Application of Alfred Aufhauser

399 F.2d 275, 55 C.C.P.A. 1477
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedOctober 10, 1968
DocketPatent Appeal 7934
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 399 F.2d 275 (Application of Alfred Aufhauser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Application of Alfred Aufhauser, 399 F.2d 275, 55 C.C.P.A. 1477 (ccpa 1968).

Opinion

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant’s claims were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being for an obvious invention. Appellant stabilized a wax-polyethylene blend as a coating for paper or other solid substances. He did this by subjecting a particular blend of these components to a specified dosage of ionizing radiation using high energy electrons, and applying the irradiated blend while melted to the paper or other solid substance.

Determination of this issue requires application of the guidelines which have been set forth by the Supreme Court in a series of controlling decisions. When these guidelines are applied here they require a reversal of the decision of the Board of Appeals 1 which affirmed the examiner’s rejection of appellant’s claims. 2

In Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), we are admonished by the Supreme Court that the “inquiry” required under section 103 “lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.” Thus:

* * * Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy. * * *

The examiner and the board appear to have failed to make these “several basic *277 factual inquiries” and this failure underlies what we believe to be the essential error in the appealed decision, for as stated in Graham, "the inquiry which the Patent Office and the courts must make as to patentability must be beamed with greater intensity on the requirements of § 103.”

One aspect of the Sec. 103 inquiry on which the Supreme Court chose to comment with some particularity in Graham has unusual pertinency when applied here, i. e., the evidence of the existence of an unsolved problem in the art. The importance of this consideration was underscored by the further observation of the Court in that opinion that consideration of certain “legal inferences” or "subtests”:

* * * may also serve to “guard against slipping into hindsight,” Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., Tenn., 332 F.2d 406, 412, (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 888, 85 S.Ct. 160, 13 L.Ed.2d 93, and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.

Since at least as early as Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 67, 43 S.Ct. 322, 67 L.Ed. 523 (1923), the concept of “the invention as a whole” has comprised the total inventive act. That concept includes not only the remedy claimed but also the discovery of the source of persistent trouble despite the teachings of the prior art. See also In re Antonson, 272 F.2d 948, 47 CCPA 740, (1959); In re Con-over, 304 F.2d 680, 49 CCPA 1205 (1962).

Thus, when considering what here constitutes appellant’s “invention as a whole” within the context of 35 U.S.C. § 103, we are required to consider first that which appellant discovered as the causes of the trouble which persisted despite the prior art, and then to consider appellant’s remedy.

The strength (as well as an apparent weakness) of appellant's case is found in the relatively simple technical difference between his invention and the prior art. On the record, this difference, however, solved a problem then present in this art. This fact focuses our attention on “economic and motivational rather than technical issues” which are “more susceptible to judicial treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent litigation.” See Graham, supra.

The “judicial treatment” required to determine the § 103 issue begins with an evaluation of that issue as of the time the invention was made. As stated in In re Rothermel, 276 F.2d 393, 47 CCPA 866 (1960):

It is easy now to attribute to this prior art the knowledge which was first made available by appellants and then to assume that it would have been obvious to one having the ordinary skill of the art to make these suggested reconstructions. While such a reconstruction of the art may be an alluring way to rationalize a rejection of claims, it is not the type of rejection which the statute authorizes. 35 U.S.C. § 103 is very specific in requiring that a rejection on the grounds the invention “would have been obvious” must be based on a comparison between the prior art and the subject matter as a whole at- the time the invention was made.

Our analysis of the rejection starts with a consideration of the teachings of the prior art, for as stated in Rothermel, supra:

Viewed after the event, appellants’ invention may appear to be simple and as such obvious to those of ordinary skills in this art. This, however, is not a basis upon which to reject the claims. Where the invention for which a patent is sought solves a problem which persisted in the art, we must look to the problem as well as to its solution if we are to properly appraise what was done and to evaluate it against what would be obvious to one having the ordinary skills of the art. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & On *278 tario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 43 S.Ct. 322, 67 L.Ed. 523; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed. 721.

The Prior Art and the Problem it Poses

The prior art cited and relied upon by the examiner and cited by the board as sustaining the rejection is as follows:

Thwaites et al. 2,698,309 Dec. 28, 1954 (Thwaites)
Newberg etal. 2,706,719 Apr. 19, 1955 (Newberg)
Charlesby, “Proc. Roy.

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399 F.2d 275, 55 C.C.P.A. 1477, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/application-of-alfred-aufhauser-ccpa-1968.