Baldrige  v. Shapiro, 455 U.S.  345, 352-53
                     ________ ________     _______

             (1982).  These are the two questions before us.

                                          A

                                  The First Question
                                  __________________

                       The first  question is whether or  not the special

             tax statute is an "exempting statute."  The answer is clear.

             The  tax statute  falls  squarely within  FOIA Exemption  3.

             Exceptions aside,  the tax  statute  "requires that"  return

             information "be withheld . . .  in such a manner as to leave

             no discretion on the  issue."  5 U.S.C.    552(b)(3)(A); see
                                                                      ___

             also  De Salvo  v. IRS, 861  F.2d 1217, 1221  n.4 (10th Cir.
             ____  ________     ___

             1988)  (26 U.S.C.     6103 is  an  Exemption 3(A)  statute);

             Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984) (same);
             _________    ___

             Fruehauf Corp.  v. IRS,  566 F.2d 574,  578 & n.6  (6th Cir.
             ______________     ___

             1977) (same).   The  relevant exception, read  together with

             the rest of the statute, both "refers to particular types of
                                      ____

             matters   to  be   withheld"  (namely,   "taxpayer  identity

             information")  and  "establishes  particular   criteria  for
                            ___

             withholding" (namely, that the IRS may consider release only

             where  it would help  notify taxpayers of  refunds due, and,

             even then, only to the media).  5 U.S.C.   552(b)(3)(B); see
                                                                      ___

             also De Salvo,  861 F.2d at  1221 & n.4  (26 U.S.C.    6103,
             ____ ________

             including exceptions,  is an Exemption 3(B) statute); Grasso
                                                                   ______

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                                          8

v. IRS, 785 F.2d  70, 77 (3d Cir. 1986)  (same); Chamberlain
                ___                                           ___________

             v.  Kurtz, 589  F.2d 827,  838-39  (5th Cir.)  (same), cert.
                 _____                                              _____

             denied,  444 U.S.  842 (1979).   Thus,  we answer  the first
             ______

             question affirmatively.

                                          B

                                 The Second Question
                                 ___________________

                       The  second question  is  whether  the  taxpayers'

             street addresses  fall within the protection  of the special

             tax statute.  Aronson argues that they do not.  He points to

             the exception in  the tax  statute that permits  the IRS  to
                                                     _______

             disclose  "taxpayer identity  information to  the press  and

             other media" to help  find taxpayers owed refunds.   And, he

             says that this "exception" requires the IRS to disclose that
                                        ________

             information  here.    To  win this  argument,  Aronson  must

             convince us both (1) that he falls within the statute's term

             "press and other media"  (for the statute permits disclosure

             only  to them),  and  (2) that  the  IRS acted  outside  its

             permitted power in not  granting disclosure.  We do  not see
             _________

             how Aronson can make either of those showings.

                       1.  The Standard of Review.  Before turning to the
                           ______________________

             merits  of  Aronson's  argument,  we  consider  a conceptual

             question  of administrative  law, the  answer to  which will

             sometimes affect the outcome in a FOIA Exemption 3 case:  To

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what extent  should a court (reviewing  an agency's decision

             not to  disclose)  defer, or  give  special weight,  to  the

             agency's (here,  the IRS's)  answers to  the kinds  of legal

             questions mentioned  in the preceding paragraph,  namely the

             question of  statutory interpretation  and that of  abuse of

             discretion?   Ordinarily, a court would  give special weight

             to  the  agency's  interpretation  of the  language  of  the

             statute (such  as  the words  "press and  other media")  the

             agency  administers, where  the interpretative  question (as

             here) involves a minor, interstitial matter, closely related

             to the  daily administration of a  complex statutory scheme.

             Chevron  USA,  Inc. v.  Natural  Resources  Defense Council,
             ___________________     ____________________________________

             Inc., 467  U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984); Mayburg  v. Secretary of
             ____                                _______     ____________

             Health and Human Serv.,  740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st  Cir. 1984);
             ______________________

             Constance  v. Secretary of Health and  Human Serv., 672 F.2d
             _________     ____________________________________

             990,  995-96 (1st Cir. 1982).   A court  normally would also

             give  an  administrative  agency broad  leeway  in  deciding

             whether  or  not  to  exercise the  permissive  authority  a
                                                 __________

             statute  grants.     5  U.S.C.      706(2)(A)  (reversal  if

             "arbitrary,  capricious, an abuse  of discretion"); Citizens
                                                                 ________

             to  Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
             _________________________    _____

             ("clear error of judgment" as standard under   706(2)(A) and

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                                          10

provides  only  "narrow"   review);  5  Kenneth   C.  Davis,

             Administrative Law Treatise   29:6 (2d ed. 1984).

