In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00046-CR
ARMEN ALEX GRIGORYAN, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 31st District Court Wheeler County, Texas Trial Court No. 5536, Honorable Steven R. Emmert, Presiding
December 21, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Armen Alex Grigoryan, was convicted by
the trial court of money laundering with funds valued at $30,000 or more but less than
$150,000, a third degree felony.1 He was sentenced to eight years’ confinement and
assessed an $8,000 fine. Appellant challenges his conviction by three issues contending
(1) the evidence is insufficient, (2) trial counsel was ineffective, and (3) he was denied a
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(e)(2). fair trial by not having a neutral and detached factfinder. The State did not favor this Court
with a brief. We reverse and render.
BACKGROUND
Appellant and his father, originally from Armenia, reside in California. Appellant is
the general manager of his father’s profitable automotive oil distribution business. In
November 2021, he and his father traveled to Arkansas in a van belonging to Appellant’s
brother to hire contractors for an investment property.2 After they arrived in Arkansas,
Appellant’s wife called him and insisted he return home for Thanksgiving. Complying with
his wife’s request, Appellant left his father in a motel and began the drive to California on
Interstate 40. While traveling through Wheeler County, Texas, he was stopped for a traffic
violation. Appellant stopped the van beyond the shoulder of the road near a ditch.
The deputy who initiated the stop became suspicious Appellant was involved in
human trafficking because he was the sole passenger in a van. He began issuing a
warning for the traffic violation and questioned Appellant about his travels and whether
he had anything illegal with him or any amounts of money. According to the deputy,
Appellant told him he was traveling from Arkansas to California, disclosed he had
approximately $2,000 to $3,000 in cash, and denied having any contraband. Appellant
explained he traveled with cash because his bank card was sometimes inoperable.
After the deputy issued the warning, he asked if he could search the van to which
Appellant consented without hesitation. The deputy’s suspicion was piqued because
2 Appellant testified he accompanied his father because of his health issues and inability to speak
English well. 2 Appellant had pulled off the road beyond the pavement which he described as “highly
abnormal from the motoring public.” He was also suspicious of air fresheners in the van,
and he doubted Appellant’s travel itinerary.
During a search of the van at the scene, the deputy observed an empty mini-fridge,
a bag of chips, food wrappers, blankets, an air mattress, and two five-gallon trash bags
in the rear of the van which contained clothing and cash totaling $122,000. The cash was
bundled by rubber bands. Based on his training and experience, the deputy read
Appellant his rights and arrested him for money laundering.
Appellant and the van were transported to the jail. A secondary search of the van
revealed $2,000 behind the driver’s seat which Appellant had previously disclosed, but
he denied any knowledge of the cash in the trash bags.
A K-9 deputy and his trained narcotics dog were asked to “run a money line” which
involved placing the confiscated cash in various boxes to determine whether the odor of
narcotics was present on the cash. The dog did not alert on any of the boxes.
The dog was then tasked with detecting the odor of narcotics on the exterior of the
van.3 The K-9 deputy testified the dog “showed interest” by the back passenger door and
rear fender wheel area. He explained that a positive alert indicated narcotics were in the
van at some point. However, no drugs, paraphernalia, or illegal contraband were found
in the van or on Appellant.
3 The van was in an enclosed sally port at the time of the K-9 search.
3 Appellant was indicted for “knowingly possess[ing] the proceeds of criminal
activity, namely selling a controlled substance . . . .” (Emphasis added). At a bench trial,
the State presented the arresting deputy as a witness and the K-9 deputy as an expert
witness. The arresting deputy, constantly prefacing his answers with his “training and
experience” and “totality of the circumstances,”4 testified that traveling on Interstate 40, a
known drug corridor, with air fresheners, food wrappers, blankets, and a large amount of
cash were indicators of drug trafficking. He also disbelieved Appellant’s reason for
traveling between California and Arkansas in a short period of time. During cross-
examination, however, he conceded it was not illegal to drive with air fresheners, possess
bundled cash, or travel along Interstate 40 between California and Arkansas. He also
conceded that at the time of the stop, he was merely suspicious. He agreed he did not
find any indicia of drug dealing such as ledgers, scales, or baggies, and Appellant was
not in a suspicious place at the time of his arrest.
