Per Curiam.
The question presented concerns the apportionment of county boards of commissioners.
The Court of Appeals declined to approve a [232]*232Wayne County plan and remanded to the Wayne apportionment commission on the ground that it had failed to make a "good-faith effort to achieve districts of equal population”. The Court also declined to approve an Ingham County plan and remanded to the Ingham apportionment commission on the ground that "once mathematical exactness in population is achieved”, the subsidiary guidelines apply and the apportionment commission had selected a plan which "mathematically violated the subsidiary guidelines” "more than other plans before the commission”.
We affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals remanding to the Wayne and Ingham apportionment commissions for the drawing of plans in conformity with constitutional and statutory requirements. We do not, however, agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.
An apportionment plan for a county board of commissioners must both preserve city and township boundary lines and be drawn in accordance with other statutory criteria (1966 PA 261, 293)1 to the extent this can be done without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution as elucidated in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
I
The 1963 Constitution provides (article 7, § 7) for the establishment in each organized county of a board of supervisors, now the board of commissioners, "consisting of one member from each organized township and such representation from cities as provided by law”.2
[233]*233The constitution also provides (article 7, § 2) for the establishment, with the approval of a majority of a county’s electorate, of charter counties "with powers and limitations to be provided by general law”, and that such "law may permit the organization of county government in form different from that set forth in this constitution”.3
The voters of Wayne County have approved a charter which becomes effective on January 1, 1983. We have considered whether the apportionment of Wayne County is governed by the provision of the constitution (article 7, § 7) concerning counties generally or by the provision authorizing charter counties (article 7, § 2) and whether the general apportionment statute (Act 261) or the one concerning charter counties (Act 293) applies. Our conclusion that the apportionment of board of commissioner election districts for counties generally and for charter counties is governed by essentially the same criteria will ordinarily mean that [234]*234whether § 7 or § 2 of article 7 of the constitution or Act 261 or Act 293 applies is not determinative.
A
In Brouwer v Kent County Clerk, 377 Mich 616, 659; 141 NW2d 98 (1966), an equally divided Court affirmed a decision of the circuit court declaring article 7, § 7 violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lead opinion said "that article 7, § 7 is invalid because it requires every township to be represented on its [the county’s] board of supervisors by one member and only one regardless of the population of the township”. The Court did not prescribe a remedy. Jurisdiction was retained.4 A legislative solution was awaited.
Three months after Brouwer was decided, Act 261 was enacted.5 Act 261 provides for the apportionment of county boards of commissioners by the establishment of commissioner districts "as nearly of equal population as is practicable”.6 Act 261 [235]*235further provides for the establishment of a county apportionment commission7 and that such a commission "shall be governed by the following guidelines in the stated order of importance:”
(a) all districts shall be single member districts "as nearly of equal population as is practicable”;
(b) "contiguous”;
(c) "compact and of as nearly square shape as is practicable”; •
(d) townships shall not be combined with cities unless, and (e) townships, villages and cities and (f) precincts shall not be divided unless, "necessary” "to meet the population standard”;
(g) residents of state institutions who cannot vote are to be excluded in drawing districts;
(h) districts "shall not be drawn to effect partisan political advantage”.8
[236]*236A few days after Act 261 was enacted, the charter county enabling act (Act 293) was enacted. Act 293 parallels Act 261, but does not provide that apportionment shall be governed by guidelines with a stated "order of importance”. Act 293 provides that each city and township shall be apportioned so that it has "the largest possible number of complete districts within its boundaries before any part of the city or township is joined” with other territory, all districts shall be single-member districts "as equal in population as practicable”, contiguous, "compact and as nearly square in shape as is practicable”, and "shall be drawn without regard to partisan political advantage”, and that "[tjownships, villages, cities and precincts shall be divided only if necessary to meet the population standard”.9
[237]*237B
When this Court decided Brouwer, it was unclear whether Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S [238]*238Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964), requiring that state legislative districts be substantially equal in population, would be extended to subordinate units of state government. Indeed, it was that uncertainty regarding the reach of Reynolds which had divided this Court in Brouwer.
