Antonio White v. Superintendent Rockview SCI

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 25, 2024
• Docket: 20-3511
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________

No. 20-3511 ________________

ANTONIO WHITE,

Appellant

v.

SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA ________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D. C. No. 2-19-cv-05406) District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter ________________

Argued on November 1, 2023

Before: JORDAN, ROTH and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed June 25, 2024)

Dean Beer (ARGUED) Matthew C. Lawry Jules Welsh Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 601 Walnut Street The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellants Catherine B. Keifer (ARGUED) Delaware County Office of District Attorney 201 W. Front Street Media, PA 19063

Counsel for Appellee

________________

OPINION* ________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge

After exhausting his direct-appeal and state post-conviction rights, Antonio White

sought habeas relief in federal court. However, because he did not file his federal petition

until fourteen days after the statute of limitations had expired, the District Court dismissed

his petition as untimely. On appeal, White argues that he failed to file a timely petition

because the Trial Court docket and a state court opinion listed an incorrect date for when

his convictions became final and, as a result, misled him as to the applicable filing deadline.

We conclude that White pursued relief with reasonable diligence and that extraordinary

circumstances prevented the timely filing of his petition. Thus, he is entitled to equitable

tolling. We will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background and Procedural History

Antonio White was convicted of first degree murder and possession of an instrument

of crime in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas (Trial Court). He was sentenced

to life without parole for the murder and six months to five years for possession of an

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

2 instrument of crime. White appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that his confession

was admitted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Superior Court

affirmed on August 14, 2014,1 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for

allowance of appeal on February 19, 2015.2 The Trial Court incorrectly docketed that date

as March 16, 2015, rather than February 19, 2015.

White alleges that he never received the Supreme Court’s order denying review of

his appeal. Because he did not file a petition for certiorari, White’s convictions became

final on May 20, 2015, ninety days after the denial. At that point, the one-year statute of

limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) began to

run.3

350 days later, on May 4, 2016, White filed a counseled petition under the

Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) in the Court of Common Pleas (PCRA

Court), tolling the AEDPA clock with fifteen days remaining.4 In his PCRA Petition,

White claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise available evidence

in support of a motion to suppress his confession. The PCRA Court held an evidentiary

hearing and, on May 4, 2017, denied the petition. Like the Trial Court docket, the PCRA

Court’s opinion incorrectly stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had denied White’s

petition for allowance of appeal on March 16, 2015.

1 Commonwealth v. White, 106 A.3d 159 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished table decision). 2 Commonwealth v. White, 110 A.3d 997(Pa. 2015) (unpublished table decision). 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 4 See id. § 2244(d)(2). 3 White appealed the PCRA Court’s decision to the Superior Court, filing a brief in

support of his appeal pro se.5 The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court’s decision on

February 13, 2019,6 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on October 1,

2019.7 At that point, AEDPA’s statute of limitations resumed running.8

White filed a federal habeas petition pro se in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

on October 30, 2019. However, AEDPA’s statute of limitations had expired on October

16, 2019. If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had denied review of his direct appeal on

March 16, 2015, as the Trial Court docket and PCRA Court’s opinion stated, the statute of

limitations would not have expired until after White filed his petition on October 30, 2019,

and so it would have been timely. White filed a memorandum in support of his petition

pro se, and the Commonwealth did not respond.

On December 31, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

sua sponte, denying White’s petition as untimely and declining to apply equitable tolling.9

White objected and requested equitable tolling on the ground that the Trial Court docket

and PCRA Court’s decision listed the incorrect date for the Supreme Court’s denial of

review of his direct appeal.

5 White was represented by counsel when he appealed the PCRA Court’s decision, but he alleges that he handled the appeal pro se. His counsel formally withdrew after the appeal was filed but before White filed his supporting brief. 6 Commonwealth v. Vundel, No. 1841 EDA 2017, 2019 WL 578539 (Pa. Super. Feb. 13, 2019). 7 Commonwealth v. Vundel, 218 A.3d 391 (Pa. 2019) (unpublished table decision). 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 9 White v. Garman, No. 19-5406, 2019 WL 10817151, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019). 4 On October 7, 2020, the District Court held that White was not entitled to equitable

tolling and dismissed his petition as untimely.10 The District Court also declined to grant

a Certificate of Appealability (COA).11 White appealed, and we granted a COA on the

issue of whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.12

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, and we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review the District Court’s refusal to

toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations de novo.13

III. Discussion

Under AEDPA, an incarcerated individual seeking post-conviction relief must file

his petition in federal court within one year of “the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.”14 AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”15 It is also subject to equitable tolling.16

10 White v. Garman, No. 19-5406, 2020 WL 5944280, at *2–3 (E. D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2019). 11 Id. at *3 n.1. 12 Although White’s appeal was facially untimely, he filed several motions to request an extension of time to file based on COVID-19-related restrictions. We construed White’s Notice of Appeal as a motion to extend time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) and remanded to the District Court for review of his 4(a)(5) motion. The District Court granted his motion, and we deemed his appeal timely and issued a COA. 13 Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003)). 14 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 15 Id. § 2244(d)(2). 16 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 5 In order to be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner must demonstrate that (1) he

has diligently pursued his rights, and (2) “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way and prevented timely filing” of his petition.17 For the reasons that follow, we conclude

that White has satisfied his burden on both elements.

