APOTHIO, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-00522-JLT-CDB
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION TO COMPEL
DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et al., (Docs. 174, 178)
Defendants. 14-DAY DEADLINE
Pending before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Apothio, LLC, filed July 3, 2025, to compel Defendants Joshua Nicholson, Donny Youngblood, and Kern County Sherrif’s Office (“KCSO”) to: (1) produce documents in response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 11, and (2) provide substantive responses to (a) Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 1 to Defendants Youngblood and Nicholson, (b) Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission (“RFAs”) to Defendants Youngblood and Nicholson, (c) Plaintiff’s Second Set of RFAs to Defendant KCSO, (d) Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendants Youngblood and Nicholson, and (e) Plaintiff’s Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant KCSO. (Docs. 174, 178). The parties initially presented the various discovery disputes to the Court via the Court’s informal discovery dispute procedures (see Docs. 163, 170, 171); however, because Defendants did not agree to resolve the discovery disputes informally, the Court authorized Plaintiff to file the present motion to compel. (Docs. 164, 172). Background In its first amended complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 88, FAC), Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff is “an emerging vertically integrated player in the development of hemp-based foods, nutraceuticals, and (eventually) pharmaceuticals.” Id. at ¶ 65. Plaintiff was at all relevant times an established agricultural research institution (“EARI”) under California law. Id. at ¶ 66 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code § 81000(c)). As part of its operations as an EARI, Plaintiff maintains hundreds of acres of land for hemp research. Id. at ¶ 66. In Kern County, California, Plaintiff maintained approximately 500 acres of land to grow, research, and harvest hemp plants. Id. at ¶¶ 66, 97-98, 107-09. In March 2019, Plaintiff planted approximately 17 million industrial hemp seeds on the approximately 500 acres located in Kern County. Id. at ¶ 110. The hemp plants were grown openly in the approximately 500 acres of fields, which were bordered by several “No Trespassing” signs. Id. at ¶ 111. On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff was sued by a former vendor, Newbridge Global Ventures, and its related entities. Id. at ¶ 129. Plaintiff asserts Newbridge attempted to gain leverage over Plaintiff by reporting it was growing “500 acres of illegal Cannabis” to law enforcement. Id. at ¶¶ 129-33. On October 17, 2019, Defendant Halverson, a lieutenant employed by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, applied for and obtained a search warrant to collect samples from Plaintiff’s field for tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) testing. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 134. Halverson’s warrant application represented that Plaintiff intended to sell cannabis to out-of-state buyers. Id. at ¶ 138. Plaintiff contends Defendant Halverson obtained the search warrant by intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly misrepresenting or omitting material facts to deceive the court. Id. at ¶¶ 136-73. Plaintiff asserts Defendants Halverson and Nicholson (a Sergeant with Defendant KCSO) executed the search warrant at night and “took 36 unscientific and unrepresentative samples from [Plaintiff’s] crops” to corroborate statements made by a Newbridge employee. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 175. Plaintiff alleges Halverson failed to file a return for the search warrant listing what he took and retained, failed to send samples to an independent certified lab as required by law and destroyed evidence. Id. at ¶ 176. On October 24, 2019, Defendant Nicholson applied for and obtained a search warrant to search and seize property used “as a means of committing a public offense.” Id. at ¶ 180. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Halverson reviewed Nicholson’s warrant and affidavit before he submitted it to the court. Id. at ¶ 182. Plaintiff argues Defendant Nicholson obtained the search warrant based on many of the same intentional, knowing, and reckless misrepresentations and omissions that Halverson made in his warrant and affidavit. Id. at ¶ 183. On October 25, 2019, state and county law enforcement agents executed Nicholson’s warrant and entered Plaintiff’s hemp fields in Kern County. Id. at ¶ 250. Plaintiff asserts that the warrant was defective because of an incorrect description of Trent Jones (Plaintiff’s principal), the acreage grown, and because it ignored Plaintiff’s status as a research entity under California law. Id. at ¶¶ 254-57. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Nicholson acknowledged CDFW Director Bonham had ratified the destruction of Plaintiff’s crops. Id. at ¶ 258. Soon after, Defendants destroyed all approximately 500 acres of Plaintiff’s plants. Id. at ¶ 266. Following the filing of its original complaint and litigation over various motions to dismiss, on May 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC. (Doc. 88). After a second round of motions to dismiss, this action proceeds on Plaintiff’s excessive destruction claim under the Fourth Amendment and related Bane Act claim. (Docs. 133, 160). Governing Legal Standards Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. See, e.g., Ford v. Unknown, No. 2:21-cv-00088-DMG-MAR, 2023 WL 6194282, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Although relevance is broadly defined, it does have “ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978). Relevant here, in response to a party’s request for production of documents, the receiving party “is obliged to produce all specified relevant and nonprivileged documents or other things which are in its ‘possession, custody or control’ on the date specified in the request.” Jadwin v. Cnty. Of Kern, No. 1:07-cv-0026-OWW-TAG, 2008 WL 2025093, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)). Additionally, a party responding to an interrogatory is obligated to respond to the fullest extent possible, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3), and any objections must be stated with specificity, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). “Generally, the responding party does not need to conduct extensive research in answering the interrogatory, but a reasonable effort to respond must be made.” Ramirez v. Kitt, No. 1:17-cv-00947-BAM (PC), 2024 WL 247243, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2024) (citation omitted). Under Rule 36, a “party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).” A responding party may answer in one of three manners: (1) admit the request if the party has no reason to dispute its truthfulness and accuracy; (2) deny the request, in whole or in part, if it has a reasonable basis to dispute the requested matter; or (3) state that it cannot admit or deny the request and provide a “reasonable explanation[], in adequate detail, as to why it cannot respond.” F.D.I.C. v. Halpern, 271 F.R.D. 191, 195-96 (D. Nev. 2010). “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objection.” Jadwin, 2008 WL 2025093, at *1 (quotation and citations omitted). Discussion In sum, the parties request the Court to resolve disputes concerning the three Defendants’ responses to a request for production of documents, a total of 66 RFAs, and numerous interrogatories. Although many of the RFAs overlap and are amenable to grouping in a manner that facilitates the Court’s efficient consideration of the core issues presented, the disputes are broad in scope and number. The Court acknowledges the parties’ numerous efforts to meet and confer to resolve their numerous discovery disputes. However, after careful review and consideration of the parties filings and arguments, it does not appear to the Court that Defendants in particular have exhibited an acceptable level of good faith cooperation in attempting to resolve the discovery disputes presented by Plaintiff. Specifically, as set forth in more detail below, notwithstanding the clear command under Rule 36 that a party responding to an RFA either admit, deny, or “state in detail” why he can do neither, Defendants instead routinely assert answers that are nonresponsive or fail to respond entirely. See Marchand v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 22 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1994) (admonishing parties to “focus on the goal of the Rules, full and efficient discovery, not evasion and word play”). Defendants separately invoke numerous, verbatim, boilerplate objections that (1) lack detail or explanation as required under the appliable Rules, and/or that (2) Defendants fail to advance or even assert in opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel. See Villery v. Jones, No. 1:15-cv-01360-DAD-HBK (PC), 2021 WL 2227363, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2021) (“boilerplate objections to requests for admission are not sufficient”). Although Defendants raised multiple objections when initially responding to the interrogatories and RFAs at issue, the Court will only address herein the ones they elected to pursue when opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel. See Franklin v. Smalls, No. 3:09-cv1067- MMA-RBB, 2012 WL 5077630, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012). Even if the Court were to consider Defendants’ boilerplate objections not argued in the parties’ joint discovery dispute brief (Doc. 178), the objections on grounds of undue burden, vagueness and ambiguity would be (and are) overruled because they are perfunctory and not, as required under Rules 33 and 34, based on specific arguments that show why the request is vague, ambiguous, or would impose a burden that is out of proportion to the needs of the case. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) & 34(b)(2)(B) (requiring that objections be stated “with specificity”). For the reasons that follow, Defendants will be ordered to serve amended responses to Plaintiff’s discovery demands. Defendants are admonished that in serving amended discovery responses, any failure to comply either with the letter or spirit of the rulings set forth herein may result in the imposition of sanctions, including, among others, evidentiary sanctions as provided for under Rule 36(a)(3) & (6) and Rule 37. E.g., Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981) (“an evasive denial, one that does not specifically deny the matter, or a response that does not set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter, may be deemed an admission.”). A. RFP No. 11 to Defendant KCSO RFP No. 11 requires KCSO to produce all documents concerning the County’s policies on investigating, seizing, storing, testing, and destroying hemp, cannabis, and marijuana. In their amended response to RFP No. 11, Defendants assert a largely boilerplate objection on the following grounds: unintelligible, vague, overly broad, lacks particularity, compound, irrelevant, assumes facts, fails to include the source of the document, and privilege. Defendants further acknowledge in their response that Plaintiff seeks “written policies in effect in October 2019,” and assert, “no written policies specific to hemp, cannabis or marijuana as phrased ever existed. Generally, however, see KCSO policies A-0500 and J1800, produced herewith.” The version of policy A-0500 produced by Defendants, titled “Search Warrants,” reflects it was effective May 15, 2008, and revised December 18, 2019. Because the policy produced was revised on December 18, 2019, and it does not purport to identify the revisions made as of that date, it is not clear whether that policy was in effect in October 2019. However, notwithstanding Defendants’ current position as set forth in the parties’ joint statement of discovery dispute that “[t]here is no dispute here. Defendant will ensure the corrected policy will be produced,” Plaintiff’s repeated efforts over a period of approximately seven weeks to gain Defendants’ cooperation have been unsuccessful and Defendants have not carried through with their agreement to clarify their response to RFP No. 11. It appears to the Court that Defendants have acted with unreasonable intransigence in relation to Plaintiff’s efforts to troubleshoot a relatively narrow and straightforward discovery dispute. In particular, Plaintiff contacted Defendants on April 1, 2025, to confer about Defendants’ amended discovery responses. Plaintiff and Defendants had a further conference on April 4, 2025. As relevant here, Defendants agreed to confirm the policy in effect as of October 2019, and they requested supporting caselaw for the proposition that responding to interrogatories based only on responding parties’ memories is insufficient. That day, Plaintiff provided caselaw. (Doc. 178-17). Plaintiff repeatedly followed up on that email. On May 9, 2025, Defendants agreed to “amend[] again in terms of the identification of individuals for communications to address [Plaintiff’s] concerns about review of documents to refresh memories.” (Doc. 178-18). Despite numerous follow-up emails and phone calls, Defendants (as of the date of the informal discovery dispute conference, June 23, 2025, see Doc. 172) have yet to confirm the investigations policy in effect as of October 2019. See, e.g., (Doc. 178-19). Accordingly, the Court will direct Defendants to either (1) confirm in an amended response to RFP No. 11 that the version of policy A-0500 produced was in effect in October 2019, or (2) produce the version of policy A-0500 that was in effect in October 2019. B. Interrogatory No. 1 to Defendants Youngblood and Nicholson Interrogatory No. 1 directed to Defendants Youngblood and Nicholson, as narrowed during the parties’ meet and confer efforts, generally requires both Defendants to identify people with whom they discussed either Apothio or Trent Jones in relation to the cultivation or destruction of hemp/marijuana crops during the search warrant execution, narrowed to the timeframe January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2020. In their responses to Interrogatory No. 1, both Defendants assert that they do not remember each and every person with whom they communicated about the narrowed topic and argue they have no independent duty to refresh their recollection about the matter by, for instance, reviewing investigative