FILED Aug 18 2025, 9:19 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana April Neal, Appellant-Petitioner
v.
Ryan Neal, Appellee-Respondent
August 18, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-DR-2968 Appeal from the Clinton Superior Court The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 12D01-1210-DR-999
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 1 of 16 Judges May and Mathias concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary [1] April Neal (“Mother”) and Ryan Neal (“Father”) dissolved their marriage in
2013. The parties share two children, L.N., born on December 20, 2009, and
H.N., born on August 22, 2012 (“the Children”). Although initially the parties
shared joint legal custody of the Children with Mother having physical custody,
in 2017 the trial court granted physical custody to Father. After Mother had
experienced some mental-health issues, Mother and Father entered into an
agreement which had provided that Mother’s parenting time was to be
supervised and that Mother was not to drive the Children to or from visits due
to concerns about her ability to drive safely.
[2] Mother moved to modify her parenting time in December of 2023. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered that Mother’s parenting time
continue to be supervised and that Mother continue to not drive the Children.
The trial court also ordered Mother to pay $1000.00 of Father’s attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
her requests to have unsupervised parenting time and to be able to transport the
Children. Mother also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 2 of 16 ordering her to pay Father’s attorney’s fees. Because we disagree with each of
Mother’s contentions, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Mother and Father dissolved their marriage on December 27, 2013. The parties
share the Children, and, initially, the parties were awarded joint legal custody
of them with Mother having physical custody. In September of 2015, the trial
court entered an order appointing guardian ad litem (“GAL”) Clare
Deitchman. The trial court ordered GAL Deitchman to “investigate and make
a recommendation as to custody and parenting time” and to file a report with
the trial court. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 12. In February of 2017, the trial
court granted physical custody of the Children to Father.
[4] Mother and Father have entered into numerous agreements regarding
supervision and parenting time throughout this case. On February 14, 2022,
the parties entered into their fourth agreement regarding supervised visitation,
which agreement the trial court approved. The agreement provided that the
Children’s “parenting time with Mother […] shall be supervised at all times[,]”
and that “[t]ransportation will be provided at the beginning of the visits by
[Maternal Grandmother, Pauline Reed] and at the end of the visits by Father.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 88.
[5] Mother moved to modify her parenting time on December 8, 2023, in which
motion she alleged that “there have been substantial and ongoing changes in
the parties’ circumstances such that a modification of Mother’s parenting time
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 3 of 16 is warranted pursuant to Ind[iana] Code 31-17-4-2.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III
p. 37. Mother requested that “the supervision requirement be removed as the
[C]hildren would not be physically or emotionally harmed if Mother’s
parenting time would be unsupervised[,]” and that “the driving restrictions be
removed and that she be able to transport the children.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
III p. 38.
[6] In August of 2024, GAL Deitchman filed her supplemental report (“the GAL
report”). The GAL report made mention of Mother’s recent driving
evaluations and provided that GAL Deitchman had “asked [the Children]
about driving in a vehicle operated by [Mother]. [L.N.] on three (3) separate
occasions has informed the GAL that she ‘absolutely’ does not want to be
driven by [Mother].” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 45. The GAL report
specified that H.N. had expressed a desire for the parenting time supervision to
continue and for the driving restrictions to remain unchanged. The GAL report
also noted that the Children had gone “long periods of time” where they had
not seen Mother due to her mental and physical health issues. Appellant’s App.
Vol. III p. 41.
[7] The GAL report detailed information from medical records, which Mother had
provided to GAL Deitchman, including psychiatric records. Included in the
records were visit notes from October 31, 2023, which provided that Mother
reported “she ‘needs a letter to give to an attorney explaining that her bipolar is
stable and revoke her ability to not drive the car with her kids in them.’”
Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 44. A letter from a provider indicated “[Mother]’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 4 of 16 bipolar diagnosis is not currently affecting her ability to drive, specifically
without her children. [Mother] has gained the ability to have supervised visits
with her children, so allowing her to have her children in the car would be a
great step to allow her to gain more independence[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. III
p. 44.
[8] The GAL report also provided that the records indicated that the visit prior, on
October 16, 2023, noted that
Mother “has started dating a gentleman that wakes up around 2:30 am and [Mother] would find herself being wired and waking up early to text him in the morning. . . . they have since broke up, so her sleep schedule is back to normal. . . . feared that she was going manic.
Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 44. GAL Deitchman recommended in the report,
in part, that Mother’s parenting time continue to be supervised and that Mother
not be allowed to drive the Children.
[9] An evidentiary hearing was conducted on October 22, 2024. At the hearing,
Mother testified that, while she and Father were still married, she had had a
tumor on her left optic nerve which had required surgery. Later, Mother was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and has experienced physical health issues,
including vision problems. Mother testified that while she can see out of her
left eye, she “can’t move it to the left, from midpoint to the left[,]” and that
when she checks for traffic to the left, she “will close [her] eye and [she] can see
perfectly with [her] right eye with no incident.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 5 of 16 [10] Reed testified that she had been Mother’s visitation supervisor for “years” and
that she believed that “at one point [… Mother] needed supervision.” Tr. Vol.
II p. 54. Reed further testified that
after [Mother’s] brain surgery she became manic and bipolar. [….] She didn’t have good judgment, stuff like that, because they did not have her medications right. So, it took her going into a mental institution, them messing with her medicines, changing them around. She–she has been into a mental institution. She goes in, they keep her for two to three weeks and say well she is ready to go home. And I tell them no she is not ready to go home.
Tr. Vol. II p. 54.
[11] Reed testified that she believed that Mother had not been hospitalized within
the last two years of the hearing. Reed testified that the last time Mother had
been hospitalized was for a “Lithium overdose” as a result of her medication,
and that, by the time Reed was able to reach someone for assistance on the
matter, Mother “had already went into the–the bipolar or the mania[.]” Tr.
Vol. II p. 53. Reed testified that she had not seen Mother struggle with the
same kind of condition since 2022, that Mother has maintained consistency
with her medication, and that Mother “goes to every doctor’s appointment.”
[12] Father also testified at the evidentiary hearing. Father testified that in May of
2018, Mother had had a mental-health incident while driving, which had
ultimately resulted in Mother’s hospitalization. Father testified that since then,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 6 of 16 Mother’s improvement had been “up and down for quite a while” until
“recently.” Tr. Vol. II p. 67. Father testified that in 2022, Mother was “having
issues with her medicine and not being correct in her being manic so to speak.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 68. Father testified that this was related to the “level of Lithium
that […] she was being prescribed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 68. Father also testified that
Mother had been, “[a]t this point[,]” stable, “[m]aybe for the last year.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 77. Father testified that he had a concern from the spring of 2024
regarding an instance in which Mother “was trying to take a lamp apart or
change a lightbulb in the middle of the night while the kids were trying to
sleep.” Tr. Vol. II p. 78.
[13] Mother testified at the evidentiary hearing that, since 2022, she has seen her
doctors “every three months like clockwork and [her] medication is regulated as
it needs to be by [her] doctors and [she] take[s her] medicine every single day.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Mother testified, “I am very, very serious about missing my
medication and things like that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Mother testified that there
had not been any issues with her medication in the last two years since the
evidentiary hearing, and she testified that she is compliant with all of her
doctors’ requests. Mother also testified that she currently had a non-restricted
driver’s license as a result of her driving tests done through specialized services.
Mother testified that she had been, since April of 2024, and still was at the time
of the hearing, working as a driver for Uber. Mother admitted into evidence
her Occupational Therapy Driving Evaluation conducted by Senior Driving
Mobility Services from January 6, 2023, and testified that she had passed that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 7 of 16 exam, “went to the BMV[,]” and passed the driving test there, as well. Tr. Vol.
II p. 24. Mother also testified that she “revealed [her] medical history”
including her bipolar diagnoses and the extent of some of her physical
limitations to the Senior Driving Mobility Services instructor. Tr. Vol. II p. 24.
[14] Mother also admitted into evidence a follow-up Occupational Therapy Driving
Evaluation conducted on August 6, 2024. That report provided that Mother
had “performed very well during the on road portion of the evaluation and this
therapist sees no reason (from a driving standpoint) to keep [Mother] from
transporting her children.” Ex. Vol. p. 23. The report also provided, “Based on
today’s driving evaluation and the information provided, this therapist is
making the following recommendation: This client is fit to continue
unrestricted driving.” Ex. Vol. p. 24.
[15] The trial court entered its order on the evidentiary hearing on November 21,
2024. The order provided, in part, that “Mother’s parenting time with the
[Children] shall continue to be supervised.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 34.
