Antonio Fernandez v. Orange Walker, LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: September 28, 2021
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01061
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CV 21-1061-RSWL-Ex 12 ANTONIO FERNANDEZ, ORDER re: Plaintiff’s 13 Plaintiff, Application for Default 14 v. Judgment [19] 15 ORANGE WALKER, LLC, a 16 California Limited Liability Company; and 17 JASON YONG JAE KWOK, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Antonio 21 Fernandez’s (“Plaintiff”) Application for Default 22 Judgment (the “Application”) [19]. Having reviewed all 23 papers submitted pertaining to this Application, the 24 Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court DENIES 25 the Application without prejudice. 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background

3 Plaintiff is paralyzed from the waist down and uses 4 a wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. 5 Orange Walker, LLC (“Defendant Orange Walker”) owned and 6 owns the real property located at 14408 Pioneer Blvd., 7 Norwalk, California 90650 (the “Property”). Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 8 Jason Yong Jae Kwak (“Defendant Yong Jae Kwok”) owned 9 and owns Mike’s Liquor Jr. Market (the “Business”) 10 located on the Property. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 11 In January 2021, Plaintiff visited the Business. 12 Id. ¶ 10. Upon arrival, Plaintiff found that the 13 Property failed to provide wheelchair accessible paths 14 of travel in compliance with ADA standards. Id. ¶ 12. 15 Specifically, “some of the paths of travel inside the 16 [Business] had widths that were well below 36 inches.” 17 Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff personally encountered these 18 barriers. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff intends to return to the 19 Business to test its compliance with disability access 20 laws, but he is currently deterred from doing so because 21 of the existing barriers. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff asserts 22 that these barriers are “easily removed without much 23 difficulty or expense.” Id. ¶ 21. 24 B. Procedural Background 25 Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] on February 5, 26 2021, alleging violations of the ADA and Unruh Act. 27 Plaintiff served Defendant Yong Jae Kwak [11] on 28 February 12, 2021, and Defendant Orange Walker [15] on 1 March 17, 2021. 2 As of yet, Defendants have not pleaded, answered,

3 or otherwise appeared in this Action. The Clerk of 4 Court entered default as to Defendant Yong Jae Kwak [14] 5 on March 12, 2021, and as to Defendant Orange Walker 6 [17] on May 4, 2021. On August 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed 7 the present Application [19]. Plaintiff seeks an order 8 enjoining Defendants to provide premises that comply 9 with the ADA and Unruh Act. Compl. 7:4-5. Plaintiff 10 also requests awards of $4,000 in statutory damages 11 against each Defendant and $3,116 in attorneys’ fees and 12 costs, for a total award of $11,116. Id. at 7:8-11; 13 Decl. of Russell Handy in Supp. of Pl.’s App., Invoice, 14 ECF No. 19-3; Proposed Order 2:6, ECF No. 19-12. 15 II. DISCUSSION 16 A. Legal Standard 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) 18 authorizes a district court to grant default judgment. 19 Pursuant to Local Rule 55-1, the party moving for 20 default judgment must submit a declaration establishing: 21 (1) when and against which party default was entered; 22 (2) on which pleading default was entered; (3) whether 23 the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent person, or 24 active service member; and (4) proper service. Upon 25 default, all factual allegations in the complaint, 26 except those relating to damages, are assumed to be 27 true. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 28 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. 1 Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).

2 In exercising its discretion to grant default

3 judgment, the court must consider the following 4 factors: (1) possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, 5 (2) merits of the substantive claim, (3) sufficiency of 6 the complaint, (4) sum of money at stake in the action, 7 (5) possibility of disputes regarding material facts, 8 (6) whether excusable neglect caused the default, and 9 (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 10 Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 11 NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th 12 Cir. 2016) (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 13 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, if the 14 defaulting party failed to plead or otherwise defend, 15 the court must determine that it has subject matter and 16 personal jurisdiction. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 17 (9th Cir. 1999). When default judgment is granted, the 18 relief awarded “must not differ in kind from, or exceed 19 in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. 20 Civ. P. 54(c). 21 B. Discussion 22 1. Jurisdiction 23 a. ADA Claim 24 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 25 violations of the ADA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 26 1343. See Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. 27 Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017). 28 Moreover, the Court has personal jurisdiction over 1 Defendants because they have “certain minimum contacts”

