Armstead v. National Freight, Inc.

2020 IL App (3d) 170777

Opinion

2020 IL App (3d) 170777

Opinion filed November 20, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

CLIFTON ARMSTEAD, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Grundy County, Illinois. ) v. ) Appeal Nos. 3-17-0777 ) 3-18-0009 NATIONAL FREIGHT, INC., d/b/a NFI ) Circuit No. 16-L-21 Industries, Inc., and DERRICK ) ROBERTS, ) ) Honorable Lance R. Peterson, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Carter and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Clifton Armstead, appeals the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment

in favor of defendants, National Freight, Inc., d/b/a NFI Industries, Inc. (National Freight), and

Derrick Roberts. Plaintiff argues the circuit court improperly characterized his statement from

a separate but related action as a judicial admission. Originally, we reversed the judgment of

the circuit court. After our initial disposition, defendants filed a petition for rehearing. Upon

rehearing, we now affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 The record on appeal indicates that on March 6, 2015, defendant Roberts, while driving

defendant National Freight’s semi-truck, struck plaintiff’s semi-truck in Grundy County.

Plaintiff filed a tort complaint against defendants, alleging Roberts negligently operated the

vehicle at an excessive speed in the course of his employment as National Freight’s agent.

Plaintiff complained of and sought damages for back, shoulder, and knee injuries that occurred

as a result of the accident. He maintained the accident caused injuries to his back, shoulder,

and knee in interrogatories.

¶4 At the time of the accident, plaintiff drove the semi-truck for his employer, Manfredi

Mushroom Company (Manfredi), a Pennsylvania corporation. On or around March 31, 2015,

plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim against Manfredi in Pennsylvania for the injuries

he sustained in the course of his employment. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. During the

workers’ compensation proceedings, an independent medical examiner opined that plaintiff

suffered an injury to the right knee as a result of the March 6, 2015, accident. The independent

medical examiner also opined: “[r]elative to [plaintiff’s] lower back condition, the information

available to me today does not indicate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty any

injury to have been sustained by [plaintiff] relative to the lower back on or around March 6,

2015.”

¶5 On November 9, 2016, plaintiff signed a “Compromise and Release Agreement by

Stipulation” (Agreement) settling the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim. The

Agreement contained language pertinent to this appeal. Under the “Conclusions of Law”

section, the signed Agreement states it is “appropriately approved as binding only on the

signing Parties, and limited to their respective rights and obligations under the [Pennsylvania

Workers’ Compensation Act].” The Agreement also states it “is not to alter rights or

-2- obligations of any third party not a signatory to the Agreement.” In the body of the Agreement,

under “[s]tate the precise nature of the injury,” the description indicates “[r]ight knee strain.

The parties agree that Claimant did not sustain any other injury or medical condition as a result

of his 3/06/2015 work injury.” Plaintiff certified the complete Agreement by signature.

¶6 Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s tort claim, arguing the

claim was barred under the doctrines of (1) collateral estoppel, (2) res judicata, and (3) judicial

admission. Under their judicial admission argument, defendants maintained plaintiff could not

present evidence of injuries other than to his knee based on the signed Agreement. The circuit

court granted defendants’ motion, finding the above statement concerning the scope of

plaintiff’s injuries to be a judicial admission disclaiming other injuries. The circuit court’s

partial grant of summary judgment limited plaintiff’s tort claim injuries to knee issues. The

circuit court, however, rejected summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. Plaintiff

moved for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. Plaintiff dismissed the underlying

complaint as a result.

¶7 On January 17, 2019, this court issued a Rule 23 order (see Illinois Supreme Court Rule

23 (eff. Apr. 1, 2018)) reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendants. Plaintiff moved to publish the order as an opinion. On February 5, 2019, we

granted plaintiff’s motion and published the opinion the same day. Two days later, defendants

filed a petition for rehearing, which we granted. Plaintiff filed a response; defendants filed a

reply. We now consider defendants’ arguments anew.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 In the initial briefing, defendants urged this court to reject several of plaintiff’s arguments

for failure to raise them in the response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. When

-3- reading plaintiff’s response, we observed all the arguments included on appeal. Defendants

initially moved for summary judgment on three bases: (1) collateral estoppel, (2) res judicata,

and (3) judicial admission. Plaintiff addressed the same issues in his response to defendants’

motion as on appeal but not exclusively under the heading “Judicial Admission.” Plaintiff’s

arguments are therefore properly before this court. See Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc., 295

Ill. App. 3d 963, 978 (1998) (explaining it is longstanding law to require a legal theory be

raised in an initial response).

