OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
For many years this Court, exercising its inherent right to determine the conditions of admission to the bar of this state,1 has insisted on two complementary requirements: one, that an applicant for admission be a graduate both of an accredited college and of an accredited law school; and two, that the applicant take and pass the bar examination administered by the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Ex[45]*45aminers (an arm of this Court). These two requirements have been insisted upon because of the belief that neither alone was sufficient. The learning process of attending a law school was felt to need the capstone of an examination administered under the supervision of the admitting authority,2 and the examination in turn was felt to need the underpinning of a competent legal education.
For many years the rule of our Court relating to the legal education requirement said only that the institution should be “approved”; in practice, the Court looked to and relied upon the American Bar Association’s accreditation list as its guide in determining whether that requirement had been met. In 1971 this practice was made explicit, the rule stating that to qualify for the bar examination an applicant “shall have completed the study of law in a law school accredited by the American Bar Association.” 441 Pa. xxx.3
In 1977 the Pennsylvania bar admission rules were revised generally, and the former rule specifying accreditation was incorporated into Rule 203 of the new Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules, 471 Pa. lxxix. To the adoption of these [46]*46new rules a dissenting opinion was filed by our brother MANDERINO. Ibid, at xcv.
We now have before us two appeals4 from actions by the Board of Law Examiners based on the accreditation requirement. One appeal, by Edward M. Murphy, II, is from the refusal of the Board to allow him to sit for the bar examination.5 The other, by Thomas Sylvester Acker, is from the refusal of the Board to certify the applicant’s eligibility to be admitted on motion under the rule of comity which recognizes five or more years of practice in a reciprocating sister state, and a certificate of good standing by the supreme court of that state, as sufficient to warrant admission to the bar of this Court without examination. The point in common in the two cases is that in Pennsylvania both admission to the bar examination and admission to the bar “on motion” under the comity rule are premised upon the applicant possessing a law degree from an approved law school. Murphy graduated from Western State University College of Law of Orange County, Fullerton, California6; Acker graduated in 1955 from Youngstown State University [47]*47School of Law, Youngstown, Ohio.7 Neither institution is accredited under our rules because neither has received ABA accreditation and it was for this reason that the Board took the action it did in each case. We affirm the decisions of the Board.
The dissenters apparently do not quarrel with the philosophy that a good legal education, not merely passing a state administered bar examination, is a reasonable and beneficial condition for admission to the bar. The disagreement seems to be with the selection of the American Bar Association as the accrediting agency; more precisely, with what is seen to be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority to a non-governmental body such as the ABA.8 Mr. Justice MANDERINO finds basic flaw in the absence of any standards to guide the ABA in its delegated functions.9 He would therefore permit graduates of an unapproved school to seek admission in this state, “either individually or by their schools.” In our view, this argument is misplaced.
In the first place, this Court has not “delegated” any judicial function to the ABA. The admission of a person to practice law in this state is and always has been a judicial [48]*48function, exercised now exclusively by the Supreme Court, with the aid of the State Board of Law Examiners. As explained at the outset, we have chosen to make a legal education one of the pre-conditions of seeking admission to our bar whether through the taking of the bar examination or recognition of the five-year practice equivalent in a reciprocating sister state. We could have decided to determine the adequacy of the legal education of an applicant through our own investigative machinery. Even Mr. Justice MANDERINO, however, recognizes that this would be “very impractical.” 10 471 Pa. at xcvii. Instead, Pennsylvania, like every other state in the union, has chosen to avail itself of the results of the ABA accreditation procedure, and accepts and adopts the ABA listing.11
The ABA’s long-standing concern with the quality of legal education in the United States needs no documentation here.12 This concern is expressed primarily through the Association’s Section of Legal Education and Admission to [49]*49the Bar,13 and it is the Council of this Section which has operating responsibility for the Association’s program of accreditation. A law school is approved by the ABA upon application of the school and after a finding that it offers a sound program of legal education that complies with the ABA’s Standards for the Approval of Law Schools.14 Approval is by action of the House of Delegates of the Association.15
