STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-2017-0150
DANIEL ARBO and LISA ARBO, 1 ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) V. ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TOWER GROUP, INC. d/b/a TOWER ) GROUP COMPANIES, and MAINE ) INSURANCE GUARANTY ) ASSOCIATION, ) ) Defendants. )
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order
granting Defendant Maine Insurance Guarantee Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on
all counts of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs contend the Court erred by granting summary
judgment against them on their breach of contract claim on an issue not raised by either party.
"A defendant moving for a summary judgment has the burden to assert those elements of
the cause of action for which the defendant contends there is no genuine issue to be tried."
Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, ,r 9, 742 A.2d 933. Plaintiffs contend
MIGA's sole argument with respect to their breach of contract claim was "that there were no
disputed facts relevant to the analysis of whether the corporate veil separating York and Tower
should be disregarded ...." (Pis.' Mot. Reconsideration, at 1.)
1 Subsequent to the filing of the present Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Notice of Death
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 25(a)(2) infmming the Court ofthe untimely passing of plaintiff Lisa Arbo. Daniel Arbo did not move to substitute parties pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 25(a)(l) because he had not been appointed personal representative of Lisa Arbo's estate, and therefore the parties named in the caption have not been changed. Mr. Arbo may file such motion, ifhe desires, within the timeframe prescribed by M.R. Civ. P. 25(a)(I}.
1 To the contrary, MIGA argued "the Arbos claims are not 'covered claims existing prior
to the determination of the insolvency,' and MIGA has no obligation to pay any money to the
Arbos. 24-A M.R.S. § 4438(1)." (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., at 11.) MIGA noted that its obligation
is to "stand[] in the shoes ofan insolvent insurer when assessing claims against [an] insolvent
insurer." (Id at 11.) MIGA asserted a number of facts which established that York Insurance
Company of Maine, and not Tower Group, Inc., was the only company that could be considered
an "insurer," "member insurer," or "insolvent insurer" such that the Arbos' claim would be
considered a "covered claim" under the Maine Insurance Guarantee Association Act. (See
DSMF ,r,r 34-44); 24-A M.R.S. § 4435. Plaintiffs were therefore put on notice that they would
have to demonstrate that there was a legitimate factual dispute as to whether their claims were
both "covered" and timely.
The Arbos responded to MIGA's Motion for Summary Judgment by arguing the doctrine
of alter ego liability should apply such that the finder of fact could disregard the separate
corporate identities of York Insurance Company of Maine and Tower Group, Inc. Plaintiffs did
not supportably refute MIGA's factual averments pertinent to the question of whether their claim
was a timely, covered claim. Plaintiffs simply demonstrated that a finder of fact might be able to
disregard the separateness of two corporate entities, one foreign and one domestic, without any
elaboration as to how that, in turn, would transmute the Tower/York corporate amalgam into a
foreign, insolvent, member insurer such that their claims would be both timely under the Maine
Insurance Code and "covered" under the Maine Insurance Guarantee Association Act.
Based on the factual record and the arguments presented in the parties' memoranda of
law, the Court granted summary judgment to MIGA on the Arbos' breach of contract claim
because Plaintiffs could not demonstrate their policy was issued by an "insurer" that was
2 requisitely "foreign," "insolvent," and a "member" of the Maine Insurance Guarantee
Association such that their claim would not be time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, or for which MIGA would be obligated to pay as a "covered claim."
Accordingly, the entry shall be:
"Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order on Maine Insurance Guarantee
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment Dated December 4, 2018 is DENIED."
The clerk shall incorporate this order on the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P.
79(a).
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Justice, Superior Court
3 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKETNO. CV-17-150
DANIEL ARBO and LISA ARBO ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT MAINE ) INSURANCE GUARANTEE TOWER GROUP, INC. d/b/a TOWER ) ASSOCIATION'S MOTION FOR GROUP COMPANIES, and ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAINE INSURANCE GUARANTY ) ASSOCIATION, ) ) Defendants. )
This case concerns Defendants' liability for certain losses sustained by Plaintiffs Daniel
and Lisa Arbo as a result of a fire that destroyed their home on May 3, 2013. Defendant Maine
Insurance Guaranty Association ("MIGA") now moves for summary judgment on all counts in
the Plaintiffs' complaint, arguing the Arbos' claims are time-barred by the statute of limitations
provided for in their insurance policy.