After Act 261 was enacted, this Court was called upon for an advisory opinion regarding the constitutionality of that act. A majority of the Justices first responded by signing an advisory opinion stating that article 7, § 7 "is valid and, therefore, PA 1966, No 261 is not”. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1966, No 261, 379 Mich 55, 65; 149 NW2d 443 (1967).10
A year later, the United States Supreme Court decided Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 485-486; 88 S Ct 1114; 20 L Ed 2d 45 (1968), which held that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution requires "that units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population”.
A month later, the 1967 advisory opinion was "recalled” and six of the eight justices signed another advisory opinion stating that Act 261 "is valid, section 7 of article 7 notwithstanding. For [239]*239Avery has just lifted section 7 out of our Constitution, leaving the rest of article 7 intact with the legislature left free to implement it in the same manner as if no section 7 had ever appeared therein.” Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1966, No 261, 380 Mich 736, 740; 158 NW2d 497 (1968).11
C
In 1968, the Court of Appeals, in its first county apportionment opinions, set the tone for subsequent adjudication by that Court. It emphasized achieving "districts of substantially equal population” without regard to the other statutory criteria.12
[240]*240In 1970, the Court of Appeals again considered county apportionment. It rejected the argument that "variances in population are justified in order to obtain compact square-shaped districts, avoid gerrymandering, avoid the splitting of precincts, and to avoid the division of political subdivisions” in accordance with the criteria set forth in Act 261. Apportionment of Muskegon County Board of Comm’rs—1970, 23 Mich App 156, 159; 178 NW2d 154 (1970).13
In so concluding, the Court of Appeals relied on a 1968 decision of that Court which declared that the other criteria would "not justify districts of substantially unequal population”. In re Apportionment of Allegan County Board of Supervisors—1968, 13 Mich App 692, 695; 164 NW2d 665 (1968). The Court said that this requirement had been "reinforced” by the United States Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394 US 526, 530; 89 S Ct 1225; 22 L Ed 2d 519 (1969), where the Court said that in drawing districts for the House of Representatives "the 'as nearly as practicable’ standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality”. Since Avery "imposes the 'one man-one vote’ requirement on county government”, the Court concluded that "the requirement stated in Kirkpatrick v Preisler relative to congressional apportionment is equally applicable in this case”. "Laudable as may be the efforts to avoid gerrymandering and the fragmenting of political subdivisions, these too have been rejected by the Supreme Court if they [241]*241are used to avoid equal population.” 23 Mich App 160.14
In 1972, the Court of Appeals again addressed the question of county apportionment. In Apportionment of Ionia County Board of Comm’rs—1972, 39 Mich App 676, 683; 198 NW2d 2 (1972),15 the Court, in rejecting a plan on the ground that the population divergence was clearly unconstitutional, referred to Avery and Kirkpatrick, among other decisions concerning congressional districting. The Court did not, however, make any reference to a decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning county apportionment decided after both Allegan County and Muskegon County.
[242]*242In Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182; 91 S Ct 1904; 29 L Ed 2d 399 (1971), the United States Supreme Court had upheld a county apportionment plan with districts corresponding to the boundary lines of the county’s five towns with the result that there was overrepresentation of 4.8% in one town and underrepresentation of 7.1% in another — a range of divergence of 11.9%.
The Court of Appeals also ignored Abate in subsequent 1972 opinions disapproving the original Oakland County and approving the Kent County plan.16 The Court said, "[w]ith reference to the argument on the violation of political subdivisions, this Court has amassed in its Ionia opinion a long line of authority in an attempt to drive home the point to drafters that county commissioners’ districts should not be designed to represent political subdivisions, but to represent people”. Apportionment of Oakland County Board of Comm’rs—1972, 40 Mich App 493, 502-503, 504; 199 NW2d 234 (1972). Although the Oakland County Apportionment Commission had reduced the divergence to 10 to 12 persons per district, its action in adopting an "arbitrary” population figure as de minimis (100 persons per district) "negates the everpresent [243]*243possibility of achieving constitutional and mathematical exactness. In so doing, it demonstrates the lack of a good-faith eifort.”
