Arimilli v. Rezendes

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Nirmala Arimilli, No. CV-21-00345-PHX-GMS

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Keith Rezendes,

13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Before the Court are Plaintiff Nirmala Arimilli’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Personal 17 Protective Order (Doc. 25), Motion to Freeze Assets (Doc. 26), and Motion for Writ Ne 18 Exeat (Doc. 27). Also before the Court is Defendant Keith Rezendes’s (“Defendant”) 19 Motion to Strike the above motions (Doc. 31). For the following reasons, Defendant’s 20 Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff filed various tort claims against Defendant, arising from Defendant’s 23 business transactions. Plaintiff alleges that she was misled into investing in Defendant’s 24 unsuccessful business and suffered financial and emotional harm as a result. 25 She filed her action in state court in October 2020 and filed an amended complaint 26 that included federal claims in January 2021. Defendant removed the action to this Court. 27 Having been granted leave to amend her complaint multiple times, Plaintiff filed her Fourth 28 Amended Complaint on June 24, 2022. Shortly thereafter, she filed three of the motions 1 at issue here: Motion for Personal Protective Order, Motion to Freeze Assets, and Motion 2 for Writ Ne Exeat (Docs. 25, 26, 27). 3 Plaintiffs motions all stem from the same allegations. She alleges that based on 4 prior conversations with Defendant, she fears for her safety and has reason to believe 5 Defendant will engage in unlawful activity and/or flee the country if the Court does not 6 intervene. For those reasons, she asks the Court to issue a personal protective order, freeze 7 Defendant’s assets, and seize his passport to prevent him from leaving the country. 8 Defendant moves to strike the protective order, freeze assets, and writ ne exeat 9 motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) on the grounds that they contain 10 scandalous and unsupported attacks against Defendant. Alternatively, Defendant moves 11 to strike Plaintiff’s motions (including a Motion for Joinder, the merits of which are not 12 addressed by this Order) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Local Rule of 13 Civil Procedure 7.2(m) on the grounds that they do not have a proper legal basis. 14 DISCUSSION 15 I. Defendant’s Motion to Strike 16 A. Motion to Strike 17 Defendant’s Motion to Strike is granted in part pursuant to the Court’s inherent 18 authority to manage its docket. Although Defendant relies on Rule 11, Rule 12(f), and 19 Local Rule 7.2(m) to support his Motion to Strike, none of these rules provide a sufficient 20 legal basis for striking the motions. Nevertheless, pursuant to its inherent authority to 21 manage its docket, the Court strikes the Motion for Personal Protective Order, Motion to 22 Freeze Assets, and Motion for Writ Ne Exeat. 23 First, these motions are without legal merit. As to Plaintiff’s request for a personal 24 protective order, it is unclear what type of protective order she seeks and what legal basis 25 she relies on for such an order. Plaintiff asserts that she fears for her safety based on 26 Defendant’s prior comments and actions. However, to the extent that she seeks a protective 27 order for her safety based on state law, this Court is not the proper forum to provide such 28 relief. To the extent she seeks a protective order based on federal law or procedure, it is 1 unclear what form of protection she seeks, and thus, whether this Court is able to issue such 2 an order. 3 Plaintiff’s Motion to Freeze Defendant’s assets lacks a proper legal basis. Plaintiff 4 relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 to assert that the Court should freeze the 5 Defendant’s assets. That rule, however, establishes that when securing satisfaction of a 6 potential judgment, any remedy available in state court is available in federal court. Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 64(a). The rule itself does not grant the Court independent authority to freeze or 8 seize any of Defendant’s assets prior to litigation. To the extent the Court could construe 9 this motion as a motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff does not address any of the 10 factors necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction. See Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. 11 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 12 Plaintiff’s Motion for Writ Ne Exeat likewise lacks a proper legal basis. “The power 13 to issue a writ ne exeat republica is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7402, which provides that 14 district courts ‘shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions, writs and 15 orders of injunction, and of ne exeat republica . . . as may be necessary or appropriate for 16 the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.’” Maehr v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 18-cv- 17 02948, 2020 WL 967754, at *7 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2020). In order to issue a writ ne exeat, 18 “a court must be satisfied that ‘the restraint of liberty is a necessary, and not merely 19 coercive and convenient, method of enforcement.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Shaheen, 20 445 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1971)). Thus, the purpose of the writ “is to aid the sovereign to 21 compel a citizen to pay his taxes.” Shaheen, 445 F.2d at 9-10. The circumstances of this 22 case do not permit the Court to issue such a writ because this case does not involve 23 enforcement of any internal revenue laws, and to do so would unduly restrain Defendant’s 24 liberty. 