                       Where the application or  interpretation of a FOIA

             Exemption 3  statute is  at  issue, however,  one might  ask

             whether a court should abandon  this ordinary administrative

             law framework  in light of  FOIA's statement  that a  court,

             asked  to order  an  agency to  release information,  "shall

             determine   the  matter  de  novo.  .  .  ."    5  U.S.C.   

             552(a)(4)(B).  The district court in this case believed this

             FOIA language required it  to decide de novo  (i.e., without
                                                  _______   ____

             giving  the  agency  the   leeway  that  administrative  law

             ordinarily  provides) whether  the IRS  properly interpreted

             and applied the tax statute.  And, several other courts have

             thought  the same.   E.g.,  De Salvo,  861 F.2d  at 1218-21;
                                  ____   ________

             Church of  Scientology v. IRS,  792 F.2d  146, 148-50  (D.C.
             ______________________    ___

             Cir. 1986), aff'd 484 U.S. 9 (1987); Grasso, 785 F.2d at 73-
                         _____                    ______

             75; Long v. United States IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1177-79 & n.12
                 ____    _________________

             (9th Cir. 1984); Linsteadt, 729 F.2d at 1003; Currie v. IRS,
                              _________                    ______    ___

             704 F.2d 523, 527-28 (11th Cir. 1983).

                       In  our  view,   however,  ordinary,   deferential

             principles of administrative law, not the FOIA's special, de
                                                                       __

             novo principles, govern  review of the  IRS's interpretation
             ____

             of  this Exemption 3 statute and its application to the data

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                                          11

at  issue.   For one  thing, the  language of  the FOIA,  in

             saying that the FOIA "does not apply to matters that are . .
                                   ______________

             .  specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . ,"

             5  U.S.C.    552(b)(3),  suggests  that how  an  Exemption 3

             statute applies to data that arguably fall within its reach,

             and  whether specific  circumstances  counsel disclosure  to

             further  the statute's  aim,  are legal  questions  normally

             governed  by  that  Exemption  3 statute,  not  by  the FOIA

             itself.

                        For  another  thing,  and  more  importantly,  if

             courts  were to  use principles  of FOIA  de novo  review to
                                                       _______

             decide how to interpret  or to apply the exceptions  in this

             special  tax statute, they  would risk distorting Congress's

             very different aims in  enacting the two different statutes.

             See Cheek v. IRS, 703 F.2d 271,  271-72 (7th Cir. 1983) (per
             ___ _____    ___

             curiam);  King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1982);
                       ____    ___

             Zale Corp. v. IRS,  481 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D.D.C. 1979); cf.
             __________    ___                                        ___

             Baldrige,  455 U.S. at 352-55;  White v. IRS,  707 F.2d 897,
             ________                        _____    ___

             900 (6th  Cir. 1983).   On the one  hand, the FOIA  strongly

             favors disclosure.   Its  very purpose is  "'to open  agency

             action  to the light of public scrutiny.'"  Dep't of Justice
                                                         ________________

             v. Reporters Comm. for  Freedom of the Press, 489  U.S. 749,
                _________________________________________

             772 (1989) (quoting  Dep't of  Air Force v.  Rose, 425  U.S.
                                  ___________________     ____

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                                          12

352, 372 (1976)); see also Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts,
                               ________ ________________    ____________

             492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989).  It permits every citizen, whether

             well,  or badly,  motivated,  to obtain  the information  it

             makes public.  It requires agencies to adhere to "'a general

             philosophy of full  agency disclosure.'"  Rose,  425 U.S. at
                                                       ____