It is again noteworthy that the "amassed authority” in Ionia did not include any reference to Abate. The failure of the Court of Appeals in the 1972 Ionia, Muskegon and Oakland County apportionment decisions to advert to Abate suggests that the analysis of the Court of Appeals was incomplete. The still later 1973 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mahan v Howell, 410 US 315; 93 S Ct 979; 35 L Ed 2d 320 (1973), limiting Kirkpatrick to congressional districting,17 suggests that the Court of Appeals reliance, in Ionia, Muskegon and Oakland County, on Kirkpatrick as reinforcing its earlier construction in Allegan County of the phrase "as nearly of equal population as is practicable” was incorrect.
In February of this year, the Court of Appeals confronted Mahan (but again did not advert to Abate) and declared that in the 1972 Ionia County apportionment decision it "was not applying the Fourteenth Amendment” but rather was "interpreting a state statute which attempted to codify and enforce the constitutional principle of one person, one vote on county boards of commissioners”. It concluded that "the previous opinions of this Court on the interpretation of the county apportionment statute are still valid and binding on the county apportionment commissions”. Apportionment of Delta County Board of Comm’rs— [244]*2441982, 113 Mich App 178, 181; 317 NW2d 568 (1982).18
D
In Abate, supra, 186, in approving a county apportionment plan with a range of divergence of 11.9% to preserve town boundary lines, the United States Supreme Court said that "Rockland County [New York] has long recognized the advantages of having the same individuals occupy the governing positions of both the county and its towns”.
In Michigan, also, boards of supervisors (the predecessor of the boards of commissioners) were composed originally of the township supervisors. Michigan has a history similar to Rockland County in that "[w]hen population shifts required that some towns receive a greater portion of seats on the county legislature”, the Legislature responded with a statute that reduced the "malapportionment”.19 The Michigan scheme, like the Rockland County scheme, required the township supervisor, and tended to encourage the mayor [245]*245and other officials of larger cities, "to serve on the county board”.20
Abate was written two years before Mahan v Howell. In Mahan, where election district lines had been drawn along county and city boundary lines,21 the United States Supreme Court ruled that in state legislative apportionment, the apportioning body may, within limits, depart from the goal of population equality to achieve other rational, legitimate state goals such as preserving the integrity of political subdivisions of the state.22
II
Both the Ingham and Wayne County Apportionment Commissions sought to achieve zero or substantially zero population deviation plans.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless ruled that the plan adopted by the Wayne County Apportionment Commission was void as violative of Act 261. It said that a lack of good-faith effort to achieve [246]*246districts of equal population was shown by evidence that "[mjathematical exactness was never the primary goal of the commission”, the commission had "placed the inviolability of political subdivision and out-county election precincts23 before mathematical exactness” and had shown "[a] reluctance to split census tracts by removing blocks to another district to achieve mathematical exactness”. The cause was remanded to the apportionment commission with instructions that it adopt a new plan in accordance with provisions of Act 261.
In Ingham County, the Court of Appeals held that the plan adopted by Ingham’s apportionment commission was void because it too had failed to meet the requirements of Act 261. All the Ingham plans had achieved zero deviation. The Court said that "once mathematical exactness in population is achieved” the subsidiary criteria of Act 261 must be observed and that the plan adopted by the commission was invalid because the apportionment commission had selected a plan which "mathematically violated the subsidiary guidelines” more than other plans that had been submitted.
This Court granted leave to appeal and ordered immediate briefing and argument and, after oral argument, additional briefing on whether the apportionment of Wayne County, which becomes a charter county on January 1, 1983, was governed by § 2 or § 7 of article 7 of the constitution and by Act 293 or Act 261.
