Armando P. Castillo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 31, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-1571
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 31 2018, 10:12 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jack Quirk Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Quirk & Hunter PC Attorney General of Indiana Muncie, Indiana Tyler G. Banks Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Armando P. Castillo, October 31, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1571 v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C02-1702-F4-6

Kirsch, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 1 of 10 [1] Armando P. Castillo (“Castillo”) was convicted after a bench trial of sexual

misconduct with a minor1 as a Level 4 felony and sentenced to eight years

executed in the Department of Correction. He appeals his conviction and raises

the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony regarding Castillo’s answers during his interview with police; and

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Castillo’s conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] In the summer of 2015, J.C. was fifteen years old and lived in a three-bedroom

home with her family, which included her five siblings, her mother, and her

stepfather, Castillo. Tr. Vol. II at 37-39, 43. J.C.’s mother and Castillo were in

one bedroom, her adult brother was in another, and J.C. shared a bedroom

with her sisters. Id. at 39. Her brother was in college at the time, and her

mother was employed and worked mornings on the weekends and afternoons

on the weekdays, after picking up the children from school. Id. at 40, 70. In

the summer of 2015, Castillo began sexually abusing J.C. Id. at 43.

1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 2 of 10 [4] The sexual abuse occurred in the family’s house, typically on Tuesdays and

Thursdays. Id. at 43-44. On Tuesdays and Thursdays, J.C.’s sisters would be at

dance lessons, her mom would be working, and her brother would be visiting

his biological father, so J.C. and Castillo would be home alone. Id. at 44.

Castillo would either call or text J.C. to come to his bedroom and ask her to

bring him coffee or food. Id. at 45. When J.C. entered the room, Castillo

would lock the bedroom door and tell her to remove all of her clothes. Id. at

46. If J.C. refused, Castillo would remove them himself while holding her

hands down. Id. at 47, 51. Once J.C. was naked, Castillo would touch her bare

breasts and vagina with his hands. Id. at 47. Castillo would then insert his penis

into J.C.’s vagina. Id. at 48. He would continue the sexual intercourse until he

would tell her, “I’m coming. Hold on. I’m coming.” Id. at 48. Castillo would

ejaculate inside of her, except for the one or two occasions that he used a

condom and would then “pull out.” Id. at 48-49. If J.C. attempted to resist the

sexual intercourse, Castillo would “get mad” and would be more aggressive

and “go harder” when having sex with her. Id. at 52-52.

[5] Although these sexual acts usually occurred when no one else was in the house,

occasionally her siblings or mother would be at home. Id. at 52. If her mother

was home, Castillo would not have intercourse with J.C., but would only touch

her breasts and vagina. Id. Occasionally, one of J.C.’s sisters would be home

during these sexual acts and would knock on Castillo’s locked bedroom door.

Id. at 53. When this happened, Castillo would cover J.C.’s mouth and tell

whoever was knocking to wait because he was “trying to talk to your sister.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 3 of 10 Id. at 53, 82. One of J.C.’s sisters later recalled hearing J.C. screaming in

Castillo’s room, but the sister ignored it because she thought that J.C. had fallen

“or something.” Id. at 81-82.

[6] This sexual abuse continued from the summer of 2015 until January 2017. J.C.

did not disclose the abuse earlier because she was scared. Id. at 53-54. To keep

J.C. from disclosing, Castillo would tell her that if they “didn’t have him [they]

would have no money . . .[and] would be on the streets” because J.C.’s mother

“wasn’t making enough for us to not have another income.” Id. at 54.

Therefore, J.C. worried that her sisters “would go hungry.” Id. She finally told

a friend about the sexual abuse while communicating through a messaging app

that J.C. used on a family member’s iPad. Id. at 61-62. The family member

found the conversation and brought it to the attention of J.C.’s mother. Id. On

January 26, 2017, J.C.’s mother then took J.C. to the hospital for an

examination and testing for sexually transmitted diseases. Id. at 42.

[7] J.C.’s mother confronted Castillo about molesting J.C., and he responded that

“he couldn’t believe that I was believing [J.C.] and . . . making him leave.” Id.

at 112-13. He then stated, “I might as well run.” Id. at 113. In the five days

between Castillo’s abuse of J.C. being discovered and Castillo’s arrest, he made

twenty-six Internet searches about bus and plane fares. Id. at 139, 143. During

the investigation of Castillo, Muncie Police Department Officer Kristofer

Swanson (“Officer Swanson”) interviewed Castillo. Officer Swanson was a

member of the Sexual Molest and Abuse Response Team within the Muncie

Police Department and had investigated several hundred sexual abuse cases.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 4 of 10 Id. at 126-27, 149. When asked about the allegations that he had molested J.C.,

Castillo denied any sexual contact with J.C. Id. at 146-47.

[8] On February 7, 2017, the State charged Castillo with Level 4 felony sexual

misconduct with a minor. Castillo waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench

trial was held. At trial, a video of Officer Swanson’s interview with Castillo

was admitted into evidence and played for the trial court. Officer Swanson

testified and was asked how he would characterize Castillo’s answers to his

questions in the interview. Id. at 136. Castillo objected to the question as

irrelevant and as invading the province of the trier of fact, but his objection was

overruled. Id. at 136-37. Officer Swanson responded to the question, “I felt like

he was avoiding answering the questions I was talking about and being

evasive.” Id. at 137. At the conclusion of the trial, Castillo was found guilty of

Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and the trial court sentenced

him to eight years executed. Castillo now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Testimony [9] “Questions regarding the admission of evidence are entrusted to the sound

discretion of the trial court.” Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2015), trans. denied. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision on

appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its

discretion only if its decision regarding the admission of evidence is clearly

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 5 of 10 court has misinterpreted the law. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we

consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,

but we also consider any undisputed evidence that is favorable to the defendant.