¶ 10 Plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment because the response to “[s]tate the precise nature of your injuries” is not a judicial

admission. Plaintiff points out language in the Agreement limiting its application as to plaintiff

and his former employer. Additionally, plaintiff submits that the statement was not made under

oath. Plaintiff points out that the statement is contradicted by his answers to interrogatories in

this matter. While the statement may properly be considered an evidentiary admission, plaintiff

contends the circuit court erred in finding it was a judicial admission.

¶ 11 A. Initial Disposition

¶ 12 In our initial disposition, we agreed with plaintiff that his statement in the Agreement did

not constitute a judicial admission. Therefore, we found that the circuit court erred when it

granted summary judgment on this issue. We adhere to this determination on rehearing.

¶ 13 Section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment when

the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). We review the record in the light most

-4- favorable to the nonmoving party. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007).

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Id.

¶ 14 There are two types of admissions: judicial and evidentiary. Judicial admissions are formal

admissions in the pleadings that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing

wholly with the need for proof of the fact. Konstant Products, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire

Insurance Co., 401 Ill. App. 3d 83, 86 (2010). For a statement to constitute a judicial

admission, it must be clear, unequivocal, and uniquely within the party’s personal knowledge.

Serrano v. Rotman, 406 Ill. App. 3d 900, 907 (2011). The statement must also be an intentional

statement that relates to concrete facts and not an inference or unclear summary. Id. Judicial

admissions “do not include admissions made during the course of other court proceedings.”

Green v. Jackson, 289 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1008 (1997). “Rather, such statements constitute

evidentiary admissions.” Id.

¶ 15 Evidentiary admissions may be explained by the party. Brummet v. Farel, 217 Ill. App. 3d

264, 267 (1991). “Evidentiary admissions may be made in, among other things, pleadings in a

case other than the one being tried ***.” Id. Whether plaintiff’s signed response in the

Agreement is a judicial admission is a question of law we review de novo. Hansen v. Ruby

Construction Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480 (1987).

¶ 16 Each case defendants cite on the issue of judicial admissions is distinguishable. In Hansen,

the plaintiff, during a deposition, said he fell as a result of rubber bumpers on the edge of a

loading dock. Id. at 477-78. He later attempted to change his answer to cite a different cause

for his fall. Id. at 478. The court properly treated his deposition testimony as a judicial

admission because the plaintiff made the statement in the course of the same proceeding. Id.

-5- at 482. Here, plaintiff signed the statement describing the scope of his injuries in a different

proceeding.

¶ 17 In Miller v. Miller, 167 Ill. App. 3d 176 (1988), the plaintiff filed a claim against the

defendants under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, ¶ 138.1

et seq.). He entered into a lump sum agreement disposing of all claims against the defendants.

Miller, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 180. The plaintiff then brought a common law negligence claim

against the same defendants. Id. at 177. The reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 181. The court found the Illinois

legislature intended the pursuit of recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act as a

replacement to recovery in a common lawsuit. Id. It also observed that the plaintiff already

fully recovered against the same defendants. Id. at 180. Here, the Agreement contains specific

language indicating it is not the exclusive remedy for plaintiff; it does not alter his right to

recovery against third parties. Additionally, plaintiff is seeking recovery against the alleged

tortfeasor and his employer from whom he has not yet recovered.

¶ 18 Defendants’ last case, Richter v. Village of Oak Brook, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, did not

deal with judicial admissions but, rather, issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

¶ 19 In sum, because plaintiff made a contradictory statement about the extent of his injuries in

a separate proceeding, the statement is properly characterized as an evidentiary admission.

Accordingly, the circuit court erred when it partially granted defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on this basis. In our original disposition, we reversed on this basis. However,

defendants have filed a petition for rehearing. Upon rehearing, we now affirm the circuit

court’s grant of partial summary judgment on an alternative basis.

