Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 154 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-25-98
Opinion Delivered March 4, 2026
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI APRIL BRADLEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTH APPELLANT DIVISION [NO. 60JV-24-259] V. HONORABLE TJUANA BYRD ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF MANNING, JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD AFFIRMED; MOTION TO APPELLEES WITHDRAW GRANTED
CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge
April Bradley appeals a Pulaski County Circuit Court order terminating her parental
rights to her three-year-old son, MC.1 Bradley’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
representation and a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human
Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2003), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9
(2025), stating that there are no meritorious grounds to support an appeal. The clerk of this
court made four unsuccessful attempts to mail to Bradley a certified copy of counsel’s brief
and motion to be relieved, informing her that she has the right to file pro se points for
reversal under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i)(3). The packet was ultimately returned
1 The father’s parental rights have not been terminated and thus, he is not a party to this appeal. to the clerk’s office as undeliverable, and Bradley has not filed any pro se points. We have
reviewed the record, and because we agree there are no issues of arguable merit presented,
we affirm and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On February 20, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“Department”)
received a safety request from an investigator with the Crimes Against Children Division of
the Arkansas State Police after MC was treated in the emergency room for a laceration and
a fractured nose. Bradley could not adequately explain MC’s injuries but suggested they
could have occurred when the child headbutted something or while she was holding the
child during a physical altercation with her boyfriend, Steven Underwood.
After the discussion with Bradley regarding the incident, the Department
implemented a safety plan whereby Bradley and MC would stay with the paternal
grandmother, Sandy Reed, so that Bradley would not be in contact with Underwood.
However, when the Department visited Reed’s home, it was dirty and not environmentally
appropriate for MC. As a result, a local pastor temporarily procured a hotel room for Bradley
and MC and agreed to act as her support system. The Department further advised Bradley
that she needed to obtain a protective order against Underwood.
At a team decision-making meeting, Bradley agreed to stay at a shelter with MC and
obtain employment. She further agreed to allow MC to stay with her pastor until she
removed her belongings from her home and obtained the protective order against
Underwood. She was given three days to get her affairs in order, but she requested more
2 time. The Department repeatedly texted and called Bradley over the next eight days, but she
did not respond. MC remained with the church pastor that entire time.
The Department ultimately removed MC from the home on March 6 because Bradley
had refused to go to the shelter, had failed to obtain a protective order against Underwood,
and had made no progress on making the home safe and livable. Bradley stipulated to
probable cause for the removal at the probable-cause hearing on March 14, and a probable-
cause order was entered on March 21.
After an adjudication hearing on April 25, the court adjudicated MC dependent-
neglected due to failure to protect, unexplained injury, environmental neglect, and parental
unfitness, as well as Bradley’s unwillingness or inability to provide a safe and stable home,
thereby placing MC at risk of harm. The goal of the case was determined to be reunification
with a fit parent and a concurrent goal of adoption.
A review hearing was held on August 6. The court found that Bradley was only in
partial compliance with the case plan. The court had previously ordered Bradley to have safe,
stable housing; submit to a hair-follicle drug test; and attend parenting classes and mental-
health counseling. Although there was evidence that the appropriate referrals had been made
and Bradley testified that she had submitted to a drug test and had started counseling, there
was no documentation that Bradley had availed herself of those services. The court had also
ordered Bradley to obtain an order of protection against Underwood, but Bradley had not
complied with the court’s instructions. The goal of the case remained reunification.
3 That same day, the Department and the attorney ad litem (“AAL”) filed a joint
petition for termination of parental rights, claiming that it was in MC’s best interest that
Bradley’s parental rights be terminated. As grounds for termination, the petition alleged as
to Bradley (1) aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of successful reunification; (2) prior
involuntary termination of a sibling of the juvenile; (3) that the child had been abandoned;
and (4) subsequent other factors. This petition also sought termination of the parental rights
of MC’s legal father, Paul Bradley.
On September 19, a hearing was held on several pending motions. At that hearing,
the court found Justin McGinty to be MC’s legal and biological father and, accordingly,
dismissed Paul Bradley from the case. The court then granted the Department’s voluntarily
dismissal of itself as a joint petitioner in the pending petition for termination of parental
rights, granted the AAL’s motion for continuance, and ordered that the Department vet
McGinity before any potential placement.
