Aparicio-Salgado v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 23-242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIME APARICIO-SALGADO, No. 23-242 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-312-791 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 20, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: BYBEE, LEE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Jaime Aparicio-Salgado, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a

decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of

an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for cancellation of removal,

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

When reviewing final orders of the BIA, we review the agency’s findings of

fact for substantial evidence. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748

(9th Cir. 2022). Under this standard, the agency’s factual findings are considered

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted). We review questions of law de novo. Id.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Aparicio-

Salgado has not demonstrated that his U.S. citizen daughter would suffer the

requisite level of hardship if he were removed to Mexico. An applicant may qualify

for cancellation of removal if he can show that his removal will result in “exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship” to a United States citizen or lawful permanent

resident spouse, parent, or child. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 999 (9th

Cir. 2025).

Here, the IJ thoroughly discussed each of the hardship factors Aparicio-

Salgado claims the IJ failed to “truly assess.” In particular, the IJ noted that

Aparicio-Salgado is the sole financial provider for his family and that Aparicio-

Salgado’s removal would have a “financial toll” on his daughter. The IJ

acknowledged that the evidence on country conditions supports a finding that

Aparicio-Salgado’s capacity to find employment in Mexico would be “significantly

diminished,” but that he would not be “wholly unable to find employment” in

2 23-242 Mexico. The IJ observed that his daughter would have to adapt to schooling in the

Spanish language, which is not her dominant language. Regarding the crime in

Mexico, the IJ considered that the country conditions in Mexico are much less

favorable than those in the United States and that Aparicio-Salgado’s home state of

Guerrero “struggles mightily in confronting crime.”

Ultimately, however, Aparicio-Salgado described emotional and financial

hardship, which is insufficient to support a finding of exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship. See Ruiz-Reyes v. Garland, 2022 WL 16647770, at *1 (9th Cir.

Nov. 3, 2022) (finding that petitioner’s asserted “financial and emotional hardship

on his family . . . does not warrant cancellation of removal.”); Cabrera-Alvarez v.

Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the emotional

suffering that results from the separation of parents from children is “sadly common”

in the removal context and thus does not satisfy the exceptional and extremely

unusual standard). Therefore, his hardship claim lacks merit.

2. The BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of

removal. To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, an

applicant must show that he will face a likelihood of persecution on account of a

statutorily protected ground. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir.

2021).

Here, Aparicio-Salgado has failed to exhaust any challenge to the agency’s

3 23-242 determination that he failed to meet his burden to establish that it would be

unreasonable to relocate within Mexico to avoid future harm.1 The IJ determined

that Aparicio-Salgado failed to establish it would be unreasonable to relocate within

Mexico, and he did not challenge this finding in his brief to the BIA. Similarly,

Aparicio-Salgado’s opening brief to this Court does not raise a meaningful challenge

to the agency’s relocation finding. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072,

1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s

opening brief are waived).

Because Aparicio-Salgado failed to exhaust and forfeited the agency’s

independently dispositive internal-relocation findings, the BIA properly affirmed the

IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320

F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

3. Aparicio-Salgado abandoned any challenge to the agency’s denial of CAT

protection because he did not raise such a challenge in his opening brief to this Court.

See Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hosp., 840 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016);

see also Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised

in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”). Thus,

Aparicio-Salgado’s claim for CAT protection is unexhausted and forfeited. See 8

U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring noncitizens to exhaust all administrative remedies

1 Because this issue is dispositive, this Court need not address the nexus argument.

4 23-242 available as of right); see Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079–80.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The Motion to Stay Removal (Dkt. No. 3) is denied upon the issuance of the Mandate.

5 23-242