In the second place, the acceptance of the American Bar Association’s findings is in no way arbitrary or capricious. That Association is recognized by the United States Commissioner of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as a “nationally recognized accrediting agency.” It is also so recognized by the National Commission on Accrediting. Similarly the Association of American Law [50]*50Schools, membership in which, as defined in that Association’s by-laws, is itself recognized as an important accrediting accomplishment, acknowledges that for a law school’s degree to be accepted nation-wide as satisfying the requirements of the bar admission authorities, ABA approval is essential.16
With this kind of acceptance by qualified officials and organizations, it seems wide of the mark indeed to inveigh against the ABA approval process because there are no standards to guide it. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice MANDERINO to the adoption of the Bar Admission Rules, 471 Pa. xcv at xcvii (1977), quoted in his Murphy dissent, infra, 393 A.2d at 376. Mr. Justice MANDERINO overlooks that the ABA has itself developed and adopted standards and rules of procedure and that these are printed and distributed widely to law schools, universities, libraries, boards of bar examiners, professional groups and others concerned with legal education.17 Our adoption of the results of the ABA accreditation process carries with it an endorsement of the standards which the ABA has promulgated for the guidance of itself and the institutions and students involved.18
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OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
For many years this Court, exercising its inherent right to determine the conditions of admission to the bar of this state,1 has insisted on two complementary requirements: one, that an applicant for admission be a graduate both of an accredited college and of an accredited law school; and two, that the applicant take and pass the bar examination administered by the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Ex[45]*45aminers (an arm of this Court). These two requirements have been insisted upon because of the belief that neither alone was sufficient. The learning process of attending a law school was felt to need the capstone of an examination administered under the supervision of the admitting authority,2 and the examination in turn was felt to need the underpinning of a competent legal education.
For many years the rule of our Court relating to the legal education requirement said only that the institution should be “approved”; in practice, the Court looked to and relied upon the American Bar Association’s accreditation list as its guide in determining whether that requirement had been met. In 1971 this practice was made explicit, the rule stating that to qualify for the bar examination an applicant “shall have completed the study of law in a law school accredited by the American Bar Association.” 441 Pa. xxx.3
In 1977 the Pennsylvania bar admission rules were revised generally, and the former rule specifying accreditation was incorporated into Rule 203 of the new Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules, 471 Pa. lxxix. To the adoption of these [46]*46new rules a dissenting opinion was filed by our brother MANDERINO. Ibid, at xcv.
We now have before us two appeals4 from actions by the Board of Law Examiners based on the accreditation requirement. One appeal, by Edward M. Murphy, II, is from the refusal of the Board to allow him to sit for the bar examination.5 The other, by Thomas Sylvester Acker, is from the refusal of the Board to certify the applicant’s eligibility to be admitted on motion under the rule of comity which recognizes five or more years of practice in a reciprocating sister state, and a certificate of good standing by the supreme court of that state, as sufficient to warrant admission to the bar of this Court without examination. The point in common in the two cases is that in Pennsylvania both admission to the bar examination and admission to the bar “on motion” under the comity rule are premised upon the applicant possessing a law degree from an approved law school. Murphy graduated from Western State University College of Law of Orange County, Fullerton, California6; Acker graduated in 1955 from Youngstown State University [47]*47School of Law, Youngstown, Ohio.7 Neither institution is accredited under our rules because neither has received ABA accreditation and it was for this reason that the Board took the action it did in each case. We affirm the decisions of the Board.
The dissenters apparently do not quarrel with the philosophy that a good legal education, not merely passing a state administered bar examination, is a reasonable and beneficial condition for admission to the bar. The disagreement seems to be with the selection of the American Bar Association as the accrediting agency; more precisely, with what is seen to be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority to a non-governmental body such as the ABA.8 Mr. Justice MANDERINO finds basic flaw in the absence of any standards to guide the ABA in its delegated functions.9 He would therefore permit graduates of an unapproved school to seek admission in this state, “either individually or by their schools.” In our view, this argument is misplaced.
In the first place, this Court has not “delegated” any judicial function to the ABA. The admission of a person to practice law in this state is and always has been a judicial [48]*48function, exercised now exclusively by the Supreme Court, with the aid of the State Board of Law Examiners. As explained at the outset, we have chosen to make a legal education one of the pre-conditions of seeking admission to our bar whether through the taking of the bar examination or recognition of the five-year practice equivalent in a reciprocating sister state. We could have decided to determine the adequacy of the legal education of an applicant through our own investigative machinery. Even Mr. Justice MANDERINO, however, recognizes that this would be “very impractical.” 10 471 Pa. at xcvii. Instead, Pennsylvania, like every other state in the union, has chosen to avail itself of the results of the ABA accreditation procedure, and accepts and adopts the ABA listing.11
The ABA’s long-standing concern with the quality of legal education in the United States needs no documentation here.12 This concern is expressed primarily through the Association’s Section of Legal Education and Admission to [49]*49the Bar,13 and it is the Council of this Section which has operating responsibility for the Association’s program of accreditation. A law school is approved by the ABA upon application of the school and after a finding that it offers a sound program of legal education that complies with the ABA’s Standards for the Approval of Law Schools.14 Approval is by action of the House of Delegates of the Association.15
In the second place, the acceptance of the American Bar Association’s findings is in no way arbitrary or capricious. That Association is recognized by the United States Commissioner of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as a “nationally recognized accrediting agency.” It is also so recognized by the National Commission on Accrediting. Similarly the Association of American Law [50]*50Schools, membership in which, as defined in that Association’s by-laws, is itself recognized as an important accrediting accomplishment, acknowledges that for a law school’s degree to be accepted nation-wide as satisfying the requirements of the bar admission authorities, ABA approval is essential.16
With this kind of acceptance by qualified officials and organizations, it seems wide of the mark indeed to inveigh against the ABA approval process because there are no standards to guide it. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice MANDERINO to the adoption of the Bar Admission Rules, 471 Pa. xcv at xcvii (1977), quoted in his Murphy dissent, infra, 393 A.2d at 376. Mr. Justice MANDERINO overlooks that the ABA has itself developed and adopted standards and rules of procedure and that these are printed and distributed widely to law schools, universities, libraries, boards of bar examiners, professional groups and others concerned with legal education.17 Our adoption of the results of the ABA accreditation process carries with it an endorsement of the standards which the ABA has promulgated for the guidance of itself and the institutions and students involved.18
While no reason is given in the dissenting opinion for this Court to extend recognition to a law school not approved by the ABA, the idea that we should be open to so doing is implicit therein. Some states do indeed recognize schools not approved by the ABA, but invariably, with one excep[51]*51tion known to us, this is with reference to schools located in the particular state.19 Pennsylvania is in the fortunate position of having each of the six schools situated within its borders20 fully approved by the ABA, so there is no temptation to relax standards in deference to local pressures. The exception noted above is the State of Indiana. The Supreme Court of that state now recognizes a law degree earned from a law school which is approved by the state in which the school is located, whether or not the school was ABA approved. With all respect to the action of our sister state, this seems to us to be carrying the concept of full faith and credit to an unjustified extreme, for the net effect is to permit a jurisdiction having the lowest educational criteria determine who may sit for the bar examination in Indiana. We are unable to perceive how this policy serves the public interest.
If we were to consider expanding the privilege of taking the bar examination (or being admitted on motion as an attorney from another state), and were to do so on a more informed approach than that employed in Indiana, the question immediately arises as to what criteria and procedures we should employ in making such a determination. Without written criteria to be met by the schools involved and without an established system of inspection and evaluation, plus periodic reevaluation, the approval would be on an ad hoc basis, without any of the standards which all agree are essential. With such an established system for Pennsylvania, it would seem that we would merely be duplicating the [52]*52ABA program, unless, of course, we wished to make the standards either more stringent or less stringent than the ABA standards.21 No one has advanced to us any argument that either variant is presently necessary or desirable. At this time, therefore, we see no virtue either in allowing a school unapproved by the ABA to seek independent recognition from Pennsylvania, or in permitting a bar examination applicant to attempt to prove to this Court that his unapproved school does in fact measure up to ABA standards.
Our holding today is in accord with longstanding and unanimous authority which has rejected the non-delegation argument here advanced as well as a host of other constitutional attacks on the requirement that an applicant for admission to the bar be a graduate of an ABA-approved law school. See, e. g., Potter v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 403 F.Supp. 1036 (D.N.J.1975), aff’d, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976); Rossiter v. Colorado State Board of Law Examiners, No. C-4767 (D.Colo., filed August 26, 1975) (three-judge court); Lombardi v. Tauro, 470 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1972) (no unlawful delegation); Kadans v. Collins, 441 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 1007, 92 S.Ct. 672, 30 L.Ed.2d 656 (1972); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960, 87 S.Ct. 396, 17 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); In re Lorring, 75 Nev. 330, 340 P.2d 589 (1959); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 165 A. 211 (1933).
[53]*53The orders of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners are affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which LARSEN, J., joins.
NIX, J., did not participate in the decision of the appeal at No. 44, Application of Thomas Sylvester Acker.