PER CURIAM.
The respondent, Oregon Iron & Steel Company, has moved to dismiss appellants’ appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal in this matter was not given within the time allowed for appeals, generally, as provided by ORS 19.026(1), hereinafter called the general appeal statute. It reads:
“Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) [83]*83of this section, the notice of appeal shall he served and filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment appealed from.”
Appellants assert that since the merits of the case involve a determination of water rights under chapter 539, ORS, the appeal procedure there specially provided is controlling. Appellants rely specifically on the wording of ORS 539.150(4):
“After final hearing the court shall enter a decree affirming or modifying the order of the State Engineer, and may assess such costs as it may deem just. Appeals may he taken to the Supreme Court from the decrees in the same manner and with the same effect as in other cases in equity, except that the notice of appeal must be served and filed within 60 days from the entry of the decree.”
It is admitted that appellants did not serve their notice of appeal until a date after the 30-day limitation established by ORS 19.026, supra, but did serve their notice prior to the 60-day limitation provided by ORS 539.150(4). The sole issue raised by the motion is: which of the foregoing two statutes is controlling?
A study of the history of the two statutes reveals the following:
1. The predecessor to the current general statute on limitation of time to take appeal was originally enacted in 1862. Deady § 527. The time then allowed was one year. In 1864 this time was reduced to 60 days. In 1870 the time was changed to six months. Oregon Laws 1870, § 7, p 31. In 1913 the legislature again limited the time to 60 days (Oregon Laws 1913, ch 319), and so remained until 1959, when by ch 558, § 3, of the laws of that year it was established at 30 days (ORS 19.026(1)).
2. What is now ORS 539.150(4) was part of a [84]*84comprehensive code for the determination of water rights initiated prior to February 24, 1909. Oregon Laws 1909, ch 216, § 26. Although that code (ORS, ch 539) was amended or revised in 1913 and 1923 the time limitation of 60 days for appeals was retained intact.
Respondent relies primarily upon the doctrine of implied repeal, asserting that since the general appeal statute provided a limitation of 30 days, it must of necessity repeal the special provision found in the older water code. Stated more exactly, the precise proposition for determination here is whether a subsequent broad statute (ORS 19.026(1)) impliedly repeals the earlier section (ORS 539.150(4)) governing procedure in a water rights case.
Statutory repeals by implication are not favored. Wampler v. Department of State Police, 224 Or 439, 355 P2d 238, 240; Noble v. Noble, 164 Or 538, 549, 103 P2d 293 (1940); Swensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 89 Or 275, 279, 174 P 158 (1918); State v. Rogers, 22 Or 348, 30 P 74; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed), 486, 487, § 2021; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 280, § 210.
In 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, at 486, we find the following as a persuasive reason for avoiding when possible repeals of that character. He says:
“* * * An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted to statutes of the same general nature, since the legislature is presumed to have known of the existence of prior special or particular legislation, and to have contemplated only a general treatment of the subject matter by the general enactment. * * *”
The foregoing is particularly applicable with [85]*85reference to repeals affecting procedural statutes, such as we presently consider. 82 CJS 515, Statutes § 298, states the general rule to be:
“A special act providing a special or summary mode of procedure in a particular case is not affected by a subsequent general act relating to procedure, unless there is found in the subsequent act a direct indication of an intent to repeal such special act. * * *”
See, also, 50 Am Jur 565, Statutes § 564.
This court has long been committed to this rule. Home Telephone Co. v. Moodie, 75 Or 117, 120, 145 P 635 (1915); Hill v. Hartzell, 121 Or 4, 9, 252 P 552; In re Estate of Brizzolari, 129 Or 307, 313, 275 P 17; Webber v. Bailey, 151 Or 488, 494, 51 P2d 832.
