1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 MAZEN ARAKJI, Case No. 19-cv-02936-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND
10 MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY, INC.,, [Re: ECF 8] 11 Defendant.
12 13 Pro se Plaintiff, Mazen Arakji, claims that Microsemi Corporation (“Microsemi”), 14 subsequently acquired by Defendant, Microchip Technology, Inc. (“Microchip”), engaged in 15 unlawful discrimination by declining to hire him and harassed him based on his race, religion, and 16 disability. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Back to the Superior Court of 17 California, County of Santa Clara for Lack of Jurisdiction. Motion, ECF 8. Pursuant to Civil 18 Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court concludes that this motion is appropriate for disposition without oral 19 argument. Accordingly, the hearing set on November 14, 2019 is hereby VACATED. The 20 motion is DENIED for the reasons discussed below. 21 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 22 Plaintiff is a 38-year-old male, who for “[M]uslim religious purposes,” wears a long beard. 23 Compl. ¶ 1, ECF 1-1. Plaintiff also has a “very obvious musculoskeletal disability which limits 24 [his] ability to grip and lift heavy objects.” Id. Plaintiff’s “national origin is Lebanese, which is 25 an Arab country in the Middle East” and has “Arabic ancestry and ethnic characteristics.” Id. 26 Plaintiff’s first name “Mazen” is “known to be an Arabic name” and his surname “Arakji” is 27 “known to be a [M]uslim surname.” Id. Plaintiff has advanced degrees in electrical and 1 fields. Id. ¶¶ 2-5. 2 Plaintiff alleges that he “applied for several Firmware Engineer positions at Microsemi 3 between January and April of 2017.” Id. ¶ 20. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff was telephonically 4 interviewed by a “hiring manager” at Microsemi and had a “positive experience.” Id. ¶ 23. On 5 May 10, 2017, Plaintiff had an on-site interview at Microsemi in Sunnyvale, California, which 6 despite several hours of delay, was “another positive experience.” Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Plaintiff “was 7 contacted several days afterwards and was informed that the interview had been voided by HR.” 8 Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff was promised another interview, which was later cancelled. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff 9 applied for “other positions at Microsemi,” but received responses that the positions he applied for 10 were cancelled. Id. ¶ 27. 11 Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges that Microchip “intentionally” denied him an 12 “opportunity for employment,” despite his qualifications. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that 13 Microsemi/Microchip discriminated and harassed him because “Defendant is revolted by people 14 of [Plaintiff’s] religion, national origin, ancestry, ethnic characteristics and disability, and 15 especially those with a combination of all of the above.” Id. ¶¶ 28-30. 16 On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff, filed suit against Microchip in the Superior Court of 17 California for the County of Santa Clara. Plaintiff brought two state law claims based on 18 violations of California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”): (1) “violation of Cal Gov 19 Code 12940: Denial of employment due to religious creed, national origin, ancestry, and 20 disability” and (2) “violation of Cal Gov Code 12940: Harassment in employment due to religious 21 creed, national origin, ancestry, and disability.” See Compl. at p. 7. In his Complaint, without 22 specifying an amount, Plaintiff sought (1) monetary damages, (2) punitive damages, and (3) 23 declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at p. 5. 24 II. REMOVAL 25 Plaintiff served Microchip with the Complaint on April 25, 2019. Notice of Removal at 2; 26 see also Compl. at p. 4. On May 28, 2019, Microchip timely removed the case to United States 27 District Court for the Northern District of California based on diversity of citizenship. Notice of 1 citizen of Delaware and Arizona because it is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of 2 business is in Chandler, Arizona. Notice of Removal at 3-4. Microchip acknowledged that the 3 Complaint “does not allege a damages amount or a monetary value for the injunctive relief he 4 requests.” Id. at 4. Nonetheless, Microchip claimed that the amount in controversy exceeds 5 $75,000 because Plaintiffs’ FEHA allegations, if proven, would allow him to seek unlimited 6 compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, injunctive relief, and emotional 7 distress damages. Id. at 5. The average yearly salary of a firmware engineer at Microchip’s Bay 8 Area facilities (where Plaintiff alleges he applied) is $85,000. Id. The compensatory damages 9 alone—from early 2017, when Plaintiff allegedly was wrongfully denied the position he applied 10 for, to date—for lost wages would exceed $170,000, far greater than the $75,000 jurisdictional 11 minimum. Id. 12 Microchip concluded that although Plaintiff’s Complaint “fail[ed] to list all the remedies 13 available under FEHA, and fail[ed] to specify a damages amount or a monetary value for his 14 requested injunctive relief,” based on the allegations in the Complaint and the average salary for 15 the position Plaintiff was seeking, the amount in controversy plausibly exceeds $75,000. Id. at 6. 16 III. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, and may only hear cases falling 18 within their jurisdiction. Generally, a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if 19 the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal 20 statutes are construed restrictively so as to limit removal jurisdiction. See Shamrock Oil & Gas 21 Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “strong 22 presumption against removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal 23 quotation marks omitted). Any doubts as to removability should be resolved in favor of remand. 24 See Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The 25 defendant bears the burden of showing that removal is proper. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 26 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 If at any time before final judgment it appears that a district court lacks subject matter 1 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction only where there is complete diversity 2 of citizenship—no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant—and the amount in 3 controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); see Matao Yokeno v. Sawako Sekiguchi, 4 754 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2014). Where a defendant removes an action to federal court on the 5 basis of diversity, the burden on a plaintiff seeking remand under § 1447(c) depends on whether or 6 not the amount in controversy is clear from the face of the complaint. See Guglielmino v. McKee 7 Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). When the plaintiff’s complaint does not state the 8 amount in controversy, the defendant’s notice of removal may do so. Dart Cherokee Basin 9 Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84, 135 S. Ct. 547, 551, 190 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2014).
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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 MAZEN ARAKJI, Case No. 19-cv-02936-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND
10 MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY, INC.,, [Re: ECF 8] 11 Defendant.
12 13 Pro se Plaintiff, Mazen Arakji, claims that Microsemi Corporation (“Microsemi”), 14 subsequently acquired by Defendant, Microchip Technology, Inc. (“Microchip”), engaged in 15 unlawful discrimination by declining to hire him and harassed him based on his race, religion, and 16 disability. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Back to the Superior Court of 17 California, County of Santa Clara for Lack of Jurisdiction. Motion, ECF 8. Pursuant to Civil 18 Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court concludes that this motion is appropriate for disposition without oral 19 argument. Accordingly, the hearing set on November 14, 2019 is hereby VACATED. The 20 motion is DENIED for the reasons discussed below. 21 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 22 Plaintiff is a 38-year-old male, who for “[M]uslim religious purposes,” wears a long beard. 23 Compl. ¶ 1, ECF 1-1. Plaintiff also has a “very obvious musculoskeletal disability which limits 24 [his] ability to grip and lift heavy objects.” Id. Plaintiff’s “national origin is Lebanese, which is 25 an Arab country in the Middle East” and has “Arabic ancestry and ethnic characteristics.” Id. 26 Plaintiff’s first name “Mazen” is “known to be an Arabic name” and his surname “Arakji” is 27 “known to be a [M]uslim surname.” Id. Plaintiff has advanced degrees in electrical and 1 fields. Id. ¶¶ 2-5. 2 Plaintiff alleges that he “applied for several Firmware Engineer positions at Microsemi 3 between January and April of 2017.” Id. ¶ 20. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff was telephonically 4 interviewed by a “hiring manager” at Microsemi and had a “positive experience.” Id. ¶ 23. On 5 May 10, 2017, Plaintiff had an on-site interview at Microsemi in Sunnyvale, California, which 6 despite several hours of delay, was “another positive experience.” Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Plaintiff “was 7 contacted several days afterwards and was informed that the interview had been voided by HR.” 8 Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff was promised another interview, which was later cancelled. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff 9 applied for “other positions at Microsemi,” but received responses that the positions he applied for 10 were cancelled. Id. ¶ 27. 11 Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges that Microchip “intentionally” denied him an 12 “opportunity for employment,” despite his qualifications. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that 13 Microsemi/Microchip discriminated and harassed him because “Defendant is revolted by people 14 of [Plaintiff’s] religion, national origin, ancestry, ethnic characteristics and disability, and 15 especially those with a combination of all of the above.” Id. ¶¶ 28-30. 16 On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff, filed suit against Microchip in the Superior Court of 17 California for the County of Santa Clara. Plaintiff brought two state law claims based on 18 violations of California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”): (1) “violation of Cal Gov 19 Code 12940: Denial of employment due to religious creed, national origin, ancestry, and 20 disability” and (2) “violation of Cal Gov Code 12940: Harassment in employment due to religious 21 creed, national origin, ancestry, and disability.” See Compl. at p. 7. In his Complaint, without 22 specifying an amount, Plaintiff sought (1) monetary damages, (2) punitive damages, and (3) 23 declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at p. 5. 24 II. REMOVAL 25 Plaintiff served Microchip with the Complaint on April 25, 2019. Notice of Removal at 2; 26 see also Compl. at p. 4. On May 28, 2019, Microchip timely removed the case to United States 27 District Court for the Northern District of California based on diversity of citizenship. Notice of 1 citizen of Delaware and Arizona because it is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of 2 business is in Chandler, Arizona. Notice of Removal at 3-4. Microchip acknowledged that the 3 Complaint “does not allege a damages amount or a monetary value for the injunctive relief he 4 requests.” Id. at 4. Nonetheless, Microchip claimed that the amount in controversy exceeds 5 $75,000 because Plaintiffs’ FEHA allegations, if proven, would allow him to seek unlimited 6 compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, injunctive relief, and emotional 7 distress damages. Id. at 5. The average yearly salary of a firmware engineer at Microchip’s Bay 8 Area facilities (where Plaintiff alleges he applied) is $85,000. Id. The compensatory damages 9 alone—from early 2017, when Plaintiff allegedly was wrongfully denied the position he applied 10 for, to date—for lost wages would exceed $170,000, far greater than the $75,000 jurisdictional 11 minimum. Id. 12 Microchip concluded that although Plaintiff’s Complaint “fail[ed] to list all the remedies 13 available under FEHA, and fail[ed] to specify a damages amount or a monetary value for his 14 requested injunctive relief,” based on the allegations in the Complaint and the average salary for 15 the position Plaintiff was seeking, the amount in controversy plausibly exceeds $75,000. Id. at 6. 16 III. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, and may only hear cases falling 18 within their jurisdiction. Generally, a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if 19 the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal 20 statutes are construed restrictively so as to limit removal jurisdiction. See Shamrock Oil & Gas 21 Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “strong 22 presumption against removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal 23 quotation marks omitted). Any doubts as to removability should be resolved in favor of remand. 24 See Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The 25 defendant bears the burden of showing that removal is proper. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 26 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 If at any time before final judgment it appears that a district court lacks subject matter 1 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction only where there is complete diversity 2 of citizenship—no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant—and the amount in 3 controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); see Matao Yokeno v. Sawako Sekiguchi, 4 754 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2014). Where a defendant removes an action to federal court on the 5 basis of diversity, the burden on a plaintiff seeking remand under § 1447(c) depends on whether or 6 not the amount in controversy is clear from the face of the complaint. See Guglielmino v. McKee 7 Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). When the plaintiff’s complaint does not state the 8 amount in controversy, the defendant’s notice of removal may do so. Dart Cherokee Basin 9 Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84, 135 S. Ct. 547, 551, 190 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2014). 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Back to the Superior Court of California, 12 County of Santa Clara for Lack of Jurisdiction. Motion, ECF 8. In his motion, Plaintiff asserts 13 that this Court “does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter” because his Complaint contains only 14 state law claims. Motion ¶ 2. Plaintiff does not challenge that complete diversity of citizenship 15 exists among the parties. Plaintiff’s sole argument is that removal on the basis of diversity was 16 improper because “the inconvenience damages sought are under $75,000” and “[o]nly 17 inconvenience damages are sought.” Id. For support, Plaintiff attaches a California CIV-050 form 18 (“Statement of Damages”)1, in which he seeks “pain, suffering, and inconvenience” damages for 19 $74,000 and injunctive relief in the form of an “offer for employment in the same position 20 interviewed for.” ECF 8-1. 21 Microchip opposes the motion. Opp’n, ECF 13. Microchip takes issue with Plaintiff’s 22 post-removal Statement of Damages as “simply a bad faith litigation tactic to avoid federal 23 jurisdiction.” Id. at 2. That said, Microchip argues that removal is proper even under Plaintiff’s 24
25 1 CIV-050 form’s use is limited to personal injury and wrongful death cases. Due to the pro se 26 status of the Plaintiff, however, the Court accepts that Plaintiff now seeks the remedies indicated 27 1 new theory, because the requested “inconvenience damages” of $74,000 must be aggregated with 2 the value of the injunction for employment at Microchip. Id. According to Microchip, the value 3 of employment as a firmware engineer “certainly exceeds the $1,001 differential between the 4 ‘inconvenience damages’ asserted in the Statement of Damages and the jurisdictional minimum.” 5 Id. at 4. 6 Plaintiff replies to reiterate that he is seeking (1) $74,000 in inconvenience damages and 7 (b) injunctive relief “in forcing the defendant to make an employment offer.” Reply ¶ 2, ECF 15. 8 Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that even if entitled, he is not seeking “loss of earning” because he 9 “intended to file this action” shortly after the events alleged in his Complaint, but “other matters 10 prevented him from doing so” and therefore, he “did not feel it fair to demand ‘loss of earnings.’” 11 Id. ¶ 3. As for the injunctive relief he seeks, Plaintiff asserts that he “demand[s] that an 12 employment offer be made,” but does not specify a salary. Id. ¶ 4. In Plaintiff’s view, Microchip 13 “is free to make any offer that is greater than or equal to the legal minimum salary,” which 14 Plaintiff may accept or reject. Id. 15 A defendant seeking removal must file in the district court a notice of removal “containing 16 a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal....” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The Supreme 17 Court has held that “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that 18 the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart, 574 U.S. at 89. Microchip 19 plausibly alleged that, if proven, Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages would exceed 75,000 based on the 20 average salary Microchip pays its employees in positions similar to what Plaintiff allegedly 21 applied for and did not get. Notice of Removal at 5. 22 Yet, when a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged by a plaintiff 23 in a motion to remand, both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the 24 evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied. Ibarra v. Manheim 25 Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2015). In such cases, both parties may submit 26 proof of the amount in controversy through “summary-judgment-type evidence” including 27 “affidavits and declarations,” and the defendant seeking removal bears the burden of showing by a 1 Id. Here, Plaintiff has challenged Microchip’s assertion that he seeks more than $75,000—yet, 2 neither party has submitted proof of the amount in controversy. Plaintiff has submitted a 3 Statement of Damages, in which he, for the first time, specifies the monetary damages he seeks: 4 “pain, suffering, and inconvenience” damages for $74,000. ECF 8-1. Plaintiff also seeks 5 injunctive relief in the form of an “offer for employment in the same position interviewed for.” Id. 6 The Court notes two preliminary issues with Plaintiff’s Statement of Damages: (1) the 7 amount in controversy includes all relief claimed at the time of removal to which Plaintiff would 8 be entitled if he prevails and (2) Plaintiff provides no basis for his $74,000 figure. The Ninth 9 Circuit has explained “when the amount in controversy is satisfied at removal, any subsequent 10 amendment to the complaint or partial dismissal that decreases the amount in controversy below 11 the jurisdictional threshold does not oust the federal court of jurisdiction.” Chavez v. JPMorgan 12 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, Plaintiff has, post-removal, disclaimed 13 punitive damages and lost wages from his Complaint and now seeks a curious and unsupported 14 sum of $74,000 in monetary damages. ECF 8-1. 15 However, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiff’s post-removal submission of 16 Statement of Damages was a bad faith attempt to defeat removal—because Plaintiff’s Statement of 17 Damages, accepted at face value, establishes that the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. 18 Plaintiff seeks “pain, suffering, and inconvenience” for $74,000 and injunctive relief in the form 19 of an “offer for employment in the same position interviewed for.” ECF 8-1. As for the 20 injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks an offer “greater than or equal to the legal minimum salary.” 21 Reply ¶ 13. 22 “In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in 23 controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.” Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 24 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Manly 25 Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., No. C-07-0233 JCS, 2007 WL 776261, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2007) 26 (“Where the relief sought is equitable, the amount in controversy requirement may be met where 27 the value of the injunction to the plaintiff meets or exceeds the statutory minimum.”). Microchip 1 engineer at its Bay Area facilities is $85,000. Opp’n at 3. Although a reasonable assertion, the 2 || Court declines to accept this attorney argument as evidence and thus, only considers Plaintiff's 3 Statement of Damages for its analysis. 4 Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the injunctive relief he seeks, at a 5 minimum, carries a $12-per-hour salary. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1182.12 (establishing the 2019 6 || California minimum wage at $12 per hour). In less than a month, the value of employment at 7 Microchip, even at minimum wage, will exceed the $1,000.01 differential between the 8 || “inconvenience damages” asserted in Plaintiff's Statement of Damages and the jurisdictional 9 minimum. The Court is satisfied that it is shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that the amount 10 || in controversy exceeds $75,000. 11 Vv. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for remand is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 || Dated: October 21, 2019 kom hh han én) [SAE IEMA BETH LABSON FREEMAN Z 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28