Appeal of Smith

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedDecember 20, 2004
Docket263-12-02 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Appeal of Smith (Appeal of Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Appeal of Smith, (Vt. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

Appeal of William Smith } } } Docket No. 263-12-02 Vtec } }

Decision and Order

Appellant William Smith appealed from a decision of the Development Review Board (DRB) of the Town of Richmond affirming the Zoning Administrator's June 27, 2002 response to Appellant's and other neighbors' complaints alleging zoning violations at Appellee Chittenden County Fish & Game Club, Inc. Appellant and interested persons Winifred Doan, May Beth Doyle, Michael Giangreco, Fran Huntoon, Timothy Kenney, Jennifer Kenney, Robert Low, Elizabeth Low, William Minard, Susan Minard, Durand Road, and Ellen Ward are represented by Daniel P. O' Rourke, Esq.; Appellee Chittenden County Fish & Game Club, Inc. (Appellee Club) is represented by Paul S. Gillies, Esq. The Town is represented by Mark L. Sperry, Esq.; the Town did not participate in the trial or file any post-hearing memorandum.

An evidentiary hearing was held in this matter before Merideth Wright, Environmental Judge, on Questions 1, 5, 6, and 8 of the Statement of Questions, which remained after the Court's decision on partial summary judgment. The parties were given the opportunity to submit written memoranda and requests for findings. Upon consideration of the evidence and of the written memoranda and requests for findings filed by the parties, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

Appellee Club owns a 49-acre parcel of land in the Agricultural/Residential zoning district, on which it operates gun and archery shooting ranges, fishing ponds, hiking trails, tent and trailer campsites and a parking area to serve these functions. Appellee Club's facility has been in existence since at least 1933, well before the enactment of the Town's first zoning regulations in 1969. Firearms have been used at Appellee Club's shooting range since before 1969.

For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the zoning regulations establishing the Agricultural/Residential zoning district, including the current list of allowed uses, have not changed in pertinent part since the adoption of zoning in Richmond in 1969, as no evidence was presented at trial to the contrary. As of the adoption of those regulations in 1969, Appellee Club's use of the land became a non-conforming use for two reasons: first, because the use category of ' private club' is not a use category allowed at all in this zoning district; and second, because the use category of ' outdoor recreation facility' requires conditional use approval.

The use category of ' private club' is defined in terms of having " buildings and related facilities" and by the club's nonprofit, dues-paying membership status. Although Appellee Club does not operate a clubhouse, the roofed shooting shelters do fall within the definition of ' building' in the Richmond zoning regulations, and it undoubtedly has related facilities. Appellee Club therefore falls within the use category of ' private club' for the purposes of this analysis; as such, it is a non- 1 conforming use in the Agricultural/Residential district.

The use category of ' outdoor recreation facility' is not as clearly defined. The term " recreation facility" is defined in the definitions section simply as " a place designed and equipped for sports or leisure-time activities." Both indoor and outdoor recreation facilities are allowed in the three commercial zoning districts (Gateway Commercial, Commercial, and Industrial/Commercial). By contrast, the only recreational use category allowed in the four residential zoning districts (Agricultural/Residential, High Density Residential, Residential/Commercial and Mobile Home Park) is " outdoor recreation facility or park," and then only if approved by the DRB as a conditional use with appropriate conditions, which could regulate hours of operation, levels of noise, and other regulated characteristics. Comparing the ' outdoor recreation facility' use category with the other uses allowed in the various residential districts, it is not clear whether the drafters of the regulations contemplated that this definition could include such noise-generating outdoor leisure-time activities or sports as motorcycle or snowmobile trails or racecourses, or automobile racing around a track, or shooting ranges, as well as quieter types of outdoor recreation, in those residential districts. However, this Court must apply the regulations as they are written, until or unless revisions are proposed.

The uses operated by Appellant Club at this property do fall within the use category of ' outdoor recreation,' a conditional use in the Agricultural/Residential zoning district. Although the outdoor recreation uses are allowed to continue in their pre-existing, non-conforming status without obtaining conditional use approval they remain non-conforming until or unless they obtain conditional use approval from the DRB. See, In re Appeal of Jackson, 175 Vt. 304, 312; 2003 VT 45, ¶ 23 (2003).

Under § 4.7 of the Richmond Zoning Regulations, an historically seasonal or intermittent non- conforming use is assessed at the historical rate to determine both abandonment and the extent of allowed continued use. Franklin County v. City of St. Albans, 154 Vt. 327, 331 (1990) (" If the nonconforming use was not abandoned, as the trial court concluded, then resumption of activity at the jail to pre-[zoning ordinance] levels, so long as it was within the range of the previous activity and not greater than the maximum activity within that [previous] range, was not an expansion as a matter of law." (Emphasis added)).

Under § 4.7 of the Richmond Zoning Regulations, a non-conforming use may not be increased or 2 expanded, except that up to a 25% increase in physical characteristics may be allowed if both it 3 and its site plan are approved by the now-DRB. Under § 4.7, a non-conforming use that is abandoned for more than a year may not be resumed.

As the Vermont Supreme Court recognized in In re Casella Waste Management, 175 Vt. 335, 337-38, 2003 VT 49 (2003), citing In re Gregoire, 170 Vt. 556, 559 (1999)(mem.), one of the primary goals of zoning is to eliminate nonconforming uses, yet municipalities in Vermont have authority under the state zoning enabling legislation to adopt regulations that allow for the expansion of a nonconforming use, with approval of the municipal board, under carefully regulated circumstances. Such regulations have the advantage of allowing the municipal board to assess the probable effects of the expansion, and to impose conditions to protect nearby landowners from injury caused by the expansion. In re Casella Waste Management, 175 Vt. at 341.

The shooting range on Appellee Club's property is located near the road on which are located several of the Appellants' residences. The local topography is sloped towards the road, which has the effect of reflecting sound back towards the Smith and Giangreco residences.

As of the adoption of zoning making the then-existing uses on this property nonconforming, from approximately the fall of 1971 until at least the late spring of 1997, there was very little weekday use of the shooting range. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was minimal or no winter use of the shooting range and the access to the shooting range and parking area was not plowed.

In the winter of 1993-1994, the shooting range at the facility was used on only two weekend days out of the whole winter. By contrast, in the winter of 2001-2002, the shooting range at the facility was used on at least 28 of the 30 weekend days that were monitored by the neighbors in that winter.

Until the 1996 or 1997 summer season, Appellee Club had maintained a caretaker at the facility from Memorial Day to Labor Day.

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Related

Franklin County v. City of St. Albans
576 A.2d 135 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1990)
Vermont Brick & Block, Inc. v. Village of Essex Junction
380 A.2d 67 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1977)
In Re Appeal of Casella Waste Management, Inc.
2003 VT 49 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2003)
In Re Appeal of Jackson
2003 VT 45 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2003)
In Re Appeal of Miserocchi
749 A.2d 607 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2000)
Appeal of Gregoire
742 A.2d 1232 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1999)
Wild v. Brooks
2004 VT 74 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2004)

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Appeal of Smith, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/appeal-of-smith-vtsuperct-2004.