Arnold v. Richmond American Homes of Arizona Incorporated

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00646
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Raquel-Shakira Arnold, No. CV-25-00646-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Richmond American Homes of Arizona Incorporated, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 On February 26, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Racquel-Shakira Arnold (“Plaintiff”) filed a 16 Complaint (Doc. 1) and Motion for an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) 17 (Doc. 3) against Richmond Homes of Arizona, Inc. and Fidelity National Title Agency 18 Inc. (“Defendants”). Plaintiff asks the Court to reinstate title of her property back in her 19 name. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff has filed an Affidavit of Irreparable Harm (Doc. 4) in support 20 of her Motion for TRO. Plaintiff also seeks to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis. 21 (Doc. 5). 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiff claims she is a resident of Goodyear, Arizona and the resident and 24 rightful owner of a home located at 17527 West Lincoln Street. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 3). She 25 purports to have entered into a valid real estate deal with Defendants to buy the property 26 outright using two “certified negotiable instruments totaling $669,995.00.” (Id. at ¶¶ 5– 27 6). After executing on these instruments, she alleges that Defendants instituted a Quiet 28 Title action against her in Maricopa County Superior Court, which she claims is 1 fraudulent. (Id. at ¶ 8). She states she was not provided notice to contest the Quiet Title 2 Action that was finalized around “February/March.” (Id.) She also claims that 3 Defendants were able to obtain a Writ of Restitution against her from the state court. 4 (Id.) Her eviction from her home, she says, is imminent and she will suffer irreparable 5 harm. (Id. at ¶ 11). Plaintiff alleges legal claims that include a Fourteenth Amendment 6 Due Process violation, fraud and unjust enrichment, fraudulent court proceedings that 7 resulted in a Writ of Restitution, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of financial 8 obligations. (Id. at ¶¶ 12–15). She invokes the diversity jurisdiction of this Court since 9 the Defendant Richmond American Homes of Arizona, Inc. is a corporation 10 headquartered in Colorado and she herself is an Arizona resident. (Id. at ¶ 1). She 11 provides no residency information with regard to Defendant Fidelity National Title 12 Agency, Inc.1 The Court will first address Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma 13 Pauperis (“IFP”) and then move on to the merits of the Motion for TRO itself. 14 II. Plaintiff’s IFP Application 15 A. Legal Standard 16 Upon review of Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 17 application, the Court will grant her IFP status. (Doc. 5). When a party has been granted 18 IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to determine whether the action: 19 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 20 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 21 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only

23 1 Plaintiff has not identified in her Complaint or her TRO motion what the citizenship of Defendant Fidelity National Title Agency is, as she is required to do under 28 U.S.C. 24 §1332 to establish diversity jurisdiction between herself and Defendants.

