Araceli Santibanez v. CGI Federal Inc.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO DIVISION ARACELI SANTIBANEZ, § Plaintiff, § § v. : EP-25-CV-00067-DB CEGI FEDERAL INC., § Defendant. § § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER On this day, the Court considered the above-captioned case. This case arises from Plaintiff Araceli Santibanez’s claims against Defendant CGI Federal Inc. for age discrimination, retaliation, negligent training and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See ECF No. 5.' On April 22, 2026, Defendant filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” ECF No. 18. Therein, Defendant alleges there are no genuine disputes of material facts as to any claim, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jd. at 1. For the reasons stated herein, the Court agrees, and Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. 18, is granted. BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed. Defendant is a federal government contractor, and the United States Department of State (“DOS”) is its client. ECF No. 18 at 2. Defendant provides passport processing services at the DOS’ El Paso, Texas office. /d. Given the sensitive information that is handled for the processing of passports, DOS mandates its contractors to follow internal control guidelines for the management of an applicant’s personally identifiable information. Jd. DOS also requires Defendant to follow specific progressive discipline procedures when

'“ECF No.” refers to the Electronic Case Filing number for documents docketed in this case. Where a discrepancy exists between page numbers on filed documents and page numbers assigned by the ECF system, the Court will use the latter page numbers.

Defendant’s employees violate an internal control guideline. /d. at 3. A first violation results in a written warning, a second violation leads to a final written warning, and a third violation results in termination of employment. /d. at 3; ECF No. 18-2 at 4. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a support associate in April 2024 to perform tasks related to the processing of passport applications. ECF No. 18 at 3. During her five-month tenure, Plaintiff received three internal control guideline violations. ECF No. 18 at 5. Plaintiffs first violation was on June 14, 2024. ECF No. 21 at 4; see Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 18-3 at 7. Her second violation, and final warning, occurred on July 29, 2024. Jd. at 5; see Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 18-3 at 9. Plaintiff was terminated on September 5, 2024, following a third violation. Jd. at 7; see Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 18-3 at 10-11. Plaintiff was terminated during a meeting with David Marquez (Passport Support Manager), Blanca Galvan (Team Lead not assigned to oversee Plaintiff)? and an HR representative on the phone. Jd. Defendant asserts Plaintiff's termination was predicated on these three internal control guideline violations. ECF No, 18 at 1-2. Plaintiff acknowledges the third security violation was the reason provided for her termination. ECF No. 21 at 7. However, Plaintiff contends that she was terminated because of her age given other younger employees either made internal guideline violations or were promoted without the certifications Plaintiff was required to obtain. /d. at 8. Plaintiff disputes the circumstances surrounding the three violations, and Defendants ultimate decision to categorize them violations without further inquiry. /d. at 6. She also notes she was not adequately trained because of her age, and Blanca Galvan, a Team Lead not assigned to oversee her, made several comments related to Plaintiff's age. /d. at 3-4. Plaintiff alternatively asserts she

2 Compl., ECF No. 5 at 2 (“Plaintiff was not assigned to Team Lead Blanca Galvan nor had Team Lead Blanca Galvan given any training or over saw any of Plaintiff's training.”)

was terminated because she was a named witness in a separate harassment complaint against a younger employee, and Galvan and Marquez sought to prevent Plaintiff from providing an unfavorable witness statement in that complaint. Jd. at 16. Plaintiff originally filed suit against Defendant in state court.? On February 27, 2026, Defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. |. In her Complaint, ECF No. 5, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action against Defendant for age discrimination, retaliation, negligent training and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of Texas law. ECF No. 5 at 2-6. On April 22, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 18. Plaintiff timely responded, ECF No. 21, and Defendant replied, ECF No. 22. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and drawing all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Talasek v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, LP, 16 F.4th 164, 168 (Sth Cir. 2021). The appropriate inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 US. 242, 251-52 (1986). “The summary judgment process, in which affidavits and depositions, both pro and con, are submitted will reveal exactly what facts exist, not just what the parties generally claim to exist.”