The petitioners in Wayne County are citizens of [247]*247Dearborn, Dearborn Heights, and Westland. They contend that the so-called staff plan is preferable to the Holley plan, which was the plan adopted by the Wayne apportionment commission. The range of divergence under the staff plan was 0.48% and under the Holley plan 0.3%.
Under both plans six districts are made up entirely of Detroit and two districts are overwhelmingly Detroit districts.24
Under the staff plan:
(a) 72,597 of Dearborn (90,660) is combined with Allen Park, Melvindale, and 35,931 of Detroit to form a district; the remaining 17,063 of Dearborn is combined with Dearborn Heights (67,706), Garden City, and Inkster to form a district.
(b) Westland is combined with Wayne and 49,742 of Livonia (approximately one-half of Livonia’s 104,814) to form a district; the remaining 55,072 of Livonia is combined with Redford Township and 42,223 of Detroit to form a district.
Under the Holley plan:
(a) 23,480 of Dearborn Heights (67,706) is combined with Redford Township and 74,010 of Detroit to form a district; 20,684 of Dearborn Heights, 64,447 of Westland, Garden City, and Inkster are combined to form a district; the remaining 23,542 [248]*248of Dearborn Heights, 54,603 of Dearborn, and Taylor are combined to form a district.
(b) 2,287 of Westland (84,603) is combined with Livonia, Northville City and Township, and Plymouth City and Township to form a district; 17,869 of Westland is combined with Sumpter, Huron and Van Burén Townships, Belleville, and Romulus to form a district and (repeating) the remaining 64,-447 of Westland is combined with 20,684 of Dear-born Heights, Garden City, and Inkster to form a district.
Under the staff plan, more Detroiters vote in all-Detroit districts. Livonia alone among the communities that would, if kept intact, dominate a district is split under the staff plan.
Under the Holley plan, approximately 1/3 of Dearborn Heights (67,706) is in each of three districts; Dearborn (90,660) is split approximately 2/3 in one district and 1/3 in another district; and Westland is split approximately 3% in one district, 20% in another, and the balance in a third.25
B
The petitioner in Ingham County is a proponent of the plan proposed by the Republican commissioners. The Ingham County Apportionment Com[249]*249mission adopted one of the three plans proffered by Democratic commissioners who made up a 3 to 2 majority of the commission.
The three Democratic and one Republican plan were, together with other plans that had been considered, all zero population deviation plans.
It is contended that the Republican plan is superior because the plan which was adopted (i) combines seven townships with cities in addition to the nine townships that are so combined under both plans, and (ii) divides, in addition to the two townships and two cities divided under both plans, one additional township and one additional city.
Ill
While article 7, § 7, of the Michigan Constitution, insofar as it allots to each township one and only one member of the board of commissioners without regard to population, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept there set forth that the board shall be composed of representatives of townships and cities is not per se violative of the Fourteenth Amendment26 and is a Michigan constitutional goal valid under the United States Constitution.27
The declaration in the lead opinion in Brouwer that article 7, § 7 is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not [250]*250precedentially binding because Brouwer was not a majority decision of this Court.28
The 1968 advisory opinion is not precedentially binding because advisory opinions are not precedent.29
It appears that the constitution embodies a "scheme of township and city representation in county boards of supervisors”. Brouwer v Kent County Clerk, supra, 377 Mich 655. There were two parts to. that scheme: (i) that the districts represented would be townships and cities, and (ii) that the persons who would constitute the board of supervisors would ordinarily be those who had been elected as supervisors of townships and as officials of city government or who would be designated or appointed by those who had been elected.
The concept that the board of commissioners should consist of representatives of townships and cities goes back at least to the Constitution of 1850. It provided that "[a] board of supervisors, consisting of one from each organized township, shall be established in each county”. Const 1850, art 10, § 6. In apparent recognition of the growth of cities, the 1908 Constitution, retaining the language just quoted, added that "[cjities shall have [251]*251such representation” on the board of supervisors as may be provided by law. Const 1908, art 8, § 7. That provision was repeated in the 1963 Constitution.30
As originally constituted, all the members of the board of supervisors were ex officio — they were members of the board not because they had been elected by the people as members of the board but because they had been elected by the people as township supervisors.