25 2 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, § 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 26 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) 27 applies to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 28 prisoners.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, section 1915 applies to this non-prisoner IFP Complaint. 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a 2 claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and 4 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 5 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. 10 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible 11 “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 12 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 13 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 14 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 15 Nor will a complaint suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” without 16 “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. 17 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 18 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 19 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 21 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014) 22 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 23 B. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint 24 The Court will first screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 25 before moving on to the merits of its TRO petition. See Rowell v. Dzurenda, 2019 WL 26 5410059 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 27 5395444 (D. Nev. Oct. 22, 2019), aff’d and remanded, 828 F. App’x 446 (9th Cir. 2020) 28 (screening a pro se plaintiff’s complaint under Section 1915 first before addressing his 1 TRO application). 2 1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 3 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving a person of life, 4 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The 5 guarantee of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment applies only when 6 a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Bd. of Regents of State 7 Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th 8 Cir. 2015) (“Due process protections extend only to deprivations of protected interests.”). 9 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources—the clause 10 itself and the laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223–27 (1976). To 11 state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property 12 interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; 13 [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). The 14 Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause cannot be asserted as the basis of a civil 15 suit against a private corporation. Wilson v. Amtrak Nat. R.R. Corp., 824 F. Supp. 55, 57 16 (D. Md. 1992). Rather, it may extend only to actions against governmental agencies. Id. 17 The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973), stated that 18 the “commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those 19 acting under color of its authority . . . The Fourteenth Amendment itself ‘erects no shield 20 against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.’ ” District of 21 Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) 423–424 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 22 1, 13 (1948)). 23 Here, Plaintiff alleges that two private corporations violated her Due Process 24 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 3 at 1–2). However, the Fourteenth 25 Amendment does not allow Plaintiff to assert a due process violation against a party that 26 is not a state actor. District of Columbia, 409 U.S. at 424. Plaintiff stated that 27 Defendants were corporations in her Complaint and in her TRO and pleads nothing that 28 would allow the Court to think otherwise. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1; Doc. 3). 1 Because the auspices of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to violations by 2 private actors, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim must be denied. Because of this, 3 the Court denies and will dismiss the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. 4 2. Writ of Restitution 5 Plaintiff also challenges a Writ of Restitution issued against her in state court. 6 (Doc. 1 at 2). This claim is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 7 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts generally lack 8 jurisdiction to review a final state court decision. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 9 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The reasoning 10 underlying this principle is that the United States Supreme Court is the only federal court 11 with jurisdiction to hear direct appeals from a final state court judgment. Noel v. Hall, 12 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, if a party is disappointed with a state 13 court judgment, that party may not appeal to federal district court, even if the issue would 14 be otherwise within federal district court jurisdiction based upon a federal question or 15 diversity of citizenship. Id. at 1155. The doctrine applies to both final state court 16 judgments and interlocutory orders. See Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 17 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). “The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state 18 judgments from collateral federal attack.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained that 19 federal district courts are precluded from reviewing “cases brought by [1] state-court 20 losers [2] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the 21 district court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection 22 of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 23 (2005). Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction where the federal court plaintiff is 24 simply complaining of a “legal injury caused by an adverse party”; it instead bars 25 jurisdiction if the federal plaintiff is complaining of “a legal injury caused by a state court 26 judgment.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. 27 The Writ of Restitution issued against the Plaintiff functions, for the purposes of 28 Rooker-Feldman, as a final state court judgment or at least as the result of a final state 1 court judgment. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-11783. The wording of the statute that 2 governs writs of restitution in Arizona makes clear that they can only be issued after the 3 rendition of a judgment. (Id.) Because of this, the Court cannot sit in an appellate 4 capacity and review the judgments of the state court. Cullen v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 5 5:21-CV-5220, 2022 WL 126543, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 12, 2022) (finding that pro se 6 Plaintiff should make use of the state court system to appeal state court decisions); 7 Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 8 Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred the plaintiff's claim because the alleged legal injuries 9 arose from the “state court's purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief he sought 10 “would require the district court to determine that the state court's decision was wrong 11 and thus void”); see also District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 460 U.S. at 476 (stating 12 that a federal district court may not entertain a direct or collateral attack on state court 13 civil judgements). If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal a state court judgment, she must do 14 so through the state courts. Anything else would be considered an attack by this Court on 15 state court proceedings. Because of this, the Court will not address the merits of 16 Plaintiff’s Writ of Restitution argument. 17 3. Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Breach of Financial Obligations 18 Plaintiff also claims that Defendant engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation and 19 breach of financial obligations. (Doc. 1 at 2). 20 To prevail on a claim of fraud and fraudulent practices, Plaintiff is subject to the 21 heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 9(b). Plaintiff must set forth specific facts alleging fraud with particularity to survive a 23 motion to dismiss. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 24 2003). “To satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify ‘the who, what, when, where, and 25 how of the misconduct charged,’ as well as ‘what is false or misleading about [the