¶ 20 B. Rehearing

-6- ¶ 21 On rehearing, defendants contend that this court overlooked their alternative argument that

summary judgment should be affirmed because plaintiff’s claims are barred under the doctrine

of collateral estoppel. We now address this argument. Specifically, defendants argue that

plaintiff should be estopped from seeking damages for injuries that are beyond those identified

in the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation Agreement. The circuit court rejected this

argument. However, for the reasons that follow, we find plaintiff’s claim is barred under the

doctrine of collateral estoppel.

¶ 22 We review de novo the trial court’s determination that the doctrine of collateral estoppel

does not apply to the plaintiff’s claims. State Building Venture v. O’Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151,

158 (2010) (citing In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 99 (2008)). Our function in undertaking such

review is to determine whether the circuit court reached the proper result. Northern Illinois

Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 216 Ill. 2d 294, 305 (2005). We

need not defer to the reasons given by the court for its decision or the findings on which its

decision is based. Id. Rather, we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any basis

appearing in the record, regardless of whether the lower court relied upon that basis. Id.

¶ 23 Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Application of the doctrine precludes a party

from relitigating an issue decided in a prior proceeding. Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167

Ill. 2d 288, 294 (1995). The minimum threshold requirements for the application of collateral

estoppel are (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented

in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication,

and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the

prior adjudication. Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Board, 78 Ill. 2d

1, 7 (1979).

-7- ¶ 24 There is no dispute that the first element of collateral estoppel is met. The issue in the

Pennsylvania workers’ compensation settlement is identical to the issue in the present case.

The workers’ compensation suit resolved the issue of the extent of plaintiff’s injuries following

the March 6, 2015, motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff’s present suit is for damages resulting

from the same March 6, 2015, accident.

¶ 25 The second element of collateral estoppel, i.e., a final judgment on the merits in the

previous adjudication, is also satisfied. The Agreement entered in the workers’ compensation

proceedings set the parties’ rights and liabilities based upon the agreed facts stated in the

Agreement. Thus, it qualified as a judgment on the merits. This is true even though the

Agreement came from a settlement between the parties rather than an independent

determination of the facts and issues. In Illinois, a settlement award entered by the Workers’

Compensation Commission is a final adjudication of all matters in dispute up to the time of the

agreement. Richter, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, ¶ 18 (citing Stromberg Motor Device Co. v.

Industrial Comm’n, 305 Ill. 619, 622 (1922)). 1 Consequently, the Agreement entered in the

Pennsylvania workers’ compensation proceedings acted as a final adjudication as to the extent

of plaintiff’s injuries.

¶ 26 Despite this, plaintiff claims that the language of the Agreement precludes a finding that

the Agreement acted as a final adjudication on the merits. The Agreement provided: “[t]his

Decision is entered into without adoption or litigated determination on the merits of the matters

agreed upon, and is not to alter the rights or obligations of any third party not a signatory to

1 The same is true under Pennsylvania law. See Holts v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., No. 3117, 2009 WL 8404585 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Aug. 4, 2011) (trial order); Frederick v. Action Tire Co., 744 A.2d 762, 766 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 615 A.2d 27 (Pa. 1992)); Christopher v. Council of Plymouth Township, 635 A.2d 749, 752-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). -8- this Agreement.” Since the Agreement specifically stated that nothing was “litigated,” plaintiff

contends that no final judgment occurred in the workers’ compensation proceedings.

¶ 27 We disagree. One flaw in plaintiff’s argument is that it conflates the terms “litigation” and

“prior adjudication.” For collateral estoppel to apply, a prior adjudication is required. Litigation

is not. Instead, only the incentive and opportunity to litigate is required. This is true so that a

failure to litigate the issue is, in fact, a concession of that issue. See Talarico v. Dunlap, 177

Ill. 2d 185, 192 (1997).

¶ 28 Plaintiff had both the incentive and opportunity to litigate the full extent of his injuries in

the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation proceedings. Those proceedings lasted more than a

year. During which, an independent medical examiner opined that plaintiff suffered an injury

to the right knee as a result of the March 6, 2015, accident. The independent medical examiner

also opined: “[r]elative to [plaintiff’s] lower back condition, the information available to me

today does not indicate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty any injury to have been

sustained by [plaintiff] relative to the lower back on or around March 6, 2015.” It makes sense

then that plaintiff ultimately narrowed his workers’ compensation claim. To that end, he

entered into the Agreement in which he certified that the only injury he sustained in the

accident occurred to his right knee. His failure to proceed with any additional injury claims

acted as a concession of those issues.

