Arden Reneau v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: July 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04203
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ARDEN RENEAU and LA TRUCKER Case No. 2:25-cv-04203-SPG-RAO 11 TRANSPORT LLC, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 12 Plaintiffs, MOTION TO REMAND [ECF NO. 7] 13 AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S v. MOTION TO TRANSFER [ECF NO. 8] 14 PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., 15 L.P., a limited partnership; and DOES 1 16 through 5, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Before the Court are the Motion to Remand (ECF No. 7 (“Motion to Remand”)) filed 20 by Plaintiffs Arden Reneau and LA Trucker Transport LLC (“Plaintiffs”) and the Motion 21 to Transfer Venue (ECF No. 8-1 (“Motion to Transfer”)) filed by Defendant Penske Truck 22 Leasing Co., L.P. (“Defendant”). The Court has read and considered the Motions and 23 concluded that they are suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, 25 and the record in this case, the Court DENIES the Motion to Remand and GRANTS the 26 Motion to Transfer. 27 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In brief, Plaintiffs allege that they purchased two commercial trucks from Defendant 3 between March and September 2024, and that, shortly after purchase, the trucks 4 “experienced catastrophic failures,” rendering them “unusable.” (ECF No. 1-1 5 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 8, 10). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior 6 Court on April 8, 2025, alleging eleven causes of action against Defendant, including 7 breach of express warranty, breach of contract, negligence, violation of the Song-Beverly 8 Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”), and violation of the Unfair Competition 9 Law (“UCL”). (Id. at 2). Plaintiffs request damages in excess of $1,500,000. (Id. at 7). 10 Defendant removed the case to this Court on May 9, 2025, citing diversity 11 jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1(“Notice of Removal”)). Defendant states that it is a Delaware 12 company with its principal place of business in Reading, Pennsylvania, and that Plaintiffs 13 are citizens of California. (Id. at 4). 14 On May 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Remand, seeking to remand this case 15 to state court. (Mot. to Remand). On June 4, 2025, Defendant filed its opposition to 16 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 14 (“Defendant’s Opposition”)). 17 On May 16, 2025, Defendant filed the Motion to Transfer, citing a forum-selection 18 clause in the parties’ contract and requesting transfer to the Eastern District of 19 Pennsylvania. (Mot. to Transfer). Plaintiffs timely opposed the Motion to Transfer on 20 May 17, 2025, (ECF No. 9 (“Plaintiffs’ Opposition”)), and Defendant replied in support of 21 the Motion on June 11, 2025, (ECF No. 15 (“Defendant’s Reply”)). 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A. Motion to Remand 24 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, with subject matter jurisdiction only 25 over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 26 1; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts 27 have original jurisdiction where an action presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. 28 § 1331 or there is diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under § 1332(a)(1), 1 federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction where the “matter in controversy 2 exceeds… $75,000” and the parties are citizens of different states. A case should be 3 remanded from federal court to state court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears 4 that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 5 B. Motion to Transfer 6 A district court may transfer a case “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, 7 in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Under § 1404(a), the district court has 8 discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case 9 consideration of convenience and fairness.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 10 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The presence of 11 a forum-selection clause is a “significant factor” in a court’s analysis. Id. at 499. When 12 parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, and one party moves to transfer to 13 the agreed-upon venue under § 1404(a), “a district court should ordinarily transfer the case 14 to the forum specified in that clause.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. 