The concept that the board should be composed of the heads of the constituent political subdivisions of the county was implemented in the "provision of law” adopted after 1908 regarding representation from cities; while it was left to the cities to decide in their charters whether city representatives on the board of supervisors would be appointed or elected, it seems to have been generally provided in the charters that the mayor or other elected officials or persons designated by the city commission or council, sometimes along with persons elected at large, would be the cities’ representatives.31
Thus, as originally contemplated and constituted, not only does the constitution speak of representation from townships and cities, but the [252]*252persons who became members of the board were generally persons who could be expected to speak for the concerns of the constituent political subdivisions. The apparent rationale for a county government composed largely of representatives of the constituent political subdivisions, rather than persons directly elected by the people, is the notion that decisions regarding the expenditure of county revenue have such a substantial effect on the level of service and revenue needs of the constituent political subdivisions that those most likely to be aware of and charged with the responsibility of meeting those needs should have a voice in how county resources are allocated.
The statute has nevertheless provided, since 1909, that city charters could provide for the election of a city’s representatives to the board of supervisors, and representatives were elected. That legislation was in effect given constitutional approval when the 1908 constitutional provision was carried forward into the 1963 Constitution, following extensive debate and consideration of various alternative methods for constituting the board of supervisors.32 It therefore does not appear that the concept that the representatives on the board would be the heads of the constituent political subdivisions has the status of a constitutional requirement. The Legislature was free (except as to townships) to provide for direct election by the people of the members of the board of supervisors, now the board of commissioners, as it has done in Acts 261 and 293.
The Legislature was not, however, free, under the 1963 Constitution, to provide for the establish[253]*253ment of election districts having boundary lines that do not follow the boundary lines of townships and cities.
The invalidity under the federal constitution of the provision for one representative on the board of supervisors from each township (article 7, § 7) poses the question whether the constitutional "scheme of township and city representation in county boards” is severable.
The invalidity here, in contrast with In re Apportionment of State Legislature—1982, 413 Mich 136; 321 NW2d 581 (1982), does not go "to the heart of the political process”. The provision here involved does not concern legislative apportionment, but apportionment for the county board of commissioners. Our concern in the state legislative apportionment case that the Court not arrogate to itself "a decision which the people should make” requires in the instant case that the Court enforce the decision which the people have made. To hold that the Legislature is free to abandon the scheme of township and city representation in county boards would be to relieve the Legislature of a limitation on its power which has existed since 1850. In the state legislative apportionment case, the fundamental question presented was whether the power to apportion the Legislature, which had been increasingly withdrawn from the Legislature until it was totally withdrawn from the Legislature and vested in an apportionment commission, should, in light of the invalidity declared by this Court, be returned to the Legislature.
If the Court were to have held that the power [254]*254returned to the Legislature without any limitation on the manner in which it was exercised, it would have restored to the Legislature power which had been denied by the people and it would have done so without a vote of the people. Here we again consider a limitation on the power of the Legislature. To hold that the power to provide for the apportionment of the county boards of commissioners returns to the Legislature without the constitutional limitation on that power would be to do precisely what the Court refused to do in the legislative apportionment case. Thus, paradoxically, a decision that the scheme of township and city representation in county boards is severable enforces the same value which the Court perceived in the state legislative apportionment case (although the Court there held that the provisions there involved were not severable) of not enlarging the power of the Legislature without a vote of the people. It also re-enforces the same value that the Court perceived in insisting, although it had declared the legislative apportionment rules and the commission not severable, that the criteria which had evolved over 100 years of constitutional history be enforced until the people declare whether the power to apportion the Legislature should be returned to the Legislature without limitation or be allocated or restricted by those or other limitations.
