Apollo Coating RCS, Inc. v. Brookridge Funding Corp.
This text of 103 S.W.3d 682 (Apollo Coating RCS, Inc. v. Brookridge Funding Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Apollo Coating RCS, Inc., appeals from an order granting judgment in the amount of $35,964 to Brookridge Funding Corporation in an action to collect on an account. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not rendering written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw as it requested and in awarding judgment to the appel-lee. We agree and reverse and remand for compliance with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 52.
On August 3, 1998, appellant placed an order for 170,000 pig ears at a cost of $45,900 from Rudy Gutierrez d/b/a Diversified Marketing International (DMI), which was to be shipped in several installments to another corporation, Hartz. On August 12, 1998, DMI entered into an agreement to sell some of its accounts receivables to appellee. Among the accounts sold and assigned to appellee was the account of appellant. Appellant was informed of the assignment and was aware that all future payments were to be made to appellee. On November 19, 1998, appellant paid appellee $9,936 for the first shipment of pig ears sent by DMI to Hartz. However, appellant would not pay appellee for the subsequent shipments of pig ears DMI delivered to Hartz on August 19, 1998, and on August 28, 1998. Therefore, appellee filed an action against appellant alleging that appellant was indebted to it in the amount of $35,964.
At the hearing on the matter, appellant denied any indebtedness, claiming that the two shipments of pig ears had been rejected by Hartz. On September 4, 2000, the trial court entered an order awarding judgment to appellee. However, the order did not set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, on September 7, 2000, appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 52. The trial court declined to rule on this motion.
Appellant appeals raising two arguments for reversal: (1) The trial court erred in not rendering written findings of fact and conclusions of law as it requested; and (2) The trial court erred in awarding judgment to the appellee as the goods were rejected. We agree with appellant’s first point on appeal.
Rule 52 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
(a) Effect. If requested by a party, in all contested actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 . . .
(b) Amendment.
(1)Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings of fact or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.
Under this rule, there is a clear distinction between motions or requests made pursuant to Rule 52(a) and Rule 52(b)(1). As appellant correctly notes, under Rule 52(a), a trial court is required to make specific findings of fact and state separately its conclusions of law if a timely request is made. McWhorter v. McWhorter, 70 Ark. App. 41, 14 S.W.3d 528 (2000). In comparison, Rule 52(b) is reserved for motions or requests that ask the trial court to amend previously made findings of fact or to make additional findings. Rule 52(h) does not mandate that the trial court take action even when a timely motion or request is made. McClain v. Giles, 271 Ark. 176, 607 S.W.2d 416 (1980).
In the instant case, the trial court did not set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order. Appellant, therefore, filed a motion requesting that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. As appellant’s motion was for the trial court to make findings and conclusions, not to amend them, it was governed by Rule 52(a). The motion was timely made, filed only three days after the judgment was entered. Thus, the trial court was required to provide written findings and conclusions as appellant had requested. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for compliance with the provisions of Rule 52(a).
We recognize that our opinion in Price v. Garrett, 79 Ark. App. 84, 84 S.W.3d 63 (2002), contains language that is contradictory to our holding in this case. Therefore, we specifically limit Price v. Garrett to the holding that a postjudgment motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law made under Rule 52(a) does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. To the extent that any language in Price v. Garrett is in conflict with our holding in this opinion, Price v. Garrett is overruled.
Reversed and remanded.
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103 S.W.3d 682, 81 Ark. App. 396, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/apollo-coating-rcs-inc-v-brookridge-funding-corp-arkctapp-2003.