¶ 29 Moreover, plaintiff did indeed have an incentive to litigate the entire extent of his injuries

during the workers’ compensation proceedings. We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument

that he agreed to settle his workers’ compensation claim—limiting the extent of the injuries—

simply because he was out of work and needed money. It is true that “[i]ncentive to litigate

might be absent *** where the amount at stake in the first litigation was insignificant, or if the

-9- future litigation was not foreseeable.” Id. However, that is not the case here. Plaintiff had every

incentive to maximize the compensation he could obtain in the workers’ compensation

proceedings. It is curious that he claims he did not have the incentive to litigate the full extent

of his injuries when he did, in fact, attempt to obtain compensation for his alleged back injury.

Perhaps he lacked the incentive to pursue this because it was clear from the independent

medical examiner’s opinion that plaintiff would not successfully obtain compensation for the

claimed injury. He also concedes that he accepted the Agreement under the belief that he would

be filing a civil suit against defendants. In short, plaintiff’s argument that he had no incentive

to pursue compensation for his back injuries is meritless.

¶ 30 Further, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the workers’ compensation settlement

language prevents defendants from using the award as a bar to plaintiff’s recovery in this civil

action. As stated above (supra ¶ 25), a workers’ compensation settlement is an adjudication on

the merits. Even if one could contract around this law, the Agreement itself states that it does

not “alter the rights or obligations of any third party not a signatory to this Agreement.” The

plain language of the settlement agreement does not alter defendants’ rights. In other words, it

does not alter defendants’ right to raise the prior adjudication to bar plaintiff from relitigating

the issue in this case.

¶ 31 Finally, we find that the third element of collateral estoppel is satisfied. The third element

requires an identity of parties. Plaintiff in this action is the same party to the workers’

compensation case. See Todd v. Katz, 187 Ill. App. 3d 670, 674 (1989) (only the party against

whom estoppel is asserted must be the same or in privity with the party in the prior

adjudication). Consequently, we find all three requirements of collateral estoppel are met.

- 10 - Therefore, we hold that plaintiff is estopped from seeking compensation for any injury beyond

that contained in the Agreement.

¶ 32 In reaching this conclusion, we reject plaintiff’s contention that even if the threshold

requirements for collateral estoppel are present here, it would be unfair to apply the doctrine

under the present circumstances.

“A court’s determination not to apply collateral estoppel because of unfairness typically

rests either on some inadequacy in the forum in which the matter was first determined

(Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 296 (1995)), or on the view that the

party to be estopped did not previously have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

issue, perhaps because the party had no motivation to vigorously litigate the issue in

the earlier case (Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d at 192).” Richter, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, ¶ 25.

¶ 33 Here, neither factor is present. First, plaintiff makes no argument that the Pennsylvania

workers’ compensation forum varied in any meaningful way from the same type of

proceedings in Illinois. In Illinois, the procedural adequacy of workers’ compensation

proceedings has long been recognized by Illinois courts. See id. ¶ 26 (citing Stromberg, 305

Ill. 2d at 622). Second, as we have already found (supra ¶¶ 28-29), plaintiff had the full and

fair opportunity to litigate the extent of his injuries in Pennsylvania. We find no unfairness in

barring plaintiff from now complaining of additional injuries when he had the opportunity to

pursue those claims during the workers’ compensation proceedings.

- 11 - ¶ 34 In sum, we find all three elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied. Therefore, we hold

that the circuit court correctly granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment,

albeit, on different grounds. 2

¶ 35 CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Grundy County circuit court’s grant of summary

judgment.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

2 Having resolved this appeal on the basis of collateral estoppel, we need not reach defendants’ second alternative argument based on judicial estoppel. - 12 - No. 3-17-0777

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Grundy County, No. 16-L-21; the Hon. Lance R. Peterson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Michael W. Rathsack and Adam J. Zayed, both of Chicago, for for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Robert M. Burke and Garrett L. Boehm Jr., of Johnson & Bell, for Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees. Appellee:

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