. 3 “On January 16, 2025, Plaintiff Araceli Santibanez (“Plaintiff”) filed her “Original Petition” against Defendant in the 243rd Judicial District Court, El Paso County, Texas styled Araceli Santibanez vy. CGI Federal Inc... . Plaintiff served her Original Petition on Defendant on January 28, 2025, and Defendant filed its Original Answer on February 24, 2025.” ECF No. | at 1.

Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1299 (Sth Cir. 1987). To sustain its burden, the movant must identify “those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits,’” to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Further, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” /d. at 325. In response, the non-movant “may not rest upon mere allegations contained in the pleadings, but must set forth and support by summary judgment evidence specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (Sth Cir. 1998). ANALYSIS Plaintiff raises four claims against Defendant: (1) age discrimination, (2) retaliation, (3) negligent training and supervision, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon review of the summary judgment evidence, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact as to any cause of action. After due consideration of the applicable law, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. A. Age Discrimination Plaintiff's age discrimination claim arises under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), Texas Labor Code, Section 21.001 and 21.101. Where, as here, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, Texas courts apply the familiar A44/cDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to age-discrimination claims under this state law. Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 633— 34 (Tex. 2012)). Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff is entitled to a “presumption of discrimination” if he can meet the “‘minimal’ initial burden” of establishing a prima facie case.

Id. (citations omitted). Upon a showing of a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Jd. (citations omitted). If the employer meets its burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to make an ultimate showing of intentional discrimination. Jd. (citations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she was within the protected class (over 40 years old); (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class, was treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees, or was otherwise discharged because of her age. Harris v. City of Scheriz, 27 F 4th 1120, 1123 (Sth Cir. 2022); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051. Here, the first three elements are undisputed. See ECF Nos. 18, 21. As to the fourth element, Defendant argues Plaintiff “has no evidence that a younger employee replaced her, CG] Federal treated her less favorably than similarly situated younger employees, or that CG] Federal otherwise discharged her because of her age.” ECF No. 18 at 9. In response, Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that a younger employee replaced her. See generally ECF No. 2] at 9-14. Instead, Plaintiff argues she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who were younger than 40 years old, and that she was otherwise discharged because of her age given Blanca Galvan’s age-related statements. Jd. 1. There is no genuine dispute of material fact on whether Plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees. Plaintiff alleges she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who were younger than 40 years old. /d. at 10. To meet her burden, Plaintiff offers three employees as comparators: Isis Cook, Sandra Solis, and Olivia Thomas. Jd. at 7-8, 10-12. An employee who proffers a fellow employee as a comparator must demonstrate that the employment actions at issue

were taken “under nearly identical circumstances.” Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (Sth Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). This requirement is satisfied “when the employees being compared held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation histories.” Jd. (citations omitted). In Lee, the Fifth Circuit determined “two employees were similarly situated where they held identical positions, compiled a similar number of violations over a similar period of time, including an identical infraction for which the plaintiff was fired and the comparator was granted leniency, and their ultimate employment status rested with the same person.” Jd. at 262. Here, the record lacks any evidence to substantiate Plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment between Plaintiff and the three comparators she identifies. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff relies solely on what these individuals told her, which is not enough at this stage of the proceedings.* See, e.g., Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 18-3 at 8, 13. Even assuming the record contained such evidence, it would fail to create a genuine dispute of material fact because the other employees’ violation history was not nearly identical to Plaintiff's. Plaintiff had three violations over five months and was on final warning when she was terminated. At most, each of the three comparators had a single violation. See ECF No. 21 at 7-8, 10-11 (detailing Ms. Cook, Ms. Solis, and Ms. Thomas’ alleged violations that were treated differently by Defendant, but not asserting any of the three had similar violation histories prior to Plaintiff's termination). After consideration of the summary judgment record, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

4 A district court may not consider hearsay evidence in affidavits and depositions. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (Sth Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. . . .””)).

Plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees. 2. There is no genuine dispute of material fact on whether Plaintiff was discharged because of her age. Plaintiff alternatively asserts she was discharged because of her age based on Blanca Galvan’s two age-related statements.> ECF No. 5 at 2. Plaintiff contends these are direct evidence of discriminatory intent. ECF No. 21 at 12. A statement constitutes sufficient evidence of age discrimination if it is: “1) age related, 2) proximate in time to the employment decision[,] 3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue, and 4) related to the employment decision at issue.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 683 (Sth Cir. 2001) (citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655-56 (Sth Cir. 1996)). A statement demonstrates an employer’s discriminatory intent if it is “direct and unambiguous, allowing a reasonable jury to conclude without any inferences or presumptions that age was an impermissible factor in the decision to terminate the employee.” Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 929 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Sth Cir. 1996)). Statements that do not meet these criteria are considered “stray remarks,” and standing alone, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380 (Sth Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Here, two statements are at issue. First, when Plaintiff asked Galvan why she was not being rotated to other positions weekly like others, Galvan told her it was because “younger people work faster.” Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 21-1 at 33. Second, when Plaintiff was unable to lift a heavy box of envelopes, Galvan stated Plaintiff's limitation “comes with age.” /d. at 34. Galvan disputes

5 Galvan was a Team Lead for Defendant but was not directly assigned to oversee Plaintiff. ECF No. 5 at 2. Miguel Franco was Plaintiff's Team Lead. □□□

making one of the statements. See ECF No. 18 at 10. However, even assuming both were made, each fail to meet the criteria to be considered direct evidence of discrimination in this case. Both fail at the third and fourth prongs. David Marquez, not Galvan, was the individual who issued Plaintiff each of her violations and ultimately terminated her. Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 21-1 at 35-36. To overcome this, Plaintiff raises a cat’s paw theory asserting Galvan had influence over Marquez and thereby satisfies the third prong. In Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, the Fifth Circuit determined “‘it is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee’s age-based animus if the evidence indicates that the worker possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker.” 235 F.3d 219, 227 (Sth Cir. 2000); see generally Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (Sth Cir. 1996) (referring to such taint as the “‘cat’s paw”). Plaintiff contends that Galvan was in a position of authority given her admission to being promoted and her presence at Plaintiff's termination meeting. ECF No. 21 at 13. However, even assuming Galvan was in a position of authority, Plaintiff does not identify any competent summary judgment evidence that Galvan possessed leverage over or exerted influence over Marquez’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.° There mere opportunity to exert influence is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. As to the fourth prong, even viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Plaintiff, each statement was unrelated to the termination decision. It is undisputed Defendant was required to follow a discipline protocol for internal control guideline violations dealing with the handling of personally protected information. It is also undisputed Plaintiff had three violations, the final of

§ “The summary judgment process, in which affidavits and depositions, both pro and con, are submitted will reveal exactly what facts exist, not just what the parties generally claim to exist.” Sutton, 819 F.2d at 1299.

which led to her termination. Plaintiff's characterization of the context of Galvan’s statements lacks a connection to her work with personally identifying information that led to her termination. See Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 21-1 at 33 (detailing Galvan’s first comment was related to position rotation, and the second was related to lifting heavy boxes). As such, the Court finds Galvan’s statements are stray remarks, and standing alone, do not create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment. After due consideration of the summary judgment evidence, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and concludes Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Because there is no prima facie case, the Court will not procced in the McDonnell Douglas analysis, and finds Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's age discrimination claim.’ B. Retaliation Plaintiff alternatively raises a retaliation claim under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show: (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the TCHRA, (2) she experienced a material adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Esparza v. Advanced Network Memt., Inc., No. 24-50024, 2025 WL 764602 at *5 (Sth Cir. Mar. 11, 2025) (citations omitted). “If the employee proves this prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the

7 Even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the Court notes it would have likely found insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact of whether Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff's discharge was a pretext given the same actor inference adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Davis was hired at the age of 54, by the then 56 year old Kimzey. Davis was fired only four years later, also by Kimzey, who was then 60. This situation gives rise to an inference that age discrimination was not the motive behind Davis's termination.”). Here, Plaintiff’s case is similar given she was hired and discharged by Marquez within a five-month time frame.