The K-9 deputy, testifying as an expert for the first time, explained his dog’s training
and confirmed the dog did not alert on the money line but did alert on the exterior of the
van. During cross-examination, when asked if a positive alert on the van could distinguish
between possession or sale of narcotics, the deputy answered, “so my K-9 alerting on the
vehicle would not indicate that he was in possession, transporting, selling, consuming.”
Appellant testified in his own defense. When he and his father began their journey,
his father loaded the van first and then picked him up. Appellant was unaware of the
4 “Totality of the circumstances” was invoked over a dozen times prompting defense counsel to ask
that the record reflect the prosecutor was coaching the deputy by nodding his head and in a separate instance stating “you can say totality of the circumstances all you want. I’m sure you talked to counsel about that.” 4 trash bags of cash when he loaded his belongings which were in a plastic grocery type
bag. He believed the cash in the trash bags belonged to his father because his father
distrusted banks and needed cash to hire contractors in Arkansas.5 He explained he was
in Arkansas for only a short time because his wife insisted he return to California for
Thanksgiving.
Appellant’s father, through a translator, testified and claimed ownership of the cash
bundled in rubber bands. He explained he bought the property in Arkansas as an
investment and planned to hire contractors to develop the property.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found Appellant guilty. After a
very brief punishment phase, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years’
confinement and assessed an $8,000 fine.
ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant contends his conviction for money laundering is based on mere
speculation regarding a large amount of cash rendering the evidence insufficient to
support his conviction. We agree.
The State was required to prove Appellant knowingly possessed proceeds of
criminal activity in an amount of $30,000 or more but less than $150,000. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1), (e).
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00046-CR
ARMEN ALEX GRIGORYAN, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 31st District Court Wheeler County, Texas Trial Court No. 5536, Honorable Steven R. Emmert, Presiding
December 21, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Armen Alex Grigoryan, was convicted by
the trial court of money laundering with funds valued at $30,000 or more but less than
$150,000, a third degree felony.1 He was sentenced to eight years’ confinement and
assessed an $8,000 fine. Appellant challenges his conviction by three issues contending
(1) the evidence is insufficient, (2) trial counsel was ineffective, and (3) he was denied a
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(e)(2). fair trial by not having a neutral and detached factfinder. The State did not favor this Court
with a brief. We reverse and render.
BACKGROUND
Appellant and his father, originally from Armenia, reside in California. Appellant is
the general manager of his father’s profitable automotive oil distribution business. In
November 2021, he and his father traveled to Arkansas in a van belonging to Appellant’s
brother to hire contractors for an investment property.2 After they arrived in Arkansas,
Appellant’s wife called him and insisted he return home for Thanksgiving. Complying with
his wife’s request, Appellant left his father in a motel and began the drive to California on
Interstate 40. While traveling through Wheeler County, Texas, he was stopped for a traffic
violation. Appellant stopped the van beyond the shoulder of the road near a ditch.
The deputy who initiated the stop became suspicious Appellant was involved in
human trafficking because he was the sole passenger in a van. He began issuing a
warning for the traffic violation and questioned Appellant about his travels and whether
he had anything illegal with him or any amounts of money. According to the deputy,
Appellant told him he was traveling from Arkansas to California, disclosed he had
approximately $2,000 to $3,000 in cash, and denied having any contraband. Appellant
explained he traveled with cash because his bank card was sometimes inoperable.
After the deputy issued the warning, he asked if he could search the van to which
Appellant consented without hesitation. The deputy’s suspicion was piqued because
2 Appellant testified he accompanied his father because of his health issues and inability to speak
English well. 2 Appellant had pulled off the road beyond the pavement which he described as “highly
abnormal from the motoring public.” He was also suspicious of air fresheners in the van,
and he doubted Appellant’s travel itinerary.