15 Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013). Under such circumstances, “a proper application of 16 § 1404(a) requires that a forum-selection clause be given controlling weight in all but the 17 most exceptional cases.” Id. at 59–60 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 A. Motion to Remand 20 Because the Motion to Remand challenges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, 21 the Court begins its discussion with that Motion. Plaintiffs argue that this case should be 22 remanded to state court because “subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” (Mot. to Remand 23 at 4). However, Plaintiffs do not contest Defendant’s assertions that the amount in 24 controversy is greater than $75,000 and that the parties have complete diversity of 25 citizenship. See (Notice of Removal at 3-6). Because federal district courts have diversity 26 jurisdiction where the “matter in controversy exceeds… $75,000” and the parties are 27 citizens of different states, and because these facts are not in dispute here, the Court has 28 diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 1 Instead of challenging the existence of diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs argue that, 2 even if diversity jurisdiction exists, “the presence of a forum selection clause designating 3 a state court as the proper forum can override diversity jurisdiction.” (Mot. to Remand at 4 4). Even assuming this principle is true, however, it has no bearing on this case because 5 the forum-selection clause here assigns disputes to “the state or federal courts sitting in or 6 having jurisdiction over Berks County, Pennsylvania.” (Compl. at 22). Moreover, the 7 substance of Plaintiffs’ argument is not that the forum-selection clause here is enforceable 8 and requires remand to state court, but that the forum-selection clause is un enforceable. 9 See (Mot. to Remand at 5-11). Because there is diversity jurisdiction in this Court, if the 10 forum-selection clause is unenforceable, this Court would be the proper forum following 11 Defendant’s removal. Because the Court has diversity jurisdiction and Plaintiffs present 12 no other basis for remand, the Motion to Remand is DENIED. 13 B. Motion to Transfer 14 Turning to the Motion to Transfer, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are 15 subject to a mandatory forum-selection clause that requires the dispute be adjudicated in 16 Berks County, Pennsylvania. (Mot. to Transfer at 4). Plaintiffs oppose on the grounds that 17 the forum-selection clause is unenforceable under California law. (Plaintiffs’ Opp. at 4). 18 The Court therefore begins its analysis with the validity of the forum-selection clause. 19 1. Validity of the Forum-Selection Clause 20 To begin, the parties disagree as to whether state or federal law should be applied in 21 determining the validity of the forum-selection clause. Plaintiffs argue that the forum- 22 selection clause is unconscionable under California law, (Mot. to Remand at 5; Plaintiffs’ 23 Opp. at 4), while Defendant argues that the forum-selection clause is valid under the federal 24 Bremen test, (Mot. to Transfer at 4). 25 The Ninth Circuit has long held that federal law controls both the enforcement and 26 validity of forum-selection clauses in diversity cases. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., 27 Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he federal rule announced in [] Bremen 28 controls enforcement of forum clauses in diversity cases.”); Lewis v. Lib. Mut. Ins. Co., 1 953 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The validity of a forum-selection clause is governed 2 by federal law.”). However, more recently, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, at least where 3 state law permits the voiding of a forum-selection clause, state law “determines the 4 threshold question of whether [a] contract contains a valid forum-selection clause.” DePuy 5 Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 28 F.4th 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2022). 6 Applying this rule, the DePuy court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 7 refusal to enforce a forum-selection clause following the plaintiff’s invocation of California 8 Labor Code § 925(b), which allows an employee to void a forum-selection clause under 9 certain circumstances.1 Id. at 964-67. 10 Following DePuy, some district courts in this Circuit have continued to apply federal 11 law to evaluate the validity of forum-selection clauses, provided no analogous statute 12 permits a party to void the clause. See Belkorp AG, LLC v. Venture Prods., Inc., No. 1:23- 13 cv-00762-DJC-DB, 2025 WL 916882, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (declining to apply state law 14 and distinguishing DePuy because “this case does not involve a voidable provision in a 15 contract such that a party is permitted to decide whether the forum selection clause is in 16 fact part of the contract”); Rostami v. Hypernet Inc., 5:22-cv-01813-EJD, 2023 WL 17 2717262, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2023) (“Because there are no circumstances here that 18 are similar to the state labor statute voiding the forum selection clause in DePuy, and in 19 light of the remaining Ninth Circuit authority on the issue, the Court will apply federal law 20 to the question of validity of the forum selection clause.”). 21 Other courts have declined to decide whether state or federal law applies, opting to 22 evaluate the clauses under both federal and state law. See Brooks v. WarnerMedia Direct 23 24 1 California Labor Code § 925(a) provides that an employer “shall not require an employee who primarily resides and works in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to a 25 provision that would” require the adjudication of a claim arising in California in a forum 26 outside of California or otherwise deprive the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to such a claim. Section 925(b) provides that a “provision of a 27 contract that violates subdivision (a) is voidable by the employee.” Cal. Lab. Code 28 § 925(b). 