Armour & Co. v. Block

95 S.E. 228, 147 Ga. 639, 1918 Ga. LEXIS 88
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 15, 1918
DocketNo. 260
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 95 S.E. 228 (Armour & Co. v. Block) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armour & Co. v. Block, 95 S.E. 228, 147 Ga. 639, 1918 Ga. LEXIS 88 (Ga. 1918).

Opinions

Hill, J.

When this ease was before this court on a former occasion the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. It was then ruled as follows: “1. Under the allegations in the petition, there was no error in refusing to dismiss it on general demurrer. 2. Where one succeeding to the rights of a lessor filed' an equitable petition against one who succeeded to the position of the original lessee, praying for an injunction to restrain the latter from removing certain fixtures from the premises, and the restraining order first granted was rescinded upon the defendant’s giving a bond to pay such damages as it might be found the plaintiff suffered by reason of the removal of such things from the premises, if it should be found that the removal was illegal, the giving of such a bond, or the removal of the property, would not furnish cause for dismissing the case. If damages covered by the order and bond should be established at the trial, they could be recovered under the prayer for general relief.” Armour v. Bloclc, 144 Ga. 295 (87 S. E. 18). A substantial statement of the plaintiff’s petition appears in the report of that case. On the return of the case to the lower court it was tried, and the verdict, under the evidence and the charge of the court, was in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of the proved value of the “smokehouse” which had been removed by the defendant. The allegation in the petition with reference to the trade-fixtures it may be important to repeat here. It was as follows: “That during the course of construction of said building, etc., described in said lease, and before the completion,- acceptance, and occupancy of the same on the part of the lessee named therein, a certain cooling room, smoke-room, elevator, refrigerator, cold storage ice-boxes with insulation and other fixtures, not Ijeing trade-fixtures but attached to and forming a part of the realty, were constructed as part of the said demised premises,” etc. It is to be noted that the former decision of this court was on demurrer, and was predicated on “the allegations of the petition,” one of which was that the fixtures were not trade-fixtures but were attached to and formed a part of the realty. Hnder such allegation this court held that the trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the petition. There the demurrer admitted the allegation that the fixture was not a trade-fixture. But the record now presents a different aspect. Here the contest is largely, if not entirely, an issue of whether the smokehouse as [641]*641constructed was a trade-fixture and could be removed by.the tenant before the expiration of the lease, as a matter of law, and also as a matter of contract. We will consider first the question whether the smokehouse was a trade-fixture as a matter of law and could be removed independently of any special contract to that effect. We will not discuss the question as to what constitutes a mere fixture, as it is not contended that the building in controversy is not a fixture, but whether it is a trade-fixture and can-be removed in either or both of the above ways.

Yarious definitions of “trade-fixtures” are given in other jurisdictions. See 4 Words and Phrases (3d ed.), 956. In 19 Cyc. 1065, it is said: “There is no precise definition of a ‘trade-fixture.’ In England it does not include additions by a farmer in aid of agriculture, but this distinction does not exist in the United States. Where additions to the realty are to the pecuniary advantage of the tenant, they are probably ‘trade-fixtures.’ ” In Bronson on. Fixtures, § 33, it is said: “Articles at cached to or erected upon the realty by the tenant for the purpose of assisting him in carrying on a trade are removable by him during his tenancy. . . The English decisions, particularly those of an early date, accorded to the tenant the right to remove his trade-fixtures during his term, provided that they were not so annexed as to materially injure the realty in their removal, or to cause the articles themselves to be reduced to a mere mass of crude materials, or to be destroyed. This general principle is followed, in its general tenor, by the American decisions, although there is a considerable respectable authority giving the right of removal of a trade-fixture to a tenant, irrespective of the fact that the articles, by their removal, may lose their essential characteristics as chattels, or be practically destroyed. This holding is upon the principle that the landlord can not be affected by injury done by the tenant to his own property, so long as the freehold is not damaged.” In Martin v. Eoe, 7 El. & Bl. 337, Lord Campbell said, in regard to injury by removal: “In all cases of this kind, injury to the freehold must be spoken of with less than literal strictness. A screw or a nail can scarcely be drawn without some attrition; and when all the harm done is that which is unavoidable to the mortar laid on the brick walls, this is so trifling that the law, which is reasonable, will regard it as none. Upon any other principle, the criterion of injury to the [642]*642freehold would be idle.” In Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio &c. Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 396 (12 Sup. Ct. 188, 35 L. ed. 1055), it was said, obiter, that “it is difficult to conceive that any fixture, however solid, permanent, and closely attached to the realty, placed there for the mere purposes of trade, may not be removed at the end of the term.” In Moore v. Wood, 12 Abb. Pr. (N Y.) 393, a brick chimney sunk three feet into the ground for a foundation, and not removable without being taken down in pieces, was held to be removable by the tenant. The court said: “The rigor of the ancient law of fixtures has yielded, and must continue to yield, to the contingencies of modern times. The law must take notice of trade and manufactures and their wants, and afford to them adequate and appropriate protection.” A vault built within a building for banking purposes, and a safe built within the vault, and too large to be removed without tearing down the vault, were both held to be trade-fixtures and to be, removable. Dostal v. McCaddon, 35 Iowa, 318. So a shed, stable, storeroom, and barn so erected and built upon and in a side hill as to be removable only upon being taken down, were held to be trade-fixtures. Dubois v. Kelly, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 496; and see Cromie v. Hoover, 40 Ind. 49; White’s Appeal, 10 Pa. St. 252. See also Baker v. McClurg, 198 Ill. 28 (64 N. E. 701, 59 L. R. A. 131, 92 Am. St. R. 261), where it was held that ovens upon brick foundations of their own, an engine and a boiler, the latter encased in a jacket of brick masonry, put there-by tenants, were removable as trade-fixtures, although they would be more or less injured by removal and would have to be taken down in pieces. In Yan Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137 (7 L. ed. 344), the court said: “But the question whether removable or not does depend upon the form or size of the building, whether it has a brick foundation or not, or is one or two stories high, or has a brick or other chimney. The sole question is whether it is designed for purposes of trade or not. A tenant may erect a large as well as a small messuage, or a soap boilery of one or two stories high, and on whatever foundations he may choose.” The principle ruled above is recognized in Carr v. Georgia Railroad, 74 Ga. 73, but what is there said seems to be obiter dictum. See Charleston &c. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 105 Gd. 1, 25 (30 S. E. 972, 70 Am. St. R. 17). The Yan Ness case,

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Bluebook (online)
95 S.E. 228, 147 Ga. 639, 1918 Ga. LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armour-co-v-block-ga-1918.