Ariel Bueno Valdes v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ARIEL BUENO VALDES,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 3:26-cv-343-JEP-LLL

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al.,

Respondents. ___________________________________/

ORDER

Petitioner, an immigration detainee, who is currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Baker Correctional Institute, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 17, 2026. (Doc. 1). He is proceeding on an amended petition filed on April 6, 2026. (Doc. 3). In the amended petition, he alleges that he was ordered removed in 2000 or 2001, and ICE re-detained him on October 19, 2025. (Id. at 2–10). Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as the Supreme Court construed it in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (See Doc. 3 at 1–2, 6–8, 10). Petitioner asks the Court to order his immediate release. (Id. at 8). The Supreme Court in Zadvydas held that indefinite detention of aliens after a final order of removal raises serious constitutional concerns. 533 U.S.

at 690–99. Once an order of removal is final, the government may continue to detain an alien only for a reasonable amount of time. See id. at 699–701. The reasonableness of the detention is to be measured “primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of

removal.” Id. at 699 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. at 700–01. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day

removal period [from section 1231(a)(1)(A)] plus 90 days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). After that six-month period has passed, if the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 1052 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post- removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence

of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If an alien makes these showings, then the burden shifts to the government to rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence establishing that there is “a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Notably, Zadvydas

claims asserted prior to the presumptively reasonable six-month period are deemed unripe and subject to dismissal without prejudice. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052; see also Ramos Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:25-cv-1038, 2025 WL 2591830, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2025).

Here, this Court finds that the presumptively reasonable six-month period has not expired. A split of authority exists as to when the six-month period begins. Some courts have determined that each period of detention restarts the removal-period clock. See, e.g., Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-cv-22644,

2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (rejecting a petitioner’s argument “that his detention should be counted in the aggregate based upon his prior detentions”); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1207089, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2025) (“[T]he removal-period clock restarts when an alien

subject to a removal order is again detained by ICE.”); Leybinsky v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 10 CIV. 5137 RA, 2013 WL 132544, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013) (collecting cases), vacated as moot, 553 F. App’x 108 (2d Cir. 2014). Other courts have aggregated all periods of detention following an

order of removal, regardless of whether there were any intervening periods of release from custody between periods of detention. See, e.g., Jaranow v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02396-TL, 2026 WL 35864, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2026) (collecting cases from the Ninth Circuit that “have found that the six-month period of detention need not be consecutive to reach the limit established in

Zadvydas”); Patel v. Bondi, No. CV 25-16218 (KMW), 2025 WL 3294353, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2025) (finding that the court must “consider the entire period of [the p]etitioner’s detention”—not just the length of the current detention). This Court believes that aggregating the past period of detention is not

appropriate here. Noting that the purpose of detention is to “assur[e] the alien’s presence at the moment of removal,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added), this Court is not persuaded that Petitioner’s previous detention (which he appears to assert was approximately sixty days sometime in 2021 (Doc. 3 at

7, 10))—more than four years ago—is relevant to today’s determination. To rule otherwise would grant a permanent “get-out-of-jail-free” card to Petitioner or any other detainee who has been held for more than six months at any time in the past. See Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United States, No. 4:14-CV-42-CDL,

2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Moreover, “adjudicating the constitutionality of every re-detention would obstruct an area that is in the discretion of the Attorney General—effectuating removals.” Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8. Thus, in this case, this Court will consider only the current

detention when determining whether the presumptively reasonable six-month period has passed. Petitioner filed this case on February 17, 2026, which is approximately three months and twenty-nine days since the start of his current detention on October 19, 2025. Even giving Petitioner the benefit of the date he filed the amended petition—April 6, 2026—his Zadvydas claim is still premature, as only five months and eighteen days had elapsed since the start of his current detention. Therefore, Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim is not ripe.! Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Petitioner’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 3) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any motions, enter judgment dismissing the amended petition without prejudice, and close the file. 3. The Clerk shall send Petitioner a blank § 2241 petition form. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on April 20, 2026.

JORDAN E. PRATT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 Because the Zadvydas claim is not ripe, this Court need not inquire at this time into whether there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

c: Ariel Bueno Valdes