In holding that the Legislature is limited by the constitutional scheme of township and city representation, we implement the precept that a written constitution is not only an allocation of governmental power but a limitation on its exercise, and, in this instance, a limitation on the power of the Legislature. It is not open to this Court to relieve the Legislature of limitations on its power [255]*255beyond what is required to implement limitations on state power set forth in the United States Constitution.
We therefore hold that the Legislature cannot provide for representation on the board of commissioners other than from townships and cities except to the extent required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as elucidated by the United States Supreme Court.
We have considered whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution33 embodies the concept of one person-one vote, modifying article 7, § 7. The one person-one vote concept is clearly inconsistent with the scheme embodied in article 7, § 7. The supervisor of each township, without regard to the population of the township, was to be a member of the board of supervisors. In that circumstance and also in light of the rejection by the framers of the 1963 Constitution of proposals for substituting alternative methods for the establishment of the board more consistent with the one person-one vote concept34 it is clear that the framers of the constitution and the people, in approving it, did not contemplate that the one person-one vote concept would be implemented in the establishment of the board.
The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of this state’s constitution cannot properly be enlarged to incorporate a concept clearly at odds with other provisions of this state’s constitution. The invalidity or partial invalidity of those other provisions under the federal constitution does not [256]*256change the original scope of this state’s Equal Protection Clause.
IV
Separate and apart from the requirements of article 7, § 7 of the Michigan Constitution, Act 261 requires (for counties other than charter counties) and Act 293 requires (for charter counties) that county commissioner district lines be drawn to preserve city and township lines.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that this be done with the least cost to the federal principle of equality of population between election districts consistent with the maximum preservation of city and township lines and without exceeding the range of allowable divergence under the federal constitution which, until the United States Supreme Court declares otherwise, shall be deemed to be the range approved in Abate of 11.9% (94.05% to 105.95%).
Both Acts 261 and 293 state essentially the same criteria for the drawing of election district lines for the board of commissioners.35 See Part IA, [257]*257supra, for a summary description of the statutory language , and footnotes 6, 8 and 9 for the text of the statutory provisions.
Both acts require single-member, contiguous districts as nearly of equal population as is practicable and as compact and as nearly square in shape as is practicable, depending on the geography.
Act 293 (charter counties) states that each city and township shall be apportioned so that it has "the largest possible number of complete districts within its boundaries” before any part of the city or township is joined with other territory, and that townships, villages, cities and precincts shall be divided only, if necessary, to meet the population standard.
Act 261 states a concept not expressed in Act 293: no township or part thereof shall be combined with any city or village unless combination is needed to meet the population standard. But Act 261 similarly states that townships, villages, cities and even precincts shall be divided only, if necessary, to meet the population standard.
Both acts provide that district lines shall not be [258]*258drawn to effect partisan political advantage. Act 261 alone provides that residents of state institutions who cannot vote shall not be considered in drawing district lines.
Act 261, in providing that "the county apportionment commission shall be governed by the following guidelines in the stated order of importance”, states a concept not set forth in Act 293. The stated order is (a) equality of population as nearly as is practicable; (b) contiguity; (c) compact and as nearly square in shape as is practicable; (d, e, f) not joining townships with cities and not dividing townships, villages, cities or precincts unless necessary to meet the population standard; (g) not counting residents of state institutions who cannot vote; and (h) that the district lines not be drawn to effect partisan political advantage.
If the stated order requires exhaustive compliance with each criterion before turning to a succeeding criterion, then criteria (a) through (c) alone would be determinative and criteria (d) through (f) could not be given any effect.
There are an endless number of ways in which one could construct the district lines consistent with criterion (a), equality of population, and criterion (b), contiguity. Criterion (c) requires that all districts shall be as compact and as nearly square in shape as is practicable, depending on the geography of the county area involved. Read literally and given an absolute priority, that criterion would require that the district lines be drawn without regard to township, village, city or pre[259]*259cinct lines. The apportionment of a county would be a mechanical task.