documents. Defendant Youngblood’s response identifies no person with whom he discussed Apothio/Jones, but instead, provides he does not remember “each and every person.” Defendant Nicholson likewise states that he does not recall “each and every person” with whom he spoke but also refers to the search warrant affidavit and an investigative report and names approximately 20 individuals he asserts “it is possible” he may have spoken with about the narrowed topic. “A party answering interrogatories has an affirmative duty to furnish any and all information available to the party.” Franklin, 2012 WL 5077630, at *6 (quoting 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 33.102[1], at 33–72 (3rd ed. 2012)). Thus, in general, “if a party is unable to respond to an interrogatory based solely on their recollection, they have a responsibility to make a reasonable inquiry into the matter and furnish information that is available to the party without significant burden or expense.” Jobe v. Harris, No. 5:22-cv-02276- SPG-MAR, 2024 WL 3914654, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2024) (citing cases). See Aesa, Inc, 669 F.2d at 1247 (“a response which fails to admit or deny a proper request for admission does not comply with the requirements of Rule 36(a) if the answering party has not, in fact, made ‘reasonable inquiry,’ or if information ‘readily obtainable’ is sufficient to enable him to admit or deny the matter”); Franklin, 2012 WL 5077630, at *6 (requiring party that responded to interrogatory, “I don’t recall,” to serve supplemental answer describing efforts made to obtain the information sought). On the other hand, “if a party cannot recall or readily obtain information that is responsive to an interrogatory, a court cannot compel a party to remember what they do not recall.” Jobe, 2024 WL 3914654, at *4 (citing cases). Under this authority, Defendant Youngblood’s response that he does not remember “each and every person” is nonresponsive and insufficient. Further, his argument that he has no obligation to refresh his memory is meritless. Aesa, Inc., 669 F.2d at 1247 (noting a responding party must make a “reasonable inquiry” and access “readily obtainable’” information sufficient to enable him to admit or deny the matter). Although Defendant Nicholson identifies in his response people that he possibly spoke to, his response is similarly deficient as it is nonresponsive and does not reflect whether he conducted a reasonable inquiry and accessed readily obtainable information. Accordingly, the Court will direct Defendants to serve amended responses to Interrogatory No. 1. C. RFAs to Defendant Nicholson RFAs 1-2 and 7-8: these RFAs direct Defendant to admit or deny that he obtained “Samples” pursuant to the two search warrants at issue in the lawsuit. Relevant here, in his response, Defendant objected on the grounds that “Samples” is a term that incorporates the location (“Farms”) where law enforcement seized full or partial plants during execution of the search warrant. Defendant argues that the term “Farms” is objectionable as compound because it is defined to include six separate land parcels. Defendant further argues that his response (“Admit in part insofar as I assisted in the execution of the warrant”, that he was “not the only one” assisting, and that “not all Farms were subject to samples”) is a sufficient “partial answer” given his understanding that samples of plants were not seized from every location included in the term “Farms” and the fact that he did not take every sample plant. Plaintiff’s interrogatory did not direct Defendant to admit he seized every plant obtained from every location searched in the execution of the search warrant. It merely requires Defendant to admit that he took any plant from any location withing the term “Farms.” Defendant’s various responses that he participated (but was not the only participant) in the search warrant execution, and his understanding that plants were not seized from every location subsumed in the term “Farms,” is nonresponsive and, in general, evasive. None of Defendant’s responses answer (directly or otherwise) whether he seized any single plant from any location searched. See Halpern, 271 F.R.D. at 196 (“These responses are also evasive because they do not fairly respond to the substance of the matters that Defendants request be admitted”). Accordingly, Defendant’s objections are overruled and he will be directed to serve amended responses. RFAs 17-24: these RFAs direct Defendant to admit or deny that he either “made” or “was involved in” the making of the “Decision,” and whether he consulted with either Defendant Halverson or Youngblood in connection therewith. Plaintiff defines the “Decision” as “the decision and demonstration made pursuant to the Nicholson Search Warrant’s requirement that ‘[i]n making the determination to destroy excess amounts of