             360  (quoting S.  Rep.  No. 813,  89th  Cong., 1st  Sess.  3

             (1965)).   Its exemptions  are narrowly  drawn, in favor  of

             disclosure.   See,  e.g.,  5 U.S.C.    552(b)(6)  (exemption
                           ___   ____

             where  disclosure   is  "clearly  unwarranted   invasion  of
                                      ____________________

             personal  privacy")  (emphasis   added).    Its   procedural

             provisions, such as de novo court review of agency decisions
                                 _______

             not  to disclose,  5  U.S.C.    552(a)(4)(B), further  these

             purposes.    And,  courts  have  interpreted the  disclosure

             provisions generously, in order  to achieve the FOIA's basic

             aim: sunlight.  E.g.,  Dep't of Justice v. Julian,  486 U.S.
                             ____   ________________    ______

             1, 8 (1988); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982); NLRB
                          ___    ________                            ____

             v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1978);
                ___________________________

             Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
             ____

                       In the tax statute, however,  Congress has decided

             that, with  respect  to tax  returns,  confidentiality,  not

             sunlight, is  the proper  aim.   Tax returns  contain highly

             personal information  that many taxpayers might  wish not to

             have   broadcast.      Moreover,   without   clear  taxpayer

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understanding   that  the  government  takes  the  strongest

             precautions to keep tax information confidential, taxpayers'

             confidence  in  the federal  tax  system  might erode,  with

             harmful consequences  for a tax system  that depends heavily

             on voluntary compliance.  Church  of Scientology v. IRS, 792
                                       ______________________    ___

             F.2d  153, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc), aff'd 484 U.S.
                                                           _____

             9 (1987).  Thus,  the Senate Finance Committee, recommending

             the  tax  statute  here  at  issue,  pointed   both  to  the

             "citizen's right to privacy"  and to the "related impact  of

             the disclosure upon the  continuation of compliance with our

             country's   tax  system"   as  reasons   for  more   tightly

             restricting disclosure.   S.  Rep. No.  938, 94th  Cong., 2d

             Sess.,  pt. 1,  318 (1976),  reprinted in  1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
                                          ____________

             3439, 3747.  It concluded that

                       returns  and  return information  should
                       generally be treated as confidential and
                       not  subject  to  disclosure  except  in
                       those limited  situations delineated [in
                       the exceptions].

             Id.; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
             ___  ________

             475, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4118, 4180.
                  ____________

                       If courts  review  the propriety  of  an  agency's

             exercise of  discretion authorized by  a tax confidentiality
                                                          _______________

             statute, using the full array of presumptions and procedural

             mechanisms embodied in the FOIA disclosure statute, they are
                                             __________

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                                          14

unlikely properly to  carry out Congress's  confidentiality-

             protecting  purpose.    Applied  to  the  agency's  specific

             decisions   and   interpretations  under   "confidentiality"

             statutes, the disclosure  statute's language,  presumptions,

             and procedures favoring openness will threaten, in practice,

             to  undermine  the privacy-protecting,  confidence-promoting

             objectives    that   led    Congress   to    enact   special

             confidentiality statutes, such as the tax statute before us.

             See  26 U.S.C.     6110 (procedures,  more restrictive  than
             ___

             FOIA, for public inspection  of IRS written determinations);

             Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 159.
             _____________________

                       Thus, in  our view,  once a court  determines that

             the  statute in question is an Exemption 3 statute, and that

             the information requested at least arguably falls within the

             statute,  FOIA de novo review normally ends.  See White, 707
                            _______                        ___ _____

             F.2d at 900-01; King, 688 F.2d at 494-95; Zale Corp., 481 F.
                             ____                      __________

             Supp. at 489; see  also Sims, 471 U.S. at  167-69; Baldrige,
                           _________ ____                       ________

             455 U.S. at 358-59;  Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers,  Inc. v.
                                  ____________________________________

             U.S. R.R. Retirement  Bd., 830 F.2d  331, 335-37 (D.C.  Cir.
             _________________________

             1987);  Ryan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 715
                     ____    _______________________________________

             F.2d  644, 645-47 (D.C. Cir.  1983); Irons &  Sears v. Dann,
                                                  ______________    ____

             606 F.2d 1215, 1220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  Any further review

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                                          15

must take place  under more deferential,  administrative law

             standards.

