Armstrong v. Brown

N.D. California

Armstrong v. Brown

805 F. Supp. 2d 918, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87428, 2011 WL 3443922

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California

DecidedAugust 8, 2011

DocketC 94-2307 CW

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 805 F. Supp. 2d 918 (Armstrong v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Armstrong v. Brown, 805 F. Supp. 2d 918, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87428, 2011 WL 3443922 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

Pincite

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL COMPENSATION AT THEIR COUNSEL’S REASONABLE 2010 HOURLY RATES (Docket No. 1745)

CLAUDIA WILKEN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs John Armstrong, et al., and Defendants Edmund G. Brown, Jr., et al., dispute the hourly rates at which Plaintiffs’ counsel should be compensated for work completed in 2010. Plaintiffs move to compel compensation at hourly rates they assert to be reasonable. Defendants oppose the motion. The motion was decided on the papers. Having considered the papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.

BACKGROUND

On September 20, 1996, the Court entered a remedial order and injunction that required Defendants to develop plans to ensure that their facilities and programs complied with the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq. That order and injunction provided that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in this action and were entitled to fees, litigation expenses and costs as authorized by law to ensure compliance with the September 1996 remedial order and injunction and any subsequent remedial orders. On March 26, 1997, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court entered an order governing the collection of attorneys’ fees and any disputes over fees.

In 2009, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs’ attorneys, paralegals and other legal staff (collectively, Plaintiffs’ counsel) would be compensated at their 2008 hourly rates for work completed in 2009. After the end of the first quarter of 2010, the parties *920 were not able to agree on the hourly rates for work completed in 2010. Plaintiffs sought increases in the hourly rates from their 2008 levels, which Defendants rejected. Mediation of the dispute was unsuccessful.

Despite the parties’ impasse, Plaintiffs’ counsel continue to be compensated for their work, albeit at 2008 rates. Plaintiffs indicate that, for the first quarter of 2010, the current dispute has resulted in their counsel being paid $110,070 less than what they should have been paid under the requested hourly rates that Plaintiffs assert to be reasonable for 2010. Bien Decl. ¶ 108.

DISCUSSION

The parties’ dispute focuses solely on the reasonableness of hourly rates for work completed during 2010. Defendants do not contend that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs are unreasonable. Instead, Defendants assert that the requested hourly rates reflect unreasonable increases over the 2008 rates.

Under the ADA, prevailing parties may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. In determining whether an hourly rate is reasonable, a court must look “to ‘the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’ ” Perdue v. Kenny A, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1672, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). Several factors may be considered, “including the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to try the case, whether or not the fee is contingent, the experience held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir.2008).

The party seeking an award of attorneys’ fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir.2008). To demonstrate reasonableness, that party may rely on the affidavits of counsel “and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the [party’s] attorney.” Id. at 980 (citation and editing and internal quotation marks omitted). “The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the ... facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

For partner-level attorneys at the Rosen Bien & Galvan, LLP law firm, Plaintiffs seek hourly rates that range from $560 for a 1997 law school graduate to $800 for a 1962 law school graduate. 1 Hourly rates for associates range from $285 for a 2009 law school graduate to $510 for a 1993 law school graduate. Paralegal hourly rates range from $200 to $240. Hourly rates for *921 litigation support staff and paralegal clerks range from $150 to $185.

For attorneys at the Prison Law Office, Plaintiffs seek hourly rates that range from $275 for a 2009 law school graduate to $700 for a 1978 law school graduate. The hourly rate for the firm’s law clerks, including law students and other litigation assistants, is $180. Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $170 for the office manager, who “is responsible for overseeing all operations in the office.” Norman Decl. ¶ 27.

For attorneys at the Bingham MeCutchen law firm, Plaintiffs seek hourly rates of $400 for an associate who graduated in 2008, $480 for an associate who graduated in 2006, and $655 for a partner who graduated in 1997.

For an attorney who works at the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc. (DREDF) and graduated in 1988, Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $565.

Plaintiffs offer sufficient evidence to support the reasonableness of their counsel’s hourly rates. As noted above, Defendants do not dispute that the requested hourly rates are within the range for prevailing market rates in the San Francisco Bay Area. Nor do Defendants dispute the nature of the work entailed in this action or the experience and reputation of Plaintiffs’ counsel.

Defendants’ sole objection — to the increases in the hourly rates over 2008 levels — is not well-taken. Defendants agree that hourly rates in the Bay Area have risen between 2008 and 2010, representing that hourly rates have increased, on average, by approximately 5.2 percent. However, this figure reflects only the across-the-board rise in firms’ overall rates, not the increase in individual attorneys’ hourly rates for the additional experience the individuals accrued over the two-year period. Private-sector firms often charge higher hourly rates for attorneys with more experience. See, e.g., Pearl Decl. at 4-8; Supp. Holtz Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Compensation rules for state employees also reflect this principle, providing annual experience-based pay increases. See, e.g., Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, § 599.683 (providing for annual “merit salary adjustment,” so long as the relevant authority certifies “that the employee has met the standards of efficiency required for the position”).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI