25CA0726 Aragon v Walsh 04-30-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0726 City and County of Denver District Court No. 25CV30449 Honorable John J. Olafson, Judge
Celina Aragon,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John Walsh, District Attorney for the Second Judicial District,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 30, 2026
Vanguard Justice LLC, Elisabeth L. Owen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant
John Walsh, District Attorney, Richard F. Lee, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 In this case, plaintiff, Celina Aragon, appeals the dismissal of
her claims against defendant, John Walsh, acting in his official
capacity as District Attorney for the Second Judicial District. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Aragon brought a C.R.C.P. 106 claim for mandamus relief and
three constitutional claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
against Walsh based on events that occurred in a separate criminal
proceeding.1 In the criminal proceeding, the prosecution charged
Aragon with several offenses in district court, dismissed those
charges, and then refiled a single offense in county court. While
her criminal case was still pending in county court, Aragon filed
this civil action. As relevant to this appeal, she claimed the
prosecution’s policy and custom of charging, dismissing, and
refiling criminal charges to purportedly avoid speedy trial issues
violated procedural and substantive due process, as well as the
separation of powers doctrine.
1 Aragon initially brought the same claims against the Denver
County Court, but those claims were later dismissed.
1 ¶3 Walsh filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The prosecution in the criminal
proceeding then dismissed the remaining charge against Aragon in
county court, and Aragon voluntarily dismissed her mandamus
claim in this case. The district court granted Walsh’s motion to
dismiss, finding that there was no final judgment in the criminal
proceeding to review and that, despite her mandamus arguments,
Aragon failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
¶4 Aragon appeals, arguing the court erred by relying on her
mandamus arguments to dismiss all her claims when Walsh only
moved to dismiss her C.R.C.P. 106 claim. She further asserts the
court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and
article 6, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution, and prosecutorial
immunity did not bar her claims.
¶5 We conclude Aragon’s claims for injunctive relief are not ripe,
and she also lacks standing to pursue those claims. We further
conclude she failed to state a claim for declaratory relief.
Accordingly, we affirm.
2 II. Claims for Injunctive Relief
A. Applicable Law
¶6 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction, including ripeness and standing. Zook v. El Paso
County, 2021 COA 72, ¶ 7; Wilson v. Prentiss, 140 P.3d 288, 290
(Colo. App. 2006). We review these jurisdictional questions de novo.
Zook, ¶ 7; Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014
CO 77, ¶ 7.
¶7 Ripeness tests whether an issue is real, immediate, and fit for
adjudication. Zook, ¶ 9. A claim is not ripe for review if it is based
on uncertain or contingent future matters that suppose a
speculative injury that may never occur. Id.
¶8 To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an
injury in fact (2) to a legally protected right. Wimberly v. Ettenberg,
570 P.2d 535, 538 (Colo. 1977). The injury-in-fact requirement
“ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a
proper one for judicial resolution.” Hickenlooper, ¶ 9. Although
intangible injuries like the deprivation of legal rights can constitute
injuries in fact, the remote possibility of a future injury is not an
injury in fact. Id.; see also Olson v. City of Golden, 53 P.3d 747, 752
3 (Colo. App. 2002) (neither a “presently speculative” injury nor one
“that cannot be determined until a remote time in the future”
constitutes an injury in fact).
B. Discussion
¶9 In her opening brief, Aragon describes this case as about
“put[ting] an end to the [district attorney’s office’s] policy and
custom of dismissing and refiling cases against criminal defendants
in contravention” of the law. But which criminal defendants, and in
what proceedings? To the extent Aragon seeks to enforce the rights
of other criminal defendants in unidentified future proceedings, her
claims are not real and immediate but based on speculation.
Therefore, these claims are not ripe for review, and, in any event,
Aragon lacks standing to pursue claims on behalf of other
defendants. See Jones v. Samora, 2016 COA 191, ¶ 26 (“Colorado’s
third-party standing rule ‘prevents a party from asserting the claims
of third parties who are not involved in the lawsuit’” except in
“exceptional circumstances” (citations omitted)).
¶ 10 Likewise, Aragon’s claim that the district attorney’s office
might unlawfully prosecute her again in the future is speculative.
Moreover, Aragon has not established an injury in fact resulting
4 from what occurred in the prior criminal proceeding. Her complaint
alleges the district attorney’s office “forced [her] to go to trial” in a
court lacking jurisdiction, demonstrated indifference to human
dignity, and usurped the function of the judicial branch. But
Aragon’s criminal case has been dismissed, and she does not
explain why any of these prospective injuries are more than remote
possibilities. Accordingly, we conclude her claims for injunctive
relief were properly dismissed.
III. Claims for Declaratory Relief
¶ 11 We similarly conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Aragon’s claims for declaratory relief, though under
different reasoning than the district court.
¶ 12 Initially, we question whether Aragon has established standing
to pursue her claims for declaratory relief. As to her injury in fact,
Aragon does not describe in any detail, in her complaint or on
appeal, how her liberties were restrained or how the prior criminal
proceeding infringed on her rights or interests. Indeed, her
assertion in her complaint of severe emotional distress (which she
made, for that matter, to support her mandamus claim, not her
constitutional claims) is conclusory. Likewise, as to whether her
5 injury was to a legally protected interest, Aragon does not explain
how the Colorado Constitution includes an implied right of action
for due process and separation of powers violations.2
¶ 13 Nevertheless, even if we assume Aragon has sufficiently
alleged facts to establish standing, she is not entitled to relief
because she has not stated a claim as required by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
See Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v.
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25CA0726 Aragon v Walsh 04-30-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0726 City and County of Denver District Court No. 25CV30449 Honorable John J. Olafson, Judge
Celina Aragon,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John Walsh, District Attorney for the Second Judicial District,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 30, 2026
Vanguard Justice LLC, Elisabeth L. Owen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant
John Walsh, District Attorney, Richard F. Lee, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 In this case, plaintiff, Celina Aragon, appeals the dismissal of
her claims against defendant, John Walsh, acting in his official
capacity as District Attorney for the Second Judicial District. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Aragon brought a C.R.C.P. 106 claim for mandamus relief and
three constitutional claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
against Walsh based on events that occurred in a separate criminal
proceeding.1 In the criminal proceeding, the prosecution charged
Aragon with several offenses in district court, dismissed those
charges, and then refiled a single offense in county court. While
her criminal case was still pending in county court, Aragon filed
this civil action. As relevant to this appeal, she claimed the
prosecution’s policy and custom of charging, dismissing, and
refiling criminal charges to purportedly avoid speedy trial issues
violated procedural and substantive due process, as well as the
separation of powers doctrine.
1 Aragon initially brought the same claims against the Denver
County Court, but those claims were later dismissed.
1 ¶3 Walsh filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The prosecution in the criminal
proceeding then dismissed the remaining charge against Aragon in
county court, and Aragon voluntarily dismissed her mandamus
claim in this case. The district court granted Walsh’s motion to
dismiss, finding that there was no final judgment in the criminal
proceeding to review and that, despite her mandamus arguments,
Aragon failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
¶4 Aragon appeals, arguing the court erred by relying on her
mandamus arguments to dismiss all her claims when Walsh only
moved to dismiss her C.R.C.P. 106 claim. She further asserts the
court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and
article 6, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution, and prosecutorial
immunity did not bar her claims.
¶5 We conclude Aragon’s claims for injunctive relief are not ripe,
and she also lacks standing to pursue those claims. We further
conclude she failed to state a claim for declaratory relief.
Accordingly, we affirm.
2 II. Claims for Injunctive Relief
A. Applicable Law
¶6 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction, including ripeness and standing. Zook v. El Paso
County, 2021 COA 72, ¶ 7; Wilson v. Prentiss, 140 P.3d 288, 290
(Colo. App. 2006). We review these jurisdictional questions de novo.
Zook, ¶ 7; Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014
CO 77, ¶ 7.
¶7 Ripeness tests whether an issue is real, immediate, and fit for
adjudication. Zook, ¶ 9. A claim is not ripe for review if it is based
on uncertain or contingent future matters that suppose a
speculative injury that may never occur. Id.
¶8 To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an
injury in fact (2) to a legally protected right. Wimberly v. Ettenberg,
570 P.2d 535, 538 (Colo. 1977). The injury-in-fact requirement
“ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a
proper one for judicial resolution.” Hickenlooper, ¶ 9. Although
intangible injuries like the deprivation of legal rights can constitute
injuries in fact, the remote possibility of a future injury is not an
injury in fact. Id.; see also Olson v. City of Golden, 53 P.3d 747, 752
3 (Colo. App. 2002) (neither a “presently speculative” injury nor one
“that cannot be determined until a remote time in the future”
constitutes an injury in fact).
B. Discussion
¶9 In her opening brief, Aragon describes this case as about
“put[ting] an end to the [district attorney’s office’s] policy and
custom of dismissing and refiling cases against criminal defendants
in contravention” of the law. But which criminal defendants, and in
what proceedings? To the extent Aragon seeks to enforce the rights
of other criminal defendants in unidentified future proceedings, her
claims are not real and immediate but based on speculation.
Therefore, these claims are not ripe for review, and, in any event,
Aragon lacks standing to pursue claims on behalf of other
defendants. See Jones v. Samora, 2016 COA 191, ¶ 26 (“Colorado’s
third-party standing rule ‘prevents a party from asserting the claims
of third parties who are not involved in the lawsuit’” except in
“exceptional circumstances” (citations omitted)).
