OPINION
BOB McCOY, Justice.
A jury convicted Appellant Steven Douglas Armstrong a/k/a Steven D. Armstrong of capital murder, and the trial judge imposed an automatic life sentence, the State having waived the death penalty. Armstrong brings two issues on appeal, contending that the trial court committed charge error. We affirm.
[86]*86Background Facts
On January 23, 2003, Live Oak police stopped Armstrong while he was leaving an area known for burning stolen cars. The police searched the area from which Armstrong had been seen leaving and found a Cadillac belonging to the complainant, Christopher Palmer. After the Live Oak Police Department notified the Fort Worth Police Department that it had found the car, Fort Worth police officers were sent to Palmer’s house. After entering Palmer’s house, the police discovered Palmer’s body with multiple stab wounds. According to Armstrong’s statement, he went to Palmer’s house to collect on a debt, and the two began to fight. Defeated, Palmer stopped fighting but refused to give Armstrong the money that he owed him. Determined to get his money, Armstrong then went to the kitchen, grabbed a knife, and told Palmer that he was serious, and that the best thing for him to do was to give Armstrong the money.1 Palmer lunged and swung at Armstrong. Armstrong claims that only after Palmer began lunging and swinging at him did he stab Palmer. After stabbing Palmer multiple times, Armstrong removed money and valuables from the home and drove away in Palmer’s Cadillac. At trial, Armstrong pled not guilty to capital murder. The jury found Armstrong guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison, the State having waived the death penalty.
In his first issue, Armstrong argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider the lesser included offenses of murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of self-defense. In his second issue, he again argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider self-defense.
Lesser Included Offenses
To determine whether a jury must be charged on a lesser included offense, we apply a two-step analysis. Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). The first step is to decide whether the offense is a “lesser included offense” as defined in article 37.09 of the code of criminal procedure. Tex.Code Chim. PROC. Ann. art. 37.09 (Vernon 1981); Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8. A lesser included offense is defined both in terms of the offense charged and the facts of the case: “An offense is a lesser included offense if ... it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” Tex.Code Ceim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09(1). Therefore, our analysis of whether an offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense must be made on a case-by-case basis. Bartholomew v. State, 871 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302, 315-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (op. on reh’g). It does not matter if the charged offense can be established on a theory that does not contain the lesser offense; the issue is whether the State, when present[87]*87ing its case to prove the offense charged, also includes proof of the lesser included offense as defined in article 37.09. See Bartholomew, 871 S.W.2d at 212; Broussard v. State, 642 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Second, some evidence must exist in the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that if Armstrong is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense. Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919, 114 S.Ct. 313, 126 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
The evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8. There must be some evidence from which a rational jury could acquit the defendant of the greater offense while convicting him of the lesser included offense. Id. The court may not consider whether the evidence is credible, controverted, or in conflict with other evidence. Id. If there is evidence from any source that negates or refutes the element establishing the greater offense, or if the evidence is so weak that it is subject to more than one reasonable inference regarding the aggravating element, the jury should be charged on the lesser included offense. Id.; see also Schweinle v. State, 915 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict Armstrong of capital murder if the jury found that he had committed murder in the course of committing robbery or burglary of a habitation. The State does not challenge Armstrong’s contention that murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault are lesser included offenses of capital murder in the course of committing robbery. The issue here is whether there is evidence to raise the lesser included offenses.
Aggravated Assault and Aggravated Robbery
In another capital murder case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[a] murder defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault when the evidence showed him, at the least, to be guilty of a homicide.” Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); see also Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In the case before us, Armstrong does not dispute causing the complainant’s death; there is no evidence that the complainant suffered a lesser form of serious bodily injury. See Jackson, 992 S.W.2d at 475. Consequently, there is no evidence that Armstrong is guilty, if at all, only of aggravated assault. Armstrong was therefore not entitled to an instruction on aggravated assault.
Additionally, there is no evidence that the homicide in the case before us was anything other than intentional. Consequently, there is no evidence that Armstrong is guilty, if at all, only of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.02(a)(1), 29.03 (Vernon 2003) (allowing an aggravated robbery conviction if actor recklessly caused serious bodily injury), Texas Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(46) (Vernon Supp.2004-05) (including bodily injury that causes death within the definition of “[sjerious bodily injury”); see also Jackson, 992 S.W.2d at 475. He was therefore not entitled to an instruction on aggravated robbery.
Murder
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OPINION
BOB McCOY, Justice.
A jury convicted Appellant Steven Douglas Armstrong a/k/a Steven D. Armstrong of capital murder, and the trial judge imposed an automatic life sentence, the State having waived the death penalty. Armstrong brings two issues on appeal, contending that the trial court committed charge error. We affirm.
[86]*86Background Facts
On January 23, 2003, Live Oak police stopped Armstrong while he was leaving an area known for burning stolen cars. The police searched the area from which Armstrong had been seen leaving and found a Cadillac belonging to the complainant, Christopher Palmer. After the Live Oak Police Department notified the Fort Worth Police Department that it had found the car, Fort Worth police officers were sent to Palmer’s house. After entering Palmer’s house, the police discovered Palmer’s body with multiple stab wounds. According to Armstrong’s statement, he went to Palmer’s house to collect on a debt, and the two began to fight. Defeated, Palmer stopped fighting but refused to give Armstrong the money that he owed him. Determined to get his money, Armstrong then went to the kitchen, grabbed a knife, and told Palmer that he was serious, and that the best thing for him to do was to give Armstrong the money.1 Palmer lunged and swung at Armstrong. Armstrong claims that only after Palmer began lunging and swinging at him did he stab Palmer. After stabbing Palmer multiple times, Armstrong removed money and valuables from the home and drove away in Palmer’s Cadillac. At trial, Armstrong pled not guilty to capital murder. The jury found Armstrong guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison, the State having waived the death penalty.