The “diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not

maximum, extreme, or exceptional diligence.”18 Accordingly, a petitioner “can hardly be

faulted for not acting more diligently” if he did what he reasonably thought was necessary

“based on information he received” from the court.19 White diligently pursued post-

conviction relief in both state and federal court.20 He timely litigated his direct appeals and

state habeas petition, whether represented by counsel or proceeding pro se. Timely

litigation prior to the federal habeas process supports a finding of diligence.21

The Commonwealth disputes that White acted with the requisite level of diligence

because he did not verify the information on the Trial Court docket. As the Commonwealth

notes, some other court documents listed the correct date on which White’s conviction

became final.

17 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 18 Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 799 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Holland, 560 U.S. at 653). 19 Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 331 (3d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). 20 See Ross, 712 F.3d at 799 (explaining that diligence “is an obligation that exists during the period appellant is exhausting state court remedies as well” (quoting LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005))). 21 See Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 89. During the pendency of his PCRA Petition and appeal, White submitted several other filings pro se, including a motion to appoint counsel, notice of appeal, and various letters seeking the status of his requests and for a copy of the docket. 6 The diligence prong, however, does not require a petitioner to verify information

provided by the court absent any indication that the information is inaccurate. Here, White

had no reason to second-guess the accuracy of the Trial Court docket or PCRA Court’s

opinion because he was not aware of the alternative documents identified by the

Commonwealth. He alleges that he did not receive a copy of the Supreme Court order

denying his petition for allowance of appeal because he was represented by counsel on

direct appeal. White also alleges that he was represented by counsel when his PCRA

Petition was filed, so he was unaware that the filing used the correct date.

Requiring White to doubt the reliability of the Trial Court docket, without any facial

indication of its inaccuracy, would contradict our decisions holding a petitioner need not

“le[ave] no stone unturned.”22

On the eve of argument, the Commonwealth filed a copy of White’s petition seeking

review of the Superior Court’s order affirming dismissal of his PCRA petition. White filed

the petition pro se, and the Superior Court’s opinion, which listed the correct date on which

the Supreme Court denied review of his direct appeal, was attached as an exhibit. The

Commonwealth argues that, as a result, White should have been aware of the discrepancy

between the dates listed on the Trial Court docket and in the Superior Court opinion. As

White failed to follow up on that discrepancy, the Commonwealth argues, he did not pursue

relief with the requisite level of diligence.

22 Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 330 (citation omitted). 7 However, under the circumstances, and in light of his considerable efforts in pursuit

of relief, White’s failure to identify a discrepancy buried in an exhibit to his filing does not

demonstrate a lack of reasonable diligence. Indeed, the Commonwealth had access to the

filing that it now faults White for not reviewing carefully enough, yet it failed to bring it to

our attention within the prescribed briefing schedule.

Because we conclude that White pursued relief with reasonable diligence, we turn

to whether he was prevented from filing a timely petition by extraordinary circumstances.

Here, we do not ask how unusual the circumstances were “but rather how severe an

obstacle it [wa]s for the prisoner endeavoring to comply with AEDPA’s limitations

period.”23 In prior cases, we have found extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify

equitable tolling where a petitioner was actively misled by the respondent, prevented from

asserting his rights in some extraordinary way, or timely asserted his rights in the wrong

forum.24 Another “potentially extraordinary situation is where a court has misled a party

regarding the steps that the party needs to take to preserve a claim.”25 That said, our

analysis is necessarily tailored to the circumstances faced by the specific petitioner.26

White alleges that the Trial Court and PCRA Court provided him with inaccurate

information about the date on which the Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance

of appeal and, by extension, the date by which he had to file his federal petition. He also

23 Ross, 712 F.3d at 803 (emphasis removed). 24 See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999)). 25 Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2005). 26 Ross, 712 F.3d at 802 (noting that we “measure[] the extraordinary circumstances prong subjectively”). 8 maintains that his status as a pro se and incarcerated petitioner supports his claim. Taken

together, White argues, these facts establish a “causal connection, or nexus, between the

extraordinary circumstances he faced and [his] failure to file a timely federal petition.”27

The Commonwealth argues that White must show the court made “an affirmative

effort” to mislead or “an attempt to deceive him.”28 We disagree. Our case law imposes

no such requirement. The courts communicated information to White that led him to

believe, incorrectly, that his petition would be timely up until a certain date.29 It is evident

that White’s failure to file a timely petition was not the result of counsel’s (or his own)

confusion about the law or of any miscalculation of the limitations period. Rather, he was

misled by the courts about facts bearing on the timeliness of his petition. Based on that

information, his calculation was sound and his petition timely.

Thus, White has demonstrated both diligence and extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to support equitable tolling. His request for it should have been granted.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, we will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing White’s

petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

27 Br. 15 (quoting Ross, 712 F.3d at 803). 28 Appellee’s Br. 15–17 (emphasis in original) (discussing Schlager v. Superintendent of Fayette SCI, 789 F. App’x 938, 941 (3d Cir. 2019), and Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 90). 29 See Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 83–84, 90. 9