Id. Further, even if the admission of evidence is erroneous, the error is harmless

unless it affects the substantial rights of the defendant. Cannon v. State, 99

N.E.3d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[10] Castillo argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Officer

Swanson to testify that he thought Castillo’s answers during his interview were

evasive. Castillo contends that Officer Swanson’s testimony was not rationally

“based on witness perception” and “was not offered to help clear any

understanding of the witness testimony or determine a fact in issue.” Appellant’s

Br. at 11. Therefore, Castillo asserts that Officer Swanson’s testimony invaded

the province of the trier of fact, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the

statement at trial.

[11] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 701, any witness not testifying as an expert, may

testify “in the form of an opinion” if it is “(a) rationally based on the perception

of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s

testimony or determination of a fact in issue.” “The requirement that the

opinion be ‘rationally based’ on perception simply means that the opinion must

be one that a reasonable person could normally form from the perceived facts,”

which are facts received “directly through any of the [witness’s own] senses.”

Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted). The

witness’s opinion is “helpful” “if the testimony gives substance to facts, which

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 6 of 10 were difficult to articulate.” Id. (quoting McCutchan v. Blanck, 846 N.E.2d 256,

262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).

[12] Here, during his investigation, Officer Swanson conducted an interview of

Castillo and was able to evaluate and personally observe Castillo’s answers to

the questions and his demeanor during the interview. Tr. Vol. II at 133-38.

Thus, Officer Swanson’s opinion was based on his personal perceptions gained

directly through his own senses while questioning Castillo. Additionally,

Officer Swanson’s testimony regarding Castillo’s answers to the interview

questions was helpful to the trial court because it explained why Officer

Swanson raised his voice toward the end of the interview. Specifically, the

State asked Officer Swanson, “I think in the video we saw a, towards the end

your voice raise. How would you characterize the answers that the Defendant

was giving you?” Id. at 136. Based on this question, it was clear that the State

was attempting to establish why Officer Swanson may have appeared frustrated

with Castillo during the interview. Therefore, the testimony was helpful to a

clear understanding of Officer Swanson’s testimony and his behavior while

interviewing Castillo. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it admitted Officer Swanson’s testimony pursuant to Indiana

Evidence Rule 701.

[13] Even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer Swanson’s testimony, the error

was harmless. J.C. testified extensively regarding the sexual abuse she endured

from Castillo and how he would force her to have sexual intercourse. Castillo

has not shown how this sole characterization by Officer Swanson of Castillo’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 7 of 10 interview answers as being evasive prejudiced his substantial rights and requires

reversal. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it admitted Officer Swanson’s testimony, and even if it was error to do so,

it was harmless.

II. Sufficient Evidence [14] The deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. When

we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we do not

reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Boggs v. State,

928 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We consider only the

evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from this evidence. Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 75 (Ind. Ct. App.

2014), trans. denied. We also consider conflicting evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013), trans. denied. We will not disturb the verdict if there is substantial

evidence of probative value to support it. Fuentes, 10 N.E.3d at 75. We will

affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Delagrange v. State, 5 N.E.3d 354, 356 (Ind.

2014). A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of

a single witness, even when that witness is the victim. Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.3d

644, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[15] Castillo argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. He asserts that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 8 of 10 there was no physical evidence presented “that any type of sexual penetration

or misconduct of any kind took place.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Castillo further

alleges that, “[t]he State made no effort to obtain medical evidence to support

its claim of sexual misconduct with a minor.” Id. He also contends that no

witnesses testified that they observed any behavior that amounted to sexual

intercourse or sexual misconduct. Based on this, Castillo maintains that the

State failed to meet its burden and that insufficient evidence was presented to

support his conviction.

[16] In order to support Castillo’s conviction for Level 4 felony sexual misconduct

with a minor, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Castillo was “a person at least twenty-one . . . years of age” who “perform[ed]

or submit[ted] to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct” with a “child at

least fourteen . . . years of age but less than sixteen . . . years of age.” Ind. Code

§ 35-42-4-9(a)(1).

[17] Here, the evidence most favorable to the verdict showed that J.C. testified that

she was fifteen years old at the time when Castillo first forced her to have sexual

intercourse, and it is undisputed that Castillo was older than twenty-one years

old during the relevant time period. Tr. Vol. II at 35, 43; Appellant’s Public App.

Vol. 2 at 18. At trial, J.C. testified that Castillo, on multiple occasions, would

force her to have sexual intercourse. She testified that he would call her to his

room, lock the door, demand that she remove her clothes, and then insert his

penis into her vagina until he ejaculated. Tr. Vol. II at 45-49. In her testimony,

she recalled that Castillo forced her to have sexual intercourse numerous times,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 9 of 10 but that he only used a condom once or twice. Id. at 48-50. J.C. recounted that

if she resisted the sexual encounters, Castillo would force her to submit to

sexual intercourse and would be more aggressive and “go harder” when having

sex with her. Id. at 52-52. J.C.’s testimony established that Castillo engaged in

sexual intercourse with her against her will when she was between the ages of

fourteen and sixteen, and he was over the age of twenty-one. A conviction can

be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even

when that witness is the victim. Dalton, 56 N.E.3d at 648. We, therefore,

conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Castillo’s

conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony.

[18] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 10 of 10