Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. Salesforce, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: October 10, 2024
• Docket: 24-1133
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 1 Filed: 10/10/2024

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

APPLICATIONS IN INTERNET TIME, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SALESFORCE, INC., Defendant-Appellee ______________________

2024-1133 ______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in No. 3:13-cv-00628-RCJ-CLB, Senior Judge Robert Clive Jones.

-------------------------------------------------

2024-1685 ______________________ Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 2 Filed: 10/10/2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in No. 3:13-cv-00628-RCJ-CLB, Senior Judge Robert Clive Jones. ______________________

Decided: October 10, 2024 ______________________

MICHAEL DEVINCENZO, King & Wood Mallesons LLP, New York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also repre- sented by ANDREA PACELLI, CHARLES WIZENFELD; STEVEN C. SEREBOFF, SoCal IP Law Group LLP, Westlake Village, CA.

KEVIN P.B. JOHNSON, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sul- livan, LLP, Redwood Shores, CA, argued for defendant-ap- pellee. Also represented by BRIAN C. CANNON, RAY ROBERT ZADO; GAVIN SNYDER, Seattle, WA; SAM STEPHEN STAKE, OGNJEN ZIVOJNOVIC, San Francisco, CA. ______________________

Before LOURIE, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. LINN, Circuit Judge. Applications in Internet Time (“AIT”) appeals the grants of summary judgment of non-infringement and in- validity of the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,356,482 (the “’482 patent”) and 8,484,111 (the “’111 pa- tent”). See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. Sal- lesforce.com, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1228, 1230–31 (D. Nev. 2023) (“Summary Judgment Order”). Further, AIT challenges the district court’s construction of “automati- cally detecting” as requiring the use of intelligent agents. See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00628-RCJ-CLB, 2021 WL 5238767, at *13, (D. Nev. Nov. 9, 2021) (“Markman Order”). AIT also appeals the district court’s conclusion that its case was ex- ceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and the award of nearly Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 3 Filed: 10/10/2024

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$6.9 million in attorneys’ fees. See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. Salesforce, Inc., 3:13-CV-00628-RCJ-CLB, 2024 WL 1199594, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2024) (“Fee Or- der”). For the reasons that follow, we modify the district court’s claim construction of “automatically detecting,” va- cate the district court’s grants of summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity, and reverse its excep- tional case determination. BACKGROUND In 2013, AIT sued Salesforce in the District of Nevada for patent infringement of the ’482 and ’111 patents. The ’482 and ’111 patents have substantially identical specifi- cations. The asserted patents are directed to methods and systems for automatically detecting changes to business re- quirements and incorporating such changes into an appli- cation. Representative claim 1 of the ’482 patent recites: 1. A system for providing a dynamically gener- ated application having one or more functions and one or more user interface elements; comprising: a server computer; one or more client computers connected to the server computer over a computer net- work; a first layer associated with the server com- puter containing information about the unique aspects of a particular application; a second layer associated with the server computer containing information about the user interface and functions common to a variety of applications, a particular applica- tion being generated based on the data in both the first and second layers; Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 4 Filed: 10/10/2024

a third layer associated with the server com- puter that retrieves the data in the first and second layers in order to generate the func- tionality and user interface elements of the application; and a change management layer for automati- cally detecting changes that affect an appli- cation, each client computer further comprising a browser application being executed by each client computer, wherein a user interface and functionality for the particular applica- tion is distributed to the browser application and dynamically generated when the client computer connects to the server computer. ’482 patent col. 32 ll. 9–34 (emphases added). Relevant to this appeal, unasserted claim 8 recites: 8. The system of claim 1, wherein the change management layer further comprises one or more intelligent agents that detect changes that affect an application. ’482 patent col. 32 ll. 59–61 (emphasis added). In its Markman order, the district court construed “au- tomatically detecting” as requiring the use of one or more intelligent agents, concluding that the specification made clear that intelligent agents were integral to the invention. Markman Order, at *6–7. Additionally, the district court afforded “changes that affect” its plain and ordinary mean- ing. See id. at *8. Salesforce moved for summary judgment of non-in- fringement of all asserted claims. Summary Judgment Or- der, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1227. Salesforce also moved for summary judgment of invalidity, contending that the claims were anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,249,291 Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 5 Filed: 10/10/2024