2 with California such that “the suit does not offend

3 ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 4 justice.’” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) 5 (citation omitted). Specifically, Defendants owned and 6 own the Property and the Business located at 14408 7 Pioneer Blvd., Norwalk, California 90650. Compl. ¶¶ 2- 8 5. 9 b. Unruh Act Claim 10 The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over 11 “claims that are so related to claims in the action 12 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of 13 the same case or controversy under Article III of the 14 United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(a). Even 15 if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district 16 courts have discretion to decline supplemental 17 jurisdiction “in exceptional circumstances” or where 18 “there are other compelling reasons for declining 19 jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). The Supreme 20 Court has described 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as a 21 codification of the principles of “economy, convenience, 22 fairness, and comity” that underscore the Supreme 23 Court's earlier jurisprudence concerning pendent 24 jurisdiction. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of 25 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172–73 (1997) (quoting Carnegie- 26 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). 27 The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation 28 for a district court’s reasons [for declining 1 supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court acts

2 under” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)-(3). San Pedro Hotel Co.

3 v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 4 1998). It does, however, require a district court to 5 “articulate why the circumstances of the case are 6 exceptional in addition to inquiring whether the balance 7 of the Gibbs values provide compelling reasons for 8 declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.” Exec. 9 Software N. Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 10 Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994). 11 According to the Ninth Circuit, this “inquiry is not 12 particularly burdensome.” Id. 13 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act provides: 14 “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of [California] 15 are free and equal, and no matter what their . . . 16 disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal 17 accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or 18 services in all business establishments of every kind 19 whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51. Pursuant to Civil 20 Code § 51(f), a violation of the ADA is a per se 21 violation of the Unruh Act. But unlike the ADA, the 22 Unruh Act provides for recovery of monetary damages. A 23 plaintiff may recover actual damages for each offense 24 “up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual 25 damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars 26 ($4,000).” Id. § 52(a). “The litigant need not prove 27 she suffered actual damages to recover the independent 28 statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, 1 Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Botosan

2 v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir.

3 2000)). 4 “In 2012, in an attempt to deter baseless claims 5 and vexatious litigation, California adopted heightened 6 pleading requirements for disability discrimination 7 lawsuits under the Unruh Act.” Velez v. Il Fornanio 8 (Am.) Corp., No. 3:18-CV-1840-CAB-MDD, 2018 WL 6446169, 9 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). These heightened 10 pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a 11 “construction-related accessibility claim,” which 12 California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil 13 action with respect to a place of public accommodation, 14 including but not limited to, a claim brought under 15 Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on 16 an alleged violation of any construction-related 17 accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). 18 California’s heightened pleading standard requires a 19 plaintiff to include specific facts concerning the 20 plaintiff’s claim, including the specific barriers 21 encountered and how the plaintiff was deterred on each 22 occasion. See Cal. Civ. Code § 425.50(a). California 23 law also requires that complaints for construction- 24 related accessibility claims be verified; if they are 25 not, they are subject to a motion to strike. See id. 26 § 425.50(b)(1). 27 When California continued to experience large 28 numbers of these actions, California imposed additional 1 limitations on “high-frequency litigants.”1 These

2 additional restrictions became effective on October 15,

3 2015. In support of its imposition of additional 4 requirements on high-frequency litigants, the California 5 Legislature found and declared: 6 According to information from the California 7 Commission on Disability Access, more than one- half, or 54 percent, of all construction- 8 related accessibility complaints filed between 9 2012 and 2014 were filed by two law firms. Forty-six percent of all complaints were filed 10 by a total of 14 parties. Therefore, a very 11 small number of plaintiffs have filed a disproportionately large number of the 12 construction-related accessibility claims in 13 the state, from 70 to 300 lawsuits each year. Moreover, these lawsuits are frequently filed 14 against small businesses on the basis of 15 boilerplate complaints, apparently seeking quick cash settlements rather than correction 16 of the accessibility violation. This practice 17 unfairly taints the reputation of other innocent disabled consumers who are merely 18 trying to go about their daily lives accessing 19 public accommodations as they are entitled to have full and equal access under the state’s 20 Unruh Civil Rights Act (Section 51 of the Civil 21 Code) and the federal Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336). 22 23 Id. § 425.55(a)(2). In response to the “special and 24 unique circumstances” surrounding disability access 25 1 A high-frequency litigant is defined in part as a 26 plaintiff who has filed ten or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the twelve- 27 month period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility 28 1 ligation, id. § 425.55(3), California imposed a “high-