¶ 10 Likewise, Aragon’s claim that the district attorney’s office
might unlawfully prosecute her again in the future is speculative.
Moreover, Aragon has not established an injury in fact resulting
4 from what occurred in the prior criminal proceeding. Her complaint
alleges the district attorney’s office “forced [her] to go to trial” in a
court lacking jurisdiction, demonstrated indifference to human
dignity, and usurped the function of the judicial branch. But
Aragon’s criminal case has been dismissed, and she does not
explain why any of these prospective injuries are more than remote
possibilities. Accordingly, we conclude her claims for injunctive
relief were properly dismissed.
III. Claims for Declaratory Relief
¶ 11 We similarly conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Aragon’s claims for declaratory relief, though under
different reasoning than the district court.
¶ 12 Initially, we question whether Aragon has established standing
to pursue her claims for declaratory relief. As to her injury in fact,
Aragon does not describe in any detail, in her complaint or on
appeal, how her liberties were restrained or how the prior criminal
proceeding infringed on her rights or interests. Indeed, her
assertion in her complaint of severe emotional distress (which she
made, for that matter, to support her mandamus claim, not her
constitutional claims) is conclusory. Likewise, as to whether her
5 injury was to a legally protected interest, Aragon does not explain
how the Colorado Constitution includes an implied right of action
for due process and separation of powers violations.2
¶ 13 Nevertheless, even if we assume Aragon has sufficiently
alleged facts to establish standing, she is not entitled to relief
because she has not stated a claim as required by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
See Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Samora, 2013 COA 81, ¶ 38 (we
may affirm on any ground supported by the record).3
¶ 14 To avoid dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), a party must plead
sufficient facts to suggest plausible grounds to support a claim for
relief. Coyle v. State, 2021 COA 54, ¶ 25. To determine whether a
plaintiff has pled a claim for relief, we accept all matters of material
2 Nor does she respond whatsoever to the arguments made in this
regard in the answer brief. 3 We recognize that Walsh did not base his motion to dismiss on
C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), and the district court did not consider whether Aragon stated a claim for relief. Nevertheless, our review is de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. See Hess v. Hobart, 2020 COA 139M2, ¶ 11; see also Denv. Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011) (in determining whether a party has stated a claim, we consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as exhibits and matters proper for judicial notice). Because Walsh presented this argument in his answer brief as an alternative basis to affirm, and we may affirm the court’s dismissal on any grounds supported by the record, we elect to consider it.
6 fact alleged in the complaint as true and view the allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. But we disregard
conclusory allegations or allegations purporting to assert principles
of law. Id.
¶ 15 Aragon asserts that Walsh violated the constitution by
dismissing and refiling charges against her, in further violation of
the speedy trial statute and the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure. But she has not pled sufficient facts to allow us “to
draw the reasonable inference that [Walsh] is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009)
(describing the plausibility standard). With regard to speedy trial,
she must show some plausibility that the prosecution dismissed
and refiled the charges against her in order to avoid the speedy trial
mandate. Otherwise, the speedy trial deadline began anew when
the new charges were filed. See People v. Nelson, 2014 COA 165, ¶
18. Her complaint does not do so.
¶ 16 Likewise, particularly given the prosecution’s broad discretion
to file, dismiss, and refile criminal charges, Aragon has not pled
sufficient facts to demonstrate that any criminal rules were violated.
See People v. Pennington, 2021 COA 9, ¶ 27 (“Generally, a
7 prosecutor’s discretion in charging or requesting the dismissal of
pending charges ‘may not be controlled or limited by judicial
intervention.’” (citation omitted)). While her complaint makes
conclusory allegations that the prosecution violated Crim. P. 5, 7,
and 8, she does not plead any facts to suggest plausible grounds to
support those claims, let alone to support her claim that any rule
violation further violated the constitution. See Crim. P. 5 (governing
preliminary proceedings for felonies and misdemeanors); Crim. P. 7
(governing how felony charges are filed and a defendant’s right to a
preliminary hearing); Crim. P. 8 (governing joinder of defendants
and offenses). Because she failed to state a claim for declaratory
relief, we conclude that these claims, too, were properly dismissed.
¶ 17 Finally, Aragon’s arguments on appeal do not require a
different result. Even if she were right that the district court
dismissed her constitutional claims sua sponte (an argument belied
by Walsh’s motion to dismiss and supporting brief), or that it failed
to analyze her claims independent of C.R.C.P. 106, and even if
prosecutorial immunity does not provide a basis for dismissal, her
claims were properly dismissed for the reasons set forth above.
Accordingly, she is not entitled to relief.
8 IV. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.