In the Hill, Webber and Brizzolari cases, supra, the court quoted from and applied the rule as expressed by Mr. Justice Brewer in Rodgers v. United States, 185 US 83, 46 L ed 816, 22 S Ct 582. We think it so aptly meets the present problem that we again repeat Justice Brewer’s words:
“It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. In other words, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that the one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, and the general will not be understood as repealing the special, unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the special.”
[86]*86There are no express words of repeal in the present general appeal statute. Therefore, a presumption arises that the legislature, in enacting the statute, acted with full knowledge of existing statutes relating to the subject of appeal and intended not to repeal the earlier statute. Webber v. Bailey, supra (151 Or at 493); 82 CJS, supra, at 487, § 289; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, at 486.
We also take notice of another significant fact; that is, when the present general appeal law was amended in 1959, the limiting words “and not otherwise” were stricken from the general appeal statute as it had previously appeared in its predecessor, ORS 19.030. The presence or absence of negative words have often been invoked by courts as an aid in fathoming the legislative intent between conflicting statutes. See State ex rel Wash.-Ore. Invest. Co. v. Dobson,
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PER CURIAM.
The respondent, Oregon Iron & Steel Company, has moved to dismiss appellants’ appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal in this matter was not given within the time allowed for appeals, generally, as provided by ORS 19.026(1), hereinafter called the general appeal statute. It reads:
“Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) [83]*83of this section, the notice of appeal shall he served and filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment appealed from.”
Appellants assert that since the merits of the case involve a determination of water rights under chapter 539, ORS, the appeal procedure there specially provided is controlling. Appellants rely specifically on the wording of ORS 539.150(4):
“After final hearing the court shall enter a decree affirming or modifying the order of the State Engineer, and may assess such costs as it may deem just. Appeals may he taken to the Supreme Court from the decrees in the same manner and with the same effect as in other cases in equity, except that the notice of appeal must be served and filed within 60 days from the entry of the decree.”
It is admitted that appellants did not serve their notice of appeal until a date after the 30-day limitation established by ORS 19.026, supra, but did serve their notice prior to the 60-day limitation provided by ORS 539.150(4). The sole issue raised by the motion is: which of the foregoing two statutes is controlling?
A study of the history of the two statutes reveals the following:
1. The predecessor to the current general statute on limitation of time to take appeal was originally enacted in 1862. Deady § 527. The time then allowed was one year. In 1864 this time was reduced to 60 days. In 1870 the time was changed to six months. Oregon Laws 1870, § 7, p 31. In 1913 the legislature again limited the time to 60 days (Oregon Laws 1913, ch 319), and so remained until 1959, when by ch 558, § 3, of the laws of that year it was established at 30 days (ORS 19.026(1)).
2. What is now ORS 539.150(4) was part of a [84]*84comprehensive code for the determination of water rights initiated prior to February 24, 1909. Oregon Laws 1909, ch 216, § 26. Although that code (ORS, ch 539) was amended or revised in 1913 and 1923 the time limitation of 60 days for appeals was retained intact.
Respondent relies primarily upon the doctrine of implied repeal, asserting that since the general appeal statute provided a limitation of 30 days, it must of necessity repeal the special provision found in the older water code. Stated more exactly, the precise proposition for determination here is whether a subsequent broad statute (ORS 19.026(1)) impliedly repeals the earlier section (ORS 539.150(4)) governing procedure in a water rights case.
Statutory repeals by implication are not favored. Wampler v. Department of State Police, 224 Or 439, 355 P2d 238, 240; Noble v. Noble, 164 Or 538, 549, 103 P2d 293 (1940); Swensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 89 Or 275, 279, 174 P 158 (1918); State v. Rogers, 22 Or 348, 30 P 74; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed), 486, 487, § 2021; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 280, § 210.