On September 24, the AAL filed a separate petition for termination of parental rights
as to Bradley alone. The petition once again alleged that termination of parental rights was
in MC’s best interest and listed subsequent other factors, aggravated circumstances, and
prior involuntary termination of parental rights as grounds for termination.
At the October 24 termination hearing, adoption specialist Kienda McFadden
testified that she ran a data match using MC’s characteristics and that the search returned
333 potential adoptive resources, indicating that MC was likely to be adopted. Sandra
Mathis, Bradley’s landlord, testified that Bradley owed $9,450 in back rent; the utilities were
4 off; Bradley had not maintained the property; and the home was currently uninhabitable.
She stated that she had not evicted Bradley because she felt sorry for her.
Bradley also testified at the hearing. She admitted that the house she was renting was
unlivable; that she owed back rent (although not as much as Mathis claimed); that she had
pending criminal charges against her in Pulaski County for which she expected to receive
probation; that she had active arrest warrants from Indiana; that she had not started
domestic-violence classes; and that she had not progressed beyond supervised visits with MC.
She claimed that she was currently employed; that she had submitted to a drug test; and that
she had obtained a protective order against Underwood. However, she did not or could not
provide any documentation that she had obtained a protective order, nor did she present
any documentation that she had attended any parenting classes or counseling sessions.
As for her relationship with Underwood, Bradley initially claimed she had not spent
any time with him after she alleged that he may have injured MC in March. However, the
Department introduced a phone call from Bradley to an unnamed male caller in April
initiated while she was incarcerated. In that call, it was clear that Bradley and the unnamed
caller were in an intimate and romantic relationship. Although this phone call occurred
shortly after MC’s removal, Bradley denied she was in a romantic relationship with
Underwood at the time of the call. She later admitted that she had had to call the police on
Underwood several times since MC’s removal but claimed she had not seen Underwood
since June. When questioned about calls to the police regarding Underwood in June and
July, she claimed she could not remember making the calls.
5 Bradley was also questioned about four other recorded inmate calls in September
2024. In one, Bradley informed an unnamed male caller that she had been having weird
dreams. When the unnamed caller indicated that it was probably because she was “coming
down off dope,” Bradley stated, “I know. I’ve been sleeping non-stop.” Even though the
recording of this admission was played at the hearing, Bradley denied having “funny dreams”
or being on drugs. In another call, Bradley was heard telling an unnamed male caller that
McGinty was going to let her have MC back if she got a house and got her “head out of [her]
ass.” In the third call, Bradley informed the caller that she wanted to quit doing dope when
she was released; however, at the hearing, Bradley denied telling anyone that. In a fourth
call, Bradley giggled and told the caller that she was high on speed. The caller stated he
thought Bradley had wanted to quit, and Bradley responded that she still intended to quit.
The caller then admonished her that she should not be getting high in jail.
In each of the four calls, Bradley told the unnamed male caller that she loved him.
Bradley claimed to be in a relationship with Travis Hall in September when those calls were
made but denied they were in a relationship in April when the first phone call was recorded.
Finally, in a fifth phone call, Bradley told the caller that she did not want to take her
seizure medication because she was afraid it would make her gain weight. She acknowledged
at the hearing, however, that it was important to stay on her seizure medication if she was
going to be in charge of a young child.
Despite the foregoing, Bradley claimed that she was drug-free; she could obtain stable
and suitable housing quickly; and her pending charges would not prevent her from taking
6 custody of MC. She stated that she had bonded with MC and that with additional time, she
believed she could successfully bring MC home.
Sergeant Jessica Ezell with the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility was in
charge of maintaining jail call logs, and she authenticated the recorded phone calls made by
Bradley while incarcerated.
Mahogany Smith, the caseworker, testified that the Department had made all the
required referrals, but Bradley had not cooperated and that her emails and texts to Bradley
would go unanswered. Smith testified that, as of the date of the hearing, Bradley had not
provided her with proof of income or of safe and stable housing (or potential housing); the
home Bradley currently rented was without utilities and appeared abandoned; and she was
unsure where Bradley was currently residing. She also did not have any evidence that Bradley
had complied with obtaining the court-ordered hair-follicle test and testified that Bradley
appeared to have unresolved drug issues. Smith also expressed concern about Bradley’s
romantic relationships and the fact she had not provided any evidence of taking any legal
precautions to protect MC from domestic abuse. Because Bradley had not engaged with the
services that had been ordered and had not demonstrated any improvements on her own,
Smith did not believe that adding more services or providing her with more time would
result in a successful reunification.