If there were, say, sixteen commissioners, all that would need to be done, or indeed could be done, to apportion the county would be to find the population center of the county and to create four quadrants, and in each quadrant to find the population center and to create four more quadrants. Although each quadrant would not be of exactly the same size, each would have exactly the same number of people. All districts would be single-member and contiguous, and clearly the districts would not have been drawn to effect partisan political advantage. It is most unlikely, however, that any district line would coincide with any township, village, city or precinct line.
We reject such a rigid reading of "stated order” because so read:
(a) It would introduce a unique concept of apportionment; one which we are persuaded has not yet achieved political acceptance.
(b) It would impose a concept of apportionment for counties generally that is radically different than required for charter counties; we do not think that the Legislature intended such a rigid set of criteria for counties generally and no such constraint on charter counties.
(c) It would give no effect whatsoever to criteria (d) through (f) concerning the preservation of township, city, village and precinct lines, and thereby make meaningless those provisions. It is our duty to read the statute as a whole and to avoid a [260]*260construction which renders meaningless provisions that clearly were to have effect.
(d) The stated order of criteria would be violative of the Michigan Constitution which provides a "scheme of township and city representation in county boards” (see Part IIIB, supra). It is our duty to construe the statute to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Criteria (a). through (f) state apportionment goals. Criterion (g) concerns the counting of certain residents of state institutions. Criterion (h) states that the pursuit of partisan political advantage may not be a goal.
Criteria (d), (e), and (f) together with criterion (a) concern the population standard: all districts shall be single-member districts drawn to preserve township, village, city and precinct lines if this can be done within the population standard of composing districts "as nearly of equal population as is practicable”.
Criteria (b) and (c) concern geography and serve to avoid gerrymandering. The districts are to be contiguous and to be as compact and as of nearly square shape as is practicable depending on the geography of the area involved.
In stating that the districts shall be compact and square as practicable, the Legislature stated a goal which is to take precedence over preserving the boundary lines of local governmental units to the extent that there are alternative plans by which those boundary lines could be preserved. Where [261]*261there is a choice between alternative plans both of which preserve such boundary lines, the plan which is more compact and square in shape is to be selected because compactness and squareness has a higher stated order of importance.
Compactness and squareness (criterion [c]) is not an end in itself but rather a means of avoiding gerrymandering. It was not intended that criterion (c) be implemented to the extent of entirely subordinating boundary lines criteria (d), (e) and (f).
The meaning of the phrase "as nearly of equal population as is practicable” is rooted in the history of the legislation.
The bill which became Act 261 was introduced on April 14, 1965, the year after Reynolds v Sims was decided. The litigation which culminated in this Court’s decision in Brouwer v Kent County Clerk, supra, had already been commenced shortly after Reynolds was decided. Brouwer was argued in this Court on November 3, 1965, and decided April 5 and 6, 1966. Act 261 was approved July 12, 1966 and Act 293 July 14, 1966.
It is clear from the history of Act 261 and of the apportionment provisions of Act 293 that they were designed to remedy the defect in the apportionment procedures for the county board perceived by the circuit judge in Brouwer, who was affirmed by an evenly divided Supreme Court in that case. The defect there perceived was the failure to observe the requirements of Reynolds v Sims.
[262]*262When Acts 261 and 293 took form it had not been definitively decided by the United States Supreme Court whether Reynolds v Sims would be applied to county board apportionment nor was it clear to what extent the Supreme Court would permit divergence from absolute equality to implement the statement in Reynolds v Sims that a state may "legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territories in designing a legislative apportionment scheme”. Reynolds v Sims, supra, 377 US 578.