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(“Popp”) and rendered obvious by the combination of Popp with an academic reference (“Amati”). Id. at 1237. AIT filed a motion for summary judgment of no anticipation, contending that Salesforce failed to prove that Popp dis- closed an intelligent agent. Id. at 1227, 1242. The district court granted summary judgment of non- infringement, reasoning that because AIT’s expert, Mr. Zatkovich, failed to compare the accused products to the specification’s description of intelligent agents, no reason- able jury could find in AIT’s favor. Summary Judgment Order, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1234–35. The district court also granted summary judgment of invalidity, concluding that the asserted claims were anticipated by Popp and rendered obvious by the Popp–Amati combination. Id. at 1253. De- termining that its Markman order ended any reasonable likelihood of AIT prevailing on the merits, the district court held that AIT’s continued litigation after the Markman or- der made this case exceptional and awarded Salesforce $6,890,328.28 in attorneys’ fees. See Fee Order, at *6. These appeals followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review “Claim construction is ultimately a question of law, de- cided de novo on review, as are the intrinsic-evidence as- pects of a claim-construction analysis.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “To the extent the district court, in construing the claims, makes underlying findings of fact based on extrinsic evidence, we review such findings of fact for clear error.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 321–22 (2015). Claim terms generally carry their or- dinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordi- narily skilled artisan. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “But where the Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 6 Filed: 10/10/2024

inventor has clearly set forth a different definition of a claim term, or has manifested that the invention does or does not include a particular aspect, that intention is re- garded as dispositive.” Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quo- tations omitted). Establishing disavowal requires “clear and unequivocal evidence that the claimed invention in- cludes or does not include a particular feature.” Poly-Am., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We review a grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit. Adasa Inc. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 55 F.4th 900, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit “re- view[s] the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, determining whether, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). The determination of whether a case is exceptional un- der § 285 is a factual determination reviewed for clear er- ror. Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The subsequent determi- nation of a reasonable award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. II. Claim Construction Claims 1 and 21 of the ’482 patent recite “automatically detecting changes” and claim 13 of the ’111 patent recites a fourth portion of a server that is configured to “automat- ically detect changes.” ’482 patent col. 32 ll. 27–28, col. 33 ll. 52–53; ’111 patent col. 34 ll. 5–6. The district court con- cluded that the specification expressly disavowed automat- ically detecting changes without intelligent agents and the specification distinguished the invention from the prior art Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 7 Filed: 10/10/2024

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by its use of intelligent agents. Markman Order, at *7. Ac- cordingly, the district court construed “automatically de- tecting” as limited to “detecting without human intervention through the use of one or more intelligent agents.” Id. at *13. AIT contends that the statements the district court treated as express disavowals are merely exemplary and, thus, do not limit the invention as a whole. AIT also argues that because unasserted claim 8 expressly recites the use of intelligent agents, claim differentiation weighs against incorporating that limitation into the broader independent claim. Salesforce responds that the district court correctly construed “automatically detecting” to require the use of intelligent agents because intelligent agents are essential to the invention as a whole and the specification consist- ently describes the invention as including intelligent agents without providing any alternative. We agree with AIT that the district court erred in con- struing “automatically detecting” as requiring the use of an intelligent agent. First, because claim 1 recites “automat- ically detecting changes” and claim 8 requires that the changes be detected by “one or more intelligent agents,” claim differentiation provides a strong reason not to limit claim 1 to intelligent agents. ’482 patent col. 32 ll. 27–28, 59–61; see Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]here the limitation that is sought to be ‘read into’ an independent claim already ap- pears in a dependent claim, the doctrine of claim differen- tiation is at its strongest.”). Second, the specification does not disavow “automati- cally detecting” without “intelligent agents.” The portion of the specification that describes “the invention” as detect- ing changes using intelligent agents is exemplary and not descriptive of the invention as a whole. ’482 patent col. 10 ll. 29–42; see Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (recognizing that descriptions of “the Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 8 Filed: 10/10/2024

