Arfridson v. Ladd
This text of 12 Mass. 173 (Arfridson v. Ladd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have no doubt that the defendant was personally bound by tne written contract which he signed, notwithstanding it shows that anoth er person was owner of the vessel in which the plaintiff agreed to perform the services for which this action is brought. It is not sufficient that a person, in order to discharge himself from a promise in writing, should show that he was in fact the agent of an-[*175] other ; but *it should be made to appear that he treated as agent, and actually bound his principal by the contract. Here there are no words, either in the contract itself, or connected with the name of the defendant at the bottom, which furnish any indication of an intent to charge any other person than himself, and no action would lie against the supposed principal upon this contract merely.
Nor does the subsequent engagement, made by the plaintiff upon the shipping paper, discharge the defendant from his previous stipulation. It is manifest that that document was merely formal, to enable the owners, if occasion should require, to avail themselves of the neutral character of the plaintiff, in order to avoid a capture, or to procure a restoration.
[155]*155We are also of opinion that the principles, which govern the mar time contracts between' masters and owners, are not applicable to the special contract on which this action is founded.
The master is entitled to nothing, quasi wages, after the capture ; which is supposed to dissolve all subsisting contracts.
We therefore think the plaintiff entitled to the full benefit of his contract with the defendant; the object of which was to secure him certain wages, from the time he departed on his voyage until his return. He can, however, recover * nothing be- [*176] yond the exact stipulations in his contract. For, although a master of a captured vessel, if he remains to claim the property for the benefit of his owners, and incurs expenses on that account, may recover in indebitatus assumpsit an indemnity, notwithstanding the dissolution of the contract; yet this can. be recovered only against the owners of the property ; and such a claim is not within the letter or the spirit of the contract now sued.
If the plaintiff, therefore, will remit so much of the damages as exceed the amount of wages reckoned at the rate of sixty dollars pet month, he may have judgment on the verdict for the residue.
The plaintiff having remitted accordingly, judgment was rendered upon the verdict.
Quære, if all the writings and the facts should not have been taken together as making one contract. This was not a case within the statute of frauds, where writing was essential to the validity of the agreement; 1 Phil. Ev., 7th ed., 570; and evidence is admissible to show that a written contract, purporting to be made between A. and B., was in fact made by B. not on his own account, but as agent of a third person
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12 Mass. 173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arfridson-v-ladd-mass-1815.