The order also provided that Mother “shall continue to not transport the
[Children] in a motor vehicle.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 34. Finally, the
trial court ordered Mother to “pay $1,000.00 of Father’s attorney fees within
ninety (90) days.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 34.
Discussion and Decision [16] Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition
to modify her parenting time. We initially note that the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 8 of 16 has recognized “a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude
and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51
N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). The Indiana
Supreme Court has further explained that
[a]ppellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face- to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.
Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).
[17] We note that the trial court did not enter specific findings of fact and
conclusions thereon. Therefore, a general-judgment standard applies. Matter of
Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “Under this
standard, we will reverse the award of custody only if the trial court’s
determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court or the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Id. Moreover, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of witnesses. In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012), trans. denied.
[18] “Indiana has long recognized that the rights of parents to visit their children is a
precious privilege that should be enjoyed by noncustodial parents.” Duncan v. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 9 of 16 Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Indiana Code
section 31-17-4-2 provides that the trial court “may modify an order granting or
denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best
interests of the child.” The trial court, however, “shall not restrict a parent’s
parenting time rights unless [it] finds that the parenting time might endanger the
child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development.” Id. Although the statute uses the term “might,” this court has
held that a parent’s visitation rights may not be restricted “unless that visitation
would endanger the child’s physical health or emotional development.” Duncan,
843 N.E.2d at 969 (emphasis in original).
I. Mother’s Supervised Parenting Time [19] Mother contends that the trial court was required to explicitly find that
unsupervised parenting time would endanger the Children’s physical health or
impair their emotional development and further contends that the evidence
presented was insufficient to permit such a finding. We conclude that ample
evidence was presented that would support the conclusion that unsupervised
parenting time would significantly impair the Children’s physical health or
emotional development.
[20] Father testified that L.N. had been “concerned that [Mother] was going manic
again because she was up late doing things at night when the kids would be
sleeping[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 85. Consistent with this concern, Mother admitted
that she had told her psychiatrist that she was “feeling manic” approximately
five months prior to the hearing, and that she had been staying up late during Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 10 of 16 that period. Tr. Vol. II p. 38. Mother also admitted to having skipped doses of
her medication “every other day” prior to 2022, which had led to the
requirement of supervised visitation with the Children, and which she admitted
had likely been the reason for which she had been deemed “a danger to the
[C]hildren.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14.
[21] The GAL report detailed that Mother had indicated that “she was concerned
about going ‘manic’ due to poor sleep habits[,]” and that “Mother is not a good
self-reporter historically as to her medical conditions[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol.
III p. 48. The report further noted that the Children both indicated that they
were “uncomfortable with unsupervised time” with Mother. Appellant’s App.
Vol. III p. 42. The GAL report questioned whether the Children would be
expected to “sound the alarm” or “make evaluations as to how [Mother] was
behaving” if an instance arose in which Mother needed mental-health treatment
during an unsupervised visit. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 48. This is sufficient
evidence from which one could conclude, at the very least, that the Children’s
emotional development could be impaired by experiencing one of Mother’s
“manic” episodes, something with which they are unlikely to be able to cope.
[22] As for the lack of an explicit finding on this point, Indiana Appellate Rule
66(A) provides the following:
No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 11 of 16 [23] In light of the ample evidence supporting a conclusion that unsupervised
parenting time would significantly impair the Children’s physical health or
emotional development, we are left with no doubt that a remand would lead to
nothing more than the addition of a finding quoting the statute. We decline to
remand for that purpose.
II. Mother’s ability to transport the Children [24] Mother next contends that the trial court erred in denying her request to modify
her ability to transport the Children in her vehicle during parenting time. In
February of 2022, Mother and Father agreed that Reed would transport the
Children to Mother’s parenting time and that Father would collect them at the
conclusion of visitation. Mother requested in her petition that the driving
restrictions “be removed and that she be able to transport the children.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 38.
[25] A thorough review of Mother’s physical limitations and the concerns expressed
by GAL Deitchman, Father, and the Children demonstrates that the trial
court’s ruling was well-grounded in fact and law. Father testified at the
evidentiary hearing to a concerning incident in May of 2018, during which
Mother had been “having an episode” while driving, and while on the phone
with Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 67. Father testified that he had been on the
telephone talking to Mother for thirty-five to forty minutes and he had been
telling Mother, “hey, just pull over, I will get an ambulance to you, take you to
the hospital, you know, you are having an episode, you need to stop, you are a
danger to other people on the road.” Tr. Vol. II p. 67. Mother was hospitalized Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 12 of 16 after this incident. When questioned about why her driver’s license had
previously been suspended, Mother testified, “I wasn’t taking my medication
and I wasn’t safe behind the wheel.” Tr. Vol. II p. 12.