In 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, at 486, we find the following as a persuasive reason for avoiding when possible repeals of that character. He says:
“* * * An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted to statutes of the same general nature, since the legislature is presumed to have known of the existence of prior special or particular legislation, and to have contemplated only a general treatment of the subject matter by the general enactment. * * *”
The foregoing is particularly applicable with [85]*85reference to repeals affecting procedural statutes, such as we presently consider. 82 CJS 515, Statutes § 298, states the general rule to be:
“A special act providing a special or summary mode of procedure in a particular case is not affected by a subsequent general act relating to procedure, unless there is found in the subsequent act a direct indication of an intent to repeal such special act. * * *”
See, also, 50 Am Jur 565, Statutes § 564.
This court has long been committed to this rule. Home Telephone Co. v. Moodie, 75 Or 117, 120, 145 P 635 (1915); Hill v. Hartzell, 121 Or 4, 9, 252 P 552; In re Estate of Brizzolari, 129 Or 307, 313, 275 P 17; Webber v. Bailey, 151 Or 488, 494, 51 P2d 832.
In the Hill, Webber and Brizzolari cases, supra, the court quoted from and applied the rule as expressed by Mr. Justice Brewer in Rodgers v. United States, 185 US 83, 46 L ed 816, 22 S Ct 582. We think it so aptly meets the present problem that we again repeat Justice Brewer’s words:
“It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. In other words, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that the one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, and the general will not be understood as repealing the special, unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the special.”
[86]*86There are no express words of repeal in the present general appeal statute. Therefore, a presumption arises that the legislature, in enacting the statute, acted with full knowledge of existing statutes relating to the subject of appeal and intended not to repeal the earlier statute. Webber v. Bailey, supra (151 Or at 493); 82 CJS, supra, at 487, § 289; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, at 486.
We also take notice of another significant fact; that is, when the present general appeal law was amended in 1959, the limiting words “and not otherwise” were stricken from the general appeal statute as it had previously appeared in its predecessor, ORS 19.030. The presence or absence of negative words have often been invoked by courts as an aid in fathoming the legislative intent between conflicting statutes. See State ex rel Wash.-Ore. Invest. Co. v. Dobson, 169 Or 546, 552, 130 P2d 939 (1942), where the negative term “no appeal to the circuit court shall be taken” was evaluated in determining the legislative intent. See, also, Brigham v. City of New York, 227 NY 575, 124 NE 209; U. S. v. Gillis, 95 US 407, 416, 24 L ed 503; Howard v. Hulbert, 63 Kan 793, 66 P 1041, 1042; Allaby v. Mauston Electric Serv. Co., 135 Wis 345, 116 NW 4, 5; 50 Am Jur, supra, at 565.
Unless there is a plain indication of an intent that the general act shall repeal the special act, the special act will continue to have effect, and the general words with which it conflicts will be restrained and modified accordingly, so that the two are to be deemed to stand together; one as the general law of the land, and the other as the law of the particular case or an exception to the general rule. Streby v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 107 Or 314, 323, 215 P 586 (1923); Webber v. [87]*87Bailey, supra (151 Or at 494); Hill v. Hartzell, supra (121 Or at 9).
We also find at least two independent statutes providing for a special time of appeal greater than the general appeal statute. The criminal appeal section provides for 60 days (ORS 138.070). The Public Utilities Commission statutes permits 60 days for appeal. ORS 756.610. In State v. Stone, 178 Or 268, 273, 166 P2d 980 (1946), it was indicated that the section of the statute pertaining to criminal appeals was complete in itself and that while it might have been desirable to make the provisions of the criminal code similar to those of the civil appeal, “the legislature has not seen fit to do so.”
In conclusion, we find an admonition of Sutherland is pertinent in this matter:
“Statutes giving the right of appeal are liberally construed in furtherance of justice, and an interpretation which will work a forfeiture of that right is not favored. Thus provisions limiting the time for bringing an appeal are liberally interpreted so that the party pursuing the remedy of appeal will not be defeated on mere technicalities. * * *” 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, at 334-335.
We hold that the enactment of ORS 19.026(1) did not result in a repeal of ORS 539.150(4) by express provision or implication. The motion to dismiss is denied.