I. Background
A. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint on June 15, 2017, naming Tower Group and
MIGA as defendants and seeking recovery under theories of breach of contract and unfair claim
settlement practices. (Pl.'s Compl. ,r,r 52-57.) Plaintiffs further sought to estop Tower Group
from asserting contract provisions that are inconsistent with certain provisions of the Maine
Insurance Code. (See id. ,r,r 50-51.)
1 On March 15, 2018, MIGA moved for summary judgment on all counts in Plaintiffs'
complaint, supported by a Statement ofUndisputed Material Facts ("SUMF"). Plaintiffs filed an
opposition and submitted a Statement of Additional Material Facts ("SAMF").
B. Factual Record
This case arises out of a fire that destroyed the Arbos' home located at 41 Oak Terrace in
Kittery, Maine on May 3, 2013. (SUMF ,r,r 1, 10.) At the time of the fire, the Arbos had an
insurance policy that provided home and automobile coverage. (SUMP ,r,r 2-4.) Section I of the
Arbos' insurance policy provided the necessary conditions for submitting a claim. (SUMF ,r 7.)
Another provision of the insurance policy provided: "No action can be brought against us unless
there has been full compliance with all of the terms under Section I of this policy and the action
is started within two years after the date of loss." (SUMP ,r 9.)
Part of Arbos' claim based on the fire was paid in June and July of 2013. (SAMF ,r 4.)
The remainder of the Arbos' claim was denied on June 16, 2015. (SUMF ,r 26.) The parties
dispute whether the claim was rightfully denied under the terms of the policy, particularly
whether the Arbos complied with the terms of Section I of the policy.
York Insurance Company of Maine was a domestic insurer formed under the laws of the
State of Maine, was domiciled in Maine, and was identified as such in its 2013 Annual Statement
filed with the Maine Secretary of State. (SUMP ,r,r 34-36.) Tower Group, Inc. was a publicly
traded insurance holding company organized under the laws of the state of New York that,
between March 2013 and June 2015, owned York Insurance Company of Maine. (SUMF ,r,r 37
38.) Between March 2013 and June 2015, York Insurance Company of Maine operated or did
business in Maine under the trade name "Tower Group Companies." (SAMF ,r 8.)
2 The Arbos maintain that Tower Group, Inc. was their insurer, while MIGA contends
York Insurance Group of Maine was the insurer, and was at all relevant times separate and
distinct from Tower. (SUMF ,r,r 32, 41.)
In July 2016, York Insurance Company of Maine was merged into Castlepoint National
Insurance Group, which was in turn declared legally insolvent by a California state court on
March 30, 2017. (SUMF ,r,r 42, 44.) Neither the Arbos nor MIGA have pointed to any record
evidence indicating Tower Group, Inc. was ever declared insolvent by a court of competent
jurisdiction. (See generally, SUMF; SAMF.)
The "Declarations" page of the Arbos' insurance policy designated "Company: YORK
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MAINE." (SUMF ,r 5.) The policy further provided that
references to "we," "us," and "'our" within the policy referred to "the Company Providing this
insurance." (SUMF ,r 6.) The Arbos were also provided insurance cards in connection with their
automobile coverage that identified the insuring "Company" was "York Insurance Company of
Maine." (SUMF ,r 5.)
Part of the Arbos' initial claim was paid by two checks dated June 28, 2013 and July 5,
2013 issued by Tower Insurance Company, 120 Broadway, New York, New York. (SAMF ,r 4.)
