Appleton Chair Corp. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Millmen's Local No. 1748

1 N.W.2d 188, 239 Wis. 337, 1941 Wisc. LEXIS 153, 9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 781

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: November 7, 1941
• Status: Published

Opinions

FaiRchild, J.

The cases were briefed and argued together in the court below as well as before this court and the findings and orders in both matters before the board will be considered together. The labor board found that the union members picketed without a majority vote by secret ballot to strike, but that they were not guilty of any unfair labor practices and dismissed the complaint against them. The employer, however, was found to be guilty of interfering with 'the formation of a union by threatening the loss of employment and in refusing to reinstate striking employees and in refusing to bargain in good faith with the representatives of a majority of its employees. An order was entered to cease and desist such activity and to take certain affirmative action. That order has not been complied with.

Appellant assigns as error the findings by the labor board as well as the failure to find the employer-employee status had been terminated by the unfair practice of the union. Appellant charges the court erred in not setting aside those orders of the board and in adjudging the company and its president guilty of contempt of court for violation of the judgment commanding specific action on the part of-the company.

Respondent contends that there was competent and credible evidence to sustain the board’s findings and that they were properly affirmed. Respondent also claims that the employee status is not automatically terminated by participation in a strike without first holding a secret ballot and that the court had jurisdiction to adjudge appellant and its president guilty of contempt of court.

Had the financial difficulties of the employer been thoroughly understood by the complaining employees or had the patience of the management not been so quickly exhausted, the dispute in all probability would not have required the intervention of the Wisconsin employment relations board. But each side, yielding- to its basic prejudices, took positions opposed to the other. The employer adhered firmly to its position and as. found by the board it refused to bargain in good faith. Under such circumstances an adjustment could not be accomplished without an investigation and a determination by the board as to who' was failing to enter in good faith into an effort calculated to unravel a labor dispute. The board reached a conclusion and the evidence fairly sustains the findings. The court cannot exercise the powers conferred on the board as an administrative agency and substitute its opinion for the judgment of the board.

In dealing with this matter of labor disputes the legislature has recognized a public interest in the relation between employer and employee. It grows out of the employment and the operation of the industry of the employer. The enactments in relation thereto- do not destroy nor are they calculated to invade contract rights, but they do seek to protect the public against unfair labor practices and to- foster the continuance of that relation in which the public is interested. Wisconsin Labor R. Board v. Fred Rueping L. Co. 228 Wis. 473, 279 N. W. 673. It has been definitely declared that the relation shall not be dissolved because of differing ideas as to- the right of collective bargaining or union membership. It is an established and justified rule which gives the authority to- the labor board to- determine, in a labor dispute over wages or working conditions, whether the act of an employee or employees is a complete and irrevocable termination of the employee status. Bitterness engendered at such time might lead either side to act in utter disregard of the public interest which the legislation has declared shall be protected. As pointed out in the case of Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin E. R. Board, 237 Wis. 164, 183, 295 N. W. 791, the legislature deals with a labor dispute, not primarily as a method of enforcing private rights, but to enforce the public right as well. In that case it was considered, “in view of the large discretionary power committed to the board, that the act affects the rights of parties to a controversy pending before the board only in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the order” of the board. Appellant urges a review of the ruling in that case. But there is a direct relation between continuity of the relation of employer and employee and the public interest. It is the order of the board which determines the status and relative rights of the parties. The findings merely furnish the factual situation to' which .the board in the exercise of its discretion applies the law. The existence of a certain fact does not of itself require the board to reach a certain result. Such an interpretation would deprive the board of the power to do anything but find the facts. Sec. 111.07 (4), Stats., says that “final orders may” do the things stated. It does not say the board shall do them. It clearly vests in the board a power which it may exercise according to its discretion. In furtherance of public policy where there are unfair labor practices on the part of both employer and employee the board by reason of its disinterested position is authorized to order the remedy most consistent with the public interest. We are of the opinion that the correct rule was announced in the Allen-Bradley Case, supra.

The appeal from the so-called supplementary judgment does not bring the contempt matter before us. The finding of guilty of contempt is not a final sentence of the law pronounced by the court. It is not an appealable order nor is it a final judgment. We find no occasion, therefore, for the exercise at this time of any authority over the so-called contempt proceedings.

By the Court. — Appeal from the ruling dated July 1, 1941, is dismissed. The judgments are affirmed.