In his first issue, Armstrong argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider the lesser included offenses of murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of self-defense. In his second issue, he again argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider self-defense.
Lesser Included Offenses
To determine whether a jury must be charged on a lesser included offense, we apply a two-step analysis. Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). The first step is to decide whether the offense is a “lesser included offense” as defined in article 37.09 of the code of criminal procedure. Tex.Code Chim. PROC. Ann. art. 37.09 (Vernon 1981); Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8. A lesser included offense is defined both in terms of the offense charged and the facts of the case: “An offense is a lesser included offense if ... it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” Tex.Code Ceim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09(1). Therefore, our analysis of whether an offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense must be made on a case-by-case basis. Bartholomew v. State, 871 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302, 315-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (op. on reh’g). It does not matter if the charged offense can be established on a theory that does not contain the lesser offense; the issue is whether the State, when present[87]*87ing its case to prove the offense charged, also includes proof of the lesser included offense as defined in article 37.09. See Bartholomew, 871 S.W.2d at 212; Broussard v. State, 642 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Second, some evidence must exist in the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that if Armstrong is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense. Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919, 114 S.Ct. 313, 126 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
The evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8. There must be some evidence from which a rational jury could acquit the defendant of the greater offense while convicting him of the lesser included offense. Id. The court may not consider whether the evidence is credible, controverted, or in conflict with other evidence. Id. If there is evidence from any source that negates or refutes the element establishing the greater offense, or if the evidence is so weak that it is subject to more than one reasonable inference regarding the aggravating element, the jury should be charged on the lesser included offense. Id.; see also Schweinle v. State, 915 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict Armstrong of capital murder if the jury found that he had committed murder in the course of committing robbery or burglary of a habitation. The State does not challenge Armstrong’s contention that murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault are lesser included offenses of capital murder in the course of committing robbery. The issue here is whether there is evidence to raise the lesser included offenses.
Aggravated Assault and Aggravated Robbery
In another capital murder case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[a] murder defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault when the evidence showed him, at the least, to be guilty of a homicide.” Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); see also Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In the case before us, Armstrong does not dispute causing the complainant’s death; there is no evidence that the complainant suffered a lesser form of serious bodily injury. See Jackson, 992 S.W.2d at 475. Consequently, there is no evidence that Armstrong is guilty, if at all, only of aggravated assault. Armstrong was therefore not entitled to an instruction on aggravated assault.
Additionally, there is no evidence that the homicide in the case before us was anything other than intentional. Consequently, there is no evidence that Armstrong is guilty, if at all, only of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.02(a)(1), 29.03 (Vernon 2003) (allowing an aggravated robbery conviction if actor recklessly caused serious bodily injury), Texas Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(46) (Vernon Supp.2004-05) (including bodily injury that causes death within the definition of “[sjerious bodily injury”); see also Jackson, 992 S.W.2d at 475. He was therefore not entitled to an instruction on aggravated robbery.
Murder
Similarly, we must determine whether there is evidence that Armstrong is guilty, if at all, only of murder, not capital murder. Here, even if we take as true Armstrong’s own version of the events, he is not entitled to the lesser [88]*88included charge of murder, because “[a] creditor who assaults his debtor to compel him to pay a debt can be convicted of robbery in this State.” Frazier v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 432, 342 S.W.2d 115, 116 (1961); see also Jones v. State, No. 01-90-00460-CR, 1995 WL 397045, at *6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 5, 1995, pet ref'd) (not designated for publication); Collins v. State, 800 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.).
Armstrong’s own statement reflects that he went to Palmer’s house to collect on a debt, that Palmer denied owing him money, that they fought, and that at some point during the scuffle, he grabbed a knife and told Palmer, that he was serious, and that the best , thing he could do would be to give Armstrong the money. This is evidence of robbery. See Frazier, 342 S.W.2d at 116; see also Jones, 1995 WL 397045, at *6; Collins, 800 S.W.2d at 269. It does not matter that Armstrong claims that he did not form the intent to take money and other items of value from Palmer’s home until after he killed Palmer, for' his own statement establishes that Palmer was killed in the course of Armstrong’s attempt to collect a debt by force, i.e., robbery. Consequently, there is no evidence that Armstrong is guilty, if at all, only of murder. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, Armstrong was not entitled to an instruction on murder.
Self-Defense
Finally, Armstrong argues that even if he committed theft he was nevertheless entitled to raise the defense of self-defense as to the intentional mental state required by the capital murder statute in causing the death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.2004-05). Although Armstrong argues that the complainant had a knife, the record does not support his assertion. The record reveals no evidence of conduct by the complainant that would justify Armstrong’s deadly force. A person is entitled to an instruction on self-defense only on those issues raised by the evidence. Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying Armstrong’s requested self-defense charge. We overrule Armstrong’s first and second issues.
Conclusion
Having overruled Armstrong’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DAUPHINOT, J. filed a dissenting opinion.