Armstrong v. United States
This text of Armstrong v. United States (Armstrong v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 LEWIS DEAN ARMSTRONG, 9
Petitioner, 10 Case No. 2:20-cv-00609-RAJ v. 11 ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 12 APPEALABILITY
Respondent. 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on a referral notice from the Ninth Circuit 16 Court of Appeals. Dkt. # 32. That notice instructed this Court to grant or deny Petitioner 17 Lewis Dean Armstrong a certificate of appealability. Dkt. # 32. For the reasons below, 18 the Court DENIES Mr. Armstrong a certificate of appealability. 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 A. Procedural History 21 On April 18, 2020, Mr. Armstrong filed a habeas petition in this action under 28 22 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. # 1. In that petition, he sought to vacate, set aside, or correct his 23 sentence in a separate, criminal action, U.S. v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-cr-00322-RAJ-1 24 (W.D. Wash. June 19, 2020) (Dkt. ## 13, 52). Id. The government later moved to 25 dismiss the petition. Dkt. # 6. It argued that the petition was premature under United 26 States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Id. 27 The Court agreed and dismissed Mr. Armstrong’s petition without prejudice 1 because it was premature. Dkt. # 25. The Court explained: 2 Petitioner Lewis Dean Armstrong was previously charged and convicted for aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3 §§ 1153, 2241(c), 2246(2)(B). U.S. v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-cr-00322-RAJ- 4 1 (W.D. Wash. June 19, 2020) (Dkt. ## 13, 52). At sentencing, Judge John C. Coughenour sentenced Mr. Armstrong to a 20-year term of 5 incarceration, with a lifetime of supervised release to follow. Id. (Dkt. # 6 115). Judge Coughenour determined that the thirty-year mandatory sentence would be unconstitutional as applied to this case. Id. (Dkt. # 117). 7 . . . The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment, in part, holding that the 8 “district court erred in determining that the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) violated the Eighth Amendment” and that the 9 mandatory minimum sentence was in fact proportionate. Id. (Dkt. # 218 at 10 5-6). Two months later, the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate. Id. (Dkt. # 221). Following appeal, this Court has not yet resentenced Mr. Armstrong 11 or amended his previous judgment. Mr. Armstrong’s resentencing is 12 currently scheduled for October 23, 2020. 13 After receiving the Ninth Circuit’s decision but before receiving the mandate, Mr. Armstrong filed this action, moving to vacate, set aside, or 14 correct his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. # 1. . . . 15 . . . . 16 Since the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to this Court, Mr. 17 Armstrong has yet to be resentenced, and the Court has not yet amended its previous judgment. Once those events occur, Mr. Armstrong will be able 18 to challenge the judgment by direct appeal if he chooses. After direct appellate review is exhausted, Mr. Armstrong’s motion will become ripe 19 for the Court. Until then, it is premature and dismissed without prejudice. 20 Id. 21 The Court reached that conclusion by applying United States v. LaFromboise, 427 22 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2005). In LaFramboise, the Ninth Circuit explained that a district 23 court may not “entertain” a habeas petition until “direct appellate review [has been] 24 exhausted.” Id. at 686. Direct appellate review is “exhausted” only when “the district 25 court has acted on remand and the time has passed for appealing the district court’s 26 action.” Id. at 685 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 27 1 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, given that the Court had not yet resentenced Mr. 2 Armstrong or amended its previous judgment, the Court had not yet “acted on remand.” 3 Dkt. # 25. The Court thus concluded that Mr. Armstrong’s habeas petition was 4 premature and must be dismissed. Id. 5 More than a month later, Mr. Armstrong filed a notice of appeal. Dkt. # 30. 6 Though unclear, it appears that he is appealing this Court’s dismissal order. Id. at 2 (“I 7 want to appeal there [sic] denial to [sic] my motions and petitions.”). 8 Observing that this Court has not issued or declined to issue a certificate of 9 appealability, the Ninth Circuit remanded “for the limited purpose of granting or denying 10 a certificate of appealability at the court’s earliest convenience.” Dkt. # 32. 11 B. Analysis 12 The Court declines to issue Mr. Armstrong a certificate of appealability. Pursuant 13 to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997), 14 the Court declines to issue a certificate because the Court’s dismissal of Mr. Armstrong’s 15 petition was entirely procedural, not substantive. The Court has not yet considered the 16 merits of Mr. Armstrong’s petition. And it has not done so for good reason. Under 17 LaFramboise, the Court may not “entertain” Mr. Armstrong’s petition until he has been 18 resentenced and appellate review has been exhausted. Indeed, the Court may even lack 19 the jurisdiction in the first place. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d at 686 n.9 (“There is some 20 dispute whether this rule reflects a jurisdictional bar or simply a prudential concern. We 21 need not resolve this discrepancy, however, because the district court should refrain from 22 hearing LaFromboise’s § 2255 motion until after he exhausts his direct appellate review 23 rights under either theory.” (citations omitted)). 24 Given the facts of this case, § 2253 is a poor fit, and a certificate of appealability 25 should not issue. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003), the United States 26 Supreme Court explained that “a prisoner who was denied habeas relief in the district 27 court must first seek and obtain a [certificate of appealability]” before a circuit court may 1 entertain an appeal. A certificate will only be issued “if the requirements of § 2253 have 2 been satisfied.” Id. Under § 2253, a petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the 3 denial of a constitutional right.” Id. That requires a petitioner to show that “reasonable 4 jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been 5 resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 6 encouragement to proceed further.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Slack 7 v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 8 To determine whether a petitioner has made a “substantial showing,” a court must 9 “look to the District Court’s application of [the habeas corpus statute] to petitioner’s 10 constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of 11 reason.” Id. (emphasis added). Put differently, “[w]here a district court has rejected the 12 constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 13 straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 14 district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 15 U.S. at 484.
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