employer merely to ‘state a nonretaliatory reason for its employment action.’” /d. (citations omitted). “The burden then reverts to the employee to prove the reason is pretext for retaliation and that the adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ her protected activity.” /d. Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case because she offers no evidence she engaged in protected activity to satisfy the first element. ECF No. 18 at 14. In Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., the Fifth Circuit recognized “Section 21.051 [of the Texas Labor Code] is effectively identical to Title VII... .” 701 F.3d 434, 439 (Sth Cir. 2012). An employee has engaged in protected activity when they have “‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.” See Thompson v. Somervell Cnty., 431 F. App’x 338, 341 (Sth Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). There is a split of authority among federal courts regarding whether a plaintiff may assert a claim for retaliation when her employer targets her for an adverse employment action because of the protected activity of a third party such as a friend or relative. The majority of federal courts who have considered the issue have refused to recognize third-party retaliation claims as valid causes of action under federal anti- retaliation laws. Dias v. Goodman Manufacturing Co,,214 8.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, review denied) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff did not actively participate in “protected activity” as a matter of law. Plaintiff predicates her claim on being named a witness in a harassment complaint filed by a co- worker, Emma Sanchez. See Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 18-3 at 11. Sanchez filed a harassment complaint against another employee and named Plaintiff as a witness. Jd. Sanchez filed this complaint with Galvan and Marquez the day before Plaintiff was terminated. /d@. Other than being named a witness to an internal harassment complaint made by another employee, there are no facts

in the record to support that Plaintiff actively participated in protected activity.® Even viewing the record in light most favorable to the non-moving party, being named a witness, without more, does not satisfy the plain language of the statute requiring active participation. See Dias, 214 S.W.3d at 681 (finding plaintiff did not engage in activity protected by section 21.055 by asking two people if there was anything he could do to help his mother and requesting forms related to medical insurance). Plaintiff does not identify any other facts in the record to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her engaging in protected activity. Even if this Court determined being named as a witness in a third-party workplace complaint was engaging in protected activity, the underlying complaint must still be tied to discrimination made unlawful by the TCHRA. “The employee’s complaint must, at a minimum, alert the employer to the employee’s reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 786 (Tex. 2018). “Complaining only of harassment, hostile environment, discrimination, or bullying is not enough.” /d. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, it is undisputed Sanchez’s underlying harassment/bullying complaint was based on a co-worker spraying disinfectant spray after Sanchez expressed it caused her issues given her asthma. ECF No. 21 at 7; Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 21-1 at 28.° Plaintiff does not cite any evidence to support that Sanchez’s complaint implicated unlawful discrimination

8 “Q. [Y]ou did not report anything to HR or to David Marquez or to Blanca or to Miguel about Emma [the individual complaining], correct? A. No, I did not. Q. And you did not give a statement, correct? A. Correct. Q. So the only thing I’m hearing is Emma mentioned you in whatever she submitted—mentioned you as a witness? A. Correct.” Santibanez Dep., ECF No. 18-3 at 11. 9 (“I had spoken to [] Emma Sanchez. . . she had mention my names as a witness in one of the complaints that she submitted to HR and to Mr. Marquez for bullying that they [] did because of her illness, and just happened I was there at that moment.”) 11

under the TCHRA. In sum, the Court finds Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. C. Negligent Training and Supervision and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Defendant argues there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff's two remaining claims, and each claim fails for several independent reasons. See ECF No. 18 at 16-20. In her response, Plaintiff does not offer any counterarguments or in any way disputes Defendant’s position. After due consideration, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute of material fact on either remaining claim, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each. CONCLUSION After due consideration of the record and applicable law, the Court finds Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all claims raised in Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 5. Accordingly, IT Is HEREBY ORDERED Defendant CGI Federal Inc.’s “Motion for Summary Judgment,” ECF No. 18, is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED all deadlines and court settings are VACATED. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. SIGNED this 4th day of September 2026.

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE