Arabella Fairchild v. Vang, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARABELLA FAIRCHILD, No. 1:23-cv-00917-JLT-FRS (BAM) (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, 13 v. FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

14 VANG, et al., (ECF No. 23)

15 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Arabella Fairchild, also known as Gigi Fairchild-Littlefield and Gigi Ariel 18 Fairchild-Littlefield (“Plaintiff”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action 19 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed February 20, 2026, is 20 currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 23.) 21 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 25 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 26 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 13 Plaintiff is currently housed at the Central California Women’s Facility (“CCWF”) in 14 Chowchilla, California, where the events in the second amended complaint are alleged to have 15 occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Jacob Stoeltzing, Attorney General/Department of 16 Justice, CA Office of Attorney General Dept. of Justice, Sacramento, CA (“OAG”); (2) Joanna 17 Breiden Hood, Attorney General, OAG; (3) R. Lawrence Bragg, Attorney General, OAG; (4) 18 Nathan Marco Guerro, Attorney General, OAG; (5) Doe Defendant, Office of Legal Affairs; 19 (6) Karen Johnson, Associate Governmental Program Analyst (“AGPA”), Office of Victim & 20 Survivor Rights & Services (“OVSRS”), CDCR; and (7) Doe Defendant, CCWF Accounting 21 Office Personnel, CCWF. All defendants are named in their individual and official capacities. 22 Plaintiff alleges claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment extortion 23 under color of official right, Fifth Amendment double jeopardy, and Fourteenth Amendment 24 Equal Protection. 25 Plaintiff alleges that on June 9, 2020, she exercised her First Amendment right and filed 26 Littlefield v. Amezcua, Case No. 1:20-cv-00799-JLT-GSA. The case settled on March 20, 2023, 27 with Plaintiff to receive $1,600.00, which included her filing fee and the previous return of nine 28 boxes of all her confiscated personal property. 1 On May 3, 2023, forty-four days after the closing of Littlefield v. Amezcua, a 32-year-old 2 restitution fine from Victorville, Case No. VCR5202 ordered in 1991 for $4,000.00, which was 3 subject to a 10-year statute of limitations at the time it was ordered, was placed on Plaintiff’s 4 prison trust account as “active” and $0.98 (or 50%) was deducted from the $1.95 Plaintiff had 5 received as I/M Pay Support. 6 Plaintiff contends that her cause of action for the 1991 restitution fine was completed 7 when she was sent to the California Institute for Women (“CIW”). Plaintiff was incarcerated as 8 CDC# W-39671 from 1991 to 1999. Plaintiff’s Correctional Counselor I (“CCI”) informed 9 Plaintiff, when Plaintiff mentioned her restitution fine order, that “Being in prison was the 10 plaintiff’s restitution.” The State made no effort to collect the $4,000 from 1991 to 2001 when 11 Plaintiff discharged CDC# W-39671, therefore forfeiting collection of VCR5202 fine within the 12 prescribed statute of limitations in effect on monetary judgements of 10 years, in effect in 1991, 13 at the time of the order. 14 For her current incarceration on Case No. INFO45012, 2007 to present, Plaintiff was 15 assessed a restitution fine of $10,000.00, which was fulfilled at the time the 1991 restitution fine 16 VCR5202 was placed as “active” on Plaintiff’s prison trust account in May of 2023. 17 On June 28, 2023, about 90 days after the closing of Littlefield v. Amezcua, Check No. 18 05156350 for the amount of $1,600.00 appeared on Plaintiff’s trust account statement. Normally, 19 checks are placed on an encumbrance list for 30 days. This was the settlement check, and it is 20 listed five times as a “DIRECT RESTITUTION PAYMENT” with the entire amount placed and 21 then removed five times. Then the $1,600.00 is again placed on Plaintiff’s trust account and the 22 amount of $1,523.81 is deducted as a “RESTITUTION FINE PAYMENT” when by law the 23 deduction amount on a viable restitution fine order is 50%. Then an “Administrative Fee” is 24 charged and deducted for the amount of $76.19, leaving Plaintiff’s account balance the same after 25 the check arrived as before the check arrived. Plaintiff alleges that her settlement check for 26 $1,600.00 was “extorted under color of official right, in it’s entirety” and that she is ultimately 27 extorted for $4,000.00 due to the placing of VCR5202 as “active.” 28 /// 1 Plaintiff attempted to resolve the issue with the Office of Risk Management and requested 2 immediate removal of Restitution Fine VCR5202 from Plaintiff’s Trust Account, the return of all 3 monies collected on it so far, and the $402.00 filing fee for the instant case. Plaintiff alleges that 4 OOA’s failure to comply with her demands, instead generating a 602 form with a new log 5 number, gave a chilling effect. Plaintiff attempted to follow through with the newly-generated 6 602 and was again denied by CCWF OOG, but CDCR OOA acted obtuse and portrayed Plaintiff 7 as grievancing the fulfilled $10,000 on her current case, again creating a chilling effect. Plaintiff 8 believes that the settlement agreement for Littlefield v. Amezcua was more than fair on her part, 9 but alleges that the amount taken by the restitution fine was very distressing. Plaintiff alleges that 10 it took a while to find exactly where the retaliation was coming from, and “it will probably take a 11 trial to find out which of the defendants actually did what or nothing.” (ECF No. 23, p. 11.) 12 Plaintiff requests service of the second amended complaint, a trial and redress, and 13 monetary damages. 14 III. Discussion 15 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Despite 16 being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure 17 the identified deficiencies. 18 A. Immunity 19 For the first time in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants 20 attorneys who are employed by the California Office of the Attorney General who apparently 21 represented the defendants in a prior civil rights action filed by Plaintiff. 22 “Prosecutorial immunity applies to § 1983 claims. State prosecutors are absolutely 23 immune from § 1983 actions when performing functions ‘intimately associated with the judicial 24 phase of the criminal process,’ or, phrased differently, ‘when performing the traditional functions 25 of an advocate.’” Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 (citations omitted). The 26 same immunity is extended to government lawyers prosecuting or defending civil rights actions. 27 Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991) (government lawyers absolutely immune for 28 actions “intimately” or “closely” associated with judicial process); see also Murphy v. Morris, 1 849 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988) (“state assistant attorney general defending state officials in 2 prisoner civil rights litigation” entitled to “absolute immunity” from Section 1983 suit for 3 damages) (citations omitted); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572–73 (2d Cir. 1986) 4 (absolute immunity which government prosecutor enjoys in connection with official duties also 5 applies to government attorney who undertakes to defend civil suit). 6 Accordingly, Defendants Stoeltzing, Hood, Bragg, and Guerro are absolutely immune 7 from Plaintiff’s § 1983 action. 8 B. First Amendment 9 1. Retaliation 10 Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 11 petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 12 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. 13 Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 14 Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 15 adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that 16 such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did 17 not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567– 18 68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 19 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 Adverse action taken against a prisoner “need not be an independent constitutional 21 violation. The mere threat of harm can be an adverse action.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 22 (internal citations omitted). A causal connection between the adverse action and the protected 23 conduct can be alleged by an allegation of a chronology of events from which retaliation can be 24 inferred. Id. The filing of grievances and the pursuit of civil rights litigation against prison 25 officials are both protected activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68. The plaintiff must allege 26 either a chilling effect on future First Amendment activities, or that he suffered some other harm 27 that is “more than minimal.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. A plaintiff successfully pleads that the 28 action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal by alleging, in addition to a 1 retaliatory motive, that the defendant’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” or that they were 2 “unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution.” Id. 3 Plaintiff states that she is bringing a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, but 4 alleges that it took a while to find out where the retaliation was coming from and “it will probably 5 take a trial to find out which of the defendants actually did what or nothing.” (ECF No. 23, p. 6 11.) Plaintiff’s vague suggestion that she has discovered retaliation but requires a trial to find out 7 if any defendant did anything is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim for retaliation. 8 2. Grievance Process 9 Plaintiff alleges that the refusal of OOA to comply with her requests for the return of her 10 settlement funds and obtuse responses to Plaintiff’s grievances gave a chilling effect. 11 Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against prison staff based solely on the processing and 12 review of her inmate appeals. Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right to have her 13 appeals accepted or processed. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003); Mann v. 14 Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.19 88). The prison grievance procedure does not confer any 15 substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for 16 liability under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.1993); see also 17 Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 18 2010) (plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to 19 state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment). Denial or refusal to process a prison 20 grievance is not a constitutional violation. Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-BAM (PC), 21 2018 WL 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a 22 cognizable claim arising out of the screening or processing of her grievances or complaints. 23 C. Extortion Under Color of Official Right 24 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring claims under the Fourth Amendment for 25 “extortion under color of official right,” no such right exists under the Fourth Amendment. 26 The language “extortion under color of official right” may also be a reference to the 27 Hobbs Act, which makes it a crime to, inter alia, obstruct or affect commerce by extortion. 18 28 U.S.C. § 1951(a). If Plaintiff is attempting to pursue a standalone substantive Hobbs Act claim, 1 the Hobbs Act is a criminal statute for which there is no private right of action. See Diamond v. 2 Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1986) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the 3 prosecution or nonprosecution of another”). Criminal statutes generally do not provide a private 4 cause of action or a basis for civil liability. 5 D. Fifth Amendment – Double Jeopardy 6 Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause for 7 collection of the 1991 restitution fine. 8 The Double Jeopardy Clause “establishes three distinct protections: (1) against a second 9 prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution for the same 10 offense after conviction; (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. 11 Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir. 1981). 12 Plaintiff is correct that restitution fines constitute punishment for the purpose of double 13 jeopardy. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977) (fines treated the same way as prison 14 sentences for purposes of double jeopardy and multiple punishment analysis). However, Plaintiff 15 admits that CDCR made no effort to collect the 1991 restitution fine until May 2023. Thus, 16 Plaintiff was not subjected to the same restitution order twice. To the extent Plaintiff contends 17 that CDCR forfeited the ability to collect the fine due to the expiration of the statute of 18 limitations, this argument is addressed below. 19 E. Fourteenth Amendment 20 1. Equal Protection 21 Plaintiff states that she is bringing a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 22 the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 24 alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, (1985); Shakur v. 25 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by 26 showing that defendants intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on his membership 27 in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 28 702– 03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that 1 similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship 2 to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008); 3 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 4 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable equal protection claim. Plaintiff pleads no facts 6 regarding whether Plaintiff was a member of a protected class or how she was treated differently 7 than any similarly situated individual. 8 2. Restitution 9 With respect to restitution, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim for relief under the 10 Fourteenth Amendment based on restitution deductions from her inmate trust account. See 11 Thompson v. Swarthout, No. CIV S-11-0780 GEB DAD P, 2012 WL 1682029, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 12 May 14, 2012); see also Craft v. Ahuja, 475 Fed. App’x 649, 650 (9th Cir. 2012) (district court 13 properly dismissed substantive and procedural due process claims based on restitution deductions 14 from an inmate trust account); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1231–32 (S.D. Cal. 15 2004) (allegations regarding deductions from prisoner’s trust account to satisfy restitution order 16 whether authorized or unauthorized by state law fail to state a claim for violation of substantive 17 and procedural due process rights). Even if the deduction was not authorized, the Supreme Court 18 has held that “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not 19 constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful 20 post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 21 California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 22 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–895). 23 Plaintiff therefore fails to state a cognizable claim regarding any deductions made for 24 repayment of the 1991 restitution order. Any challenge to the appropriateness of the restitution 25 order, based on the statue of limitations, double jeopardy, or any other basis, should be addressed 26 under the post-deprivation remedy provided by California law. 27 /// 28 /// 1 F. Prison Regulations and Policies 2 To the extent that any Defendant has not complied with applicable state statutes or prison 3 regulations, these deprivations do not support a claim under § 1983. Section 1983 only provides 4 a cause of action for the deprivation of federally protected rights. See, e.g., Nible v. Fink, 828 5 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2020) (violations of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations do 6 not create private right of action); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) 7 (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal constitutional right); Prock v. 8 Warden, No. 1:13-cv-01572-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 5553349, at *11–12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) 9 (noting that several district courts have found no implied private right of action under title 15 and 10 stating that “no § 1983 claim arises for [violations of title 15] even if they occurred.”); Parra v. 11 Hernandez, No. 08cv0191-H (CAB), 2009 WL 3818376, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) 12 (granting motion to dismiss prisoner’s claims brought pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code 13 of Regulations); Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 1:06-cv-01378-OWW-WMW (PC), 2009 WL 14 1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no private right of action under 15 Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations) ; Tirado v. Santiago, No. 1:22-CV-00724 BAM 16 PC, 2022 WL 4586294, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 17 No. 1:22-CV-00724 JLT BAM PC, 2022 WL 16748838 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2022) (same). 18 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 19 For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails 20 to state a cognizable claim for relief. Despite being provided with the relevant legal standards, 21 Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in her complaint. Further leave to amend is not 22 warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure 24 to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 25 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 26 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 27 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 28 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 1 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 2 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 3 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 4 limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 5 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 6 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 7 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

10 Dated: February 23, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11

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