present invention” or “this invention” do not limit the claims where the intrinsic evidence does not support apply- ing the limitation to the entire patent). The repeated use of intelligent agents in the description of the best mode merely indicates that intelligent agents may be the best way of implementing the invention, not that the invention cannot be implemented without intelligent agents. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“To avoid importing limitations from the specification into the claims, it is important to keep in mind that the purposes of the specification are to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so.”). Moreover, “it is improper to read limitations from a pre- ferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee in- tended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 913. The lack of any discussion of intelligent agents in the solution described by the Abstract, Background, and Sum- mary of the Invention sections of the patent weighs against concluding that the inventor intended to limit the inven- tion to the use of intelligent agents. See Cont’l Cirs., 915 F.3d at 798 (noting that the Summary of the Inven- tion’s silence on desmear processes weighed against con- cluding “that the present invention ‘as a whole’ necessarily include[d] the repeated desmear process” (citations omit- ted)). Moreover, the Background section’s criticism of the prior art for failing to use intelligent agent routines simi- larly fails to limit the claim scope. “Mere criticism of a par- ticular embodiment encompassed in the plain meaning of a claim term is not sufficient to rise to the level of clear disa- vowal.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further, when discussing “[w]hat is needed” to address the problems in the prior art, the Background section merely explains that the solution Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 9 Filed: 10/10/2024

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requires automatically detecting and making changes, ir- respective of whether that is done by intelligent agents. For these reasons, the district court erred in limiting the claims to require the use of one or more intelligent agents. III. Non-Infringement The district court granted summary judgment of non- infringement because “AIT failed to put forth evidence suf- ficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that the accused products use any such ‘intelligent agent’ to detect changes.” Summary Judgment Order, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. Because we conclude that the district court erred in construing the asserted claims to require intelligent agents, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement as to all asserted claims. IV. Anticipation Anticipation is a question of fact that may be resolved on summary judgment only when there are no genuine is- sues of material fact. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For the rea- sons detailed below, we disagree with the district court’s analysis and vacate the district court’s summary judgment order of anticipation as to all asserted claims. A. First Layer The district court concluded that Popp discloses the claim limitation “a first layer associated with the server computer containing information about unique aspects of a particular application,” because that phrase does not ex- clude data used by an application, such as the data con- tained on the websites in Popp. Summary Judgment Order, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1239–40 (noting that “aspects” is broad enough to include “data” and that dependent claim 23 expressly adds a limitation that “the first layer com- prises . . . data”). Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 10 Filed: 10/10/2024

The district court erred because it did not consider the limitation as a whole. The limitation at issue claims a par- ticular kind of information; namely, that which is “about unique aspects of a particular application.” ’482 patent col. 32 ll. 16–17 (emphasis added). Other information, such as information unrelated to a particular application, would not necessarily satisfy this limitation, even if “data” is con- sidered a kind of information. The question for anticipa- tion should have been whether the data disclosed in Popp is about unique aspects of Popp’s application. The district court did not ask, much less answer this question, because it erroneously treated its conclusion that “information” may include data as dispositive of the anticipation inquiry. The district court’s reliance on the testimony of Salesforce’s expert, Dr. Bederson, was therefore misplaced. Although Dr. Bederson opined that Popp’s application fetches all the data from the database such as “all of the models of cars” within a shopper’s price range, J. App’x at 2075–76, 1 Dr. Bederson does not explain how “models of cars” (i.e. “data”) stored on a database and subsequently displayed on a webpage are “about a unique aspect” of the webpage. Because the district court’s summary judgment order fails to explain why a reasonable jury could not find that Popp fails to disclose the “first layer” limitation, we vacate that portion of the district court’s order. B. Changes that Affect an Application At the Markman stage, the district court afforded the term “changes that affect” its plain and ordinary meaning. Markman Order, at *8. At summary judgment, the district court purported to apply that construction, holding that “a skilled artisan would find the claim language broad enough

1 “J. App’x” refers to the appendix filed under appeal

No. 2024-1133. Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 11 Filed: 10/10/2024

