Armon v. Jones

580 F. Supp. 917, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19066
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 23, 1983
DocketCA3-80-1562-F
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 580 F. Supp. 917 (Armon v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armon v. Jones, 580 F. Supp. 917, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19066 (N.D. Tex. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

ROBERT W. PORTER, District Judge.

This cause of action is a complaint filed under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The prisoner, Plaintiff Thurman Wayne Armón, has alleged that the prison conditions and classifications at the Dallas County Jail are improper which led to the physical beating inflicted on him. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the assault. I. FACTS

The background facts of the case are generally not in dispute. On or about February 10, 1975, the Plaintiff Armón was in the lawful custody of Clarence Jones, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas. On that date, Plaintiff was transferred from tank 12-N-7 in the New Jail (classified for male felons, white/black, over 26 years of age, last names beginning A through J) to tank 6MN-1 in the Old Jail (classified for male felons, white, over 26 years, last names beginning with A through J). Apparently, the Plaintiff was moved in order to make room in the New Jail for additional prisoners. After the transfer and on the same day, Plaintiff was attacked by two other inmates, Michael Harp and Tommy J. Holt. No sheriffs department personnel witnessed or participated in the attack in question.

Plaintiff and both his attackers were white males, age 26, whose last names began with A through J. All three were awaiting trial for the following felonies: Armón, aggravated robbery; Harp, burglary of a habitation (habitual), burglary of a building (habitual), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (habitual); Holt, aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon (2 cases), injury to a witness (federal charge). Plaintiff when placed in jail was also charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon (2 cases), violating the Controlled Substance Act (2 cases), driving while intoxicated, and passing worthless checks. At some point in time, all of these additional charges were either dismissed or discharged.

Plaintiffs prior adjudicated record at Dallas County Sheriffs Department included: drunk, 1964, sentenced to 7 days and $89.00; robbery with firearms reduced to theft under $50.00, 1969, sentenced to 6 months; theft under $50.00, 1969, sentenced to 50 days; driving while license suspended, 1969, sentenced to 30 days; driving while intoxicated, 1969, sentenced to 75 days. Plaintiffs record at the Sheriff’s Department also had the following offenses which were either dismissed or disposition unknown: desertion of U.S. Army, 1960; simple assault, 1963; checks (Kansas) 1963; checks (Arkansas), 1963; vehicle theft, 1967; burglary, 1974; dangerous drugs, 1974.

The two attackers also had extensive records at the Sheriff’s Department. Michael Harp was convicted of: auto theft, 1965, sentenced to 5 years; armed robbery reduced to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 1966, sentenced to 2 years; at *920 tempted burglary, 1972, sentenced to 2 years. Prior offenses either dismissed or disposition unknown included sodomy (juvenile), 1962. Tommy Holt was convicted of assault and battery, 1965, fined $20.00; destruction of private property, 1965, fined $20.00; second degree burglary (2 cases), 1967, sentenced to 5 years each; robbery with firearms, 1970, sentenced to 17 years. Other offenses of record but dismissed or disposition unknown included 13 miscellaneous Oklahoma violations.

Plaintiff made no complaint about his injuries to the sheriffs personnel after the attack until his condition was noted in the morning of February 11, 1975, by a jail guard who promptly took Plaintiff to the nurse’s station. There does exist a dispute whether the jail guard or the Plaintiff’s attorney first noted and reported Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff states that his attorney first reported his injuries although his attorney by sworn affidavit apparently refutes such statements. Regardless of who reported the attack, Plaintiff’s medical treatment began as soon as he was taken to the nurse’s station at the jail. A physician examined Plaintiff early the next morning, after which time the Plaintiff was transferred to Parkland Memorial Hospital. Plaintiff received plastic surgery treatment for these same injuries sustained in the attack, resulting in a stay of about two weeks in the hospital. After Plaintiff was transferred back to the jail, he was placed in the Jail's hospital ward for continued recuperation.

The attackers of Plaintiff were later formally charged. Michael Harp was indicted for the offense of assault to which he pled guilty and was sentenced to 10 years in the Texas Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff did not have his jury trial for the offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon until after his hospitalization had ended. Plaintiff was convicted on October 23, 1975, and sentenced to 65 years in the Texas Department of Corrections on December 19, 1975. Plaintiff filed suit in this present case on November 25, 1980.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof falls upon the party seeking summary judgment and all reasonable doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are to be resolved against the moving party. Erco Industries, Ltd. v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 644 F.2d 424, 428 (5th Cir.1981); Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir.1980). Further, in considering such a motion, the district court must view the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Erco, supra at 428; Joplin v. Bias, 631 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir.1980).

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Defendants have forcefully argued that the statute of limitations has effectively blocked the bringing of this suit. Plaintiff was injured while in the Dallas County Jail on February 10, 1975. Suit was not filed by the Plaintiff until November 25, 1980, almost five years after the cause of action arose.

The statute of limitations which is applicable in this case is TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ann. Art. 5526, § 6 (Vernon’s 1979) which reads:

There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not after-wards, all actions or suits in court of the following descriptions: ... 6. Action for injury done to the person of another.

*921

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
580 F. Supp. 917, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19066, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armon-v-jones-txnd-1983.