cannabis, pursuant to this order, officers shall demonstrate it was not reasonably possible to preserve the suspected controlled substance in place, or to remove the suspected controlled substance to another location.’” (Doc. 178-1 at 3-4). Defendant objected to these RFAs on the grounds that the term “Decision” was vague and compound, that the RFAs otherwise were unintelligible, argumentative, and “vague as to time,” and that the RFAs addressing any consultations made with Defendants Halverson or Youngblood “assumes facts.” (Doc. 178-7). In opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel, Defendant merely reiterates the same objections without further explanation or elaboration. All of Defendant’s objections to RFAs 17 through 24 are overruled because the RFAs are neither vague, compound, unintelligible, or argumentative. Although decision-making processes are variable, sometimes involving a single decisionmaker and sometimes involving a committee, Plaintiff’s RFAs directed towards Defendants’ decision(s) to destroy excess amounts of cannabis consistent with the terms of the search warrant are sufficiently direct and discrete to facilitate responses no matter what decision-making model Defendants’ employed. See Marti v. Baires, No. 1:08-cv-00653-AWI-SKO PC, 2012 WL 2029720, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (disagreeing that challenged interrogatory was vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible, and noting that “Defendant could have and should have made a reasonable effort to respond.”). Separately, without offering any narrative explanation, merely objecting to an RFA because it purportedly “assumes facts” is improper. Taylor v. Cnty. of Calaveras, No. 1:18-cv-00760-BAM, 2019 WL 6341131, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019). In short, if Defendant was the single or ultimate decisionmaker, he offers no meritorious reason or argument as to why he is unable to respond to RFAs 17 and 18. If the decision-making process involved multiple participants, he similarly offers no meritorious reason or argument as to why he is unable to respond to RFAs 19 and 20, or at the least, why he is unable to respond to an alternate wording of the straightforward prompts presented in these RFAs. See U.S. ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles Cnty., 235 F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“a party who is unable to agree with the exact wording of the request for admission should agree to an alternate wording or stipulation. When the purpose and significance of a request are reasonably clear, courts do not permit denials based on an overly-technical reading of the request.”). Likewise, Defendant offers no basis for refusing to confirm (or deny) that, if he was involved in the decision-making process, he consulted in connection therewith with either Defendants Halverson or Youngblood. Accordingly, Defendant’s objections are overruled and he will be directed to serve amended responses. RFAs 30, 32, 34: these RFAs direct Defendant to admit or deny that he destroyed, or ordered or requested the destruction of, “Crops.” The term “Crops” is defined as “Cannabis sativa L. plants” that were growing on “the Farms,” a term to which Defendant objected in response to other RFAs (discussed above). In addition to his objection to the purportedly compound nature of the term “the Farms,” Defendant objected that the RFAs otherwise were unintelligible, argumentative, and compound. Apart from those objections, Defendant failed to either admit or deny any of the RFAs. In opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel, Defendant separately argues that the RFAs are confusing because, apart from the inclusion of the Cannabis sativa L. plants in the term “Crops,” “the Farms” includes other and related terms such as “Hemp” and “Industrial Hemp.” As with the objections and arguments he raised in connection with RFAs 17-24, Defendant’s objections to RFAs 30, 32, and 34 are conclusory and undeveloped by the arguments he presents in opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel. First, the mere fact that “the Farms” is defined to include more than one plot of land does not render the RFAs objectionable as supposedly compound. Thus, for instance, if Defendant ordered or requested the destruction of Crops seized during execution of the search warrant on one, but not all, of the locations included in “the Farms,” he should agree to an alternate wording of the RFA to make that clear. See U.S. ex rel. Englund, 235 F.R.D. at 684; see also Pecover v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 08-cv-02820 CW (NC), 2012 WL 12921363, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2012) (“Plaintiffs' objection that the requests are ‘compound’ is unpersuasive, because Rule 36 allows responding parties to ‘qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter’ as long as the answer specifies the part admitted and qualifies or denies the rest … Indeed, Rule 36 requires responding parties to ‘admit to the fullest extent possible, and explain in detail why other portions of a request may not be admitted.’”) (citing Marchand v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 22 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1994)). Second, the RFAs are not unintelligible or argumentative – either Defendant did, or did not, destroy or order or request the destruction of seized plants. Nor are the RFAs rendered defective as supposedly confusing merely because they refer to other types of plants (hemp, industrial hemp) in addition to directing a response based on Cannabis sativa L. plants. Accordingly, Defendant’s objections are overruled and he will be directed to serve amended responses. RFAs 39-40: these RFAs direct Defendant to admit or deny that on or before October 25, 2019, he understood there was a difference between Marijuana and Hemp under Federal law. Defendant objected on the grounds of “[a]ssumes facts, seeks information not maintained in the ordinary course of business, overly broad as to time, calls for speculation, compound and conjunctive, unintelligible, vague as to ‘federal law.’ The defects preclude Defendant from responding.”1 The only objection advanced and argued by Defendant in opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel is vagueness as to the terms “difference” and “federal law” and to the time period “on or before.” The vagueness objections to the terms “difference” and “federal law” are meritless in light of the RFA’s explicit reference to marijuana and hemp and, hence, overruled. See Bryant v. Armstrong, 285 F.R.D. 596, 606 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (the party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous “should exercise common sense and attribute ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests.”) (citation omitted). See also Arroyo v. Adams, No. 1:11–cv–01186–AWI– DLB (PC), 2014 WL 109494, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2014) (overruling defendants’ vagueness objection to RFA seeking admission that defendants “were familiar with both state and federal law prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures”). Defendant’s argument concerning the relevance of the RFA is disregarded given that Defendant did not interpose an objection based on relevance in its discovery response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) & (5); Friedman v. Live Nation Merchandise, Inc., 833 F.3d 1180, 1185 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding belatedly asserted objection to RFA waived). Defendant’s vagueness objection to the time period is sustained. Accordingly, Defendant will be directed to serve an amended response narrowed to the time period of October 25, 2019, immediately prior to the execution of the search warrant. RFAs 41-42: these RFAs require Defendant to admit or deny that on or before October 25, 2019, he understood there was a difference between Cannabis and Industrial Hemp under California law. Despite Defendant’s objection that the RFA requires speculation, the Court notes that
1 As noted in the introduction to this order, Defendant’s “assumes facts” objections and answers that purported “defects” within RFAs preclude him from responding are improper under Rule 36. Defendant attested in the search warrant affidavit that he knew that cannabis and industrial hemp were defined differently under California Law. (Doc. 88-3 at 6-7). Notwithstanding that this particular objection is meritless, Defendant’s vagueness objection to the time period is sustained. Accordingly, Defendant will be directed to serve an amended response narrowed to the time period of October 25, 2019, immediately prior to the execution of the search warrant. RFAs 43-48: Defendant advances no unique objections as to these remaining RFAs, and, thus, for the reasons set forth above, the objections are overruled and Defendant will be directed to serve an amended response. D. RFAs to Defendants Youngblood and KCSO In large measure, the Court’s consideration and resolution of the discovery disputes arising from Defendant Nicholson’s responses to RFAs (set forth above) applies equally to the related disputes concerning Defendant Youngblood and Defendant KCSO’s responses to the same or similar RFAs. Thus, for example, the Court’s rejection of Defendant Nicholson’s refusal in his RFA responses to either admit, deny, or “state in detail” why he can do neither (as required under Rule 36(a)(4)), applies to Defendant Youngblood and Defendant KCSO’s similarly noncompliant RFA responses. Likewise, objections asserted in response to Plaintiff’s RFAs tethered to complaints about the terms “Farms,” “Samples,” and “the Decision” are meritless for the reasons the Court articulated