During a search of the van at the scene, the deputy observed an empty mini-fridge,
a bag of chips, food wrappers, blankets, an air mattress, and two five-gallon trash bags
in the rear of the van which contained clothing and cash totaling $122,000. The cash was
bundled by rubber bands. Based on his training and experience, the deputy read
Appellant his rights and arrested him for money laundering.
Appellant and the van were transported to the jail. A secondary search of the van
revealed $2,000 behind the driver’s seat which Appellant had previously disclosed, but
he denied any knowledge of the cash in the trash bags.
A K-9 deputy and his trained narcotics dog were asked to “run a money line” which
involved placing the confiscated cash in various boxes to determine whether the odor of
narcotics was present on the cash. The dog did not alert on any of the boxes.
The dog was then tasked with detecting the odor of narcotics on the exterior of the
van.3 The K-9 deputy testified the dog “showed interest” by the back passenger door and
rear fender wheel area. He explained that a positive alert indicated narcotics were in the
van at some point. However, no drugs, paraphernalia, or illegal contraband were found
in the van or on Appellant.
3 The van was in an enclosed sally port at the time of the K-9 search.
3 Appellant was indicted for “knowingly possess[ing] the proceeds of criminal
activity, namely selling a controlled substance . . . .” (Emphasis added). At a bench trial,
the State presented the arresting deputy as a witness and the K-9 deputy as an expert
witness. The arresting deputy, constantly prefacing his answers with his “training and
experience” and “totality of the circumstances,”4 testified that traveling on Interstate 40, a
known drug corridor, with air fresheners, food wrappers, blankets, and a large amount of
cash were indicators of drug trafficking. He also disbelieved Appellant’s reason for
traveling between California and Arkansas in a short period of time. During cross-
examination, however, he conceded it was not illegal to drive with air fresheners, possess
bundled cash, or travel along Interstate 40 between California and Arkansas. He also
conceded that at the time of the stop, he was merely suspicious. He agreed he did not
find any indicia of drug dealing such as ledgers, scales, or baggies, and Appellant was
not in a suspicious place at the time of his arrest.
The K-9 deputy, testifying as an expert for the first time, explained his dog’s training
and confirmed the dog did not alert on the money line but did alert on the exterior of the
van. During cross-examination, when asked if a positive alert on the van could distinguish
between possession or sale of narcotics, the deputy answered, “so my K-9 alerting on the
vehicle would not indicate that he was in possession, transporting, selling, consuming.”
Appellant testified in his own defense. When he and his father began their journey,
his father loaded the van first and then picked him up. Appellant was unaware of the
4 “Totality of the circumstances” was invoked over a dozen times prompting defense counsel to ask
that the record reflect the prosecutor was coaching the deputy by nodding his head and in a separate instance stating “you can say totality of the circumstances all you want. I’m sure you talked to counsel about that.” 4 trash bags of cash when he loaded his belongings which were in a plastic grocery type
bag. He believed the cash in the trash bags belonged to his father because his father
distrusted banks and needed cash to hire contractors in Arkansas.5 He explained he was
in Arkansas for only a short time because his wife insisted he return to California for
Thanksgiving.
Appellant’s father, through a translator, testified and claimed ownership of the cash
bundled in rubber bands. He explained he bought the property in Arkansas as an
investment and planned to hire contractors to develop the property.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found Appellant guilty. After a
very brief punishment phase, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years’
confinement and assessed an $8,000 fine.
ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant contends his conviction for money laundering is based on mere
speculation regarding a large amount of cash rendering the evidence insufficient to
support his conviction. We agree.
The State was required to prove Appellant knowingly possessed proceeds of
criminal activity in an amount of $30,000 or more but less than $150,000. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1), (e). “Proceeds” are funds acquired or derived directly or
indirectly from, produced through, or realized through some criminal activity. § 34.01(4).
5 Appellant’s father’s distrust was the result of financial dealings with banks in Armenia.
5 “Criminal activity” is defined as any offense, including a preparatory offense, classified as
a felony. Id. at (1)(A).