The only address listed in the Arbos' insurance policy, besides theirs and that of their local agent,
was 120 Broadway, 31st Floor, New York, New York. (SAMF if 10.) Each officer and director
of the York Insurance Company of Maine had a mailing address of 120 Broadway, 31st Floor,
New York, NY. (SAMF ,r 36.)
The Tower Group Companies logo is located on every page of the Arbos' policy.
(SAMF ,r,r 9, 32.) The Declarations page also stated "The UNITED INSURANCE, HAYDEN
PERRY INSURANCE AGENCY, and TOWER GROUP COMPANIES are pleased to present
3 you with your new OneChoice package insurance policy." (SAMF ,r 11.) A notice within the
policy provided that the Arbos could "elect to receive online documents relating to your
insurance policy issued by Tower Group Companies." (SAMF ,r 12.) The website on which the
Arbos could elect to receive online documents was a Tower Group website and makes no
reference to York Insurance Group of Maine. (SAMF ,r 13.) The privacy policy associated with
the insurance policy refers to Tower Group, bears the Tower Group Companies logo, and makes
no reference to York Insurance Group of Maine. (SAMF ,r,r 14-15.) The roadside assistance
coverage notice and the roadside assistance program cards issued with the Arbos' policy bear the
Tower Group companies logo and make no reference to York Insurance Company of Maine.
(SAMF ,r,r 17-20.) The Adverse Underwriting Notice provided with the policy was issued by
Tower. (SAMF ,r 21.) The_insurance cards issued in association with the policy's automobile
coverage were signed by Elliot S. Orol, who was an officer of Tower in March 2013. (SAMF
ir,122-23.) The Arbos received billing documents that bore the Tower Group Companies logo
and address. (SAMF ,r,r 24-25.) Debits from the Arbos' bank account as premium payments
under the policy were designated as withdrawals to "Tower Insurance webprepmt." (SAMF ,r
26.)
A number of York Insurance Company of Maine's officers and directors were also
officers of Tower Group, Inc., namely William E. Hitselberger, William F. Dove, Scott T.
Melnik, Elliot S. Orol, and Catherine M. Wragg. (SAMF ,r 37.) Vito Nigro served as officer,
and Bruce Sanderson served as director, of York in 2013 and 2014. Both men were also officers
of Tower Insurance Company ofNew York, a subsidiary of Tower Group, Inc. and third-party
administrator of the Arbos' insurance policy. (SAMF ,r,r 38-39.) Seven of York's senior
corporate officers listed in 2013 filings with the Maine Secretary of State are also listed as
4 officers of Tower in 2013 filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
(SAMF ,r,r 41-42.)
MIGA could not provide any information in discovery indicating that York and Tower
were separate and distinct corporate entities at any point between march 2013 and June 2015.
(SAMF ,r,r 46-4 7.) At all relevant times, Plaintiff Daniel Arbo believed his insurer was Tower
Group, based on the references to Tower within the policy, the contact information and physical
location, and his contacts with insurance representatives at "twrgrp.com" email addresses.
(SAMF ,r,r 43-45.)
II. Discussion
The central focus of the parties' arguments focus on whether the Arbos' insurer was York
Insurance Company of Maine ("York") or Tower Group, Inc. ("Tower"). The critical distinction
is that the Maine Insurance Code provides that insurance policies may provide different statutes
of limitations for bringing claims based on the insurer's status as a "domestic" or "foreign"
insurer. The parties agree that York would be deemed a domestic insurer, while Tower would be
deemed a foreign insurer.
The Maine Insurance Code provides that domestic insurers may issue policies with
provisions that require insureds to initiate legal action against the insured for non-payment of
claims within two years of the date ofloss. See 24-A M.R.S. § 3002. The Arbos' policy
contained a provision consistent with section 3002. (SUMF ,r 9.) MIGA argues York Insurance
Company of Maine was the Arbos' insurer and the statute of limitations to bring the present
action elapsed on May 3, 2015-two years from the date of their loss.
The Maine Insurance Code further provides that foreign insurers may, by contract, limit
the period for bringing claims against them to no less than two years from the date the claim is
5 denied. See 24-A M.R.S. § 2433. The Arbos argue that Tower Group, Inc. was their insurer, and
therefore the present action was timely brought within two years of the date on which their
claims were ultimately denied on June 16, 2015.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Stanley v. Hancock County Comm'rs,
2004 ME 157, ,r 13, 864 A.2d 169; Levine v. R.B.K Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ,r 4, 770 A.2d 653;
M.R. Civ. P. 56(c).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court takes all facts and inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130, ,r 9, 909 A.2d
629. "Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals no [genuine] issues of material
fact in dispute." Id "A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the
case." Id. "A genuine issue exists when sufficient evidence supports a factual contest to require
a factfinder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000
ME 84, ,r 6, 750 A.2d 573. "Summary judgment is appropriate ... 'if the non-moving party rests
merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."'
Dyer v. DOT, 2008 ME 106, ,r 14, 951 A.2d 821.
"To withstand 'a motion for a summary judgment, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case for each element of her cause of action. If a plaintiff does not present sufficient
evidence on the essential elements . . . the defendant is entitled to a summary judgment."' Watt
UniFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ,r 21, 969 A.2d 897.
B. Tower's Liability as "Alter Ego" of York
6 The Arbos contend the alter ego theory of liability applies in this case, whereby the
factfinder will be permitted to look past York's separate corporate form to hold Tower, its parent
corporation, liable under the insurance contract.
A hallmark and principal benefit of the corporate form is limited liability of shareholders
for the obligations of the corporation. LaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653,655 (Me. 1991).
"Alter ego" liability is a subset of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine under which the
principally-liable corporation's corporate form may be disregarded to hold a parent or sister
corporation liable. See Masi v. Keeley Crane Serv. & Keeley Constr. Co., 2011 Me. Super.
LEXIS 38, *11-*14 (March 18, 2011) (citations omitted).
The law permits the corporate veil to be pierced "when the party seeking to do so
establishes that the other party [1] 'abused the privilege of a separate corporate identity' and [2]
'an unjust or inequitable result would occur if the court recognized the separate corporate
existence.'" Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, ,r 10,901 A.2d 189 (quoting State
v. Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, ,r 19,868 A.2d 200); see also Stanley v. Liberty, 2015 ME 21, ,r 27,
111 A.3d 663. "Whether the corporate form should be disregarded involves questions of fact for
a fact-finder to decide." Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Props., LLC, 2009 ME 101, ,r 43,980 A.2d
1270 (citing Advanced Constr, 2006 ME 84, ,r 10,901 A.2d 189).
The Law Court has cited with approval an exhaustive, multi-factor approach to
determining whether the abuse of privilege prong has been satisfied. See Johnson v. Exclusive
Props. Unlimited, 1998 ME 244, ,r 7, 720 A.2d 568 (quoting The George Hyman Constr. Co. v.
Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d 129, 149-50 (D. Mass. 1998)). These factors are:
(1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused intermingling of business activity[,] assets, or management; (4) thin capitalization; (5) nonobservance of corporate fotmalities; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) no payment of dividends; (8) insolvency at the time of the litigated transaction; (9) siphoning away of corporate assets by the
7 dominant shareholders; (10) nonfunctioning of officers and directors; (11) use of the corporation for transactions of the dominant shareholders; [and] (12) use of the corporation in promoting fraud.
Id
In State v. Weinschenk, the Law Court held that the trial court properly pierced the
corporate veil to hold a homebuilding company's sole officer and director, and principal
representative, liable when the corporation "was thinly capitalized and insolvent at the time of
trial[,]" and he "had pervasive control over [the company.]" 2005 ME 28, ,r 20, 868 A.2d 200.
Plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a legitimate
factual dispute with respect to the "abuse of privilege" prong. They have demonstrated common
ownership, management, and control of York by Tower, the insolvency of York, and the absence
of evidence tending to show York was separate and distinct from its parent corporation.