in addressing these issues arising from Defendant Nicholson’s RFA responses. Accordingly, the Court will direct Defendant Youngblood and Defendant KCSO to serve amended responses to the RFAs that account for the Court’s rulings set forth above. E. Interrogatories Seeking Facts Relied Upon For all RFAs not Unqualifiedly Admitted Plaintiff served a single interrogatory on each of the Defendants requiring that Defendant, for each RFA to which he/it responded with anything besides an unqualified admission, to state for each such RFA all facts on which he/it relied in responding. Although Defendants asserted various objections in response to these interrogatories, they argue in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel only that each substantive response correlating to an RFA to which he/it did not answer with an unqualified admission should count as a separate interrogatory against Plaintiff’s 25-interrogatory limit under Rule 33. One prevailing approach adopted by district courts in answering the question presented here is, where discrete RFAs relate to the same or similar subject, an interrogatory seeking facts on which the responding party relied for that group of RFAs should count as a single interrogatory against the 25-interrogatory limit. See (Doc. 178 at 73-77) (citing inter alia Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In Rawstron, the court reviewed the notes of the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, commentary by Charles A. Wright, in- and out-of-Circuit caselaw, and the general purposes of civil discovery. Defendant characterizes Rawstron as “finding that an interrogatory seeking to explain denial of admissions is improper and/or should be counted as separate requests because ‘efforts to use other devices such as requests for admissions to circumvent the limitation on number of interrogatories should not be sustained.’” (Doc. 178 at 71). But that overstates the court’s holding. In Rawstron, the propounding party sought by its interrogatories all facts supporting the responding party’s denials of wide-ranging allegations pled by the plaintiff. Although the court denied the propounding party’s motion to compel, it acknowledged that answering the question presented here requires examining whether the subparts (i.e., the discrete RFAs to which the interrogatories are directed) are “‘logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary question.’” Id. at 445 (quoting Ginn v. Gemini Inc., 137 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Nev. 1991)). Here, as set forth above in addressing the parties’ disputes concerning Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s RFAs, the Court agrees that the RFAs are amenable to grouping based on the similarity of the topics presented therein. Further, the Court agrees with the RFA grouping Plaintiff proposes in support of its motion to compel for purposes of counting interrogatories. See (Doc. 178-16). Under Plaintiff’s proposal, for instance, Defendant Nicholson’s response to Interrogatory No. 2 prompted by his denial or partial denial of any of RFAs 1-6 would count as a single interrogatory. Likewise, Defendant KCSO’s response to Interrogatory No. 9 prompted by its denial or partial denial of any of RFAs 18-23 would count as a single interrogatory. Because all Defendants will be directed to serve amended responses to Plaintiff’s RFAs, it remains unclear how and the extent to which the respective interrogatories seeking information concerning any Defendant’s outright or partial denial of any RFA will operate. To the extent Defendants’ amended responses contain any that are not an unqualified admission, they Defendants shall respond to the respective interrogatory seeking facts relied upon for the denial or partial denial. Conclusion and Order For the reasons set forth above, within 14 days of entry of this order: 1. Defendant KCSO shall either (1) confirm in an amended response to Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 11 that the version of policy A-0500 already produced was in effect in October 2019, or (2) produce the version of policy A-0500 that was in effect in October 2019. 2. Defendants Nicholson and Youngblood shall serve amended responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1, as directed above. 3. Defendants Nicholson, Youngblood, and KCSO shall serve amended responses to Plaintiff’s RFAs, as directed above. 4. Defendants Nicholson, Youngblood, and KCSO shall serve amended responses to Plaintiff’s interrogatories seeking the principal or material facts relied upon in denying or partially denying Plaintiff’s RFAs, to count against the 25-interrogatory limit consistent with Plaintiffs proposed RFA/Interrogatory matrix (Doc. 178-16), as directed above. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ August 1, 2025 | Wr bo UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15