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to encompass any ‘changes’ related to an application,” and relying heavily on Dr. Bederson’s opinion that Popp’s “de- tection of a name entered in a field to be a change that af- fects an application under at least . . . AIT’s interpretation.” Summary Judgment Order, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. AIT argues that the district court’s adoption of Dr. Bederson’s opinion on anticipation was not based on the plain and ordinary meaning of “changes that affect,” but on a new and overly broad construction that fails to appreciate the limitation as a whole, which requires the detected changes to be “changes that affect an application” rather than just “related to an application.” See id. (emphasis added). AIT also argues that the district court failed to view all inferences in AIT’s favor (as it was required to do on summary judgment) by baselessly rejecting Mr. Zatko- vich’s testimony that the information entered into Popp’s data field leaves the application “entirely unaffected.” J. App’x 2904 at ¶ 255. Salesforce argues that the ordinary meaning of “changes that affect” is not limited to changes affecting the functionality of an application, but can encompass changes to the input data on which the application operates. Fur- ther, Salesforce contends that without such a limitation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact that Popp discloses automatically detecting changes to such inputs. We agree with AIT that the district court failed to ap- ply the proper standard for summary judgment. Rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to AIT, the non-moving party, the district court adopted the perspective of Dr. Bederson, and rejected the testimony of Mr. Zatkovich without explanation. The district court did not explain why any reasonable jury must accept Dr. Bederson’s testimony and reject Mr. Zatkovich’s. Moreo- ver, the district court analyzed anticipation under “Dr. Bederson’s understanding of AIT’s interpretation” of the Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 12 Filed: 10/10/2024

claim language, rather than the claim construction it pre- viously adopted. This was error. To the extent the district court’s holding was based on a modification or clarification of its “plain and ordinary meaning” claim construction, this too was error, because the district court failed to provide any reason for any such modified construction. Moreover, to the extent that the dis- trict court resolved a dispute between the parties about the proper application of the court’s claim construction, the dis- trict court erred by resolving a factual issue on summary judgment. C. AIT’s Impeachment Evidence AIT additionally argues that the district court erred by relying on Dr. Bederson’s report, even though AIT pre- sented credible evidence that Dr. Bederson’s report did not accurately represent his personal expertise, but was copied from Dr. Schmidt’s declaration. From this, AIT argues that a reasonable jury could have reasonably disbelieved Dr. Bederson’s report and testimony, and thus the district court erred in granting summary judgment based so heav- ily on his evidence. We also agree with AIT that the district court erred in holding that summary judgment should not be denied simply because AIT asserted that Dr. Bederson’s testimony is not to be believed. Summary Judgment Order, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1251 (citing TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Mi- crosoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Sum- mary judgment should not be denied simply because the opposing party asserts that the [movant’s] witnesses are not to be believed.”)). AIT did not merely “assert[] that the movant’s witness[ is] not to be believed.” See id. Instead, AIT reasoned that Dr. Bederson’s opinions as to Popp were questionable based on the fact that much of his testimony was identical to that of Dr. Schmidt—Salesforce’s expert in a separate ex parte reexamination proceeding—and that Dr. Bederson could not specify how much of his report he Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 13 Filed: 10/10/2024

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wrote or edited. These allegations provide specific bases for doubting the credibility of Dr. Bederson’s testimony and go to the kinds of facts that TypeRight recognized could preclude summary judgment. See 374 F.3d at 1159 (“[S]ummary judgment is not appropriate where the oppos- ing party offers specific facts that call into question the credibility of the [movant’s] witness[].”). The district court here failed to explain why a reasonable jury was required to accept Dr. Bederson’s testimony in light of AIT’s allega- tions. D. Claims 23–26 The district court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Popp anticipates claims 23–26 of the ’482 patent because they are substantially identical to claims 14–17 of the ’111 patent. Summary Judgment Or- der, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1248. AIT argues that the district court erred in so conclud- ing because claims 23–26 include additional limitations— “a business content database” in claim 23 and its depend- ent claims and “a metadata database” in claim 25—not pre- sent in claims 14–17. AIT argues that Dr. Bederson provided no opinions as to whether Popp anticipates claims 23–26 and that his opinions as to claims 14–17 do not com- pel a determination of anticipation as a matter of law for claims 23–26. Salesforce defends the district court’s grant of sum- mary judgment on the grounds that “[t]he differences in claim language are minor” and that Popp discloses “an en- terprise’s corporate database.” Salesforce also disputes AIT’s claim that Dr. Bederson did not opine that Popp an- ticipates claims 23–26, arguing that Salesforce filed an op- posed motion to file a supplemental invalidity report including Dr. Bederson’s opinions as to claims 23–26 that the district court denied as moot. Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 14 Filed: 10/10/2024