The question then becomes whether Plaintiffs have put forth a prima facie case with
respect to the "inequitable result" prong. The Law Court has held that "the second prong of the
piercing doctrine does not require a finding of fraud or illegality." Johnson v. Exclusive Props.
Unlimited, 1998 ME 244, ,r 8, 720 A.2d 568. The Law Court has suggested that an unjust or
inequitable result inheres when a defendant engages in a wrongful act, such as misrepresentation,
and a plaintiff would otherwise be limited to recovering from a bankrupt or judgment-proof
corporation. See Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Props., LLC, 2009 ME 101, ,r 47,980 A.2d 1270;
Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, ,r 20, 868 A.2d 200.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Arbos, Tower held itself out as
the Arbos' insurer throughout the life of their policy and the claim settlement process, only to
deny the remainder of the claim after the statute of limitations for bringing a cause of action
against a domestic insurer had elapsed. Thus, the Court is compelled to find that there is a
8 sufficient factual dispute with respect to the second prong of the veil piercing doctrine to
withstand summary judgment.
Plaintiffs have put forth a prima facie case that York Insurance Company of Maine
should be considered an alter ego of Tower Group, Inc. Accordingly, summary judgment on the
question of alter-ego liability is not warranted at this juncture. 1
C. MIGA's Liability
MIGA was established by the Maine Insurance Guarantee Association Act ("the Act"),
24-A M.R.S. §§ 4431-4452. See 24-A M.R.S. § 4436. Among the purposes of the Act are "to
provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims ... to avoid financial loss to claimants
or policyholders because ofthe insolvency of an insurer ... and to provide an association to
assess the cost of such protection among insurers." Id § 4432. MIGA is funded through the
assessment of fees to "member insurers," which pass on the costs of such assessments to their
insureds through "rates and premiums charged for insurance policies[.]" Id §§ 4440(1), 4447.
Under the Act, MIGA is "obligated to pay" certain "covered claims" against "insolvent
insurers" in "[a]n amount not exceeding $300,000 per claim" based on property insurance
coverage. Id § 4438(1)(A)(3); see also id. §§ 4433(1)(A) (providing the Act applies to property
insurance), 705 (defining "property insurance''). Additionally, MIGA is "deemed the insurer to
the extent of its obligation on covered claims, and to such extent the insurer shall have all rights,
1 While a finder offact may ultimately find that alter ego liability applies in the present case, it strikes the Court that there is a distinction between the question of whether a party is liable under an insurance contract and whether a party is deemed to be the insurer under that contract. See 24-A M.R.S. § 4 ('"Insurer' includes every person engaged as principal and as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business ofentering into contracts for insurance."). For example, ifthis were a traditional case ofpiercing the corporate veil and the Arbos sought to hold Tower or York's corporate officers liable under the insurance contract, it would not stand to reason that those corporate officers would be deemed the "insurer" under the contract. However, for the reasons stated below, the Court need not resolve this issue to determine whether MIGA can be held liable ifTower Group, Inc. were deemed the Arbos' insurer.
9 duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent." 24-A
M.R.S. § 4438(l)(B).
1. Tower Group, Inc. as "Member Insurer" or "Insolvent Insurer"
An "insolvent insurer" is a "member insurer'' that is "[a]uthorized to transact insurance in
this State either at the time the policy was issued or when the insured event occurred; and
[a]gainst whom a final order of liquidation has been entered with a finding of insolvency by a
court of competent jurisdiction." 24-A M.R.S. § 4435(5). A "member insurer" is an "authorized
insurer that writes any kind of insurance to which [the Maine Insurance Guarantee Association
Act] applies ...." Id § 4435(4).
There is no evidence in the summary judgment record indicating Tower Group, Inc. was
ever authorized to transact insurance in Maine, had a final order of liquidation with a finding of
insolvency entered against it, or wrote insurance policies. Thus, even if Tower were deemed to
be the Arbos' "insurer" as defined in 24-A M.R.S. § 4, Plaintiffs have failed to set f011h aprima
facie case that Tower could be deemed an "insolvent insurer" or "member insurer" such that
MIGA could be held liable for any of Tower's obligations under the Arbos' insurance contract.