The last witness was Justin McGinty. He testified that it was “probably” in MC’s best
interest that Bradley’s parental rights be terminated. He stated that he believes Bradley wants
to be a good mother but noted that she had been unable to achieve reunification with any
7 of her other children. He testified that he believed drugs would be her downfall every time.
He also testified that Bradley’s testimony had not been entirely truthful at the hearing that
day; that he believed the person in the first recorded phone call was Underwood; that Bradley
had told him that Underwood accidentally hit MC during the altercation with Bradley; and
that Bradley could also be explosive and violent at times.
After hearing all the evidence, the circuit court entered an order terminating Bradley’s
parental rights. The court found that the AAL had proved by clear and convincing evidence
all the grounds for termination alleged in the petition and that termination was in MC’s best
interest. Specifically, if MC returned to Bradley, he “would be at potential risk of drug
exposure, housing instability, neglect due to exposure to other unvetted partners as she
admits to being involved with yet another man that [the Department] is not aware of and
not vetted.” The court further found credible McGinty’s testimony regarding Bradley’s toxic
and violent behavior toward him.
Bradley timely appealed the court’s order, and counsel has filed a no-merit brief and
motion to withdraw.
II. Discussion
In dependency-neglect cases, if, after studying the record and researching the law,
appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then
counsel may file a no-merit petition and move to withdraw. The petition must include an
argument section that lists all adverse rulings that the parent received at the circuit court
8 level and explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A).
Counsel, here, addresses four clearly adverse rulings—the termination decision and
rulings on three hearsay objections—and three other objections for which there was either
no ruling or the need for the ruling was later obviated. Each will be discussed in turn.
A. Termination
A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Supp 2023). Clear and
convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a
firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews
termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a
finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the
circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)
the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and
(2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,
9 caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing
of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in
section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground must be proved to support termination.
Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.
Although the circuit court here found multiple statutory grounds for termination,
only one ground is necessary to support the termination. See Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 303, 521 S.W.3d 183. One of the statutory grounds found by the
circuit court in the instant case was that, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4)(A), Bradley had previously had her parental rights involuntarily
terminated as to another child.
At the termination hearing, the Department introduced two prior termination
orders—an October 2019 order from Indiana that terminated Bradley’s parental rights to two
children and an October 2022 order from Arkansas terminating her parental rights to a third
child. Because this statutory ground was conclusively proved at the termination hearing,
there can be no meritorious challenge to the statutory-ground element of the termination
statute.
In addition to finding the existence of at least one statutory ground to support the
termination of parental rights, a court must also find that such termination is in the child’s
best interest, taking into consideration two statutory factors: (1) the likelihood of adoption
if parental rights are terminated and (2) the potential harm caused by continuing contact
10 with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). Here, the court considered both
statutory factors in light of the overall evidence, finding that termination was in MC’s best
interest. Counsel contends that there are no issues of arguable merit for reversal in
challenging this best-interest finding. We agree.
Regarding adoptability, the Department’s adoption specialist testified that she ran a
data match with MC’s characteristics, that there were 333 potential adoptive resources and
that MC was likely to be adopted. This court has long held that the testimony of a caseworker
or an adoption specialist that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability
finding. Gonzales v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 496, 725 S.W.3d 778; Coston v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 413, 698 S.W.3d 647; Strickland v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 608, 567 S.W.3d 870. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that
the circuit court had considered the likelihood of adoptability in accordance with Arkansas
Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) in finding that MC is adoptable. Accordingly,
there is no meritorious challenge to this finding.
Regarding potential harm, the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm
would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Ross v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
2017 Ark. App. 503, 529 S.W.3d 692. Potential harm must be viewed in broad terms, and
“potential” necessarily means that the court is required to look to future possibilities. Id.