2 frequency litigant fee,” requiring high-frequency

3 litigants to pay a $1,000 filing fee in addition to the 4 normal fee at the time of filing a complaint. Cal. 5 Gov’t Code § 70616.5. 6 In enacting restrictions and additional fees for 7 the filing of construction-related accessibility claims, 8 California sought to limit the burden these types of 9 cases put on its businesses. But, in filing these 10 Actions in federal courts, plaintiffs have managed to 11 avail themselves of the state-law-provided statutory 12 damages all while circumventing California’s limitations 13 on obtaining such awards. This situation, as well as 14 the increased burden on federal courts due to the 15 increasing number of these cases, presents the type of 16 “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” 17 that justify a court’s discretion to decline to exercise 18 supplemental jurisdiction over any Unruh Act or other 19 state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 20 Further, declining to exercise supplemental 21 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under 22 these circumstances furthers the values of judicial 23 economy, fairness, convenience, and comity:

24 As a high-frequency litigant, the Court finds 25 it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an end-around to California’s 26 pleading requirements. Therefore, as a matter 27 of comity, and in deference to California’s substantial interest in discouraging unverified 28 1 dPelcaliinnteisf f’s sUunprpulhe mAecntt acll aim.j urisdiction over

3 Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. 4 Cal. 2017); see also Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 5 California’s elected representatives, not this 6 Court, have enacted laws restricting construction- 7 related accessibility claims, and in doing so, have 8 directed that these claims be treated differently than 9 other matters. In recognizing that a small number of 10 lawyers and plaintiffs who have filed thousands of these 11 cases have evaded California’s limitations on these 12 claims, the Court has not, as some plaintiffs’ counsel 13 have alleged, acted on a “knee-jerk dismissal 14 preference” in declining to exercise supplemental 15 jurisdiction over these claims. 16 Therefore, the Court concludes that “exceptional 17 circumstances” and “compelling reasons” exist to support 18 the Court’s decision to DECLINE to exercise supplemental 19 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. In doing 20 so, the Court has not deprived Plaintiff of any 21 remedies, as the ADA claim remains before this Court, 22 and Plaintiff may, if he so chooses, pursue his Unruh 23 Act claim in state court.2 Additionally, any resultant

24 2 Plaintiff encountered the barrier in January 2021. As 25 such, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim has not lapsed and Plaintiff is able to bring this claim in state 26 court where it can be properly adjudicated. See Harris v. County of San Diego, No. CV 18-924-BTM-AHG, 2019 WL 6683367, at *4 (S.D. 27 Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (finding that Unruh Act claims “are subject to a two-year statute of limitations”) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 28 1 inefficiencies “are slight in comparison to California’s

2 weighty interest in ensuring its laws are not

3 circumvented, and in enforcing the detailed statutory 4 regime it has set up for construction-related 5 accessibility claims.” Davidson v. Cole, No. SACV-20- 6 01733-CJC-(ADSx), 2020 WL 6588386, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 7 Sept. 28, 2020). 8 2. Service of Process 9 The Court next considers whether the procedural 10 requirements for granting default judgment are met in 11 this case. 12 Defendants were properly served under Rule 4. See 13 Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized 14 Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A 15 federal court does not have jurisdiction over a 16 defendant unless the defendant has been served properly 17 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”) (citation omitted). Service 18 on an individual may be made in accordance with the 19 rules of the state where service will be made. Fed. R. 20 Civ. P. 4(e)(1). In California, the summons and 21 complaint may be served by personal delivery. Cal. Civ. 22 Proc. Code §§ 415.10. Plaintiff served Defendant Yong 23 Jae Kwak by personal service on February 12, 2021. See 24 Proof of Service, ECF No. 11. Thus, Plaintiff properly 25 served Defendant Yong Jae Kwak and provided the 26 necessary proof of service. 27 Service on a corporation may similarly be made in 28 accordance with the rules of the state where service 1 will be made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). California