Accordingly, MIGA is entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract count of
the Plaintiffs' Complaint because either (1) if York is deemed to be the insurer, the Arbos' claim
is time-barred under the insurance contract, 01· (2) if Tower is deemed to be the insurer, it is not
an insolvent and/or member insurer such that MIGA would be obligated to pay any of the
Plaintiffs' covered claims.
2. MIGA's Liability Under Theories ofEstoppel, Unfair Claim Settlement Practices
The Arbos' ability to prevail against MIGA on the remaining counts of their complaint
(!) seeking to estop Tower from asserting the statute of limitations applicable to domestic
10 insurers based on the conduct of Tower and York's agents, and (2) seeking to recover for
Tower's allegedly unfair claim settlement practices-depend on their contention that MIGA is
liable to the same extent as an insolvent insurer. MIGA, on the other hand, contends its exposure
is limited by statute.
As stated above, MIGA is "deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation on covered
claims, and to such extent the insurer shall have all rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent
insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent." 24-A M.R.S. § 4438(1)(B). Plaintiffs
contend section 4438(1)(B) requires MIGA to step into the shoes of the insolvent insurer such
that it can be bound by the actions of the insolvent insurer's agents.
MIGA contends that it is "legally distinct and independent from the insolvent insurer"
and that "it cannot be estopped from denying coverage based on the acts of the insolvent insurer
prior to its insolvency." (Def.'s Relpy at 7, n. 3.) MIGA notes the Connecticut Supreme Court
has held that an insurer's "preinsolvency misconduct during the underlying litigation does not
estop the [insurance guarantee] association from challenging the existence of a covered claim,
which is the predicate for its liability under the guaranty act." Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Drown,
101 A.3d 200,206 (Conn. 2014).
An action for unfair claim settlement practices is a cause of action separate and apart
from a claim for non-payment under an insurance contract. The Maine Insurance Code provides
that "[a] person injured" by their insurer who "[w]ithoutjust cause, fail[s] to effectuate prompt,
fair and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear"
is entitled to "bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements,
reasonable attorney's fees and interest on damages at the rate of 11/2% per month[.]" 24-A
M.R.S. § 2436-A. Notably,
11 MIGA is obligated to pay only the "covered claims" of insolvent insurers. See id §
4438(1)(A). A "covered claim" is defined in part as "an unpaid claim, including one for
unearned premiums but excluding one for punitive damages, arising under and within the
coverage and applicable limits of a policy ...." Id § 4435(4).
The Arbos point to no provision oftheir insurance policy under which they would be
entitled to damages, fees, and interest of the type they seek in their unfair claim settlement
practices claim. As such, that claim does not "aris[e] under or within the coverage and
applicable limits of [their] policy" such that MIGA would be obligated to pay under section
4438.
In sum, Plaintiffs provide no legal basis under which MIGA could be estopped by the
actions of Tower/York's agents or would be obligated to pay damages to the Arbos for whatever
extraHcontractual damages Tower or York would be obligated to pay themselves. Moreover, for
the reasons stated above, the Arbos have failed to demonstrate that Tower is an "insolvent
insurer" such that MIGA would be obligated to pay any ofthe A.rhos' claims against it.
III. Conclusion & Order
For the reasons stated above, the Arbos have failed to put forth a prima facie case that
would entitle them to recover against MIGA. Even if Tower Group, Inc., were deemed to be the
Arbos' insurer under a theory of alter ego liability and thereby render the Arbos' ·claim timely
under 24HA M.R.S. § 2433, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how MIGA could ultimately be
held liable for the Arbos' claims against Tower under the Maine Insurance Guarantee
Association Act.
The entry shall be:
12 "Defendant Maine Insurance Guarantee Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on
all counts of the Plaintiffs' Complaint is GRANTED."
Dated: December j_, 2018 John O'Neil, Jr. Justice, Superior Court
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