25 To the extent Plaintiff requests a preliminary injunction with this motion, she does 26 not address any of the factors necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction. See Winter, 27 555 U.S. at 20. 28 In filing documents without any legal merit, Plaintiff places serious allegations 1 about Defendant in the public record that appear to be irrelevant to the proceedings at hand. 2 Courts have an “inherent authority to manage [their] dockets . . . with a view toward the 3 efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016). 4 Of course, “inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers 5 v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). And “[a] primary aspect of that discretion is the ability 6 to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Id. at 7 44-45. 8 Although Plaintiff’s motions may not have been filed in bad faith, the content of the 9 motions is almost wholly irrelevant to her underlying claims. In the three motions 10 discussed above, Plaintiff accuses Defendant of attempted murder, among other serious 11 criminal acts. One of the accusations relates to Defendant’s actions toward an anonymous 12 individual who does not appear to be relevant to this case. The other accusations relate to 13 the Plaintiff, but it is unclear how they relate to the litigation at issue because Plaintiff’s 14 primary claims in this case are torts related to her business relationship with the Defendant. 15 Moreover, even Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 16 distress do not allege the facts that she asserts in the Motion for Personal Protective Order, 17 Motion to Freeze Assets, and Motion for Writ Ne Exeat. Thus, not only do the allegations 18 in the motion “have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation,” but they 19 “unnecessarily reflect[] on the moral character” of the Defendant. Rosendahl, 2011 WL 20 4914948 at *9; Pigford, 215 F.R.D. at 4. Plaintiff may not use the judicial process to levy 21 unsupported allegations against Defendant, especially when the allegations have no 22 bearing on the outcome of this case. Although the Motion to Strike does not fall squarely 23 within Rule 12(f), Rule 11, or Local Rule 7.2(m), Plaintiff’s motions are stricken pursuant 24 to the Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket and craft sanctions sufficient to 25 address abuse of the judicial process. 26 Defendant’s Motion to Strike is denied as to Plaintiff’s Motion for Joinder, however. 27 As noted above, none of the rules Defendant relies on are proper grounds to strike the 28 motion. Plaintiff’s motion lists five named parties and eight unknown parties that she 1 requests the Court to add to the action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 authorizes the 2 Court to add or drop a party “[o]n motion or on its own,” and Federal Rules of Civil 3 Procedure 19 and 20 address the requirements for required or permissive joinder. Thus, in 4 light of the policy that “we continue to construe pro se filings liberally,” the Court cannot 5 say that the motion is “not authorized by any law,” as Defendant claims. Hebbe v. Pliler, 6 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); (Doc. 31 at 9). Additionally, unlike the above motions, 7 the Motion for Joinder does not contain unfounded or irrelevant allegations against 8 Defendant that could amount to an abuse of the judicial process. To whatever extent 9 Defendant challenges the merits of the Motion for Joinder, he may do so in a response. 10 B. Request for Attorneys’ Fees 11 Defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied because it is not clear that 12 Plaintiff’s motions were filed unreasonably and vexatiously or with the purpose of 13 harassment. If a party “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplies proceedings in a case, he 14 or she may be required to personally satisfy excess costs or attorneys’ fees. 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1927. Here, although the motions do not succeed on the merits and seek improper 16 remedies from the Court, the “pro se filings . . . are held to less stringent standards than 17 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Qazi, 975 F.3d at 992-93. Thus, although her 18 motions are largely meritless, the Court “cannot say that [P]laintiff filed the [motions] in 19 bad faith.” Brown v. Adidas Int., 938 F. Supp. 628, 636 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (declining to 20 award attorney’s fees even though pro se Plaintiff’s complaint “suffer[ed] . . . multiple 21 infirmities” and failed to set forth any allegations supporting any causes of actions 22 pleaded). At this time, the Court declines to award fees pursuant to § 1927. “However, 23 the Court reminds both parties that [§] 1927, as well as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules, applies 24 to all pleadings which may be filed in this case.” Brown, 938 F. Supp. at 636. Should 25 Plaintiff continue to file motions with little to no legal support, fees or costs pursuant to § 26 1927 may become appropriate. 27 CONCLUSION 28 Accordingly, 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 31) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted as to the Motion for Personal || Protective Order (Doc. 25), Motion to Freeze Assets (Doc. 26), and Motion for Writ Ne 4|| Exeat (Doc. 27). Those motions are thus STRICKEN from the record. The Motion to 5|| Strike is DENIED as to the Motion for Joinder (Doc. 24). 6 IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that Defendant shall have 14 days from the entry 7\|| of this Order to respond to the Motion for Joinder (Doc. 24). 8 Dated this 8th day of December, 2022. UW 10 A Whacrsay Sooo) 11 Chief United states District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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