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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 FATEN ANWAR, CASE NO. 22-CV-01255-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PENDING 12 v. MOTIONS AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 14 Defendant. 15
16 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. District courts “have an independent 17 obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists[.]” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 18 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). This determination is an “inflexible” threshold requirement that must be 19 made “without exception, for jurisdiction is power to declare the law and without jurisdiction the 20 court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 21 (1999) (cleaned up); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (the district court “must dismiss” an action 22 if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction”). For the reasons discussed 23 below, Plaintiff Faten Anwar fails to establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 24 1 her claims. She must therefore show cause why this case should not be dismissed. The Court also 2 takes this opportunity to address several pending motions. See Dkt. Nos. 23–24, 26, 31. 4 Ms. Anwar filed an amended complaint on the heels of Defendant Etsy Incorporated’s
5 motion to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 24, 30; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). This time she alleges that 6 Etsy violated Section 82.08.0531 of the Revised Code of Washington “by withholding information 7 vital to [her] business record keeping and tax-filing.” Dkt. No. 30 at 3. More specifically, Ms. 8 Anwar claims that Etsy failed to provide “monthly reports of gross [Washington] State transactions 9 by the . . . 15th of the following month for all the months during which [her] account remained 10 open.” Id. She also asserts that Etsy violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTCA”). Id. 11 at 2; see 15 U.S.C. § 45. According to Ms. Anwar, Etsy “made contradictory statements about the 12 date of account closure, which constitutes fraudulent and deceptive business practices[.]” Dkt. No. 13 30 at 2. Moreover, Etsy allegedly “created a supplier component to effectuate invoicing in [Ms. 14 Anwar’s] account without [her] knowledge or permission,” an act that likewise “constitutes [a]
15 fraudulent and deceptive business practice[.]” Id. Ms. Anwar asks the Court to (1) enjoin Etsy 16 from “conducting any activities in [her] account”; (2) order Etsy to close the account “if it is still 17 open”; (3) order Etsy to provide her “with a monthly list of gross Washington State [s]ales and tax 18 submitted to the Department of [R]evenue for each and every month [her] account remained open”; 19 and (4) award her $100,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 4. 21 The Court first explains why it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. It then 22 dispenses with several pending motions. 23
24 1 A. Ms. Anwar Fails to Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction 2 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they “possess only that power 3 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 4 377 (1994). This means that the Court can only hear certain types of cases. Home Depot U.S.A.,
5 Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). The typical bases for federal jurisdiction are 6 established where (1) the complaint presents a federal question “arising under the Constitution, 7 laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) where the parties are diverse (e.g., residents of different 8 states) and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The party 9 asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it. See United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 10 600 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Ms. Anwar’s amended complaint fails to do so. 11 The Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over this case. Although Ms. Anwar alleges 12 that Etsy committed fraudulent and deceptive business practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 45, 13 this claim fails “because there is no private right of action under the ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 14 practices’ section of the FTCA.” Williams v. Nat’l Football League, No. C14-1089-MJP, 2014
15 WL 5514378, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2014); see Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th 16 Cir. 1981) (noting that “private litigants may not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district 17 courts” by alleging unfair business practices because the FTCA “rests initial remedial power solely 18 in the Federal Trade Commission”). 19 Nor does the Court have diversity jurisdiction. As noted above, federal courts provide a 20 “neutral forum” for adjudicating civil actions between citizens of different states. Exxon Mobil 21 Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). However, “[t]o ensure that diversity 22 jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes,” Congress imposed a minimum 23 requirement on diverse litigants who wish to utilize that neutral forum: the amount in controversy
24 must exceed $75,000. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, Ms. Anwar seeks $100,000 in punitive 1 damages. Dkt. No. 30 at 4. “In a diversity case originally filed in federal court, the sum claimed in 2 the complaint controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal 3 certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.” Maine 4 Cmty. Health Options v. Albertsons Companies, Inc., 993 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned
5 up). The “legal certainty” standard, phrased differently, permits a district court to dismiss the case 6 for lack of jurisdiction if it is obvious on the face of the complaint that the suit cannot involve the 7 necessary amount. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 8 1106 (9th Cir. 2010). 9 That is the case here. For starters, regardless of the merits of Ms. Anwar’s assertions under 10 Section 82.08.0531 of the Revised Code of Washington, she seeks punitive damages—a remedy 11 the statute does not provide. See Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1996) 12 (observing that Washington courts have “consistently disapproved punitive damages as contrary 13 to public policy,” and citing the “long-standing rule prohibiting punitive damages without express 14 legislative authorization.”).
