Armstrong v. Candon

451 F. Supp. 1148, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 96, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303
CourtDistrict Court, D. Vermont
DecidedApril 19, 1978
DocketCiv. A. 77-235
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 451 F. Supp. 1148 (Armstrong v. Candon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armstrong v. Candon, 451 F. Supp. 1148, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 96, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 (D. Vt. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

HOLDEN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs Kenneth Armstrong and Terry Beaupre seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enable them to obtain benefits under the State of Vermont’s program for Aid to Needy Families with Children, free from any constraints or conditions imposed by the defendants under a plan designated by the defendants as the “Burlington Project.” The defendants, Sister Elizabeth Candon, Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Human Services, David Wilson, Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare, Kent Stoneman, Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, and Joseph Kerr, Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Employment Security, are officials of the State of Vermont whose duties include the administration of the ANFC program.

Plaintiffs contend that the “Burlington Project” is in conflict with two programs involving joint federal-state participation under the Social Security Act: Aid for Families with Dependent Children and the Work Incentive Program. As a result of the conflict, plaintiffs maintain the “Burlington Project” must fall because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. They further contend that the “Burlington Project” is violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The cause first came on for hearing on the plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the “Burlington Project.” By an accommodation between the parties, the need for court ordered restraint was eliminated. Evidentiary hearings on the request for preliminary injunctive relief have been consolidated with the trial on the merits, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a). The evidence presented at the trial has been supplemented by facts stipulated by the parties.

Class Action

The complaint has designated the controversy as a class action. The plaintiffs have moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, for a determination that they may maintain this action as representatives of a class composed of two groups of individuals:

(1) All Vermont residents who are or will be applicants for benefits under the ANFC-UF program and are thus subject to the requirements and sanctions of the “Burlington Project”; and
(2) All Vermont residents who have applied for benefits under the ANFCUF program but have been denied such benefits for failure to meet the requirements of the “Burlington Project.”

The prerequisites to class certification imposed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2) have been met. The defendants argue that certification is unnecessary under the teaching of Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2652, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974) inasmuch as the defendants are all public officials and will abide by the court’s decision. Accepting this contention, there is nevertheless good reason for certifying the class. The duration of the “Burlington Project” is limited to the time period between application for ANFC and the eligibility determination on that application. Generally, this period will be thirty days or less. Plaintiffs’ claims concerning the project may be mooted by the successful completion of the project, either the first time through, as with plaintiff Beaupre, or on a subsequent attempt, as with plaintiff *1151 Armstrong. Consequently, class certification is necessary to preserve the claims on important questions for others similarly situated. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In view of this posture of the case, the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted.

Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs rely on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4) as the basis for this court’s jurisdiction to assert claims on statutory and constitutional grounds. Section 1343(3) of 28 U.S.C. confers jurisdiction on the district courts without regard to the amount in controversy, “To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law . of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens . . . .” To invoke this ground for jurisdiction, the court must rely on plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ actions under the “Burlington Project” constitute denials of both equal protection and of due process, thus entitling the plaintiffs to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its counterpart section 1343(3). It cannot be used as a basis for jurisdiction over a claim of violation of the Social Security Act, as that act does not provide for equal rights. Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1975).

Section 1343(4) grants federal jurisdiction over claims “under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . . . .” The Social Security Act not being an act providing for the protection of civil rights, does not come within the scope of § 1343(4). Andrews v. Maher, supra, at 119.

Consequently, this court’s power to consider the plaintiffs’ claims concerning violation of the Social Security Act is derived as a matter of pendent jurisdiction provided the court first determines that it has jurisdiction over the constitutional claims. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). However, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are so patently devoid of merit as to be unsubstantial.

It is clear that the complaint alleges a deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights. In so doing, the pleading requirements for invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have been met. Thus the question of the substantiality of the plaintiffs’ claims is presented squarely by defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In evaluating plaintiffs’ complaint against the substantiality requirement, this court must be mindful of the proper limitations on the scope of review. A detailed review is not appropriate until the merits are reached. The possibility that the plaintiffs will not prevail is not controlling.

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485 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D. Iowa, 1980)
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475 F. Supp. 368 (D. Hawaii, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
451 F. Supp. 1148, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 96, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armstrong-v-candon-vtd-1978.