We agree with AIT that the district court erred. First, the district court failed to grant every reasonable inference in AIT’s favor. The “business content database” and “metadata database” elements recited in Claims 23–26 have facially different scopes than the “business knowledge” and “metadata” elements recited in claims 14– 17. Therefore, a showing that Popp anticipates the latter does not necessitate a conclusion that Popp likewise antic- ipates the former. Second, the anticipation inquiry is a search for strict, not substantial, identity. See Trintec In- dus., 295 F.3d at 1296. Here, the district court acknowl- edged that claims 23–26 of the ’482 patent differ from claims 14–17 of the ’111 patent. Summary Judgment Or- der, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 1248 (“The only differences between these two sets of claims identified by AIT are the ‘business content database’ (claim 23) and ‘metadata database’ (claims 25–26), but claims 14–17 of the ’111 patent already require ‘information associated with one or more predeter- mined business applications’ (claim 14), ‘business knowledge’ (claim 15), and ‘metadata’ (claims 16–17).’”). The district court failed to explain, however, why the scope of claims 23–26 is necessarily congruent with the scope of claims 14–17. * * * For these reasons, we vacate and remand the district court’s grant of summary judgment of anticipation of all asserted claims. V. Obviousness The district court also granted summary judgment of invalidity, concluding that all the asserted claims were ob- vious over the combination of Popp and Amati. This was error. The district court’s obviousness determination de- pended in some measure on both its erroneous conclusion, discussed above, that Popp discloses each of the asserted claims’ limitations as a matter of law, and on its erroneous claim construction requiring an “intelligent agent,” also Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 15 Filed: 10/10/2024

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discussed above, that led to its conclusion that if Popp did not disclose an “intelligent agent,” Amati did, and a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the references. Further, the district court rejected AIT’s evi- dence of commercial success and technical advantages of the accused product as objective indicia of non-obviousness given its finding of non-infringement. The district court’s determination of non-infringement, however, was based on the absence of intelligent agents in the accused product, an absence that no longer leads to non-infringement in light of our holding on claim construction, supra. Because the district court’s grant of summary judg- ment of obviousness depended on its erroneous claim con- struction, non-infringement, and anticipation determinations, we vacate the district court’s grant of sum- mary judgment of obviousness. VI. Fees The district court determined that AIT’s case was ex- ceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 because AIT continued to litigate “after claim construction end[ed] any reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits.” Fee Order, at *6. Because the district court’s determination relied on an in- correct claim construction, and because we have now va- cated the district court’s summary judgments of non- infringement, anticipation, and obviousness, we reverse as moot the district court’s finding that AIT’s case was excep- tional under § 285. Additionally, “[w]hether or not a district court ulti- mately finds a case exceptional on motion for attorney fees, it is important that the court provide some indication of the reasoning underlying its decision to provide a basis for meaningful review.” Superior Fireplace, 270 F.3d at 1377. The district court, however, failed to explain why its claim construction order ended any reasonable likelihood of AIT succeeding on the merits. Specifically, the district court did not articulate whether its claim construction order Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 16 Filed: 10/10/2024

prevented AIT from proving infringement, avoiding inva- lidity, or both. Because infringement and invalidity cannot be assessed by looking to the claims alone, the district court needed to specify how its claim construction order pre- vented AIT from prevailing on the merits in view of the na- ture of the accused product or Salesforce’s proffered prior art references. The district court’s assessment of the reasonableness of Salesforce’s attorneys’ fees was similarly threadbare. The district court simply concluded that “Salesforce is en- titled to the $6,890,328.28 incurred after the Court’s Claim Construction Order” because “Salesforce has satisfied its burden under the Court’s Local Rules to provide a ‘reason- able itemization and description of the work performed,’ and the Court finds that the requested amount is reasona- ble considering the context of the case and the substantial amount in dispute.” Fee Order, at *6. But the district court provided no explanation as to why it held Salesforce’s at- torneys’ fees to be reasonable, even though the narratives for all of Salesforce’s time entries were redacted. Should the district court encounter these questions again on remand, consistent with our discussion above, the district court should articulate the factual findings under- pinning its assessment of exceptionality and explain its ra- tionale as to why the fees awarded are reasonable. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we modify the district court’s claim construction; reverse the district court’s ex- ceptional case determination; vacate the district court’s grants of summary judgment of non-infringement, antici- pation, and obviousness; and remand for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion. Because “denials of summary judgment are ordinarily not appealable,” M. Ea- gles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006), we do not address AIT’s Case: 24-1133 Document: 47 Page: 17 Filed: 10/10/2024

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passing arguments that the district court erred by denying summary judgment of no anticipation. REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED COSTS Costs are awarded to AIT.