Arfridson v. Ladd
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have no doubt that the defendant was personally bound by tne written contract which he signed, notwithstanding it shows that anoth er person was owner of the vessel in which the plaintiff agreed to perform the services for which this action is brought. It is not sufficient that a person, in order to discharge himself from a promise in writing, should show that he was in fact the agent of an-[*175] other ; but *it should be made to appear that he treated as agent, and actually bound his principal by the contract. Here there are no words, either in the contract itself, or connected with the name of the defendant at the bottom, which furnish any indication of an intent to charge any other person than himself, and no action would lie against the supposed principal upon this contract merely.
Nor does the subsequent engagement, made by the plaintiff upon the shipping paper, discharge the defendant from his previous stipulation. It is manifest that that document was merely formal, to enable the owners, if occasion should require, to avail themselves of the neutral character of the plaintiff, in order to avoid a capture, or to procure a restoration.
Footnotes
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12 Mass. 173 (Arfridson v. Ladd) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.