15 Nor does Ms. Anwar’s request for nonmonetary relief satisfy the amount-in-controversy 16 requirement.
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 FATEN ANWAR, CASE NO. 22-CV-01255-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PENDING 12 v. MOTIONS AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 14 Defendant. 15
16 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. District courts “have an independent 17 obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists[.]” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 18 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). This determination is an “inflexible” threshold requirement that must be 19 made “without exception, for jurisdiction is power to declare the law and without jurisdiction the 20 court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 21 (1999) (cleaned up); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (the district court “must dismiss” an action 22 if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction”). For the reasons discussed 23 below, Plaintiff Faten Anwar fails to establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 24 1 her claims. She must therefore show cause why this case should not be dismissed. The Court also 2 takes this opportunity to address several pending motions. See Dkt. Nos. 23–24, 26, 31. 4 Ms. Anwar filed an amended complaint on the heels of Defendant Etsy Incorporated’s
5 motion to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 24, 30; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). This time she alleges that 6 Etsy violated Section 82.08.0531 of the Revised Code of Washington “by withholding information 7 vital to [her] business record keeping and tax-filing.” Dkt. No. 30 at 3. More specifically, Ms. 8 Anwar claims that Etsy failed to provide “monthly reports of gross [Washington] State transactions 9 by the . . . 15th of the following month for all the months during which [her] account remained 10 open.” Id. She also asserts that Etsy violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTCA”). Id. 11 at 2; see 15 U.S.C. § 45. According to Ms. Anwar, Etsy “made contradictory statements about the 12 date of account closure, which constitutes fraudulent and deceptive business practices[.]” Dkt. No. 13 30 at 2. Moreover, Etsy allegedly “created a supplier component to effectuate invoicing in [Ms. 14 Anwar’s] account without [her] knowledge or permission,” an act that likewise “constitutes [a]
15 fraudulent and deceptive business practice[.]” Id. Ms. Anwar asks the Court to (1) enjoin Etsy 16 from “conducting any activities in [her] account”; (2) order Etsy to close the account “if it is still 17 open”; (3) order Etsy to provide her “with a monthly list of gross Washington State [s]ales and tax 18 submitted to the Department of [R]evenue for each and every month [her] account remained open”; 19 and (4) award her $100,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 4. 21 The Court first explains why it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. It then 22 dispenses with several pending motions. 23
24 1 A. Ms. Anwar Fails to Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction 2 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they “possess only that power 3 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 4 377 (1994). This means that the Court can only hear certain types of cases. Home Depot U.S.A.,
5 Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). The typical bases for federal jurisdiction are 6 established where (1) the complaint presents a federal question “arising under the Constitution, 7 laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) where the parties are diverse (e.g., residents of different 8 states) and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The party 9 asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it. See United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 10 600 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Ms. Anwar’s amended complaint fails to do so. 11 The Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over this case. Although Ms. Anwar alleges 12 that Etsy committed fraudulent and deceptive business practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 45, 13 this claim fails “because there is no private right of action under the ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 14 practices’ section of the FTCA.” Williams v. Nat’l Football League, No. C14-1089-MJP, 2014
15 WL 5514378, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2014); see Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th 16 Cir. 1981) (noting that “private litigants may not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district 17 courts” by alleging unfair business practices because the FTCA “rests initial remedial power solely 18 in the Federal Trade Commission”). 19 Nor does the Court have diversity jurisdiction. As noted above, federal courts provide a 20 “neutral forum” for adjudicating civil actions between citizens of different states. Exxon Mobil 21 Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). However, “[t]o ensure that diversity 22 jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes,” Congress imposed a minimum 23 requirement on diverse litigants who wish to utilize that neutral forum: the amount in controversy
24 must exceed $75,000. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, Ms. Anwar seeks $100,000 in punitive 1 damages. Dkt. No. 30 at 4. “In a diversity case originally filed in federal court, the sum claimed in 2 the complaint controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal 3 certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.” Maine 4 Cmty. Health Options v. Albertsons Companies, Inc., 993 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned
5 up). The “legal certainty” standard, phrased differently, permits a district court to dismiss the case 6 for lack of jurisdiction if it is obvious on the face of the complaint that the suit cannot involve the 7 necessary amount. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 8 1106 (9th Cir. 2010). 9 That is the case here. For starters, regardless of the merits of Ms. Anwar’s assertions under 10 Section 82.08.0531 of the Revised Code of Washington, she seeks punitive damages—a remedy 11 the statute does not provide. See Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1996) 12 (observing that Washington courts have “consistently disapproved punitive damages as contrary 13 to public policy,” and citing the “long-standing rule prohibiting punitive damages without express 14 legislative authorization.”).