The only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d
854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). We consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, any
rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
We give deference to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts
in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Each
fact need not point directly and independently to the appellant’s guilt, as long as the
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Id.
Appellant relies heavily on this Court’s decision in Deschenes v. State, 253 S.W.3d
374, 386 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d), in which the appellant’s conviction was
reversed and a judgment of acquittal rendered under strikingly similar circumstances.
Deschenes was driving a rental car and was stopped for speeding on Interstate 40, a
route known by the trooper to be used by drug smugglers. Id. at 376–77. The trooper
6 became suspicious when he observed empty beverage containers and food wrappers
which gave the car’s interior a “lived-in” look. He also detected Deschenes was nervous.
He disbelieved Deschenes’s travel destination. After he was issued a warning,
Deschenes gave consent for a search of the car. No evidence of drugs or contraband
was found in the car’s interior but when the trooper searched the trunk of the car, he
observed three pieces of luggage—one contained clothing and hygiene items, a second
was empty, and a smaller bag contained bundles of cash held together by rubber bands.
Appellant admitted, “Okay, I lied.” Id. The trooper also found scales in one of the bags.
Id. at 377. A DPS canine was called to run the car. The canine did not alert to the interior
or exterior but did alert to the small bag containing the cash and the large empty bag. Id.
Deschenes was arrested and convicted for money laundering.
During trial, the State referenced “drug trafficking” and “drug smuggling” but did
not connect Deschenes and the cash to an identified felony.6 Id. at 378. To prove its
case, the State relied on the trooper’s testimony that drug proceeds “shipped to the east
come back westbound to either the originator who sent the drugs or someone that’s going
to purchase narcotics or weapons or whatever the contraband may be.” Id. at 381. This
Court found the trooper’s testimony “speculative” and without probative value without a
connection between the cash and drug trafficking. Id. For a money laundering conviction
to stand, “there must be direct or circumstantial evidence of a temporal connection, or
nexus, between the money and some criminal activity.” Id.
6 The indictment charging Deschenes was defective because it did not specify a particular felony,
but he waived the issue on appeal. At trial, however, the State argued the cash came from “sales and trafficking in narcotics.” Deschenes, 253 S.W.3d at 380. 7 As in the case before us, in Deschenes, the State relied on numerous profiling
characteristics and a positive alert by a narcotics canine to establish a connection
between the cash and criminal activity. This Court found such “evidence” to be mere
conjecture.” Id. at 382–83. No credible evidence was presented to infer Deschenes was
involved in a drug transaction, sale, or delivery at or around the time of his arrest for
money laundering. Id. at 385. He had no prior conviction related to drugs, no relationship
with drug trafficking, and he did not attempt to hide the cash in packaging designed to
prevent its detection. Id.
In the underlying case, the State similarly used profiling characteristics to justify
charging Appellant with money laundering. Unlike the scales found in Deschenes and
his admission that he lied, here, the arresting deputy admitted Appellant told the truth
about the $2,000 that was found behind the driver’s seat and that he was not carrying
anything illegal in the van. Thus, the evidence in this case is weaker than the evidence
presented in Deschenes.7
Appellant testified the van belonged to his brother and he used it “just a little bit.”
He testified he has never been involved in the narcotics business. He acknowledged a
misdemeanor theft conviction in 2003 but did not have any felony convictions. The K-9
deputy testified the positive alert on the van did not indicate Appellant was involved in the
sale of narcotics—the specific offense charged as the criminal activity element of money
7 Under the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, this Court must follow materially indistinguishable
decisions of earlier panels of the same court unless a higher authority has superseded that prior decision. See Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022). Deschenes has not been superseded by this Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals. 8 laundering. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a nexus between the
cash found in the trash bags and the sale of narcotics. Appellant’s first issue is sustained.
Our disposition of issue one pretermits consideration of his remaining two issues.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is reversed, and a judgment of acquittal is hereby
rendered.
Alex Yarbrough Justice
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