[26] Following her surgery, Mother has experienced a number of physical
limitations, including impaired vision in her left eye, which prevents her from
looking left with that eye while driving, issues with double vision, and “drop
foot[.]”1 Tr. Vol. II p. 25. The GAL report included information on Mother’s
medical records, explaining that from 2017 to 2023, “[m]any of [Mother’s]
reports focused on ‘gait difficulties’, ‘shaking’ or ‘spasms’ in her arms, ‘memory
issues’, ‘right foot drop’, ‘manic’ episodes requiring hospitalization at a state
hospital in Evansville; note that she had failed a driving safety test; and lithium
toxicity (2022) requiring inpatient hospitalization[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. III
p. 43.
[27] The GAL report indicated that GAL Deitchman had “asked [the Children]
about driving in a vehicle operated by [Mother]. [L.N.] on three (3) separate
occasions has informed the GAL that she ‘absolutely’ does not want to be
driven by [Mother].” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 45. L.N. had elaborated,
citing concerns about Mother’s muscle weakness in her legs, slow response
time, and hearing and visual impairments. H.N. had likewise been “adamant
1 At the evidentiary hearing, Mother indicated that “drop foot” in her case affects her ability to walk, explaining that “[w]hen I am walking, sometimes I am unable to get my foot up as high and I will trip.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 13 of 16 about not wanting to ride in a vehicle driven by Mother.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. III p. 46. While GAL Deitchman discussed Mother’s recent driving tests,
which she had passed, GAL Deitchman ultimately reported that she “supports
[L.N.] and [H.N.]’s position that they are not comfortable riding with their
Mother driving due to her health conditions.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 48.
GAL Deitchman recommended that “Mother should not be allowed to
transport the [C]hildren in a motor vehicle operated by her[.]” Appellant’s
App. Vol. III p. 49.
[28] The trial court considered all relevant evidence, including Mother’s testimony
and driving tests, Father’s testimony, Reed’s testimony, and the GAL report,
and ultimately denied Mother’s request to remove her driving restrictions.
Based on the record, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion
in denying Mother’s request to modify her ability to transport the Children.
Mother’s argument is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence,
which we will not do. See In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d at 883.
III. Attorney’s Fees [29] Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay
$1000.00 of Father’s attorney’s fees. In an action to enforce or modify an order
granting or denying parenting time rights, a trial court “may award: (1)
reasonable attorney’s fees; (2) court costs; and (3) other reasonable expenses of
litigation.” Ind. Code § 31-17-4-3(a). In determining whether to award such
expenses, the trial court may consider “whether the petitioner substantially
prevailed and whether the court found that the respondent knowingly or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 14 of 16 intentionally violated an order granting or denying rights; and […] whether the
respondent substantially prevailed and the court found that the action was
frivolous or vexatious.” Ind. Code § 31-17-4-3(b). In post-dissolution
proceedings, the trial court may order a party to pay a reasonable amount
toward an opposing party’s attorney fees. Ratliff v. Ratliff, 804 N.E.2d 237, 248
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “The trial court has broad discretion in awarding
attorney fees.” Gilbert v. Gilbert, 777 N.E.2d 785, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
“We will reverse the trial court’s decision only when it is against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id.
[30] Father had requested that Mother pay $2000.00 of his legal fees related to the
petition at issue, and the trial court ultimately ordered Mother to pay $1000.00.
Mother testified that she earns approximately $500.00 per week as an Uber
driver and that she is “saving a lot of money by living with” Reed, and Mother
presented evidence that she had been given a $200.00 performance bonus as an
Uber driver. Tr. Vol. II p. 31.
[31] Given the evidence of Mother’s ability to pay and our conclusions that the trial
court acted within its discretion in denying Mother’s petition to modify
visitation, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision was against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court.
[32] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 15 of 16 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Denise F. Hayden Lacy Law Office, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Brian K. Zoeller Cohen & Malad LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-DR-2968 | August 18, 2025 Page 16 of 16