1 LLC, No. CV 23-7579-GW-MRWx, 2023 WL 10706636, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“This 2 Court need not determine whether federal law or state law applies as it would find the 3 forum-selection clause valid and enforceable under both.”); N.Z. v. Fenix Int’l Ltd., No. 4 8:24-cv-01655-FWS-SSC, 2025 WL 1122493, at *4 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025) (“[T]he 5 court need not decide whether federal or state law applies in assessing validity here because 6 both bodies of law dictate the same result.”). 7 The Court is inclined to agree with the Belkorp and Rostami courts that DePuy does 8 not require the application of state law here. While DePuy purported to withhold decision 9 on the question of “whether state law would govern validity of a forum-selection clause 10 that had not been voided and is before the district court for consideration in the transfer 11 analysis,” DePuy, 28 F.4th at 964 n.6, it appears to the Court that this question was already 12 decided in Lewis. See Lewis, 953 F.3d at 1164 (“The validity of a forum-selection clause 13 is governed by federal law.”). Moreover, DePuy is distinguishable in that California Labor 14 Code § 925 applies to the employment context, and Plaintiffs have not pointed to any 15 analogous statute that allows the voiding of a forum-selection clause under the present 16 circumstances. See Brooks, 2023 WL 10706636, at *5. However, given the uncertain 17 scope of DePuy, and because the Court’s decision would be unchanged under either 18 California or federal law, the Court will analyze the validity of the contract under both 19 sources of law. 20 a) California Law 21 Under California law, a court may refuse to enforce any clause of a contract that it 22 finds to “have been unconscionable at the time it was made.” Cal. Civ. Code 23 § 1670.5(a). A finding of unconscionability requires both a procedural and substantive 24 component, though they need not be present in the same degree. Armendariz v. Found. 25 Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000). Courts typically utilize a “sliding 26 scale” approach to determine if an agreement is unconscionable; less procedural 27 unconscionability requires a greater amount of substantive unconscionability, and vice 28 versa. Id. 1 Procedural unconscionability focuses on the factors of “oppression or surprise.” 2 OTO, LLC v. Kho, 8 Cal. 5th 111, 126 (2019). “Oppression occurs where a contract 3 involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice.” Id. (citation and emphasis 4 omitted). Surprise, meanwhile, occurs “where the allegedly unconscionable provision is 5 hidden with a prolix printed form.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts also ask whether a party 6 lacked “any realistic opportunity to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract,” or 7 whether a party “must either adhere to the standardized agreement or forego the needed 8 service.” Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1320 (2005). 9 Applying this standard, the Court concludes that there was, at most, minimal 10 procedural unconscionability here. Plaintiffs claim that the forum-selection clause is 11 procedurally unconscionable because it was a part of a contract of “adhesion,” or a 12 “standard-form contract presented to Plaintiffs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,” and that the 13 “bargaining power disparity” between the parties is “evident.” (Mot. to Remand at 5). 14 Plaintiffs are correct that the use of an adhesion contract generally “establishes a minimal 15 degree of procedural unconscionability.” Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 16 571, 585 (2007). However, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence of oppression or surprise, 17 such as being “rushed through the signing process,” failing to see the provision due to 18 “buried” or obscured language, or being subjected to inordinate pressure. See Magno v. 19 The College Network, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 5th 277, 285 (2016). Plaintiffs initialed right next 20 to the forum-selection clause, and the language was not hidden or buried in the contract. 21 (Compl. at 34). Plaintiffs also have not claimed any lack of reasonable market alternatives 22 or shown that accepting the terms was essential to operating their business. See Bolter v. 23 Superior Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 900, 907 (2001) (finding procedural unconscionability 24 where petitioners were told that they had to agree to new “franchise terms” to 25 “continue running their franchises”). Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown nothing more than 26 minimal procedural conscionability. 27 As such, Plaintiffs are “obligated to make a strong showing of substantive 28 unconscionability” under the sliding scale approach to render the clause unenforceable. 1 Gatton, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 586. Substantive unconscionability exists when a provision 2 is so “overly harsh or one-sided” that it falls outside the “reasonable expectations” of the 3 non-drafting party. Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 88 (2003) (citation 4 omitted). “A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one 5 side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be so one-sided as to shock the 6 conscience.” Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 7 223, 246 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court should refrain 8 from enforcing a provision only where “the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in 9 view of all relevant circumstances.” Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 10 899, 912 (2015). 11 Plaintiffs have not established any substantive unconscionability in the present case. 12 Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that transferring the case would “effectively deprive 13 Plaintiffs of the protections afforded by California’s consumer protection laws.” (Mot. to 14 Remand at 6; Plaintiffs’ Opp. at 5). But Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that granting the 15 transfer would be substantively unfair, one-sided, or deprive them of any available remedy 16 at law. While Plaintiffs highlight the protections available under the Song-Beverly Act 17 and the UCL, they make no attempt to compare these statutes to analogous Pennsylvania 18 statutes, nor do they identify any protections available under these statutes that are 19 unavailable under Pennsylvania law. See Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., 237 Cal. App. 4th 20 141, 157 (2015) (“[A] comparison [with the foreign jurisdiction’s laws] is necessary to 21 determine whether enforcing a forum selection and choice-of-law clause would violate 22 California’s public policy embodied in its governing statutes.”). 23 Plaintiffs also argue that requiring them to litigate in Pennsylvania would impose a 24 significant hardship because they are a “small California business” and cannot afford to 25 litigate in Pennsylvania. (Mot. to Remand at 6). However, “[m]ere inconvenience or 26 additional expense is not the test of unreasonableness since it may be assumed that the 27 plaintiff received under the contract consideration for these things.” Smith, Valentino, & 28 Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 496 (1976) (citation omitted); see also 1 America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 19 (2001) (“[T]he additional 2 cost or inconvenience necessitated by litigation in the selected forum is not part of the 3 calculus when considering whether a forum selection clause should be enforced.”). 4 Because the forum-selection clause has minimal, if any, procedural 5 unconscionability, and no substantive unconscionability, the Court finds that the clause is 6 not unconscionable under California law. 7 b) Federal Law 8 Though the federal test uses different language, it weighs similar factors. Under 9 federal law, a forum-selection clause should be enforced unless the opposing party shows 10 that: “(1) the clause is invalid due to ‘fraud or overreaching,’ (2) ‘enforcement would 11 contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared 12 by statute or by judicial decision,’ or (3) ‘trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely 13 difficult and inconvenient that [the litigant] will for all practical purposes be deprived of 14 his day in court.’” Yei A. Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081, 1088 15 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1972)). 16 Plaintiffs argue that all three Bremen factors are satisfied, using much of the same 17 reasoning as their unconscionability arguments. (Mot. to Remand at 10). First, Plaintiffs 18 state that the inclusion of the forum-selection clause was a result of “overweening” 19 bargaining power and “textbook . . . overreaching.” Id. at 10-11. But Plaintiffs fail to 20 identify any overreaching beyond the mere fact of the adhesive contract, and they do not 21 discuss fraud at all. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[a] differential in power or 22 education on a non-negotiated contract will not vitiate a forum selection clause.” Murphy 23 v. Schneider, 362 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004). The first factor thus weighs against 24 Plaintiffs. 25 For the second factor, the party opposing enforcement must “point to a statute or 26 judicial decision that clearly states . . . a strong public policy” against enforcement of 27 forum-selection clauses. Yei A. Sun, 901 F.3d at 1090. A state statute or law satisfies the 28 second Bremen factor when it has “plain language” that militates against forum selection. 1 See Gemini Techs., Inc. v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 931 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2019) 2 (finding second factor satisfied where state statute rendered any contractual choice-of- 3 forum clause “void” and against “public policy”). 4 Plaintiffs here argue that enforcement of the clause would contravene California's 5 “strong public policy of protecting consumers and small businesses from unfair and 6 deceptive business practices.” (Mot. to Remand at 6, 11). To support this claim, Plaintiffs 7 describe California’s consumer protection, competition, and environmental laws, like the 8 Song-Beverly Act and the California Air Resources Board regulations. Id. at 8. But 9 Plaintiffs fail to identify any specific provisions in these statutes stating a clear public 10 policy against forum-selection clauses. California has no overarching statute similar to the 11 one in Gemini Technologies. See Gemini Techs., 931 F.3d at 916 (noting that “only four 12 other states,” not including California, have comparable statutes to Idaho, and explaining 13 that such exceptions are “bound to be far from routine”). And courts have rejected 14 arguments that other California statutes expressed a sufficiently strong expression of public 15 policy to invalidate a forum-selection clause, even with more directly applicable language 16 than that at issue here. See Belkorp, 2025 WL 916882 at *3; Audeamus Inc. v. Baxter 17 Constr. Co., Inc., No. 20-cv-01333-JLT-SKO, 2022 WL 605407, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18 1, 2022). Because Plaintiffs have not pointed to a California statute or judicial decision 19 that bars enforcement, the second factor also weighs against Plaintiffs. 20 The third Bremen factor places a “heavy burden” on the party opposing enforcement 21 to show that enforcement would deprive them of their day in court. Yei A. Sun, 901 F.3d 22 at 1093. “Courts must enforce a forum-selection clause unless the contractually selected 23 forum affords the plaintiffs no remedies whatsoever.” Id. at 1092. It is Plaintiffs’ burden 24 to demonstrate a lack of legal remedy in the new forum, which Plaintiffs have not met. 25 Further, “to prove that a party would be denied its day in court, it must typically show that 26 all relevant witnesses are not located in the contracted forum, they are physically unable to 27 go to the agreed-upon forum, or they lack the financial ability to continue in the forum.” 28 Belkorp, 2025 WL 916882, at *3. Plaintiffs state that it would be “gravely difficult and 1 inconvenient” to litigate in Pennsylvania, (Mot. to Remand at 10), but they have not shown 2 that they would be deprived of their day in court should the forum-selection clause be 3 enforced. See White Knight Yacht LLC v. Certain Lloyds at Lloyd’s London, 407 F. Supp. 4 3d 931, 948 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (rejecting arguments “made in a boilerplate fashion without 5 any specific and concrete evidence that pursuing Plaintiff’s claims in the [contractual 6 forum] would be gravely difficult or inconvenient”). The third factor thus also weighs 7 against Plaintiffs. 8 Because Plaintiffs do not meet the standards laid out by Bremen, the Court finds that 9 the forum-selection clause is valid under federal law. 10 2. The Public Interest Factors Do Not Disfavor Transfer 11 Where the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, courts “should not 12 consider arguments about the parties’ private interests.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. 13 Courts will instead “consider arguments about public-interest factors only,” and “the party 14 acting in violation of the forum-selection clause . . . must bear the burden of showing that 15 public-interest factors overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.” Id. at 64, 67. The public 16 interest factors include: “[1] administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; 17 [2] imposition of jury duty on the people of a community unrelated to the litigation; [3] the 18 local interest in resolving the controversy at home; [4] the interest in having 19 a diversity case tried in a forum familiar with the law that governs the action; and [5] the 20 avoidance of unnecessary conflicts of law problems.” Gemini Cap. Grp., Inc. v. Yap 21 Fishing Corp., 150 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). “Because those [public interest] 22 factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum selection 23 clauses should control except in unusual cases.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. 24 Plaintiffs state that the public interest factors “bar transfer.” (Plaintiffs’ Opp. at 6). 25 However, many of the public interest factors Plaintiffs list in their opposition are actually 26 private interest factors and will not be considered. See (id.). The public interest factors 27 that Plaintiffs do reference—like California’s interest in enforcing its consumer protection 28 and environmental laws—have been addressed above and are not sufficient to override a 1 || valid forum-selection clause. Addressing each factor in turn: (1) Plaintiffs have not 2 ||identified any additional administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) jury 3 ||members in Pennsylvania will not be overburdened by the facts and law of this case: 4 ||(3) though California has some interest in protecting its residents, Pennsylvania also has 5 ||an interest in holding a business domiciled in its state accountable; (4) a district court in 6 || Pennsylvania will be able to apply the law relevant to this case; (5) there are no unnecessary 7 conflicts of law to be avoided. See Belkorp, 2025 WL 916882, at *4. Because the public- 8 |/interest factors do not “overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer,” the forum-selection clause is 9 ||enforceable. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 67. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and 12 || GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Transfer. In accordance with the Court’s ruling, this case 13 || shall be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The 14 Clerk is directed to close this file. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 ||DATED: July 18, 2025 —. 18 ~ HON. SHERLY EAC... 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28