2 permits a corporation to be served by substituted

3 service if personal service cannot be accomplished with 4 reasonable diligence. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20(b). 5 A copy of the summons and complaint may be left at the 6 home of the person to be served in the presence of a 7 competent member of the household, and copies of the 8 documents must thereafter be mailed to the person to be 9 served. Id. For corporations, the person to be served 10 includes a person designated as agent for service of 11 process. Id. § 416.10. Plaintiff served a designated 12 agent of Defendant Orange Walker on March 17, 2021, and 13 thereafter mailed the documents to the person to be 14 served. See Proof of Service, ECF No. 15. Thus, 15 Plaintiff properly served Defendant Orange Walker and 16 provided the necessary proof of service. 17 3. Local Rule 55-1 18 Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements 19 for default judgment under Local Rule 55-1. Plaintiff’s 20 counsel submitted a declaration in support of the 21 instant Application, which stated that default was 22 entered against Defendant Orange Walker and Defendant 23 Yong Jae Kwak on May 4, 2021, and March 12, 2021, 24 respectively, for failure to respond to the Complaint. 25 Decl. of Faythe Gutierrez in Supp. of Pl.’s App. ¶ 5, 26 ECF No. 19-11. The declaration further states that 27 neither defendant is an infant, incompetent person, or 28 exempted under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief 1 Act of 1940. Id. ¶ 2. It also verifies that notice of

2 the Application was served on both Defendants on August

3 2, 2021. Id. ¶ 6. 4 4. Eitel Factors 5 Here, Plaintiff’s Application fails because of the 6 second and third Eitel factors, which require the Court 7 to consider the sufficiency of the Complaint and the 8 merits of the claim. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471 (citation 9 omitted). At this stage, the Court concludes that the 10 Complaint does not support granting default judgment. 11 To prevail under the ADA, a plaintiff must 12 establish that “(1) she is disabled within the meaning 13 of the ADA; (2) the defendant . . . owns, leases, or 14 operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the 15 plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the 16 defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. 17 Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 18 42 U.S.C. § 2182(a)-(b)). 19 According to the ADA, a disability is “a physical 20 or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 21 more major life activities,” including walking. 42 22 U.S.C. § 12102. Plaintiff is paralyzed from the waist 23 down and requires a wheelchair for mobility. Compl. 24 ¶ 1; Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 19-4. Therefore, 25 Plaintiff is disabled. Further, Plaintiff alleges that 26 the Business is a place of public accommodation. Compl. 27 ¶ 11. Plaintiff has therefore established the first two 28 elements of his ADA claim for purposes of 1 discrimination.

2 Plaintiff must also establish that Defendants

3 discriminated against him because of his disability. 4 Under the ADA, discrimination includes the “failure 5 to remove architectural barriers . . . where such 6 removal is readily achievable . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 7 § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The Americans with Disabilities 8 Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) establish the 9 technical standards for determining whether a barrier 10 exists. Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 11 1075, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2004). 12 The ADA requires that the clear width of walking 13 surfaces be 36 inches minimum. 36 C.F.R. § Pt. 1191, 14 App. D § 403.5.1. Here, Plaintiff alleges that some of 15 the paths of travel inside the Business have widths that 16 are well below 36 inches. See Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. Walking 17 paths that are not wide enough for wheelchairs present 18 architectural barriers that are subject to the ADA. 19 Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 779 F.3d 1001, 20 1005 (9th Cir. 2015). 21 The next issue is whether removal of these barriers 22 is readily achievable. The Ninth Circuit has recently 23 adopted a burden-shifting scheme, which places the 24 initial burden on the plaintiff to “plausibly show how 25 the cost of removing the architectural barrier at issue 26 does not exceed the benefits under the circumstances.” 27 Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 974 F.3d 1030, 28 1038 (9th Cir. 2020). Once “the plaintiff makes a 1 plausible showing that the requested accommodation is

