Arakji v. Microchip Technology, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 MAZEN ARAKJI, Case No. 19-cv-02936-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 10 MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY, INC., [Re: ECF 18] 11 Defendant.

12 13 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff, Mazen Arakji’s Objections to the Court’s Order on 14 Motion to Remand. ECF 18. The Court construes Plaintiff’s submission as a motion requesting 15 leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Order Denying Remand pursuant to Civil 16 Local Rule 7-9. MFL, ECF 18. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant, Microchip Technology, Inc., alleging 19 violations of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, in the Superior Court of California for 20 the County of Santa Clara. ECF 1-1. Defendant removed the case to United States District Court 21 for the Northern District of California based on diversity of citizenship. ECF 1 at 1; see 28 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1441, 1332. Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to the Superior Court of California. ECF 23 8. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Order, ECF 16. Plaintiff did not dispute that 24 diversity of citizenship exists among the parties and therefore, the only issue was the amount in 25 controversy. Id. at 4. The Court concluded that the value of Plaintiff’s requested “pain, suffering, 26 and inconvenience” damages ($74,000) in combination with the injunctive relief he seeks in the 27 form of an “offer for employment in the same position interviewed for” exceeded the jurisdictional II. LEGAL STANDARD 1 Trial courts have the inherent power to reconsider, set aside, or amend interlocutory orders 2 at any time prior to entry of a final judgment. Meas v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 681 F. Supp. 3 2d 1128, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101, 105 (9th Cir. 4 1958)). “In this judicial district, Civil Local Rule 7–9 provides a procedure whereby a litigant 5 dissatisfied with an interlocutory ruling may seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration in this 6 court.” Microsoft Corp. v. FIFAVIP Co., No. 17-CV-02887-LHK, 2017 WL 4517060, at *3 (N.D. 7 Cal. Oct. 10, 2017) (citation omitted). 8 Civil Local Rule 7-9 specifies the requirements for such a motion. The moving party must 9 show “reasonable diligence in bringing the motion” as well as one of the following: 10 (1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from 11 that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which 12 reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable 13 diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of 14 the interlocutory order; or 15 (2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such 16 order; or 17 (3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments 18 which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. 19 Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored and are not the place 20 for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Whalen v. Ford Motor Co., 21 No. 13-CV-03072-EMC, 2018 WL 6069812, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018). “Nor is 22 reconsideration to be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought.” Garcia v. City 23 of Napa, No. C-13-03886 EDL, 2014 WL 342085, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (citing United 24 States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998)). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Plaintiff disagrees with the Court’s Order for three reasons (1) the Court mischaracterized 27 one of the factual allegations in his Complaint (MFL ¶ 2), (2) Plaintiff’s modification of the relief 1 he seeks (in the form of Statement of Damages) was not post-removal (id. 4 3)', and (3) the Court’s 2 || valuation of the injunctive relief he seeks is incorrect because he seeks an “employment offer” and 3 || not actual employment “for some period of time” (id. 5). 4 Plaintiff has failed to make the required showing under Local Rule 7—9(b) to obtain 5 || reconsideration. He has not pointed to a “material difference in fact or law” that exists from that 6 || which was presented to the Court before entry of the Court’s Order. He has not pointed to “the 7 emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of” the Court’s Order, 8 || nor has he shown a “manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal 9 || arguments which were presented to the Court” before the Court’s Order. 10 Instead, Plaintiff's motion is essentially an unallowable attempt to re-litigate his motion for 11 remand. First, Plaintiff's “disagreement” with the Court’s characterization of his on-site interview 12 || with Defendant has no bearing on the value of his claims for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. 5 13 Second, the Court specifically explained that it did not decide Plaintiff's motion for remand based 14 || on the post-removal status of his Statement of Damages. Order at 6. Third, Plaintiffs distinction 3 15 || between an injunction for “an offer for employment” and “employment” appears to be a baseless a 16 || attempt to manipulate jurisdiction — it is absurd to accept that Plaintiff is seeking to “force the 3 17 || defendant to make an employment offer,” just so that he can reject it. MFL (“..., should I choose 18 || to accept an employment offer, ...”). Similarly, if Defendant is “force[d] ... to make an employment 19 offer” as a result of losing this discrimination lawsuit, it would be absurd to suggest that it would 20 || terminate Plaintiff “in the following instant” of his acceptance. Id. 21 || IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: October 31, 2019 kom hh han "YI tn) 25 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 26 United States District Judge 27 28 ' Plaintiff also makes an “observation” to question Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of case law and removal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1447. MFL ¥ 3.