15 Nor does Ms. Anwar’s request for nonmonetary relief satisfy the amount-in-controversy 16 requirement. “When a complaint seeks nonmonetary relief, ‘the amount in controversy is measured 17 by the value of the object of the litigation.’” Maine Cmty. Health, 993 F.3d at 723 (quoting Hunt 18 v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). To recap, Ms. Anwar seeks to 19 enjoin Etsy from “conducting activities in her account” and wishes to close her account if it is still 20 open. Dkt. No. 30 at 4. She also asks the Court for an order compelling Etsy to provide “a monthly 21 list of gross Washington State [s]ales and tax submitted to the Department of [R]evenue for each 22 and every month [her] account remained open[.]” Id. It is obvious from the face of the amended 23 complaint that the object of this litigation does not exceed $75,000 in value. The Court
24 acknowledges that this dispute is important to Ms. Anwar. And there are no “small” cases in that 1 sense. However, she fails to articulate how enjoining Etsy from “conducting activities” in her 2 account and closing that account (assuming it is not already closed) is worth more than $75,000 3 (or even a fraction of that amount). Ms. Anwar similarly does not quantify the value of the sought- 4 after monthly gross sales information or otherwise explain how obtaining that information would
5 result in a perceptible contribution towards the statutory minimum amount necessary to invoke the 6 Court’s diversity jurisdiction. 7 B. Other Pending Motions 8 The Court denies as moot Etsy’s motion to dismiss in light of Ms. Anwar’s amended 9 complaint. Dkt. No. 24; see Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n 10 amended pleading supersedes the original pleading.”). Etsy’s motion to stay discovery pending 11 resolution of the motion to dismiss is therefore also denied as moot. Dkt. No. 26. But this does not 12 mean that Ms. Anwar is entitled to discovery. 13 Because Ms. Anwar must show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of 14 subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court again finds good cause to defer entry of a case schedule. See
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2) (a district court may defer entering a scheduling order for good cause); 16 Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is sounder 17 practice to determine whether there is any reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs can construct a 18 claim before forcing the parties to undergo the expense of discovery.”). Ms. Anwar’s “efforts to 19 conduct a Rule 26(f) conference, and thereby pursue discovery, are [therefore] premature.” Zavala 20 v. Kruse-W., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-00239-DAD-SKO, 2019 WL 3219254, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 21 2019); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (absent a court order or other circumstances not present 22 here, “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as 23 required by Rule 26(f)”). Nor has Ms. Anwar provided the good cause necessary to force Etsy’s
24 participation in a premature conference. See Zavala, 2019 WL 3219254, at *2 (requiring good 1 cause to compel a premature Rule 26(f) conference); Dkt. No. 23 at 1–2, 5–6 (summarizing the 2 discovery sought and alleging that Etsy has halted Ms. Anwar’s “endeavor to find out the truth,” 3 is “unilaterally delaying . . . the required discovery conference,” and is flouting Rule 26(f)’s 4 requirement that the parties “confer as soon as practicable”). Indeed, it would be impractical and
5 a waste of the parties’ resources to conduct discovery at this stage because, as things currently 6 stand, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Anwar’s motion for reconsideration is 7 therefore denied, Dkt. No. 31, as is her motion to compel Etsy’s participation in a Rule 26(f) 8 discovery conference, Dkt. No. 23. 10 Ms. Anwar must, within 20 days of this Order, show cause why the Court should not 11 dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If she does not file a timely response 12 establishing subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will dismiss her amended complaint without 13 prejudice. 14 The Court DENIES as moot Etsy’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay Discovery. Dkt.
15 Nos. 24, 26. It further DENIES Ms. Anwar’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Compel 16 Scheduling a Discovery Conference Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Dkt Nos. 23, 31. 17 Dated this 21st day of November, 2022. 18 A 19 Lauren King United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24