2 readily achievable, the burden shifts to the defendant

3 to counter the plaintiff’s initial showing.” Id. at 4 1038-39. “Although Lopez was decided at the summary 5 judgment stage, courts in this circuit have applied the 6 same framework where plaintiffs seek default judgment.” 7 Burke v. G-B-F Stanton, No. 8:20-cv-01044-JLS-KES, 2021 8 WL 3207959, at *4 (C.D. Cal March 3, 2021). 9 Here, Plaintiff alleges that the barriers at issue 10 “are easily removed without much difficulty or 11 expense.” Compl. ¶ 21. Moreover, Plaintiff claims 12 that “there are numerous alternative accommodations 13 that could be made to provide a greater level of access 14 if complete removal were not achievable.” Id. These 15 conclusory statements are insufficient to meet 16 Plaintiff’s burden under Lopez. Neither the Complaint 17 nor the Application contain cost estimates for removal 18 or any explanation as to how such costs would not exceed 19 the benefits of removing the barrier. Compare Bouyer v. 20 Ban Pan Corp., No. CV 20-11540-MWF (PDx), 2021 WL 21 2791623 (C.D. Cal. April 5, 2021) (denying motion for 22 default judgment because plaintiff failed to allege how 23 the costs of repairing curb ramp and aisle surface next 24 to accessible parking space would not exceed the benefit 25 of such repairs), with Hull v. RA2 L.A.-Brea LP, No. 26 2:21-cv-00910-MCS-MAA, 2021 WL 3772401 (C.D. Cal. August 27 25, 2021) (finding that plaintiff met his burden by 28 submitting a Site Accessibility Evaluation providing 1 recommendations for removing barriers and a declaration

2 containing cost estimates for doing so). While

3 plaintiffs need not provide “precise cost estimates” or 4 “a specific design” for the proposed accommodation, 5 Lopez, 974 F.3d at 1038, Plaintiff has supplied the 6 Court with no information regarding the nature of the 7 non-compliant paths of travel or the changes that would 8 be necessary to widen those paths.3 9 Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to 10 plausibly show how the cost of removing the barriers at 11 issue does not exceed the benefit. Accordingly, the 12 Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Application. 13 Plaintiff must file a renewed application for default 14 judgment no later than October 13, 2021, which provides 15 evidence that the cost of removing the barriers at issue 16 does not exceed the benefits under the circumstances. 17 Plaintiff does not have to file an amended complaint. 18 Because this factor alone makes granting default 19 judgment inappropriate, the Court need not address the 20 21 3 Plaintiff provided photographs of the Business as an exhibit to his Application, but they are unhelpful in determining 22 which pathways are too narrow and how they can be widened to comply with the ADA. See Photographs, ECF No. 19-6. Plaintiff 23 additionally asserts that the barriers at issue are “identified by the Department of Justice as presumably readily achievable to 24 remove.” Compl. ¶ 21. Indeed, the federal regulations list 25 examples of barriers that are presumably readily achievable to remove, such as “widening doors” and “rearranging tables, chairs, 26 vending machines, display racks, and other furniture.” See generally 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b). But Plaintiff fails to explain 27 how taking any action enumerated in that regulation would bring the Business into compliance. Without more information, 28 1 other Eitel factors. 2 III. CONCLUSION

3 The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental 4 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and 5 thereby DISMISSES the claim without prejudice. The 6 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Application as to the ADA claim 7 without prejudice, and Plaintiff shall file a renewed 8 motion that explains why the barriers at issue are 9 readily achievable to be removed. 10 Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file a 11 renewed application for default judgment by the deadline 12 set forth above, or filing one that otherwise fails to 13 address the requirements set forth in this Order, shall 14 result in the renewed application being denied and/or 15 the action against defendants being dismissed for 16 failure to prosecute and/or to comply with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. 18 Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962). 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 DATED: September 28, 2021 ______/_s_/ R_o_n_a_ld_ S_._W_._ L_e_w__________ HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 23 Senior U.S. District Judge 24 25 26 27 28