Here, the court found that MC would be at potential risk of future instability,
substance exposure, and exposure to domestic violence if returned to Bradley. Here, the
Department presented evidence of Bradley’s housing instability as shown by the evidence
11 that her house lacks working utilities and is currently uninhabitable; her continued drug
usage, even while incarcerated; her failure to complete her domestic-violence classes despite
having been in a physically abusive relationship; and her failure to comply with practically
all the court’s orders other than visitation. This is in addition to all the services she was
provided in the other prior cases that also resulted in termination. This court has frequently
held that continued drug use, domestic violence, and instability demonstrate potential harm
sufficient to support a best-interest finding in a parental-rights-termination case. See, e.g.,
Beaird v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 415, 585 S.W.3d 172; Murphy v. Ark. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465; Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
2017 Ark. App. 262, 520 S.W.3d 322; Rossie-Fonner v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 Ark.
App. 29, 388 S.W.3d 38.
B. Other Adverse Rulings
Finally, counsel notes that, in addition to the termination decision, she has reviewed
the record for all rulings adverse to Bradley made by the circuit court on all objections,
motions, and requests made at the termination hearing in accordance with Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j)(1)(A). In addition to the sufficiency to support termination,
Bradley’s counsel fully briefed and discussed all but one adverse ruling. She even discussed
three other objections from which either no ruling was obtained or the ruling was later
obviated.
Three of the adverse rulings addressed by counsel were related to hearsay objections
to Bradley’s testimony regarding what she had been told by the drug-screening company and
12 by her caseworker about being referred for services and what her probation officer told her
about her pending criminal charges. We review evidentiary rulings under a manifest-abuse-
of-discretion standard, and we will not reverse absent a demonstration of prejudice. Joslin v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 273, 577 S.W.3d 26. After reviewing the record,
we agree with counsel that the circuit court’s rulings were correct and that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion. Moreover, we have held that when an adverse ruling could not
have changed the outcome of the proceeding and resulted in no prejudice, there can be no
meritorious challenge to the adverse ruling. Mayer v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App.
51. Here, even if there was an error with the adverse rulings identified by counsel, the error
would nevertheless be harmless considering the other evidence presented supporting
termination of Bradley’s parental rights as already discussed above.
The other adverse ruling addressed by counsel relates to the circuit court’s denial of
a motion for continuance of the termination hearing because Bradley was not present when
the case was called. However, Bradley was represented by counsel throughout the hearing,
she appeared by Zoom shortly after the hearing began and even testified at the hearing. Thus,
the need for a continuance was obviated.
As for the one adverse ruling not fully briefed, our supreme court has held that
counsel’s failure to address every adverse ruling will not prohibit us from granting counsel’s
motion to withdraw and affirming a termination order when the ruling clearly did not
constitute reversible error. Lewis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 364 Ark. 243, 217 S.W.3d 788
(2005). The adverse ruling that Bradley’s counsel failed to discuss—her request for more time
13 to complete the case plan—clearly does not constitute reversible error. Bradley has never been
in full compliance with the case plan and has still not addressed her substance-abuse issues
despite services being provided since at least 2018 when two of her children were removed
from her care in Indiana. Even were she to begin services now, this court has consistently
held that eleventh-hour attempts to comply with court orders do not outweigh prior
noncompliance and need not be credited by the circuit court. Watts v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 339, 669 S.W.3d 831. A parent’s past behavior is often a good
indicator of future behavior, and a child’s need for permanency and stability may override a
parent’s request for more time to see if the parent can change his or her behavior. Id.
The goal of the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a
child’s life when returning the child to the family home is contrary to the child’s health,
safety, or welfare, and the evidence demonstrates that a return to the home cannot be
accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). A child’s need for permanency and stability may override a
parent’s request for more time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Morton v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 388, 465 S.W.3d 871. Under the facts and circumstances
presented in this case, MC’s need for permanency and stability outweighed Bradley’s request
for additional time, and the circuit court did not err in denying her request.
III. Conclusion
Having carefully examined the record and the no-merit brief, we hold that Bradley’s
counsel has complied with the requirements for a no-merit termination-of-parental-rights
14 appeal and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion
to withdraw and affirm the termination order.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
HARRISON and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
One brief only.