                       2.  Applying the Standard.  Applying ordinary (not
                           _____________________

             special, FOIA)  administrative law principles of  review, we

             must hold that Aronson does not have a legal right to  force

             disclosure of  taxpayers' street addresses.   For one thing,

             the relevant  statutory provision  -- permitting the  IRS to

             disclose "taxpayer  identity  information" for  purposes  of

             finding taxpayers owed refunds -- authorizes disclosure only

             "to the press  and other  media."  26  U.S.C.    6103(m)(1).

             Aronson concedes, as he must, that he is not a member of the

             press.   Normally,  one would  think that  the words  "other

             media," unless  used in some special sense,  refer to radio,

             television,  and the  like,  not to  a  private citizen  who

             wishes  to write letters to taxpayers.   See, e.g., National
                                                      ___  ____  ________

             Sec.  Archive v. Dep't of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381, 1386, 1387
             _____________    ________________

             (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("representative of the news media" refers,

             in  FOIA, to  those,  including  newspapers, television  and

             radio,  who  "gather[]  information"  and turn  it  "into  a

             distinct work, and distribute[]  that work to an audience"),

             cert.  denied, 494  U.S. 1029  (1990); cf.  Tax Analysts  v.
             _____________                          ___  ____________

             Dep't of Justice, 1992  U.S. App. LEXIS 12143, at  *11 (D.C.
             ________________

             Cir. June  2, 1992)  (publisher of  weekly tax  magazine and

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                                          16

creator of electronic database on tax  law within FOIA "news

             media,"  "broadly" defined)  (citing National  Sec. Archive,
                                                  ______________________

             880 F.2d  at 1387).   Even  were there  some  lawful way  of

             stretching  the meaning  of those  words to  cover Aronson's

             activity, we  could not  so interpret  them here,  where the

             agency charged with administering the tax statute interprets

             them as  not including  Aronson, for that  interpretation is

             not "manifestly contrary to the statute."  Chevron, 467 U.S.
                                                        _______

             at 844.

                       For another  thing, even were Aronson  a member of

             the "media,"  the  statute simply  permits  -- it  does  not
                                                _______

             require   --   the  IRS   to  disclose   "taxpayer  identity
             _______

             information."  Of  course, the IRS,  in deciding whether  or

             not to disclose, may not act in a manner that is "arbitrary,

             capricious, [or]  an  abuse  of  discretion."   5  U.S.C.   

             706(2)(A).  But, the decision to disclose or to withhold the

             street addresses obviously involves competing considerations

             -- the usefulness  of an  old street address  in locating  a

             taxpayer who  has moved, the potential  that disclosure will

             lead to  disturbing  whoever now  lives  at the  old  street

             address, aggravation of ordinary taxpayers' worry that other

             private  citizens may obtain personal information about them

             from the  IRS.  Cf. Chevron,  467 U.S. at 844  (deference to
                             ___ _______

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                                          17

administrative interpretation of statute  that "reconcil[es]

             conflicting policies") (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367
                                             _____________    ______

             U.S.  374, 382 (1961)).  Nothing in the record suggests that

             the IRS  has balanced  those considerations in  an arbitrary

             way.

                       We  conclude that the  IRS's decision  to withhold

             the street addresses  was lawful.   We reverse the  district

             court's order requiring their release.

                                          IV

                                   Aronson's Appeal
                                   ________________

                       Aronson  appeals  a  different  decision   of  the

             district  court, a decision not  to require the  IRS to give
                                         ___

             him a  different  item of  "taxpayer identity  information,"

             namely, taxpayer identification numbers (usually the same as

             a taxpayer's social security number).  The legal  issues are

             the  same as  those just  discussed.   Indeed, the  same, or

             greater,  protection  attaches  to this  information  as  to

             street  addresses.   See Int'l  Bhd. of Elec.  Workers Local
                                  ___ ___________________________________

             Union  No. 5 v. Dep't of Hous.  and Urban Dev., 852 F.2d 87,
             ____________    ______________________________

             89 (3d  Cir. 1988) (citizens have  "strong privacy interest"

             in social security numbers,  more than in "home addresses").

             Thus, the same conclusion  -- that the IRS need  not release

             the information -- follows.

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                                          18

The  decision  to  compel  release  of  taxpayers'

             street addresses is

                       Reversed.
                       ________

                       The  decision not  to compel  release of  taxpayer

             identification numbers is 

                       Affirmed.
                       ________

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