Confronted with a determination in Brouwer which called for a legislative response before the United States Supreme Court had clearly defined the reach of Reynolds v Sims, the Legislature chose to use the exact words of Reynolds v Sims. In Reynolds v Sims, the Court had said that "[b]y holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.”36 (Emphasis supplied.)_
[263]*263The United States Supreme Court gave meaning to its statement that mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement in holding, in Abate and Mahan, that a divergence from absolute equality is permissible to achieve the state goals of drawing election district lines to coincide with the boundary lines of local political subdivisions.
With that history in mind, we conclude that the phrase "as nearly of equal population as is practicable” means in essence what the United States Supreme Court says it means. The Legislature recognizing that we were then, even today, in the foothills of the judicial development of what is meant by "as nearly of equal population as is practicable” left it, as it so often leaves other concepts, to the judiciary to develop.37
We thus conclude that Acts 261 and 293 require that commissioner district lines be drawn to preserve township, village, city and precinct lines to the extent this can be done without exceeding the range of allowable divergence under the federal constitution (11.9% [94.05% to 105.95%] until the United States Supreme Court declares otherwise) at the least cost to the federal principle of equal population between election districts consistent [264]*264with the maximum preservation of such lines. Between two or more alternative plans, which comply with that standard, compactness and squareness in shape to the extent practicable shall govern.
V
It has been argued that county apportionment commissions have discretion in drawing the boundaries of county districts and that as long as they act in good faith their determinations should be sustained. One can accept that proposition without agreeing that it is dispositive in a particular case. Manifestly there will be areas for the exercise of judgment. A reasonable choice in the reasoned exercise of judgment should ordinarily be sustained.
A declaration by this Court that a county apportionment commission may exercise judgment and that the burden is upon objectors to show an absence of good faith would provide no guidance to the commission.
The members of the commission need to know whether there is a permissible range of divergence and, if so, its extent. May or must it go to 0.48% and choose the staff plan? May or must it go to 11.9% if necessary to preserve the boundaries of local political subdivisions?
Unless this Court states the range of divergence, neither the members of the commission nor objectors will know what is the duty of the commission or what showing must be made to establish an abuse of discretion or bad faith. Nor will they know, unless this Court construes the statutes and [265]*265states its views regarding the continuing viability of article 7, § 7 of the constitution, what is required by the statutes and the Michigan Constitution.
The Court has an obligation to state what are the governing criteria under the federal and state constitutions and applicable statutes so that the commissions will know what standards are to guide their deliberations and objectors will know what showing they must make in order to prevail on appeal.
To fail to provide such guidance is to deny meaningful judicial review. The statute contemplates judicial review of a plan approved by the commission "to determine if the plan meets the requirements of the laws of this state”.38 Judicial review is thwarted if neither the apportionment commission nor objectors know what the standards are and the extent of their burden, for without such foreknowledge the appellate court can always dismiss on the ground that the petitioner has failed to meet an undefined burden of showing a breach of an undefined standard.
Before Baker v Carr, 369 US 186; 82 S Ct 691; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962), courts avoided any responsibility in the apportionment process by declaring the matter to be a political question. To deny effective appellate review, by imposing on a petitioner an insurmountable burden — despite the articulation [266]*266of detailed apportionment criteria in the statutes and the establishment of a statutory and constitutional right of judicial review — is to indulge a judicial preference for noninvolvement.
Now that Baker v Carr is the law of the land and apportionment has become a justiciable question, this Court cannot escape its responsibility. Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals will be seen to have acted apolitically if this Court fails to articulate in advance objective criteria, if it permits or makes subjective, ad hoc judgments from time to time depending upon the circumstances of the case, which almost inevitably will have a political taint.
This Court can maintain its neutrality only by speaking beforehand, before it knows and others may think that it knows the political consequences of its rulings. The Court owes it not only to the electorate but to the institution to protect itself against charges that when it does act it has done so in response to political pressure. It can best protect itself against such charges by stating in advance the criteria which should govern an apportionment commission before it or others can attribute the political consequences to the Court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed and the causes are remanded to the respective apportionment commissions.
Coleman, C.J., and Kavanagh, Levin, and Fitzgerald concurred.