April Carroll v. Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 19, 2024
• Docket: 22-3417
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 22-3417 ___________

APRIL CARROLL, as ADMINISTRATOR of ESTATE OF KEVIN CARROLL, and in her own right

v.

COMPREHENSIVE HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC, d/b/a BRIGHTON REHABILITATON AND WELLNESS CENTER; SAMUEL HALPER; EPHRAM LAHASKY; HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP, INC.; HCSG EAST, LLC

Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services, LLC, d/b/a Brighton Rehabilitation and Wellness Center; Samuel Halper; Ephram Lahasky, Appellants

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-22-cv-00686) Honorable David S. Cercone ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) (April 18, 2024)

Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 19, 2024)

____________ OPINION* ____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

A nursing home and its owners appeal the District Court’s order remanding this

case to state court. Because this case does not belong in federal court under Maglioli v.

Alliance HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393 (3d Cir. 2021), we will affirm.

I

Kevin Carroll provided housekeeping and laundry services at Brighton

Rehabilitation and Wellness Center, a nursing home in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.

While working at Brighton, he caught COVID-19, which tragically caused his death. His

wife April Carroll, as administrator of his estate, sued Brighton and its owners in

Pennsylvania state court, alleging various state-law claims, including negligence and

wrongful death.

Brighton and its owners (collectively, Brighton) removed the case to federal court.

As relevant here, they contended that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness

Act (PREP Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, provided a basis for federal-question

jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and remanded the case to state court, applying

our precedent in Maglioli, 16 F.4th 393. See Carroll v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt.

Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 17156776, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2022), report and

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

2 recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17105481 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2022). Brighton now

appeals.1 Because we agree with the District Court that Maglioli requires remand, we will

affirm.

II

Brighton maintains that federal jurisdiction is proper on three grounds.

Brighton first argues that federal-question jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 because the PREP Act completely preempts Carroll’s state-law causes of action.

We disagree because Carroll alleges only negligent wrongdoing by Brighton. The PREP

Act requires willful misconduct, which Carroll does not allege. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-

6d(d)(1); Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 407–08. Carroll’s “claims thus do not fall within [the]

scope of the [PREP Act’s] exclusive federal cause of action. They are not completely

preempted, so they belong in state court.” Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 407–08.

Brighton next contends that removal to federal court is proper under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1). That statute allows a federal officer—or “any person acting under that

officer”—to remove a civil action from state court to federal court. We rejected this

argument in Maglioli, which binds us here. “[N]ursing homes [such as Brighton] do not

assist or help carry out the duties of a federal superior. They are not government

contractors. . . . They are not delegated federal authority, nor do they provide a service

1 “The issue here is whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1442. Because [Brighton] appeal[s] the issue of federal-officer removal, we may also review the parts of the District Court’s order rejecting removal based on complete preemption and a substantial federal issue. We review issues of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo, including a court’s decision to remand for a lack of jurisdiction.” Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 402–03 (cleaned up). 3 that the federal government would otherwise provide.” Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 405 (citation

omitted). Brighton thus was not acting under a federal officer.

Finally, Brighton argues that this case raises a substantial federal issue such that

federal-question jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Normally, a case arises

under federal law only when federal law creates the cause of action asserted. Gunn v.

Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). But “in certain cases federal-question jurisdiction will

lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal

Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). For federal jurisdiction to

lie under this exception, the federal issue must be “necessarily raised” by the state-law

claims. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. The federal issue is not necessarily raised here because

the PREP Act is not an essential element of any of the state-law claims. See Maglioli, 16

F.4th at 413. “We therefore lack federal-question jurisdiction under Grable.” Id.

* * *

The District Court was correct to hold that Maglioli forecloses federal-court

jurisdiction over this case. We will affirm.