Anthony Williamson v. Theodore Brown, Director, Arkansas State Crime Laboratory
This text of 2026 Ark. 36 (Anthony Williamson v. Theodore Brown, Director, Arkansas State Crime Laboratory) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. 36 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-25-332
Opinion Delivered: February 19, 2026 ANTHONY WILLIAMSON APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, TWELFTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60CV-24-2239]
THEODORE BROWN, DIRECTOR, HONORABLE CARA CONNORS, ARKANSAS STATE CRIME JUDGE LABORATORY APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
Anthony Williamson is serving thirty years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery
and kidnapping.1 He requested the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory (Crime Lab) provide
him with records. Despite the Crime Lab sending him records relevant to every matter
involving him, he believes he is entitled to more. Because of this dispute, he filed a petition
for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. Following a hearing, the circuit court
entered summary judgment for the Crime Lab. It found that Williamson could not identify
any unproduced records for the court to order the Crime Lab turn over. He appeals, and
we affirm the circuit court’s decision.
1 Williamson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 595. In January 2024, Williamson requested that the Crime Lab produce records related
to fifteen criminal cases under Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-12-312(a)(1)(A)(ii)(a)
(Supp. 2021). It produced all the records of his recent criminal conviction and all his “related
prior criminal cases,” even those he did not seek. Yet it did not provide records for the cases
in which he was not a defendant.
Dissatisfied with the Crime Lab’s responses, Williamson filed a petition for
declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. The Crime Lab moved for summary judgment
and attached an affidavit by Sammy Williams, a Crime Lab director. Williams affirmed that
all documents related to Williamson’s most recent conviction in case number 66FCR-08-
12362 together with documents connected to previous convictions had been provided to
Williamson.3
At the summary-judgment hearing, both Williams and Williamson testified. Williams
again affirmed that the Crime Lab had provided Williamson with all records connected to
Williamson’s cases. Williams further testified that the additional records requested by
Williamson were not related to his criminal cases. He explained that the other cases also had
2 The record reveals that this criminal docket number from Sebastian County was referred to throughout pleadings and testimony at the hearing as CR-2008-1236. The Crime Lab numbers associated with case number CR-2008-1236, as established by Williams’s affidavit and testimony, are Crime Lab record numbers 2007-012616 and 2007- 018193. Williams explained that record number 2007-018193 included documents connected to a sample prep of collected DNA. 3 Williams’s affidavit and testimony was that the Crime Lab provided Williamson the records from his previous criminal cases bearing Crime Lab record numbers 2005LIT- 13114, 2006-08191, and 2007-004934.
2 DNA samples sent to Orchid Cellmark for testing (likely in the same batch, which explains
why Williamson saw the case numbers in his records).
Williamson introduced over two hundred pages of the records the Crime Lab
provided him. Yet he insisted that more were missing. The circuit court patiently and
extensively asked Williamson to precisely identify what was missing. He could not identify
any documents that the circuit court could not find in the records or that he was entitled to
under the statute. The court granted summary judgment because there were no material
facts in dispute and no justiciable controversy. On appeal, Williamson insists that the circuit
court abused its discretion. We affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact
to be litigated and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gates v. Hudson, 2025
Ark. 48, at 5, 711 S.W.3d 142, 147. Williamson filed a petition for declaratory relief that
he was entitled to records from the Crime Lab and a writ of mandamus that the court order
the Crime Lab to produce them. Declaratory relief may be granted if the petitioner
establishes (1) that there is a justiciable controversy; (2) that the controversy is between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination. Rogers, 2017 Ark. 267, 527 S.W.3d 719. Additionally, the purpose of a writ
of mandamus is to enforce an established right. Scott v. Sullivan, 2025 Ark. 152, at 4, 720
S.W.3d 865, 868. A petitioner requesting the writ must show a clear and certain right to
the relief sought and the absence of any other adequate remedy. Id.
3 Our de novo review reflects that on summary judgment, the Crime Lab established,
through pleadings, Williams’s affidavit, records, and subsequent testimony, a prima facie case
that there were no material issues of fact in dispute. The Crime Lab had complied with
section 12-12-312(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). It produced all records that were required and did not
produce those that were prohibited. Once the burden shifted, Williamson could not identify
any missing records he was entitled to and thus could not meet his burden to demonstrate
the existence of material disputed facts. Once the moving party establishes its prima facie
case, the opposing party must meet proof with proof. Williamson failed. It follows, then,
that Williamson has failed to demonstrate a clear and certain right to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus. Scott, 2025 Ark. 152, 720 S.W.3d 865. We find the circuit court did not err
in granting summary judgment, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
WOMACK, J., dissents.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Dismissal of the case is proper pursuant
to article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. 1 Absent an express constitutional
provision to the contrary, the State can never properly be a defendant in any of its
courts.2 Here, Williamson improperly made the State a defendant when he petitioned for
1 See Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Womack, J., dissenting). 2 Id.
4 mandamus and declaratory relief in a new civil action below, 60CV-24-2239.3 Instead, he
should have petitioned in his related, underlying criminal case. Accordingly, this court, like
the circuit court below, lacks jurisdiction. For these reasons, the circuit court’s order must
be reversed and the case dismissed.
Anthony Williamson, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Chelsea Harvey, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
3 See Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112, at 5 (Womack, J., dissenting) (reasoning Article 5, section 20 required the dismissal of the appeal from denial of writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment).
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