26 3 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1178(C) states that “No writ of restitution shall issue until the expiration of five calendar days after the rendition of judgment. The writ of restitution 27 shall be enforced as promptly and expeditiously as possible. The issuance or enforcement of a writ of restitution shall not be suspended, delayed or otherwise affected 28 by the filing of a motion to set aside or vacate the judgment or similar motion unless a judge finds good cause.” 1 purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.’ ” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. 2 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ebeid ex rel. 3 United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks 4 and citations omitted). 5 While Plaintiff claims fraud, she does not adequately plead it. Plaintiff does not 6 explain how Defendant engaged in fraud or fraudulent practices and/or breach of 7 financial obligations. She attaches four things as exhibits in her Complaint: (1) a signed 8 contract between the parties; (2) a deposit receipt; (3) a payment receipt; and a (4) special 9 warranty deed. (Doc. 1 at 4). If anything, these documents only show that Plaintiff 10 contracted with Defendants to purchase a home. Plaintiff does not make clear how, 11 when, and where the Defendants committed fraud or engaged in fraudulent practices. See 12 Cafasso, U.S. ex rel., 637 F. 3d at 1055. The Court cannot ascertain any fraud on the part 13 of Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead fraud under Federal Rule 14 of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Court will dismiss this claim. 15 III. Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO 16 A. Legal Standards for TROs 17 A TRO preserves the status quo pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction 18 motion in order to avoid irreparable harm in the interim. See Ariz. Recovery Housing 19 Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 2020 WL 8996590, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2020); 20 Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996). 21 The standards governing temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are 22 “substantially identical.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017) 23 (citation omitted). Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy never 24 awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 25 An ex parte TRO may be granted without notice to the adverse party only if: 26 (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable 27 injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in 28 opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to 1 give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required. 2 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show: (1) a 4 likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm if injunctive relief 5 were denied, (3) that the equities weigh in the Plaintiff’s favor, and (4) that the public 6 interest favors injunctive relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The movant carries the burden 7 of proof on each element of the test. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. 8 National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980). 9 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO 10 Because Plaintiff asserts no cognizable claims that can get survive Rule 8 pleading 11 standards, Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits and her TRO 12 request will also be denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); See Alliance for the Wild 13 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that although the 14 four Winter factors use a flexible sliding scale approach, “serious questions going to the 15 merits,” warrant against the granting of a TRO).4 16 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Due Process claim fails because none of the claims 17 are being brought against a state actor. See District of Columbia, 409 U.S. at 424. Her 18 challenge to the state-issued Writ of Restitution at issue will also not succeed because this 19 Court is not the proper avenue to appeal a state court judgment, or a subsequent writ 20 (relief which is typically issued after a final judgment on the merits of a dispute). See 21 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1178. Lastly, the fraud allegations do not survive because

22 4 Plaintiff also cannot show why an ex parte TRO should be granted. While a TRO is never granted as a matter of right generally, an ex parte TRO is an even more 23 extraordinary remedy. First Technology Safety Systems, Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters and 24 Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423 (1974). For a TRO to be issued ex parte, Plaintiff must show why notice should not be provided to the other 25 party. See e.g. Comcast of Illinois X, LLC v. Till, 293 F.Supp.2d 936, 938-39 (E.D. Wisc. 2003); Best Deals on TV, Inc. v. Naveed, 2007 WL 902564, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding 26 that plaintiff could not show the need for a temporary restraining order without notice when plaintiff waited months after learning of the situation to file the request). Plaintiff 27 has not shown why the adverse party, Defendants in this case, were not notified. Plaintiff admits in the Complaint that Defendants were able to reclaim title to the property in 28 February/March of 2024. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 8). This gave Plaintiff plenty of time to notify Defendants of this action. 1 they were not pled according to the heightened pleading standards required under Federal 2 Rule of Civil procedure 9(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Due to the foregoing, Plaintiff’s 3 TRO will be denied. 4 IV. Leave to Amend 5 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave 6 to amend unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 8 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to 9 ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on [the] part of the movant, repeated failure to 10 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing 11 party . . . [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 12 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962)). Leave 13 to amend may be denied when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts 14 consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 15 Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 16 In sum, leave to amend “is properly denied [where] amendment would be futile.” 17 Carrico v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 18 Here, the Court finds no reason to believe that the Complaint can be cured of its 19 defects. The proper remedy for Plaintiff is an appeal to the state court of appeals. The 20 Plaintiff cannot correct her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim because no state 21 actor is involved. She cannot cure her other claims either because she properly belongs 22 in the state court system. Bringing an amended complaint to this Court would risk futility 23 and therefore, leave to amend is denied. 24 Accordingly, 25 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 26 (Doc. 5) is granted and her Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 28 Order (Doc. 3) is denied. 1 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and terminate this matter. 3 Dated this 27th day of February 2025. 4 ZL Le S norable'Diang/4. Hurmetewa 6 United States District Fudge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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